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Abstract 
Unsafe abortion, an issue that leads to over 2,000 deaths and health complications 
for more than 21,000 women annually in Kenya, remains largely unaddressed by 
the Kenyan state. Despite the significant public importance of abortion, there has 
been little or no scholarly attention directed at the role of the state in shaping 
sexual politics through its regulation of abortion. In this thesis, I undertake a 
feminist analysis of the Kenyan state to explore how the state, through its policy 
regime, shapes sexual politics.    
I argue that Western-based feminist theorisations of the state, although useful, do 
not fully account for the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the issue of abortion. 
Consequently, I draw on the range of scholarship in feminist theorisations of the 
state and in African politics to develop the Critical African Feminist Perspective 
on the state. Using this perspective, I undertake a discourse analysis of archival 
material, policy texts, and interviews with key actors in abortion politics.  The 
analysis of the state over three phases – colonial, dictatorial, and democratic – 
reveals the neo-patrimonial character of the state, resulting in policies and 
practices that systematically ignore or marginalise issues affecting women.  
This study demonstrates that across consecutive governments, the Kenyan 
political elite, in an attempt to consolidate political power and popularity in the 
face of low levels of legitimacy and complex tribal politics, has deployed a tactic 
of “strategic ambivalence”, wherein the law criminalising abortion has been 
sustained but not enforced. State efforts have therefore been directed at presenting 
a positive image of itself to both pro- and anti-abortion actors, rather than 
substantively tackling the problem of unsafe abortion. 
The study establishes that although neoliberalism, capitalism and patriarchy play 
significant roles, neo-patrimonial politics is the key impediment to creating 
policies and institutions that will ensure Kenyan women‟s access to safe 
abortions. I note that although Kenya‟s new Constitution guarantees women better 
access to legal abortion, it has not conclusively addressed neo-patrimonialism, 
which is therefore likely to continue to have negative implications for sexual 
politics and issues of gender equality in general. 
iv 
 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
This was a long journey, full of pain and pleasure. I had companions, walking 
with me, holding my hand, opening my eyes, clearing my way. I would like to 
express gratitude to the following people, without whom this research would not 
have been possible:  
 Auckland Medical Aid Trust (AMAT) for funding this study. Without the 
Trust‟s financial support, this research would not have got off the ground.  
 My chief supervisor, Associate Professor Priya Kurian. I express heartfelt 
thanks for your advice and advocacy. 
 My supervisors Dr. Carolyn Michelle, and Dr. Rachel Simon-Kumar. 
Your collective wisdom nurtured my growth as a researcher and enabled 
the success of this study. 
 My children Njau and Nyakairu: They followed me to New Zealand and 
had to put up with lack of maternal attention while I was studying. Njau, a 
big hug for taking care of your sister in my absence.  
 My family: I am indebted to my sisters and brothers for their endless 
support and prayers. Specifically, I thank my sister Ruguru, for travelling 
to New Zealand to watch over my children while I conducted my 
fieldwork in Kenya. 
 Jim and Helen Findlay: I appreciate the love, care, and support that they 
have shown to me and my children during the course on my study. 
 My friends and colleagues: I thank Ernesta, Nyamaamaa, Nwosu, Kunle, 
Maloba, Iribe, Alex, Dassia and Chandra, for the good times that we 
shared.  
 Collegues and friends in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and in the 
Department of Political Science & Public Policy: I am indebted to you for 
the assistance and cooperation that I received.   
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Mary Wanja and Charles Njagi; they are 
the role models of my life. 
vi 
 
 
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................ v 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................ vii 
List of Figures and Tables .................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.0. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Background of the Study ......................................................................................... 2 
1.2. The Legal Context of Abortion in Kenya ................................................................ 5 
1.3. The State and Sexual Politics ................................................................................... 8 
1.4. Post-Independence Kenya: An Overview of Political Regimes .............................. 9 
1.5. Research Questions ................................................................................................ 12 
1.6. Discourse, Policy and Gender ................................................................................ 14 
1.7. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 14 
1.8. Chapter Outline ...................................................................................................... 15 
Chapter Two ........................................................................................................ 19 
Accounting for the State in Abortion Politics ................................................... 19 
2.0. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 19 
2.1. Feminist Theories of the State ............................................................................... 21 
2.1.1. Liberal Feminism and the State ...................................................................... 21 
2.1.2. Radical Feminism and the State ...................................................................... 28 
2.1.3. Socialist Feminist Theorizations of the State .................................................. 32 
2.1.4. Post-structuralist Feminism and the State ....................................................... 35 
2.2. Contribution of Western Feminist Theories of the State to the Present Study ...... 36 
2.3. The Nature of Post-colonial African States: Neo-patrimonialism ......................... 40 
2.4. Roadmap to a Critical African Feminist Theorization of the African State ........... 46 
2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 53 
Chapter Three ..................................................................................................... 55 
Research Methodology........................................................................................ 55 
3.0. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 55 
3.1. Feminist Qualitative Research ............................................................................... 56 
3.2. Discourse and Discourse Analysis ......................................................................... 58 
viii 
 
3.3. Research Methods .................................................................................................. 62 
3.3.1. Semi-structured In-depth Interviews ............................................................... 62 
3.3.2. Document Collection....................................................................................... 68 
3.4. Data Categorisation and Analysis .......................................................................... 70 
3.5. Ethical Considerations............................................................................................ 73 
3.6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 74 
Chapter Four ....................................................................................................... 75 
Colonial Sexual and Body Politics in Kenya: The Female Circumcision 
Controversy .......................................................................................................... 75 
4.0. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 75 
4.1. Representation, Colonialism, Body and Sexual Politics ........................................ 77 
4.2. Colonial Sexual Politics in Kenya .......................................................................... 80 
4.3. The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Introduction ...................................... 88 
4.3.1. The Female Circumcision Controversy and the Colonial State in Kenya ....... 91 
4.3.2. Christian Missionaries and Female Circumcision ........................................... 96 
4.3.3. The Nationalist Movement and the Female Circumcision Question ............. 102 
4.4. Kikuyu Women in Colonial State‟s Discourses of Female Circumcision ........... 106 
4.4.1. The Importance of Female Circumcision for Kikuyu Women ...................... 110 
4.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 114 
Chapter Five ....................................................................................................... 117 
The Governance Structures of Modern Kenyan State: The Emergent Politics 
of Abortion ......................................................................................................... 117 
5.0. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 117 
5.1. The Political Landscape in Kenya: Neo-patrimonialism, Patriarchy and Abortion
 ..................................................................................................................................... 119 
5.2. A powerful Patriarchal Bureaucracy and the Abortion Debate ............................ 125 
5.3. The Kenyan Judicial System and the Abortion Issue ........................................... 134 
5.4. Neo-patrimonialism, Corruption and Abortion Politics in Kenya........................ 142 
5.5. Women, Patriarchal Neo-patrimonialism, and the Politics of Abortion............... 146 
5.6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 158 
Chapter Six ......................................................................................................... 161 
Deploying Religion, Science and Health: An Analysis of Anti-abortion 
Discourses in Kenya .......................................................................................... 161 
6.0. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 161 
6.1. Anti-abortion Actors in Kenya ............................................................................. 163 
6.2. Anti-abortion Discourses in Kenya ...................................................................... 170 
6.2.1. Religious and Foetal Life Anti-abortion Discourses ..................................... 170 
ix 
 
6.2.2. Pseudo-Scientific Discourses of Abortion .................................................... 178 
6.2.3. Abortion and Women‟s Health ..................................................................... 184 
6.2.4. Abortion and the Corruption of Africa‟s Societal Morals ............................ 189 
6.3. Implications of Anti-Abortion Discourses ........................................................... 196 
6.4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 203 
Chapter Seven ................................................................................................... 205 
The Pot Bearer Understands its Weight: An Analysis of Pro-abortion 
Discourses in Kenya .......................................................................................... 205 
7.0. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 205 
7.1. Non-state Actors in Kenya: Local and International Organisations .................... 207 
7.2. Subjectivities: It is Poor and/or Young Women Who Have Abortions ............... 214 
7.3. Pro-abortion Discourses in Kenya ....................................................................... 223 
7.3.1. Abortion as an Issue of Public Health ........................................................... 223 
7.3.2. The Economic Cost of Abortion ................................................................... 233 
7.3.3. Human Rights Abortion Discourses in Kenya .............................................. 236 
7.4. Implications of Public Health and Economic Pro-abortion Discourses ............... 242 
7.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 247 
Chapter Eight .................................................................................................... 251 
Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................ 251 
8.0. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 251 
8.1. Major Findings of the Study ................................................................................ 251 
8.2 Significance of the Research ................................................................................. 256 
8.3. Key Features of the New Constitution ................................................................. 259 
8.3.1. Neo-patrimonial Politics and Kenya‟s New Constitution ............................. 259 
8.3.2. Gender Equality in the New Constitution ..................................................... 265 
8.3.3. The New Constitution and the Abortion Question ........................................ 269 
8.4. Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................... 271 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 273 
Appendixes ......................................................................................................... 363 
Appendix A: Interview Guidelines for the State Actors ............................................. 363 
Appendix B: Interview Guidelines for the non-State Actors (pro-law liberalisation) 364 
Appendix C: Interview Guidelines for the non-State Actors (anti-law liberalisation) 365 
Appendix D: Information Sheet .................................................................................. 366 
Appendix E: Consent Form for In-depth Interviews................................................... 369 
List of Figures and Tables  
Figure 1: Critical African Feminist Perspective of the State .............................50 
Table 1: Model Research Questions ............................................................ 51-52 
      
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.0. Introduction 
Abortion, except in rare circumstances, is illegal in Kenya. However, it remains 
one of the major causes of maternal mortality and morbidity (Ministry of Health, 
2005). For example, at least 2,600 women die from unsafe abortion annually, 
while a further 21,000 women are hospitalized with complications from 
incomplete and unsafe abortions (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010). Despite 
the health and rights implications of access to abortion services, the response of 
the Kenyan state has been, at best, ambivalent; it has thus far not reversed the 
colonial legislation denying women access to safe abortion. Yet, almost 
contradictorily, the state has not sought to enforce the existing laws, refraining 
from actually prosecuting those involved with procuring and providing illegal 
abortion.  
The abortion conundrum is, in reality, a reflection of what in policy circles are 
called wicked problems – issues that are not easily solved because they are so 
entwined in a multitude of cultural, social, political and gender politics (Watson, 
2000; Wegner, 2009). The Kenyan state‟s ambivalent response to “the abortion 
problem”, in many ways, reflects the anomaly of gender politics in Kenya, and 
indeed, many Third World African states. Despite being a signatory to a wide 
range of international agreements on women‟s/human rights, the state has shown 
little interest thus far in fulfilling its legal obligations by fully decriminalizing 
abortion and making it widely available for women who seek it. At the same time, 
in 2010, Kenya adopted a new Constitution that has loosened access to abortion. 
Overall, the state still continues to maintain its prohibition on most abortions, 
while failing to enforce it.
1
 The state thus situates itself as a defender of sexual 
morality and conservative ideals while relegating abortion to an unregulated realm 
                                                          
1
 In fact, after adopting a new Constitution in August 2010, Kenya ratified the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) on October 
8, 2010. However, it entered a reservation on Article 14(2) (c), which obliges African states to take 
measures to ensure availability of abortion in situations of rape, incest and where the physical and 
mental health of the mother is at risk. 
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where the ability to pay largely determines who has access to safe abortions and 
who does not.  
The Kenyan state‟s ambivalent response is not accidental. Rather, it reflects the 
complex machinery of the Third World African State vis-à-vis gender politics. An 
analysis of the structures and processes of law-making on women‟s issues reveals 
deeper institutional values and ideologies that have significant implications for 
gender power and equity (Geiger, 1996). To study the politics of law-making 
around abortion in Kenya, therefore, is to unravel the complex politics of 
sexuality and the female body in the African context. This complex politics has 
roots in the historical and contemporary structures of the state, informed as much 
by colonialism, autocratic rule and recent democratic politics, as by social and 
cultural values steeped in patriarchy. Yet, despite the significance of this issue for 
women‟s rights, public policy, and Third World state politics, little scholarly 
attention has been directed towards an analysis of the Kenyan state and its 
regulation of abortion politics. This research offers a critical examination of how 
the patriarchal and neo-patrimonial nature of the state influences the shape of 
sexual politics in Kenya, and illuminates how both pro- and anti-abortion actors 
strategically deploy particular discourses around abortion in their attempts to 
control political and policy outcomes.   
1.1. Background of the Study 
Abortion remains one of the world‟s mostly highly contested issues, and is 
surrounded by debate and activism. According to Press and Cole (1999, p.1), 
abortion is “one of the most contested social issues of our time, one firmly 
straddling the problematic intersection of public policy and private life.” As a 
result, it has been a central issue for contemporary international feminism, and its 
centrality in policy has been compared to “what the suffrage issue had been to the 
feminist movement around the turn of the 20
th
 century” (Dahlerup, 1986, p.10). 
Feminist concern about abortion has focused on its perceived connection to the 
legal and political constructions of what it means to be a woman citizen of a 
nation state, how this ties in with the meaning of justice and democracy, and how 
other social and political differences beyond gender – such as sexuality, ethnicity, 
religion, and class – fit into a hierarchy of citizenship underwritten by the 
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institutions of the state (Smyth, 1998). Historically, the abortion question has 
sparked major controversy in Western liberal democracies and it remains a 
politically explosive social issue in the United States of America and elsewhere in 
the world, including many parts of Africa.  
Campaigns for the legalisation of abortion peaked in Western Europe, North 
America and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (Lovenduski & Outshooron, 
1986), but it remains a taboo subject in many parts of Asia and Africa. In their 
arguments, anti-abortionists focus on the moral dimensions of the issue in relation 
to the rights of the unborn, and therefore actively support criminalising women 
and abortion providers, and making abortions illegal (Petchesky, 1986). On their 
part, pro-abortionists have advocated safe abortion as a public health goal and 
legal abortion as a woman‟s right (Berer, 2002). The right of women to decide 
whether to have an abortion has been pursued by feminists, who perceive imposed 
abortion restrictions as instruments of social control (Petchesky, 1986). Feminists 
have insisted that when abortion is provided on broad socio-economic grounds 
and at a woman‟s request, and when safe, accessible services have been put in 
place, unsafe abortion disappears and abortion-related mortality and morbidity are 
reduced to a minimum (Berer, 2004; Sedgh et al., 2012). In fact, when abortion is 
provided with proper medical techniques and care, the risk of death is negligible 
and nearly 14 times lower than that of childbirth (Sedgh et al., 2012), as evident in 
the United States of America and in European countries such as the Netherlands. 
In the United States, for example, the death rate due to abortion complications fell 
by more than 50 per cent in the five years following legalisation (Tietze, 1984). 
In contrast to Western democracies, in the former Soviet Union and most Central 
and Eastern Europe countries, abortion on request became policy prior to the use 
of modern contraceptives (Stenvoll, 2007). It was the primary method of birth 
control (Stloukal, 1999) mainly because contraceptives were seen as unnatural, 
inefficient and/or dangerous (Kulczycki, 1999). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Bloc in 1989, however, abortion rights were among the first to be threatened by 
virtually all of the post-socialist governments (Kligman & Gal, 2000). Yet, despite 
growing political conflict around the issue in countries such as Hungary, 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and the former German 
Democratic Republic, abortion policies have remained relatively permissive 
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(Flood, 2002).  In Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, restrictive abortion regimes 
that existed prior to the transition have been liberalised, leading to reduced 
abortion mortality (Grimes et al., 2006). 
The situation has been different in most developing countries, where almost all 
unsafe abortions in the world are now carried out. In these countries, restrictive 
abortion laws were introduced by European colonial powers that have since 
changed their laws, but unsafe abortion is yet to be addressed by policymakers, 
even though it has been identified as a significant health and social problem 
(Grimes et al., 2006; Kulczycki, 1999). It is notable that in India, elective abortion 
was legalised as part of population policy under the Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy (MTP) Act (1971) and MTP Rules (1975) (Iyengar & Iyengar, 2002), 
while some African countries, including Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Tunisia, and South Africa, have also 
liberalised their laws (Braam & Hessini, 2004; Gebreselassie et al., 2010). 
However, in many other developing countries in Africa, including Kenya, the 
abortion issue remains a delicate one, presenting a complex moral and ethical 
dilemma to governments and policy makers (Oye-Adeniran et al., 2002). This is 
despite the fact that unsafe abortion remains a leading cause of death among 
women of childbearing age. According to the World Health Organisation, more 
than 6 million unsafe abortions occur in Africa annually, resulting in 29,000 
deaths, more than half of the world‟s estimated 47,000 deaths (Mesce & Clifton, 
2011). Additionally, Africa has the world‟s widest range of abortion rates, with 
Middle and Eastern Africa having rates as high as 38 and 36 abortions for every 
1000 women (Sedgh et al., 2012). It is evident from these figures that restrictive 
abortion laws have not led to a reduced need for abortion. 
This situation is particularly evident in Kenya. In Kenya, unsafe abortion is seen 
as contributing to between 30-50 per cent of maternal mortality and morbidity 
(Otsea, 2004), in addition to 60 per cent of all gynaecological admissions at public 
hospitals (Gebreselassie et al., 2005; Wamwana et al., 2006). Although access to 
safe, effective contraception could substantially reduce the need for abortion, 
unmet need for family planning remains high, with one in four women having an 
unmet need (Ian et al., 2009). A major reason behind the low use of family 
planning is poor access to contraceptive services (see Chapter 7). Because 
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international donors such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have historically 
covered the costs of all contraceptives in Kenya, a shift in international attention 
to HIV/AIDS programmes since the 1990s has led to constant commodity stock 
outs and lack of methods of choice (Crichton, 2008). The Kenyan government has 
been slow in responding to the shifting international aid allocations, and in fact, it 
was only in 2005 that the government allocated 200 million Kenyan Shillings, or 
US$2.62 million, for contraceptive commodities (ibid.). Obviously, the likelihood 
that a woman will seek to terminate an unintended pregnancy increases with 
unmet need for family planning. 
1.2. The Legal Context of Abortion in Kenya   
In pre-colonial Kenya, matters concerning women‟s bodies, including on issues of 
sexuality, sexual practices, and access to abortion, were governed by tribal 
traditions and norms. Abortion was not only permitted, but was in fact required 
under certain circumstances (see Chapter 3). In the colonial period, the state 
instituted a series of policies creating or reinforcing political, economic, and 
social structures, with profound implications for gender equity and sexual politics 
that continue to the present day. Current abortion laws in Kenya, as in other 
British Commonwealth countries around the world, were inherited from the 
English Common Law during colonialism (Cook & Dickens, 1981). The laws 
criminalized abortion except where it was procured to save the life of a pregnant 
woman (Ngwena, 2010).  
These laws operated in Kenya until 2010, when a new Constitutional order was 
adopted.
2
 Although the new Kenyan Constitution has expanded the exceptions in 
which legal abortion could be offered,
3
 implementing laws are yet to be 
introduced and therefore the chief statute that can be construed as governing the 
                                                          
2
 This document is available at 
http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf 
3
 Article 26(4) provides that “abortion is not permitted unless, in the opinion of a trained health 
professional, there is need for emergency treatment, or the life or health of the mother is in danger, 
or if permitted by any other written law.” (p. 24) 
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prohibition of abortion is the Penal Code (Cap 63 Laws of Kenya).
4
 Under 
Sections 158,
5
 159,
6
 and 160,
7
 the law criminalizes the woman and the person 
who provides the abortion, with the two liable for prison sentences of up to 14 
years if found guilty. Section 240,
8
 though, provides an exception by allowing for 
legal abortion to save a woman‟s life. However, the law does not go further to 
explain the circumstances in which lawful abortions might be provided, although 
there have been expansive interpretations of this exception issued by the Ministry 
of Health and the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board, allowing for abortions 
to be lawfully performed in cases of risk to the woman‟s health, or in some cases 
of rape (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010). Unfortunately, few medical health 
providers in Kenya are trained on the full provisions of the law and most women 
remain unaware of the law‟s exceptions, thus making safe and legal abortions in 
Kenya rare (ibid.). 
Additionally, there is the National Reproductive Health Strategy (NRHS) 1997-
2010, aimed at eradicating all forms of discrimination against women and the girl 
child, enabling them to exercise their reproductive and sexual rights. However, 
this policy document does not mention abortion, not even as an acknowledgement 
of the magnitude of unsafe abortion in the country (Ministry of Health, 1996). The 
same applies to the National Population Policy for Sustainable Development 
                                                          
4
 This document is available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/8.%20The%20Penal%20Code.pdf 
5
 “Any person who with intent to procure miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with 
child unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take any poison or other noxious thing or uses 
any force of any kind, or uses any other means whatever, is guilty of a felony and is liable to 
imprisonment for fourteen years.” (Penal Code, p. 66) 
6
 “Any woman who being with child with intent to procure her own miscarriage, unlawfully 
administers to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or uses any kind, or uses any other means 
whatever, or permits any such thing or means to be administered or used to her, is guilty of a 
felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.” (Penal Code, p. 66-67) 
7
 “Any person who unlawfully supplies or procures for any person anything whatever, knowing 
that it is intended to be unlawfully used to procure the miscarriage of  a woman whether she is or 
is not with child, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years.” (Penal Code, 
p. 67) 
8
 “A person is not criminally responsible for performing in good faith and with reasonable care and 
skill a surgical operation upon any person for his benefit, or upon an unborn child for the 
preservation of the mother‟s life, if the performance of the operation is reasonable, having regard 
to the patient‟s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.” (Penal Code, p. 85) 
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2000,
9
 which also fails to take any real initiative on the issue of abortion. It 
declares that abortion will not be used as a method of family planning and that 
every effort will be made so that the need for abortion is eradicated through 
education and counseling. Surprisingly, the National Reproductive Health 
Strategy (NRHS) for the period 2009-2015 also ignores the issue of unsafe 
abortion, only identifying post-abortion care as one of the strategies for 
accelerating the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals related to 
Maternal and Newborn Health (Republic of Kenya, 2009). This is despite the fact 
that the same report recognizes unsafe abortion as one of the five direct causes of 
maternal deaths in Kenya (ibid.). 
Although these restrictions on abortion exist, they have failed to curb backstreet 
abortions, as evidenced by the figures presented above and discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7. Furthermore, the law has not been implemented, as 
prosecution of abortion providers, and of those who receive them, is unusual in 
Kenya. This is despite the fact that newspapers often carry reports of discarded 
foetuses and of women dying after attempting to terminate their pregnancies. 
While the majority of women with unwanted pregnancies from the lower socio-
economic stratum are forced to seek abortions from those unqualified to perform 
such procedures, those from the higher socio-economic stratum can illegally 
secure a safe abortion from trained physicians or travel to countries where it is 
legal. This results in further discrimination against poor and younger women, who 
cannot afford the clandestine fees charged by doctors to terminate a pregnancy. In 
fact, qualitative research on abortion in Kenya seldom mentions fear of 
prosecution as a concern informing a woman‟s decision on how and where to 
have the abortion (Izugbara et al., 2009). Rather, most concerns are over the safety 
and expense of various methods and providers.  
Access to abortion services, clearly, has implications not only for public health 
and national development indicators, but also for women‟s rights, gender equity, 
and social justice. Yet there is little scholarship to explain why the Kenyan state 
regulates sexual politics, and specifically abortion politics, as it has. This research 
attempts to identify the nature and characteristics of the Kenyan state that shape 
                                                          
9
 Available at http://www.ncapd-ke.org/UserFiles/File/nppsd.pdf 
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the domain of sexual politics through the regulation of reproductive practices that 
in turn bolster gender inequality. As feminist researchers have clearly noted, 
although the state is not monolithic, it does mediate or deploy a vast array of 
powers that profoundly shape women‟s lives – physical, economic, sexual, 
reproductive, and political (Rajan, 2010).  
1.3. The State and Sexual Politics 
The state is a pivotal actor that, in all its heterogeneity, significantly shapes access 
to power and resources in ways that are profoundly gendered. Feminist scholars 
have developed a large body of theory on the state which embraces many different 
strands, including liberal, radical, socialist and post-structuralist theories (see 
Chapter 2). Earlier work by liberal, radical, and socialist feminists focused on 
women as a homogeneous group and concentrated on a centralised state‟s role in 
reproducing patriarchal social relations (Ferguson, 1984; MacKinnon, 1989). 
Later work by post-structuralist feminist scholars unearthed how states are 
differentiated entities, comprised of multiple gender arrangements (Haney, 2000). 
Questioning the traditional conspiratorial notions of state patriarchy, later feminist 
theorists have demonstrated the various ways in which states shape, and are 
shaped by gender relations (Chappell, 2002; Connell, 1990).  
Although these theories remain relevant in accounting for the gendered and 
patriarchal nature of states, they do not conclusively account for African states in 
general, and the Kenyan state in particular. This is not just because the theories 
are Western-based, but because they lack a historical gendered consciousness of 
African histories (Agarwal, 1992; Chhachhi, 1991; Mama, 1995a; Rai, 1996; 
Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). These Third World post-colonial scholars have, 
for example, argued that the colonial period and process of decolonisation were 
critical ruptures in the history of colonised states. It is, therefore, impossible to 
understand the nature of Third World post-colonial states without reflecting on the 
legacy of colonialism, because independent post-colonial states retained the 
administrative, legal and bureaucratic features introduced by the European 
colonisers, which were largely gender discriminatory. These features were 
retained mainly because dismantling the colonial framework of governance was 
considered to be inimical to the interests of the ruling elite (Kandiyoti, 1991). 
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These elites, in an attempt to build their power bases and increase legitimacy, 
sought and continue to control, survey, and discipline women‟s lives to placate 
key interest groups (Stamp, 1991). In addition, feminist scholars have pointed out 
how the Third World “state‟s discourses surrounding gender, influence the nature 
of development policy formulated by the state” (Simon-Kumar, 2006, p. 90). It is, 
however, noteworthy that Third World feminist theorising of the state, with some 
important exceptions, does not sufficiently explain the gender politics of the 
African state as there is tendency to concentrate on patriarchy
10
 and culture as the 
major reasons behind gender discrimination particularly in Africa (Gordon, 1996; 
Maseno & Kilonzo, 2011; Parpart & Staudt, 1989). 
In order to understand the Kenyan state‟s contradictory responses and actions on 
the issue of unsafe abortion, it is important to consider its neo-patrimonial nature. 
Neo-patrimonialism is commonly understood as a hybrid regime consisting of, on 
the one hand, an exterior of modern, formal, rational-legal, state-like apparatus, 
and on the other hand, a patrimonial spoils network in which centralised elites 
mobilise political support by using their public positions to distribute jobs, rent-
seeking opportunities, and resources as personal favours (Bratton & van de Walle, 
1997). As a result of neo-patrimonialism, the Kenyan ruling elite have been 
unwilling to enforce and campaign for women‟s rights for fear of losing support 
from men in general, and particularly from male-dominated traditional and 
religious groups. I demonstrate that, much more than liberalism, capitalism and 
patriarchy, it is neo-patrimonial politics, coupled with related practices such as 
clientelism and corruption, the politics of exclusion and marginalization, as well 
as governmental manipulation, co-optation and subversion, that impede African 
and Kenyan women‟s ability to access reproductive freedom (see Chapter 4). 
1.4. Post-Independence Kenya: An Overview of Political Regimes 
In this section, I provide a short history of the character and operation of the three 
post-colonial political regimes in Kenya following Independence. This historical 
sketch comprises an essential background to understanding the nature of the 
contemporary Kenyan state. 
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 Patriarchy is defined in very liberal terms to apply to virtually any form or instance of male 
domination (Kandiyoti, 1988). 
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Kenya gained Independence from Britain on 12
th
 December 1963. The 
independence Constitution provided for a multiparty democracy, a freely elected 
bicameral Parliament, and guaranteed judicial independence (Asingo, 2003; 
Makau, 2001). However, President Jomo Kenyatta, who ruled Kenya from 1963-
1978, considered the inherited Westminster System with a dual executive 
unsuitable and embarked on systematic amendments of the Constitution that 
transferred power from other arms of government to the executive (Odhiambo-
Mbai, 2003). The first Constitutional Amendment transformed Kenya into a 
republic and created the position of the President, who became both the Head of 
State and Head of Government (ibid.). The resultant concentration of all executive 
power in the Presidency paved the way for a “despotic executive” (Makau, 2001, 
p. 97) that was characterised by systematic clientelism, wherein public sector jobs, 
material rewards and economic opportunities were offered as favours to clients 
who mobilised political support and loyalty for the patron (Asingo, 2003).  
Upon President Kenyatta‟s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi assumed power and 
ruled until 2002. Moi followed in Kenyatta‟s footsteps, undertaking reforms to 
increase the powers of the President (Adar, 2000; Makau, 2001). Scholars have 
argued that Moi exercebated most of the negative practices predominant during 
Kenyatta‟s era, particularly repression, patronage, widespread corruption, 
nepotism, and various ethnic and human rights abuses. Kyle (1999, p. 203), for 
example, notes that during Moi‟s regime, “the scope for criticism and free debate, 
already limited, was continually narrowed, civil society crippled and human rights 
infringed.” During Moi‟s rule, corruption increased enormously, as he needed 
resources to reward clients and voters loyal to the government, which had become 
increasingly authoritarian and repressive (Nasong‟o & Murunga, 2007).  
Following local and international pressure, President Moi in 1991 reluctantly 
agreed to repeal the law which had made Kenya a one-party state, and allowed for 
the holding of multi-party elections (Adar, 2000). As a result of multiple factors, 
among them politically instigated ethnic violence
11
 and patronage politics,
12
 as 
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 President Moi‟s government has been accused of sponsoring ethnic violence to discredit multi-
partyism as a system of governance, and also to disenfranchise voters opposed to him (Asingo, 
2003; Oyugi, 1997).  
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well as the fragmentation of the opposition, Moi won the multi-party elections 
held in 1992 and in 1997 (Brown, 2004). Seemingly, the transition to democracy 
did not bring any meaningful change, as Kenya continued as an autocratic state 
under Moi. Odhiambo-Mbai (2003) notes that: 
Corruption continued unabated in public life; President Moi and key 
officials continued to manage public institutions in total disregard to the 
law; President Moi continued to pronounce decrees even when such 
decrees were in total conflict with the country‟s constitution and laws; the 
executive and especially the presidency remained more powerful than the 
other branches of government. (pp. 67-68) 
President Moi retired from politics in 2002,
13
 after his preferred successor, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, was defeated in the general election by Mwai Kibaki (Asingo, 2003).  
Mwai Kibaki assumed office in January 2003, with a promise to “institute a new 
constitutional dispensation, rein in corruption, initiate development, bring security 
to the country and improve the lives of all Kenyans” (Lynch, 2006, pp. 240-41). 
Although Kibaki‟s government ensured a sustained economic growth, the politics 
of ethnic favouritism, patronage and grand corruption prevailed to a degree that 
eclipsed the excesses of the Moi regime (Berman et al., 2009; Nasongo & 
Murunga, 2006). In 2004, for example, western donors alleged that corruption had 
cost the Kenyan treasury US$1 billion since Kibaki took over power. Kibaki‟s 
government also failed to honour the promise to deliver a new Constitution within 
one hundred days of assuming power (Berman et al., 2009). As a result of 
disagreement between the ruling coalition partners, the draft Constitution 
subjected to a referendum in 2005 was rejected by a majority of voters (ibid.).  
However, following the post-election violence that followed the disputed 2008 
presidential election in which Kibaki was declared the winner, an internationally 
negotiated power-sharing agreement between the two contending parties singled 
out constitutional reform as crucial in order to avert future violence (Kramon & 
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 For example, a few weeks before the 1992 elections, President Moi raised the salaries of 
teachers, lecturers and civil servants in an attempt to attract their votes (Adar, 2000). Among other 
directives, Moi also asked employers to give Muslims time off on Fridays to enable them to attend 
prayers and to provide women with housing allowance (ibid.). 
13 The 1991 constitutional changes in Kenya which re-introduced multi-party democracy also 
provided for a limited presidential tenure of two-five year terms. 
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Posner, 2011). A new Constitution was adopted in August 2010 after a national 
referendum. The new Constitution established rules, values, and principles that, if 
implemented, will facilitate the realization of equality and inclusive citizenship. In 
sum, it established the framework for the restoration of constitutional democracy 
in Kenya.   
1.5. Research Questions 
Although Kenyan women‟s reproductive capacity has received significant 
attention from researchers and medical health professionals (Aggarwal & Mati, 
1982; Ankomah et al., 1997; Baker & Khasiani, 1992; Bradley et al., 1993; Centre 
for Reproductive Rights, 2010; Gebreselassie et al., 2005; Izugbara et al., 2009; 
Izugbara et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 1993; Lema et al. 1996; Mitchell et al., 2006; 
Mutungi et al., 1999; Ngwena, 2010; Nyambaka, 1987; Ojwang‟ & Omuga, 1991; 
Solo et al., 1999), none of these existing studies has focused on the connection 
between the nature of the Kenyan state and the state‟s unwillingness to 
decriminalize abortion.  
Most of these studies, published in medical and health related journals, mainly 
focus on issues such as the epidemiology of induced abortion, complications and 
management of abortion, costs for the treatment of incomplete abortion, the 
magnitude of abortion complications, relationship between abortion and family 
planning, and characteristics of women who abort, among other things. In sharp 
contrast, this study focuses on a feminist analysis of the nature of the African 
state, specifically Kenya, and illuminates how and why it regulates women‟s 
access to abortion in the way that it does.  
This research is fundamentally an analysis of the sexual politics of the Kenyan 
state in colonial and post-colonial contexts. It explores how and why the Kenyan 
state negotiates as it does the issues surrounding women‟s bodies, with a specific 
reference to women‟s access to safe abortion. It does this through an analysis of 
the complex political, economic, and cultural contexts that frame the relationship 
between the state and non-state actors, that in turn shape gendered power relations 
in Kenya. Drawing on a post-positivist and feminist stance, this research analyses 
the interactions and relationships between the state and non-state institutions on 
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matters relating to control over women‟s bodies in historical and contemporary 
periods. 
The core question addressed in this research is: 
 In what ways do the political, economic, and socio-cultural institutional 
contexts of the Kenyan state fundamentally shape the politics of women‟s 
bodies?  
Some specific research questions addressed are: 
 How can the Kenyan state be theorised from a feminist perspective? 
o In particular, what are the implications of the evolution of the 
Kenyan state from the colonial to the contemporary post-colonial 
state for the sexual politics of abortion? 
 How have the discursive struggles between key state and non-state actors 
informed the sexual politics of the state, in contemporary and historical 
periods? 
o In the context of abortion, how have anti- and pro- abortion actors 
deployed particular discourses to sustain or challenge the current 
restrictions on abortion, and with what consequences? 
 What factors explain the success or failure of Kenyan women‟s 
organizations in influencing sexual politics broadly, and the abortion issue 
in particular? 
Overall, this research seeks to unearth the factors behind the Kenyan state‟s 
contradictory positions on unsafe abortion through an analysis of the multiple and 
contested discourses, values, worldviews, and belief structures of key actors in the 
abortion arena. In particular, it examines the institutionalization of patriarchal 
power by the state, as well as the various ways in which the state‟s neo-
patrimonial nature influences not just women‟s experiences of abortion, but also 
women‟s ability to organize against the state.   
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1.6. Discourse, Policy and Gender  
This intellectual inquiry into the Kenyan state‟s ability to influence abortion 
politics as well as the discourses of non-state actors on abortion is important for 
two reasons. First, in order to realise an effective public policy, the processes by 
which abortion in Kenya is made controversial, and the nature of dominant 
perspectives in support of particular social policies by pro- and anti-abortion 
actors, need to be better understood. That is, in order to understand abortion 
politics in Kenya, it is necessary to analyse the rhetoric of those in positions to 
influence policy, with the hope of discerning the ways in which the issue is 
named, framed and debated, as different articulations of the abortion problem and 
the suggested solutions have the capacity to affect policy outcomes (Feindt & 
Oels, 2005; Hajer, 1995). This is in line with the objectives of discourse analysts, 
who have demonstrated how versions of reality, also referred to as discourses, are 
assembled and accomplished in the way individuals talk about physical and social 
realities to give them meaning (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Hajer, 1995; Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987). Moreover, research on policy processes has shown that policy 
change is not simply a technocratic process based on rational analysis. Rather, it is 
largely a complex, messy and power-laden process in which both state and non-
state policy actors play important roles in bringing about policy change (Fischer, 
1995; Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Parsons, 1995). 
Second, the state is instrumental in shaping and implementing any policy changes 
that could result in improved reproductive health care for Kenyan women. In a 
practical sense, the findings of this research have the potential to inform policy 
makers in Kenya by providing a new way of understanding the politics of 
abortion. Since no researchers have studied the link between the nature of the state 
and the way it shapes sexual politics, the Kenyan state‟s contribution to women‟s 
inability to access safe legal abortions may have been missed. 
1.7. Methodology 
A feminist qualitative methodology informed by Foucauldian discourse analysis 
was used for this study (see Chapter 3). The adoption of qualitative research 
strategies facilitated the collection and analysis of discourses, arguments and 
worldviews, articulated by state and non-state actors in the abortion debate in 
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Kenya. However, documents such as demographic health surveys and census 
reports, whose data must have been generated through the use of quantitative 
methods, were useful in providing information on the use of contraceptives, 
prevalence of unsafe abortion, and costs of treating resultant health complications, 
among others.
14
  
Both primary and secondary data was used for the study. Primary data was 
generated through qualitative semi-structured interviews conducted with state 
policymakers, religious leaders, health professionals, women‟s and human rights 
activists. Secondary sources of data include published and unpublished materials 
on abortion and related issues such as female circumcision. Specifically, 
secondary data was useful in clarifying claims made by pro- and anti-abortion 
actors on, for example, the magnitude of abortion in Kenya. Anti-abortion actors, 
for example, accused pro-abortion actors of overrating the number of abortions to 
justify their campaign for abortion decriminalization, whereas pro-abortion actors 
accused those opposed to abortion of underestimating statistics of abortion. In 
such a case, studies conducted either by the Kenyan state or non-state 
organizations were used to provide more objective information.   
1.8. Chapter Outline 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. This chapter (Chapter 1) has provided 
an overview of the study, its main objectives, and the rationale, while Chapter 2 
presents the theoretical considerations that have guided this research. The first 
section of the second chapter explores diverse Western feminist perspectives on 
the state, with the aim of evaluating their ability to account for the Kenyan state‟s 
treatment of the issue of unsafe abortion. The second section of Chapter 2 presents 
my analysis of additional factors that ought to be taken into account when 
attempting to explain the nature and conduct of the African state in relation to 
sexual politics. Chapter 3 provides details of the methodology used, including 
methods of data collection and analysis. This chapter also provides a description 
of how Foucauldian discourse analysis has been used to understand how different 
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the need for gendered statistics to demonstrate the reality of women‟s lives (MacDonnald, 1993). 
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actors in the abortion debate in Kenya construct the issue differently and for 
different reasons.  
To demonstrate the importance of a clearer appreciation of the nature of the 
African state in understanding discourses of abortion in Kenya, Chapter 4 
provides an analysis of colonial racial and sexual politics, and shows how the 
interplay of gendered and religious legacies of colonial rule continue to affect the 
post-colonial state‟s treatment of the gender question in general, and unsafe 
abortion in particular. Using the female circumcision controversy as an example, 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the colonial state not only introduced, but actually 
provided a model for, the civil management of women‟s sexuality for state and 
elite interests. 
Chapters 5 to 7 focus on data analysis. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of abortion 
politics exhibited by state and political actors, with the aim of demonstrating the 
Kenyan state‟s role in shaping the abortion debate, and also how the interaction of 
gender discourses and political practices has shaped the process of dealing with 
the issue of unsafe abortion. An analysis of the Kenyan state and political actors is 
significant in this research mainly because both anti- and pro-abortion activists 
appeal to the state to either liberalize the law criminalizing abortion, or to retain it.  
Chapter 6 seeks to investigate the discourses and discursive strategies used by 
Kenyan anti-abortion actors in establishing the legitimacy of their stance. In 
addition to providing an analysis of the four major discourses that are used by 
anti-abortion actors to oppose decriminalization of abortion and their policy 
implications, this chapter shows that the nature of Kenyan politics has led to the 
cultivation of networks of reciprocity between mainly secular political leaders and 
religious anti-abortion actors, leading to the legitimation and institutionalization 
of anti-abortion discourses, as opposed to the pro-abortion discourses discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
Chapter 7, which provides a detailed analysis of pro-abortion discourses in Kenya, 
focuses on the arguments, philosophical principles, narratives and other important 
rhetorical strategies that are employed by pro-abortion actors in an attempt to 
counter the institutionalized anti-abortion discourses discussed in Chapter 6. This 
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chapter shows that a myriad of factors, both national and international, influence 
the type of pro-abortion discourses in Kenya.  
Chapter 8 provides a discussion and summary of the major findings of this 
research and offers suggestions on the way forward. The thesis concludes that 
even though the newly promulgated Constitution of 2010 seemingly guarantees 
women better access to legal abortion, it has not, and possibly cannot, address 
neo-patrimonialism, and particularly its clientelist facet. As such, it is likely that 
clientelist politics will continue to have negative implications for sexual politics 
and issues of gender equality in Kenya, as the generally male dominated party 
leaderships may select female leaders that are close to them, either ideologically 
or literally in terms of family or blood ties, as has been witnessed in neighbouring 
countries. 
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Chapter Two 
Accounting for the State in Abortion Politics 
2.0. Introduction 
The issue of abortion has often been politically marginalised (Lovenduski & 
Outshooron, 1986), although it has been a central issue in contemporary 
international feminism. Feminist interest in the abortion issue normally targets the 
institutions of the state, as abortion is usually regulated by state laws (Smyth, 
1998). As such, a study that seeks to provide a feminist analysis of the regulation 
of sexual politics in Kenya ought to begin by situating the Kenyan state within 
feminist theories of the state. This is because the Kenyan state‟s action and/or 
inaction on abortion may be a result of its structure, institutions, and ideologies, 
all of which may also impact on the ways in which actors in the abortion debate, 
including feminists, struggle to engage with the state to shape abortion laws and 
practice. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the Kenyan state has expressed an interest in abortion by 
legislating against it. To explain the state‟s actions, I first explore diverse feminist 
perspectives on the state, as this provides a crucial starting point in understanding 
the Kenyan state‟s persistent unwillingness and/or inability to conclusively 
address the issue of unsafe abortion. I argue that, although useful, mainstream 
Western feminist theorizations of the state are not sufficient to account for African 
states in general, and more particularly, the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the issue 
of abortion. Specifically, the theories lack a gendered consciousness of African 
histories, and more so of the gendered effects of colonialism and the realities of 
the resultant neo-patrimonial nature of post-colonial states. Unlike the modern 
welfare state that underpins Western-based feminist theories of the state, the state 
in Africa, since colonial times, has been noted to be bureaucratic and 
undemocratic, and involved in patterns of looting and extraction (Crais, 2002). 
This has had profound impacts on gender power and gender relations.  Moreover, 
contrary to the claims of some Western feminist analysts, African women were 
not always powerless; rather, the colonial masters engineered the decline of 
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women‟s rights15 for state and political elite benefit (Oyewumi, 2003; Tamale, 
2008). For example, it is widely acknowledged that African women‟s 
subordination resulted from their incorporation into the colonial economy as 
subsistence producers and reproducers of male wage labour in the service of the 
colonial state and capital (Martin, 1984). This intervention reshaped African 
women‟s role in agriculture, their political power, and even their access to the 
colonial state, all to their disadvantage. As Western feminist theories of the state 
ignore such histories of non-Western women, they fail to understand and therefore 
to take into account the complexities that shape African women‟s experiences 
(Mama, 1995a).  
Following this critique of existing feminist theories of the state, I argue that neo-
patrimonial politics, coupled with related practices such as the politics of 
exclusion and marginalization, as well as governmental manipulation, co-optation 
and subversion, have to be taken into account in the formulation of a framework 
that could be used in explaining and understanding the African state. I thus 
propose an analytical framework (see Table 1), the Critical African Feminist 
Perspective, which draws on some relevant aspects of liberal, radical, socialist and 
post-structuralist feminist theorizations of the state, but also includes the concept 
of neo-patrimonialism. This analytical framework provided the lens through 
which I examined the ways in which the Kenyan state shapes abortion politics. In 
essence, this chapter demonstrates why the state is an important site to consider 
while attempting to understand the politics of abortion in Kenya, both because of 
its role in influencing women‟s access to safe abortions, and also because it is an 
important site for the exercise of policy influence (Gouws, 2004). This chapter 
also demonstrates that an adequate theoretical understanding of the state‟s role in 
relation to the abortion issue requires a nuanced appreciation of the interactions 
between neo-patrimonialism and various aspects identified by different feminist 
theories of the state. For instance, the liberal feminist insistence on the importance 
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 century, women had various forms of status as 
farmers, traders, mothers, elders, members of secret societies, and religious figures. The failure of 
the colonists and agents of the colonial state to understand complex and intricate gender relations 
led to the portrayal of the African woman as a beast of burden due to her farming responsibilities, 
the presence of polygamy, and of bride-price and female circumcision (Oyewumi, 2003). 
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of legal reforms to ensure women‟s access to public life is useful in explaining the 
politics of abortion in Kenya. Additionally, the radical feminist concept of 
patriarchy, and the socialist feminist focus on class analysis as well as the link 
between patriarchy and capitalism, are equally important for this study. Lastly, the 
post-structuralist feminist view of the state as non-unitary, and the recognition of 
the ways in which women‟s bodies and sexuality may be regulated and/or 
disciplined for the benefit of those in power, are relevant in explaining the Kenyan 
state‟s multiple contradictory discourses about abortion and the women who seek 
them.  
2.1. Feminist Theories of the State  
It is perhaps a truism to state that feminism does not refer to a unitary body of 
theory (Dietz, 2003). Rather, there are multiple perspectives that fall under the 
rubric of feminism, each of which makes different assumptions about the source 
of gender inequality and women‟s oppression (Burgess-Proctor, 2006). Feminist 
engagement with the state has therefore proceeded from a variety of philosophical 
perspectives, among them liberal, radical, socialist and post-structuralist 
theorizations. In what follows, I provide a discussion of these approaches, with 
the aim of showing that although they have dominated contemporary feminist 
analyses of the state, they fail to account for some of the complex realities of 
African states. At the same time, I demonstrate how the different feminist 
theorizations of the state direct and/or affect their understanding and treatment of 
the issue of abortion. A discussion of feminist approaches to the state is central to 
this study mainly because they provide a starting point in understanding not just 
the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the abortion question, but also how the state 
influences the nature and structure of the discourses that are articulated by both 
pro- and anti-abortion actors in the country. 
2.1.1. Liberal Feminism and the State 
Although liberal feminism takes various forms, they all share the view that 
freedom is a fundamental value for women, as much as for men (Wendell, 1987). 
Liberal feminism is grounded in the claims of classical liberal philosophy 
developed by Locke, Bentham and Mill for equal rights, individualism, liberty and 
justice (Andermahr et al., 1997). Embracing all these tenets of liberalism, liberal 
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feminism holds that men and women are fundamentally similar and, as such, 
women deserve the same opportunities and legal rights as men. Liberal feminists 
argue that unlike men, women are unable to enjoy their freedom because women‟s 
needs and interests are often insufficiently reflected in the male-dominated 
institutions of the state (Okin, 1989; Pateman, 1988). Discrimination against 
women is seen as resulting from their lack of access to various aspects of public 
life, including education, paid work, politics and so on. To enable women to 
participate equally in all spheres of life, liberal feminists point to the state‟s basic 
responsibility of, firstly, treating each citizen with equal concern and respect, and 
secondly, securing individuals‟ freedom to pursue their own objectives to an 
extent consistent with similar freedom for others (Rhode, 1994). For liberal 
feminists, state institutions should protect fundamental rights that are essential to 
liberty so as to ensure the minimum conditions for individuals to exercise such 
rights (Rhode, 1990).   
An important aspect of the liberal feminist sense of citizen entitlement is 
autonomous private choice, free from public intervention. As Becker (1999) 
explains: 
Liberal feminism assumes that people are autonomous individuals making 
decisions in their own self-interest in light of their individual preferences. 
Human well-being therefore should increase as individuals have more 
choices. Sexism operates by pressuring and requiring, sometimes by law, 
individuals to fulfil male and female roles regardless of their individual 
preferences. The solution to inequality between women and men is to offer 
individuals the same choices regardless of sex. The legal standard of 
formal equality is an expression of this solution. (pp. 32-33) 
This being the case, liberal feminism has usually concentrated on pursuing the 
equality of men and women through political and legal reform on issues such as 
citizenship, property, personal rights and the rule of law.  
Although the citizen is presented within liberal theory as an unsexed individual 
abstracted from their social context (Connell, 1994), the state is considered 
important in that it may be a source of empowerment for women if and when it 
offers them the opportunity to make gains in economic and political terms 
(Waylen, 1998). Entrenched in the philosophy of liberalism‟s notion of the state 
as being fundamentally concerned with justice and equality, women are held to 
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suffer from discrimination only because of their sex (van Acker, 1999). By 
seeking reforms of particular laws obstructing women‟s freedom and equality, 
liberal feminists seem to consider the state a neutral arbiter between conflicting 
interests, as well as a guarantor of individual rights to both men and women 
(Waylen, 1998). For these feminists, legal reform aimed primarily at increasing 
women‟s professional and occupational stature, alongside women‟s participation 
in state initiatives, legislation and policies, can promote equality and address 
women‟s concerns. A clearly distinguishable characteristic of liberal feminists is 
their reliance on legal remedies as a strategy for addressing women‟s needs. 
In relation to abortion, liberal feminists have supported women‟s access to safe 
abortion as a basic right rooted in the classic liberal ideology of privacy, 
autonomy, and individual choice (Morrison, 1995) and envisaged by the United 
States of America Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade in 1973 (Weisberg, 1996). 
Conceived this way, individual women are characterised as capable of making 
personal and private abortion decisions without government interference. 
Additionally, given liberal feminists‟ acceptance of the public-private distinction 
and support for the right to freedom from governmental scrutiny, abortion is 
considered to belong in the realm of the private, and therefore as immune from 
government and legal intervention (Kim, 2006).   
2.1.1.1. Critique of Liberal Feminism 
Although formulating abortion in terms of women‟s right to autonomous decision-
making extends to women the traditional liberal values of liberty, possession of 
self, and opportunity to participate in the public domain as free citizens, other 
feminists have considered the privacy doctrine a double-edged sword, with the 
tendency to constrain as well as to expand reproductive rights (Copelon, 1990; 
Solinger, 2001). For instance, as has happened in the United States of America, 
governments can argue that because abortion is a private issue, public revenue 
need not be used in providing abortion services (Bacchi, 1999). This has the 
obvious consequence of limiting poor and vulnerable women‟s ability to access 
safe abortions, thus rendering it an economic issue (Solinger, 2001). Moreover, in 
countries where a majority of the victims of unsafe abortion are poor women who 
are incapable of paying for safe services, the government‟s failure to provide free 
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or subsidised safe abortions would not reduce the number of unsafe abortions. 
Rather, women would most probably continue having unsafe abortions, even if it 
were legalised. 
Additionally, as a result of viewing abortion as an issue relating to individual 
women‟s autonomy, liberal feminists are unlikely to problematize the placement 
of abortion under the control of medical professionals. By alluding to the right to 
privacy, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade upheld the physician‟s right to make a 
medical decision, and not a woman‟s right to choose whether to give birth or not 
(Saulnier, 1996). The privileging of doctors in abortion decisions, together with 
prohibiting the use of state funds for elective abortions, effectively restricts the 
right to privacy between a woman and her doctor, thereby limiting access to safe 
abortion (ibid.). Eisenstein (1981), for example, has argued that: 
Women... are free from interference by the government in their decision to 
have an abortion. This does not require that government “interfere” by 
making public funds available to them. The right to privacy in the case of 
welfare women is just what they do not need. An abortion law based on 
this right actually denies women the state aid they require.... It is 
politically important to make clear to women that their right to control 
their bodies has not been accepted as a tenet of the state. (pp. 240-241) 
Moreover, seeing abortion from a gender equality perspective has been found 
inadequate because within the context of reproduction, such as pregnancy and 
abortion, women and men are not similarly situated biologically (Weisberg, 
1996). This is complicated by the fact that liberal feminist theory has been 
focused on rejecting arguments based on biological differences between men and 
women and, as such, it has been difficult to fashion a liberal feminist theory of 
pregnancy that supports women and childbearing without reopening the door to 
paternalistic protection of women by the state (Choudhury, 2011). 
Criticism of liberal feminists‟ understanding of abortion resonates with the 
general criticism of liberal feminism. Although they have made significant 
contributions in highlighting and institutionalising women‟s needs in state 
institutions, entitlements, and resource allocation (Staudt, 1998), liberal feminists 
have been accused of producing a theory that has tended to assume the 
characteristics of white, first-world, heterosexual, and middle-class women, and to 
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marginalise or exclude the experiences of other women (Barriteau, 2006; Hunter, 
1996). As a result of using the experiences of middle class women as a normative 
position from which to judge the nature and degree of discrimination against all 
women, liberal feminists posit a universalised woman, whose experiences are 
primarily determined by gender. However, in describing all women as being 
discriminated against only on the basis of gender, liberal feminism seems 
unconcerned with and unresponsive to the lives of women who experience sexism 
only as one aspect of oppression (Harris, 1990). Many Third World feminists and 
marginalised women have thus rejected liberal feminism‟s view of a 
quintessential female experience, pointing out that their experiences of oppression 
are influenced by their race, ethnicity, class, colonisation, religion and/or sexual 
orientation, as well as gender (Andersen & Collins, 2004; Burgess-Procto, 2006; 
Parashar, 1993). As Ansley (1989) has noted, these forms of oppression 
interpenetrate, converge and reflect on each other, interlocking to produce 
complex hierarchies of power and inequality. Moreover, by claiming that all 
women are equal, and that there are no systemic or patterned differences between 
groups of women, liberal feminism not only privileges middle-class gendered 
experiences, but also leaves other women‟s experiences untheorised (hooks, 1984; 
Flax, 1993; Morton-Robinson, 2000). This critique is evident in Audre Lorde‟s 
(1984) claim that: 
By and large, within the women‟s movement today, white women focus 
upon their oppression as women and ignore differences of race, sexual 
preference, class, and age. There is a pretence to homogeneity of 
experiences covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist. (p. 
116) 
Saunders (2002) has also noted that unlike Western feminists who make gender 
equality the centre of their struggle, feminists in developing countries generally 
single out the satisfaction of basic needs as the most pressing issue. In such 
communities, women are likely to prioritise economic issues, since poverty and 
harsh economic conditions, much more than their sex, significantly shape their 
everyday experiences. This also partly explains why women‟s organisations in 
Africa tend to be welfare-oriented rather than empowerment-oriented 
(Mathangani, 1995) and why legal abortion is not a priority of many such 
organizations. 
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It is important to note that feminist bias towards middle-class women‟s 
experiences is also a reality in Africa, where feminist consciousness is identified 
with a few elite women (Aina, 1998; Mohanty, 1991; Nnaemeka, 2005). These 
women‟s activists, who ostensibly represent women‟s interests, have been noted 
to pursue policies that benefit their own class and/or ethnic groups (Staudt, 1984). 
Staudt argues that although women share commonalities in terms of their 
reproductive capacities, sexual division of labour, and the state conception of 
women, there are differences among women based on class and ethnicity, which 
not only often lead to differences in opportunities and lifestyles, but also narrow 
the political agendas of gender activists. Kenyan scholars have, for example, 
noted the marginalisation of rural and urban poor women‟s needs by an elite 
middle-class and city-based women‟s movement (Mathangani, 1995). As a result 
of poverty and also geographical isolation, rural and urban poor women are 
compelled to prioritise access to day-to-day needs such as food, clean water, 
shelter and so on, all of which are unlikely to be the concerns of urban middle-
class women. The gender debate has therefore been dominated by issues of 
political representation and the introduction of quotas, which are likely to benefit 
educated middle-class women, rather than the more substantive issues of cultural 
subordination, access to productive resources, especially land, or women‟s rights 
to bodily integrity (Britton, 2005). Meintjes (2010, p. 4) clearly captures this in 
her observation that in Africa, “women politicians, who are members of an elite 
political class, are no more likely than men to champion women‟s rights, needs 
and interests.”16 Indeed, it is possible that the issue of unsafe abortion has failed to 
attract sufficient support from women‟s organisations because the elite women 
associated with the organisations are often able to pay for safe services, which are 
readily available despite being illegal.  
In addition to failing to consider important differences in degrees of power and 
access to the proposed liberties among different classes and ethnicities, liberal 
feminism‟s contribution becomes more limited in corrupt and undemocratic 
political contexts in which governments subordinate women in a myriad of ways, 
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 There is a general feeling that although women‟s presence in governance has greatly improved 
in Africa, this has not altered pervasive patriarchal cultures and practices (Meintjes, 2010). 
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some related to gender factors and others related to the neo-patrimonial nature of 
African politics (Nzomo, 1997; Staudt, 1998). The liberal feminist belief that the 
state can be entrusted with securing women‟s rights in terms of the law also fails 
to take into account that some states, such as those found in developing countries, 
are not only illegitimate but have also been noted to uphold many gender 
discriminative laws, especially if abolishing them might threaten political stability 
and/or support bases (McFadden, 2002).
17
 It is unlikely for such states to be 
supportive of policies that legitimise controversial issues such as abortion, which 
have potential to upset important constituents such as traditional patriarchs and 
religious groups.  
Liberal feminism‟s exclusive focus on integrating women into state institutions 
without challenging the deep structures of male dominance has two major 
consequences. Firstly, because of liberal feminism‟s focus on women‟s 
incorporation into public roles, it is likely to appeal to women who have the 
economic resources to better compete with men for desirable social positions and 
employment opportunities. Secondly, the failure to problematise the overall 
structure of the society has been noted to potentially produce a situation that 
perpetuates dominant patriarchal discourses and norms rather than challenging 
them (Pateman, 1988). As MacKinnon (1991) has rightly noted, the law itself can 
be a vehicle for gender discrimination, as it may create and maintain male 
dominance. One way through which this may happen is co-optation, whereby 
liberal states may just incorporate feminist terms into liberalism, without taking 
feminism seriously (Eisenstein, 1981). The cooptation of women‟s activists and 
women‟s movements by governments is common in Africa (see Chapter 5), 
wherein governments have set politically correct institutional mechanisms that are 
largely governed by women members of the political elite, whose feminist 
understanding is often limited. As a result, although women‟s representation in 
governance and more so in Parliament in Africa has improved, gender equity 
policies have been integrated into state patronage systems and therefore little 
meaningful change has been achieved (Meintjes, 2010). In fact, Tripp and Kang‟s 
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 For example, the attempt by the Ugandan women‟s movement to have a Domestic Relations Bill 
passed by Parliament failed following major controversy over its contents (Tamale, 2008).  The 
bill, which assured women equality in marriage, was shelved for „more extensive consultations‟ 
after President Museveni, who was keen on winning a fifth term in office in the forthcoming 2006 
general election, declared that the bill was not urgently needed. It was therefore shelved for more 
consultation (ibid.). 
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(2008) study of women‟s movements in Africa found that even non-democratic 
states like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have met demands for 
representation, gender equity and gender mainstreaming, but without significant 
improvement in women‟s status in society. 
Lastly, liberal feminists‟ understanding of the state is rather narrow, focusing 
mainly on state institutions (Kantola, 2006). This leaves out other political players 
such as tribal and religious institutions, all of which play powerful roles in public 
life, especially on issues affecting human sexuality and gender relations. Thus, 
although liberal feminists have examined the gender discriminative character of 
the state, they have failed to understand the deeper complexities of the state, as 
well as its inherently patriarchal nature (Connell, 1994), and in the case of Africa, 
the state‟s neo-patrimonial nature. The state seems to have been severed from any 
human qualities and granted an almost mystical power, which is reflective of a 
general failure by liberal feminists to grasp the concept of power and the origins 
of the state, and the embeddedness of the state in other social institutions. 
However, despite the weaknesses that I have identified, the liberal feminist focus 
on the importance of law reform and their insistence on gender equality are 
important for this research. These will be discussed, along with their specific 
application in this research, in a later section of this chapter. 
2.1.2. Radical Feminism and the State 
Unlike liberal feminism, which is based on traditional philosophical foundations, 
radical feminism is not only contemporary but also arose from women‟s 
experiences of sexual domination (Mooney, 2000). Because radical feminism is 
rooted in women‟s experiences, it has been considered by some to be the only true 
feminist theory. MacKinnon (1983) argues that: 
Feminism has been widely thought to contain tendencies of liberal 
feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. But just as socialist 
feminism has often amounted to marxism applied to women, liberal 
feminism has often amounted to liberalism applied to women. Radical 
feminism is feminism. (p. 639) 
Radical feminists problematize the state with the claim that it is a guarantor of 
male dominance, which reproduces gender hierarchies through a variety of legal 
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and other mechanisms which allow for the control of women (Liddle, 1996). 
MacKinnon (1989) notes that: 
The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the 
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and 
authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a 
gender – through its legitimating norms, forms, relations to society, and 
substantive policies. (p. 161-2) 
Radical feminists see the patriarchal nature of the state as underpinning its 
tendency to uphold and ensure male control over women in both the private and 
public spheres of life (MacKinnon, 1989). Defined as the historically produced 
situations in gender relations where men‟s domination over women is 
institutionalized (Connell, 1994; MacKinnon, 1983),  patriarchy consists of those 
institutions, behaviours, ideologies, and belief systems that maintain, justify and 
legitimate male gender privilege and power (Braam & Hessini, 2004). Because 
women‟s control by men is both intimate and bodily, radical feminists consider 
patriarchal domination to involve male appropriation of women‟s sexuality and 
bodies. From this perspective, women are in an inherently subordinate position 
because sexual oppression is constitutive of the very gender category, woman. As 
MacKinnon (1982, p.515) has asserted, “sexuality is to feminism what work is to 
Marxism: that which is most one‟s own, yet most taken away”. Seemingly, every 
feminist issue revolves around sexuality. The centrality of women‟s productive 
and reproductive role in society is also noted by an African feminist, Tamale 
(2005), who suggests that sexuality lies at the heart of African women‟s 
oppression and that the patriarchal state has a vested interest in keeping a tight 
leash on women‟s bodies and/or their sexuality.  
Radical feminists believe that an improvement in women‟s status would require a 
revolutionary order to replace the patriarchal one, as the state cannot be expected 
to liberate women (MacKinnon, 1989). Since all social institutions are construed 
as intertwined, it is virtually impossible to attack sexism in any meaningful way. 
The resultant impossibility of separating state power from male power therefore 
implies that legal changes as proposed by liberal feminists can only serve to 
perpetuate the basic conditions of patriarchy. Moreover, since women‟s 
oppression stems from male domination, neither capitalism, nor socialism, nor 
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any other male-dominated system, can solve the problem (Gruber, 2012). For 
radical feminists, the structure of male domination needs to be dismantled if 
women‟s liberation is to be achieved (Acker, 1989). They identify civil society, 
rather than the state, as the sphere in which women should concentrate their 
energies in order to challenge patriarchy. To ameliorate women‟s suffering, 
radical feminists work at local levels to develop both for profit and not-for-profit 
institutions that are operated by women to serve other women, such as small 
businesses, day care facilities, counselling centres, and safe houses for women 
escaping domestic violence (Gruber, 2012).  
In advocating for legalised abortion, radical feminists advance the view that 
because biology, especially women‟s reproductive role, is the source of their 
oppression, liberation cannot be guaranteed by the state but can only come about 
through a biological revolution in which women seize control over the means of 
reproduction (Firestone, 1970). This would lead to women‟s liberation by directly 
ending gender-based distinction, and indirectly abolishing patriarchy, on which 
male dominance is anchored (Weisberg, 1996). This is more so because radical 
feminists see reproduction under patriarchy as being characterised by many other 
forms of compulsion, as noted by Jaggar (1983): 
Contemporary patriarchy deprives young women of adequate 
contraceptive information, and the contraceptives it does make available 
are inconvenient, unreliable, expensive and dangerous. Patriarchy limits 
abortions and often seeks to deny them entirely, but at the same time it 
subjects women to intense and unremitting pressure to engage in sexual 
relations. (p. 256-257) 
Thus, radical feminist analysis of women‟s oppression seeks to uncover and 
dismantle relations of domination that are concealed and legitimised by patriarchy 
(Jaggar, 1983).  
2.1.2.1. Critique of Radical Feminist Theorizations 
Although radical feminism provides useful insights into gender and the state, the 
tendency to essentialize the state as monolithically patriarchal is problematic. By 
singling out the exploitative structure of patriarchy as the primary cause of 
women‟s oppression, radical feminists present a model in which the state is the 
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key source of patriarchal power, and power is reduced to men‟s power over 
women. However, neither the state nor masculinity can be said to have a single 
source or terrain of power (Barrett & Phillips, 1992; Kantola, 2006; Rupp, 2008).  
Additionally, by not paying enough attention to the issue of class, radical 
feminism, like liberal feminism, seems to imply that all women share the same 
oppression and that states oppress women everywhere in the same way (Acker, 
1989; Maharaj, 1995). This renders radical feminism somewhat insensitive to 
differences among women. In addition to its universalizing tendency, which has 
been strongly rejected by black and minority feminists in Western countries 
(Hooks, 1984), radical feminist theory does not represent the situation in 
communities where women are differentiated by factors such as religion, tribe and 
class. For example, as I will demonstrate in this study, unsafe abortion affects 
mainly poor women, since middle class women are often able to pay for safe yet 
illegal services.  
At another level, radical feminists, by concentrating on patriarchal domination, 
have failed to take into account the issue of women as agents of patriarchal 
violence against women. As I will show in Chapter 4, where I discuss the politics 
of female circumcision, women are the major perpetrators of this female practice. 
Additionally, the concept of patriarchy has been criticised for being incapable of 
handling historical change (Walby, 1992). In discussing gender relations in 
Africa, for example, history is a very important aspect. Attention ought to be paid 
to the ways in which the intervention of the colonial period created a situation in 
which earlier relatively powerful positions held by women were eroded by the 
introduction of new power paradigms (Nnaemeka, 2005). Furthermore, it is 
widely acknowledged that the neo-patrimonial and patriarchal nature of states in 
Africa have colonial origin (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). 
Despite this criticism of radical feminism, the theory‟s conceptualization of the 
state as patriarchal does make an important contribution to this study. This will be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.  
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2.1.3. Socialist Feminist Theorizations of the State 
Unlike liberal feminists who construe the state in a positive manner, socialist 
feminists, drawing on Marxist and radical feminist theories,
18
 perceive state 
institutions as bodies with a dominant interest in exploiting women since, from 
their perspective, states function as instruments of patriarchy and the ruling class 
(Carnoy, 1984). Their analysis of the state as an agent of patriarchal and class 
power is based on a specific conception of class which arises from a political 
economy that excludes domestic production, and, consequently, much of women‟s 
work, from calculation (Haney, 2000; Watson, 1990). Women‟s subordination by 
the state is therefore presented as being driven by economic considerations, which 
are in significant ways related to the continuation of patriarchy and capitalist 
accumulation (Eisenstein, 1999; Walby, 1986). The state reproduces and 
maintains this primarily because it serves the interests of capital and the ruling 
class (McIntosh, 1978). An important aspect of socialist feminist analysis is its 
focus on the importance of economic factors in shaping the politics of the male-
dominated state and powerful elites. Accordingly, socialist feminists advocate for 
structural change in societies in order to accommodate women‟s interests. They 
contend that women‟s liberation will be possible only when the liberal state is 
overthrown and its capitalist and patriarchal structure dismantled (Dietz, 1987).  
Socialist feminists organizing for abortion rights believe that individual rights and 
individual choice are important, but they are not enough. Two American feminists 
– Gordon (1977) and Petchesky (1980) – who played key roles in the 
development of socialist feminist theory on reproductive control, have argued that 
feminist demands for reproductive freedom cannot be separated from the need for 
social and economic change, as the impediments to reproductive freedom are the 
structures of social and sexual relations existing under capitalism. Petchesky 
(1986, p.11), for example, maintains that biological reproduction, while natural, is 
also a social activity determined by changing material conditions and social 
relations of reproduction. For her: 
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 Like Marxism, socialist feminism recognizes the oppressive structure of capitalist society and 
like radical feminism, socialist feminism recognizes the fundamental oppression of women in 
patriarchal society. 
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Women make their own reproductive choices, but they do not make them 
just as they please; they do not make them under conditions they create but 
under conditions and constraints they, as mere individuals, are powerless 
to change. (p.11)  
This approach thus calls for a multi-issue movement for reproductive justice that 
should be organised around an understanding of women‟s need for personal 
reproductive control, but also of the need to challenge the social and sexual 
relations around which responsibilities for pregnancy and childcare are allocated 
(Hoggart, 2000). Since women are the most affected by pregnancy, it should 
follow that they should be the ones to decide about contraception, abortion and 
childbearing, and that social structures and relations facilitate the ability of 
women to make these decisions. 
2.1.3.1. Critique of Socialist Feminism 
It is notable that although socialist feminist criticism of capitalism provides a 
worthy challenge to the liberal assumption that representative government is the 
sole sanctuary for politics and the legitimate arbiter of social change (Dietz, 1998, 
p.385), it also has limitations. By over-emphasising the effectiveness with which 
the state reproduces the capitalist mode of production through women‟s 
dependence upon men within the family, it fails in explaining convincingly just 
why the state should need to reinforce masculine dominance and privilege 
(Pringle & Watson, 1998). Moreover, while socialist feminist analyses explain the 
points at which patriarchal female oppression and the capitalist mode of 
production converge, there are many aspects of female oppression, such as 
violence against women, which cannot be explained by such an emphasis 
(Bozzoli, 1983). Bozzoli also argues against the functionalist assumptions of 
socialist feminism. To her, the fact that female oppression is useful to capitalism 
does not mean it is a creation of capitalism, and implying that it is denies the 
history of patriarchal female oppression in non-capitalist societies. 
Another obvious shortcoming of focusing on capitalism and patriarchy is that 
other aspects of women‟s oppression receive insufficient attention. Consequently, 
as for liberal feminism, little consideration is given to the roles that race or 
ethnicity play in determining not just class relations or gender relations, but also 
power relations within a state. For example, as a result of racism, the chief sites of 
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oppression for women are different. Thus, although socialist feminist, radical 
feminist, and liberal feminist analyses have identified the family as a major site of 
oppression, women of colour have often considered the family a site of solidarity 
and resistance (Bhavnani & Coulson, 1986; Eisenstein, 1994; Smith, 1983). 
Rather than wish to be liberated from the home, black women, who have often 
been required to work outside the home, may actually prefer an opportunity to 
stay at home (Barriteau, 2006; hooks, 1984). Socialist feminism has also been 
accused of failing to consider women‟s ability not only to resist, but actually to 
influence institutions of the state (van Acker, 1999). 
Furthermore, the socialist feminist notion of the social welfare state, although 
laudable, is perhaps not realistic in the context of the Third World state. Firstly, it 
is unlikely that states in the developing world can afford to provide welfare 
services as envisioned by Western-based feminists. Secondly, in neo-patrimonial 
bureaucratic states such as those found in many Third World countries, even 
minimal programmes aimed at ensuring access to food and healthcare for the 
poorest sections of society are likely to be co-opted and misappropriated as part of 
a corrupt system of clientelism.
19
 In many African countries, for example, 
politicians mobilise support by promising to provide public goods and services 
such as roads, hospitals, schools, running water and sanitation that the electorate 
is in need of (Szeftel, 2000). The allocation of millions of dollars towards such 
services does not always translate into their actual delivery. 
Despite these limitations, socialist feminists‟ recognition of the interrelationships 
between patriarchy and capitalism, and their insistence on the importance of 
improving women‟s lives in both economic and domestic spheres, are relevant to 
this study. These will be discussed after the following discussion of the post-
structuralist feminist theorization of the state. 
                                                          
19 The Government of Kenya for instance introduced the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) 
in 2003 with the objective of combating poverty at the grassroots level through implementing 
community based projects (Kimenyi, 2005). However, research on the use of these funds reveals 
that the establishment of the CDF was merely to enable Members of Parliament, who manage the 
fund, to have direct access to state resources for their own benefit.In addition to the fund being 
used as a tool for political mobilisation, millions of dollars meant for poor people have been 
misappropriated (ibid.). 
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2.1.4. Post-structuralist Feminism and the State 
Although liberal, socialist and radical feminists‟ views of the state remain relevant 
to date, they have been accused of presenting the state solely as an instrument of 
men and/or patriarchal interests and of negatively presenting women as a 
homogeneous group of powerless objects of state policy (Haney, 2000; Watson, 
1990). These approaches are accused of presenting the state as a monolithic entity 
which lies almost outside of society, rather than being something which is 
embodied in diverse institutions and in the context of interactions with different 
groups (Watson, 1990). When coupled with the fact that most of these feminist 
analyses have focused on states in the First World while comparatively little 
attention has been paid to a gendered analysis of the post-colonial and Third 
World states (Rai & Lievesley, 1996), the weaknesses of these perspectives 
become more apparent.  
It is these weaknesses in the traditional feminist theorizations of the state that 
post-structuralist feminists have sought to address. One of the most significant 
contributions of post-structuralist feminist theorizations is the acknowledgement 
that the state is not a monolithic entity with unitary influences. Rather, it is a 
convergence of institutions that have their own histories, contradictions, relations 
and connections, internally and externally (Rhode, 1994). From a post-
structuralist perspective, the state is categorised as being multifaceted in nature 
and consisting of a plurality of forces (Franzway et al., 1989; Waylen, 1998), 
whose different organs may have varying interests in issues, including sexuality 
and abortion. In this theorization, the state is presented as a “process rather 
than…a thing” (Connell, 1990, p. 509) and as a “network of power relations 
existing in co-operation and also in tension” (Rai, 1996, p. 5). In Connell‟s view, 
because the state is not unitary, neither are the practices that connect the various 
capillaries of the state body (Connell, 1990). 
This view of power as dispersed opens up space for the recognition of multiple 
levels of governance in relation to the state so that power relations can be seen as 
extending beyond the limits of the state. In studying the politics of abortion for 
instance, focus can therefore be extended to actors outside of the state, such as 
women‟s organizations and religious groups, since in post-structuralist analyses, 
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the state is not the primary source of power. Rather, power is conceived as a 
constantly shifting set of force relations that emerge from every social interaction 
(Foucault, 1978). As Foucault puts it, “power is everywhere, not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” (1978, p. 93). 
Because power is construed as being relational, productive, dispersed, and 
something to be exercised rather than possessed, it implies that any group or 
individual in a society can potentially wield power, and therefore be in a position 
to influence the state.  
Furthermore, feminist post-structuralist theorization shifts from analysing the state 
as sexist to seeing the state as gendered (Kantola, 2007). In this case, gender is not 
considered a variable, but an analytical category that conceives of gender as a 
social construct (ibid.). The focus thus shifts from concentrating on women‟s 
exclusion from state institutions to understanding the gendered structures of these 
institutions (Pettman, 1996). This makes it important to study the complex 
relations between gender and the state, as well as the processes that continue to 
reproduce gender hierarchies in states. 
Post-structuralist feminist theorizations of the state, like the earlier discussed 
theories, contain elements that are relevant to a discussion of the politics of 
abortion in Kenya. Their view of the state as multifaceted is especially important. 
This will be discussed in detail in the section that follows.  
2.2. Contribution of Western Feminist Theories of the State to the Present 
Study 
Having provided an in-depth analysis of Western feminist theorizations of the 
state, their critiques, and also their arguments in support of legalized abortion, in 
this section I focus on the elements of each of these theories that are applicable to 
this study. After establishing their applicability, I provide a discussion of neo-
patrimonialism, with the aim of demonstrating its importance as an additional 
concept in understanding the African state.  
Two aspects of liberal feminism are relevant to this study. First, the liberal 
feminist focus on law reform is important, as this research demonstrates the 
importance of decriminalisation of abortion in Kenya. Although some researchers 
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have argued that the law is not transformative, does not affect or cause social 
change, and has only a limited capacity to advance progressive notions of justice 
(Menon, 2004), others have argued that the law can influence social policy and 
rights and has the potential to further progressive causes (Rosenberg, 1996). For 
example, legal and/or constitutional provisions provide a legal basis and 
legitimacy for women‟s rights advocacy, help prevent policy reversal, and 
increase the likelihood of favourable decisions in the courts (Scribner & Lambert, 
2010). As such, a law decriminalising abortion would certainly boost Kenyan 
women‟s quest for safe abortions. As Meintjes (2010, p. 4) has added, without 
paper rights, women‟s freedom of choice in marriage, rights to bodily integrity, as 
well as substantive rights to inheritance, to land, and to social grants, would be 
impossible to claim. 
Secondly, liberal feminism‟s insistence on gender equality in the public sphere of 
life is equally important for this research. As will become clear later in this study, 
women‟s exclusion from governance has enabled the male elite to sustain a 
largely patriarchal state in which issues affecting women are ignored. 
Additionally, poverty amongst Kenyan women is a result of their exclusion from 
productive resources, such as land and the labour market. Furthermore, in Kenya, 
income shortfalls induce women and girls into engaging in transactional sex, 
which exposes them to unwanted pregnancies, and simultaneously forces poor 
women to seek unsafe abortions since they cannot afford to pay for safe services 
(Robinson & Yeh, 2011).  
In relation to radical feminist theory, their view of the state as patriarchal is 
particularly useful in this study because patriarchal power can be identified as 
lying at the core of understanding abortion as a contested and political issue. Since 
men are viewed as the norm in patriarchal societies, their life experiences and 
approaches are most often used as the basis on which to determine social needs, 
articulate policy requirements, and assign resources. The result of such a male-
defined and dominated world view is that experiences that are not directly 
informed by men‟s experiences, including unwanted pregnancies and abortion, are 
not considered priority areas in comparison to traditional development priorities 
such as unemployment and poverty (Braam & Hessini, 2004). As I will 
demonstrate, in Kenya, political leaders can be seen to deliberately ignore 
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abortion because it is considered a volatile issue that could compromise electoral 
support from key constituencies such as religious groups and traditionalists. 
Socialist feminist theorisation of the state also makes a significant contribution to 
this study. Drawing on socialist feminism‟s critique of patriarchy and capitalism, 
as well as its emphasis on economic justice, I will demonstrate how both the 
colonial and post-colonial Kenyan states have been instrumental in sustaining 
women‟s subordination for the benefit of the state, the male ruling elite, and 
capitalism. For example, the colonial government in Kenya criminalised abortion 
in an attempt to curb the unnecessary loss of labour, and attempted to ban female 
circumcision to appease European settler farmers who felt circumcision affected 
labour availability by contributing to maternal mortality (Thomas, 2003). The 
colonial state also reinforced pre-existing patriarchal power through the 
depoliticization of gender issues by pushing them into the private sphere, with the 
aim of creating conditions necessary for the capitalist transformation of pre-
colonial African communities. In order to foster and enable men‟s participation in 
a cash economy, the colonial state found it necessary to relegate women to the 
private sphere where women were expected to provide the necessities of 
productive and reproductive social life, become economically dependent on men, 
and articulate consumer demands to
 
stimulate the economy (Staudt, 1984; Tamale, 
2005). Although the separation between the public and private spheres may have 
preceded colonisation, the colonial state consolidated and reinforced it through its 
legal, religious and educational policies and practices (Tamale, 2005).  
Unfortunately, post-colonial African states adopted the colonial system so that 
women‟s exclusion from the public sphere and more so productive resources 
continues to date. It is possible that the relegation of gender issues to the private 
realm, and their consequent depoliticization, may be behind the lack of attention 
given to the issue of unsafe abortion, even though it causes death and health 
complications for thousands of Kenyan women. The same could be said of female 
circumcision, which was not criminalised until 2001,
20
 more than three decades 
after Kenya gained independence.  
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 This followed the adoption of the Children‟s Act 8 of 2001. Under Section 20 of the Act, those 
found responsible for subjecting a child to “female circumcision” are liable to a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand shillings, or 
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The relevance of a feminist post-structuralist analysis of the state for this study 
lies in the view of the state as fragmented, consisting of a set of arenas that are not 
necessarily coherent (Pringle & Watson, 1992). This analysis makes it possible to 
see the Kenyan state as a differentiated set of institutions, agencies and discourses, 
where various actors in the abortion debate fight their battles. In the state arena, 
anti-abortion actors have the opportunity to use a variety of strategies and 
discourses to construct their interests, and pro-abortion actors can use various 
strategies and counter-strategies to advance their goals. Moreover, the depiction of 
the state as a discursive process provides insight into the fact that the state is not 
inherently patriarchal, as radical feminists would argue. Rather, the state has been 
historically constructed as patriarchal in political discursive and structural 
processes, such as colonialism and neo-patrimonialism (Connell, 1987). As such, 
the Kenyan state can be approached, not as the manifestation of a patriarchal 
essence, but as the centre of a reverberating set of power relations and political 
processes in which women‟s subordination is both constructed and contested 
(ibid.).  
Further, the feminist post-structuralist representation of women as a 
heterogeneous group, and the emphasis on gender diversity and women‟s multiple 
identities (Pringle & Watson, 1992) mirrors the situation in Kenya.
21
 As will 
become clear in Chapter 7, women who can afford to pay are usually able to 
receive safe but illegal abortions. Additionally, feminist post-structuralist 
recognition of the ways in which women‟s bodies and sexuality may be regulated 
and/or disciplined for the benefit of those in power is particularly important.  As I 
demonstrate in this study, both the colonial and post-colonial Kenyan states have 
enacted gender discriminative laws when seeking political support from 
conservative religious and traditional groupings. 
In this section, I have identified and discussed the aspects of liberal, socialist, 
radical and post-structuralist feminist theories of the state that are applicable to 
                                                                                                                                                               
to both such imprisonment and fine. 
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/legislation_03.pdf. 
21
 It is worth noting that this notion of plurality of the subject has been challenged within feminism 
by theorists such as Hartsock (1998) who argue that endless division of the subject eliminates the 
possibility of meaningful political action. She contends that a focus on multiple subjectivities can 
divert attention from sustained axes of domination. 
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this study. However, because of their inherent weaknesses and the fact that they 
fail to acknowledge neo-patrimonialism, which, according to Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997, p. 3), is “the core feature of post-colonial politics in Africa”, they 
cannot sufficiently explain the Kenyan state‟s inability and/or unwillingness to 
address unsafe abortion.
22
 Therefore, in the following section, I provide a 
discussion of neo-patrimonialism, which I suggest, feminist analysis of the state 
ought to consider in order to fully appreciate the nature and actions of African 
states.  
2.3. The Nature of Post-colonial African States: Neo-patrimonialism 
The concept of neo-patrimonialism
23
 has been noted to mean different things to 
different scholars (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Bratton and van de Walle (1997), for 
example, understand it to be a hybrid regime consisting of, on the one hand, an 
exterior modern, formal, rational-legal state-like apparatus, and on the other hand, 
a patrimonial spoils network in which centralised elites mobilise political support 
by using their public position to distribute jobs, rent-seeking opportunities, and 
resources as personal favours. Clapham (1985, p. 48) says a neo-patrimonial state 
is “a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type 
pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal grounds”. Somewhat differently, Chabal and Daloz (1999, p.16) 
describe the modern African state as “no more than a décor, a pseudo-western 
façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations.” What is in 
agreement in these definitions is that in African neo-patrimonial states, political 
                                                          
22
 I am however aware that the concept of neo-patrimonialism  has received criticism from a 
significant some scholars (de Sardan, 2009; Mustapha, 2002; Smith, 2006) who have argued that it 
is racist and that it reduces the complexity and diversity of African states to single concepts. It is 
however notable that they do not discount the existence of patrimonial and related practices such 
as corruption and clientelism in African states. Olivier de Sardan (2008, p. 6) has for example 
noted that although patronage and clientelism undoubtedly exist in contemporary African states 
“the truth is that the multiple divergences between norms and practices ... cannot be subsumed so 
quickly under a single concept. The forms and modalities must first be explored and the nuances 
and variants identified.”  
23
 Social scientists add the modifier neo- to patrimonialism to distinguish what they regard as a 
modern variant of Weber‟s (1947) ideal type with one in which patrimonial logic characterized by 
patronage, clientelism, and corruption prevails (Pitcher et al. 2009). 
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power is personal and politics is a type of business wherein political positions 
give access to economic benefits (Bach & Gazibo, 2012; Fatton, 1990).
24
  
Some researchers have located the origin of neo-patrimonialism in the colonial 
experience (Berry, 2000; Dia, 1996; Lentz, 1995; Mamdani, 1996; Pitcher et al., 
2009).
25
 These scholars argue that the colonial era exerted so much influence on 
states and societies in Africa that contemporary governance in the continent bears 
little resemblance to that of the pre-colonial societies. Englebert (1997, p. 768) 
has for example claimed that the contemporary problems in African states derive 
“from the very exogeneity of the state, its lack of embeddedness, its divorce from 
underlying norms and networks of social organisation.” For him, the different 
values of the imported colonial state gave rise to a perception of illegitimacy in 
the minds of the colonised people, and consequently the belief that it was 
available for plunder (Englebert, 1997). As Achembe (1960, p. 30) observes, local 
people came to view the state as “an alien institution and people‟s business was to 
get as much from it as they could without getting caught.” 
It is noted that soon after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885,
26
 European 
colonialists partitioned Africa amongst themselves in a manner that reflected their 
spheres of influence, without paying regard to matters concerning ethnic 
heterogeneity or hitherto existing institutions of governance (Mamdani, 1996). 
Upon Independence, the artificial boundaries were maintained so that different 
ethnic groups, each with their own languages, culture, religion, traditions, customs 
and political and economic systems, were brought together to form single political 
and administrative units (Dowden, 2008). Forcing ethnic communities that 
previously lived independently of each other to live together, the colonisers did 
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 Some researchers, such as Erdman and Engel (2007), have noted that significant elements of 
patrimonialism survive and thrive even in the most highly industrialized present societies. 
25
 It should be noted that some scholars have located the origin of neo-patrimonialism in pre-
colonial patterns of behaviour in which patrimonial considerations are presented as having been 
paramount (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Ekpo, 1979). Some other researchers also see the reality of 
contemporary Africa as being the product of both pre-colonial and colonial practices (Dia, 1996; 
Kohli, 2004).  
26
 The Berlin Conference was held in Berlin between November 15, 1884 and November 26, 1885 
for the purpose of dividing the continent of Africa between European powers (Dowden, 2008). 
42 
 
not give a thought to the possibility of the emerging states being ethnically and/or 
otherwise polarised. 
The European idea of a monocultural nation-state left most post-colonial African 
states with the dilemma of how to unite ethnically and sometimes religiously 
plural societies (Chatterjee, 1993; Dia, 1996). Moreover, the numerous tribal 
patrimonial kingdoms encouraged by the colonialists‟ system of indirect rule27 
had led to the emergence of extremely powerful individual local intermediaries
28
 
who acted to limit the post-colonial state‟s infrastructural power (Bayart, 1993). 
In a bid to homogenise the otherwise heterogeneous groups, African leaders 
sought to centralize both the state and power, leading to the emergence of neo-
patrimonial states.  
Researchers have argued that because diverse pre-existing institutions were 
disrupted or constituted by colonialism, they could not generate loyalty and 
ownership among Africans. To compensate for the low or weak initial political 
legitimacy, post-colonial African leaders adopted neo-patrimonial and clientelistic 
strategies which temporarily afforded them the necessary “instrumental loyalty” 
of competing elites (Dia, 1996; Englebert, 2000). As Chabal (2002) observes: 
Politics at independence became patrimonial rather than 
institutionalised…. Despite their Western appearance, African political 
systems developed a logic of patronage which relied almost entirely on 
networks of personalised and vertical relations between rulers and ruled, 
elite and populace. (p. 51)  
Evidently, at its core, neo-patrimonial rule is governance based on assembling 
political supporters through patronage rather than issues. Although policies 
remain important, they are chosen on the basis of assembling clients rather than 
on appealing to citizen preferences. This is in opposition to the Western-type state 
system wherein the bureaucratic elite is, in principle, the servant of elected 
government, which makes decisions for the good of the nation-state (Parkin, 
2002). The bureaucratic system is largely rigidly hierarchical, and “everything 
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 As a result of scarcity of money and manpower, British colonialists ruled through local tribal 
leaders, particularly chiefs, to implement colonial policies (Berry, 1992; Jua, 1995). 
28
 Mamdani (1996) has noted that indirect rule resulted in decentralized despotism, in which local 
chiefs were granted increased power with often weakened downward accountability. 
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depends only on formal regulations and the specific orders of superiors” 
(Mommsen, 1989, p.113). This system, when compared to neo-patrimonialism, is 
considered preferable due to the fact that the bureaucracy is expected to work 
towards goals that are publicly accepted (Clapham, 1985).  
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) have identified three major features of neo-
patrimonialism in Africa. They include: (a) presidentialism or personalist power 
concentration, (b) systematic clientelism, and (c) the use of state resources. 
Presidentialism refers to the systematic concentration of political power in the 
hands of one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial 
decision‐making tasks (ibid). This phenomenon, often referred to as the big or 
strong man syndrome (Medard, 1982; Sandbrook, 1985), usually involves a 
charismatic leader who uses this to legitimise his authority and also to succeed in 
the winner-takes-all competition that characterises elections in African states. 
Usually symbolically marked as the nation‟s father, the big man is relatively 
unfettered by modern accountability institutions, and hence is able to use all 
available political tools such as informality, personalism, particularism, patronage 
and exchange, elite bargains, and shifting allegiances to retain power and 
legitimacy (ibid.). To accumulate power, leaders often ensure that all political 
power is centralised in the executive (Van Wyk, 2007). In Nigeria, for example, 
the personalised nature of the political arena can be seen in the domination of a 
powerful godfather at the apex of a vast patronage network at federal, state, and 
local levels. As a result, all political outcomes are the function of intense 
competition between these godfathers, often at the expense of the population 
(Sklar et al., 2006). 
The second feature of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, implies the award of 
personal favours to secure loyalty and support (Van Wyk, 2007). Clientelism, also 
described as the operating code for neo-patrimonialism, secures power for the 
ruling regime through the distribution of benefits and resources to those whose 
loyalty maintains the position of the elite (Harland, 2011). Clientelistic networks 
radiate out from the centre, usually from a President and his close associates, 
through smaller decentralised networks, franchised in return for loyalty to the 
centre (ibid.). Finally, the third feature of neo-patrimonialism, which involves the 
use of state resources for political legitimation, has been strongly associated with 
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corruption, nepotism and rent‐seeking behaviour (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). 
It is important to note that these three traits do not exist individually but rather are 
interconnected, so that clientelism and corruption are often the outcome of a 
strong concentration of political power at the top of the political system. 
Gibson and Hoffman (2002) observe that the basic structure of neo-patrimonial 
regimes consists of three sectors: the ins, the outs, and the government. In this 
arrangement, the government derives its support by providing patronage to the 
„ins‟ (clients, cronies) and funds this by taxing the outs, among them women.29 
This is usually simple because the ruler normally has control of an enormous 
amount of resources and is often a paramount patron with wide control over 
bureaucratic appointments, which are used not just as incentives for loyalty, but 
also to ensure incumbency (Clapham, 1982; van de Walle, 2001).  According to 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997):  
The right to rule in neo-patrimonial regimes is ascribed to a person rather 
than an office, despite the official existence of a written constitution. One 
individual, often the President for life, dominates the state apparatus and 
stands above its laws. Relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a 
formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy 
bureaucratic positions less to perform public service, their ostensible 
purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status. (p. 62) 
A major consequence of neo-patrimonialism is the hindering of development and 
economic growth for citizens, but more so for the poor and marginalised 
(Englebert, 2000). The use of state resources to reward supporters for their loyalty 
and the repeated appropriation of state funds by leaders and their followers for 
their personal enrichment undermines systems of public accountability and creates 
conditions where corruption and rent-seeking behaviour flourish (Pitcher et al., 
2009). It is therefore not surprising that human development and economic 
development in Africa remain amongst the lowest in the world (Fosu, 2010). 
Instability of government institutions has also been identified as an inherent 
feature and consequence of neo-patrimonial rule. Rulers regularly rotate 
officeholders “to regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from 
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 It is important to note that some women can become part of the ins by association with the 
ruling political elite. 
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developing their own power base, and to demonstrate their own power” (Bratton 
& van de Walle, 1994, p. 463). One consequence of the resultant instability 
arising from constant reshuffling and replacement of state officers is weak 
performance of state workers. Furthermore, clientelistic networks and patronage-
based distribution systems are known to undermine state consolidation, since their 
opaque and corrupt practices normally compromise formal state institutions 
(Thompson, 2009). This may damage the long term culture of democracy in a 
country, as ineffective and corrupt public institutions erode or destroy public 
confidence in these institutions. The resultant erosion of state institutional 
efficiency and regime legitimacy depresses the state‟s administrative capacities as 
well as its ability to shape the society‟s socioeconomic advancement.  As Jackson 
and Rosberg (1982) observe: 
A political system of personal rule is not a system which responds to 
public demands and support by means of public policies and actions, nor is 
it a system in which the ruler aims at policy goals and “steers” the 
governmental apparatus by information “feedback” and “learning”. 
Indeed, the concept of governance as an activity of guiding the ship of 
state toward a specific destination - the assumption of modern rationalism 
and the policy sciences - fits poorly with much political experience in 
contemporary Black African countries. (p. 18) 
Unfortunately, unlike in democratic societies where constituents technically have 
the option of voting out incompetent leaders, elections in Africa do not provide an 
effective accountability mechanism. Because neo-patrimonial systems concentrate 
power in the hands of wealthy and powerful individuals, they not only 
purposefully weaken political opposition but also use state resources and at times 
violence to ensure re-election. It should not escape notice that African political 
leaders are not only, on average, older than leaders elsewhere in the world, but 
also rule for longer. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe is 86 years old and has ruled 
the country since 1987. At the time of his death in 2010, Muammar Al-Qaddafi of 
Libya was aged 69 and had been leader of the country for 41 years, while 
Uganda‟s Yoweri Museveni has been in power for 26 years. 
The above discussion has demonstrated the importance of neo-patrimonialism in 
any analysis of African states. In the section that follows, I examine the gendered 
nature of neo-patrimonialism with the aim of showing why the concept is 
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fundamental to an adequate feminist analysis of the Kenyan state‟s inability 
and/or unwillingness to conclusively deal with the issue of abortion. I propose a 
framework, the Critical African Feminist Perspective (see figure 1), in which I 
incorporate and integrate the concept of neo-patrimonialism, with the earlier 
identified aspects of liberal, radical, socialist and post-structuralist feminist 
theories.  
2.4. Roadmap to a Critical African Feminist Theorization of the African 
State 
Without going into the details of the gendered effects of neo-patrimonialism here 
(these are addressed in Chapter 5), it is important to note that although discussion 
and application of the concept of neo-patrimonialism in African politics began in 
the 1970s (Lemarchand, 1972), scholars have been slow to examine the 
relationship between gender and neo-patrimonial politics. With the exception of 
Tripp (2001), I found no evidence of any other research on the gendered effects of 
neo-patrimonialism in Africa.
30
 Pitcher et al. (2009) have also noted that 
scholarship on neo-patrimonialism in the developing world has in large part 
overlooked patriarchalism by focusing almost exclusively on clientelism in the 
politics of contemporary regimes. However, patriarchalism, a significant aspect of 
patrimonialism, can be argued to be a major contributor towards gender 
discrimination in neo-patrimonial African states. In fact, Weber (1978, p.1011) 
describes patrimonialism as a “special case of patriarchal domination”, while 
Adams (2005, p.7) makes reference to “patriarchal patrimonialism” in recognition 
of the significance of patriarchalism, defined as including a combination of male 
dominance, extension of family symbols to politics, collectively useful marriage 
alliances, and expectations of reciprocal obligations, for understanding the nature 
of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa.  
The importance of focusing on the fundamental features of family and kinship 
networks in discussions of the African state has been recognised by various 
scholars (Chabal, 2009; Meintjes, 2010; Schatzberg, 1993; Tripp, 2001). 
Schatzberg (1993) has, for example, noted that the “moral matrix”, or cultural 
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 Tripp‟s (2001) focus is on women‟s organizations in Uganda that have resisted cooptation by the 
state. This is contrary to the implications of neo-patrimonialism that I explore in this study. 
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dispositions in Africa, which rely on the imagery of political leaders as fathers and 
providers for the family/nation, are derived from an idealised vision of authority 
and behaviour within the family and are often discriminatory towards women. In 
addition to characterizing all citizens as dependents for whom the father is 
responsible, familial metaphors that present states and families as similar also 
emphasize the power of husbands over their wives. Schatzberg (2001, p.149-168) 
argues that the African political father is expected to provide for, nurture, and care 
for his political children. He should ensure that among other necessities, the 
national family has enough to eat; he must love the children, and maintain 
paternal discipline; exercise pardon and absolutism; consult and listen to the 
voices of the wives and their adult children. In return, the father appropriates the 
rights to “receive respect and gratitude”, to exercise “punishment and pardon”, to 
“eat” and even “eat well”, and “to control and consume both people and 
resources” (ibid.). In this context, equality for women and children is very 
unlikely, especially when considered alongside the fact that the African elite also 
conceive power as indivisible. Furthermore, African men have been noted to 
identify themselves as owners of women‟s bodies, and thus as having the right to 
control their sexuality (Jewkes & Morrel, 2010). 
It should, however, be noted that although patriarchal control over women is 
justified with reference to tradition, it is not the case that traditional practices 
affirmed patriarchal power. Although older males tended to have more political 
authority and access to productive resources than women in pre-colonial African 
societies, women had considerable autonomy that helped dilute tendencies 
towards male dominance (Robertson & Berger, 1986). In some communities, 
women had parallel authority structures to those of men, and these enabled 
women to have control over their own spheres of activity. This was further 
enhanced by the fact that husbands and wives did not usually pool resources, 
thereby according women a significant amount of economic independence and 
control over productive assets (Gordon, 1995). The introduction of colonialism 
and a capitalist mode of production (as noted by socialist feminists) transformed 
these gender relations by, for example, imposing cash crop production and waged 
labour, both of which favoured men as a group (Stichter, 1982). The resultant 
patriarchal dominance, which saw men gain control over kinship systems, 
households and property ownership, seems to have survived the colonial period 
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and continued into the post-colonial period. Notably though, some researchers 
have claimed that African patriarchy is not so much a consequence of men‟s 
intention to oppress women; rather, most men have attempted to control women in 
an effort to maximize their own opportunities for survival in the context of 
widespread poverty. Langley (1983), for example, argues that: 
It is not the elder brothers, the husbands, the uncles or fathers who exploit 
women, but those social forces which dominate the economic system 
which encourage pre-existing inequalities and domination and use them to 
ensure reproduction of the labour force at the lowest possible cost (as cited 
in Gordon, 1996, p. 31).  
As would have been expected by radical feminists, the African state and ruling 
elite have failed to intervene because they too benefit from patriarchy. Obbo 
(1980) has noted that because Africa‟s elite depend heavily on the patriarchal 
family production system to generate the surplus that they expropriate for their 
own power and riches, they have not shied away from using state institutions to 
support and sustain African patriarchy. For example, although a majority of 
African states have put in place legal frameworks for women‟s equal rights to 
land, structural, cultural and economic constraints continue to limit women‟s 
access to and control over land (Harrington & Chopra, 2010). As Tripp et al. 
(2009) explain, equity legislation, which focuses on access, has been easier to 
introduce into male dominated Parliaments because it does not challenge gender 
roles per se. This is unlike issues of women‟s rights, such as the right to equal 
treatment, to inheritance and to bodily integrity, which have been resisted since 
they are seen to pose a threat to what are conceived as proper and naturally 
constituted gender roles and power relations. As a result of neo-patrimonial 
politics, the mainly male political elite have been unwilling to enforce and 
campaign for women‟s rights for fear of losing support from men in general and 
traditional and religious groups in particular.  
An obvious consequence of male dominance in social, economic and political life 
is the exclusion of women from the same, as claimed by liberal and socialist 
feminists. For example, besides Rwanda, which boasts of more than 50 per cent 
female representation in Parliament, followed by South Africa with 46 per cent, 
many countries in the continent lag far behind (Devlin & Elgie, 2008). The Sub-
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Saharan region is noted to have a female Parliamentary representation of about 20 
per cent (Yoon, 2011). Although research into the benefits of increased women‟s 
presence in Parliament is inconclusive, some studies have shown that female 
political leaders not only bring to politics their own perspectives, experiences, and 
expertise, but are also more likely than men to prioritize women-favourable 
legislation regarding education, health, child care, and violence against women 
(Stockemer, 2011; Tripp & Kang, 2008). 
Tripp (2003) contends that one way of addressing women‟s marginalization in 
governance is through quota provisions. Unfortunately, although quotas have 
increased female representation in a number of African countries, including 
Rwanda, Mozambique and South Africa, the same cannot be said of the majority 
of countries in the continent. A major reason is the nature of politics and more 
specifically the patriarchalism and neo-patrimonialism of African politics. For 
example, since political parties in neo-patrimonial states such as Nigeria and 
Angola are organized on the basis of personal connections and often also lack 
transparent rules of candidate selection (Randall & Svasand, 2002), women are 
unlikely to be nominated as candidates because they are usually excluded from the 
generally male-dominated clientelistic networks that control elections. 
Incidentally, although access to power is contingent upon women becoming 
patrons or clients in the male-dominated patronage networks (Goetz, 2003), they 
are at the same time excluded from these corrupt networks based on tradition and 
culture. Thus, when considered alongside the fact that African women often lack 
financial resources to run a campaign or to buy themselves into political networks, 
the reasons for ongoing underrepresentation of women in African parliaments 
become clear. 
Feminist scholars have hypothesized that women‟s movements may help women 
enter into politics (Ballington & Matland, 2004; Tripp, 2001) by exerting pressure 
on politicians to increase the number of women in positions of political power, 
and providing a support base for female candidates. The success of the African 
women‟s movements has, however, been constrained by authoritarian neo-
patrimonial governments that often co-opt them or their leaders into state 
feminism. This often happens through the creation of state-run organisations, 
more often than not women‟s wings of ruling political parties (Geisler, 2004). The 
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co-optation into state-linked patronage not only ensures state control of the 
women‟s agenda, but also reduces their political role to that of dancing for the 
President and his supporters at political rallies (Geisler, 2004). Additionally, the 
co-optation also refocuses women‟s mobilization from supposedly political issues 
to a narrow set of issues which at times result in a focus on women‟s morality. In 
some instances, African states have responded to international pressure by setting 
up politically correct institutional mechanisms that have largely been placed 
under the control of handmaidens of the ruling elite, whose feminist 
understanding is often limited (Meintjes, 2010).  In cases where the women‟s 
movement has survived, interaction with the state has led to the replacement of 
radicalism with the idea that the movement could make strategic gains by 
prioritizing winnable demands from the state, while ignoring more contentious 
issues (ibid.). As a result, issues such as political representation have received 
significant attention but at the expense of issues such as cultural subordination, 
human sexuality, abortion, and reproductive health (Britton, 2005).  
The above discussion demonstrates the importance of neo-patrimonialism in the 
analysis of the African states in general and the Kenyan state in particular. The 
diagram below captures the manner in which the relevant aspects of Western 
feminist theories of the state, and the concept of neo-patrimonialism, were used in 
the construction of the Critical African Feminist Perspective. This framework 
provided the lens through which I sought to examine and account for the Kenyan 
state‟s treatment of the issue of abortion.  
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Figure 1: Critical African Feminist Perspective 
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The table below provides a summary of the questions that guided my use of the 
Critical African Feminist Perspective in this study. Specifically, the table details 
the kinds of questions that guided my data analysis (see Chapter 3). 
  
Table 1: Questions for a Critical African Feminist Analytical Framework 
 
Theory 
 
Relevant Questions  
Liberal feminism 
 
 In what ways do Kenyan laws, both in the colonial 
and post-colonial state, foster or hinder the full and 
equal participation of women in political, civil, 
economic, social and cultural life? 
 
Radical feminism 
 
 How does patriarchy, both nominal and substantive, 
in Kenya‟s political institutional structures 
influence abortion politics? 
 
Socialist feminism 
 
 What are the ways in which class plays a part in the 
sexual politics of the state? 
 How is abortion politics a manifestation of 
capitalist and male interests in colonial and post-
colonial Kenya? 
 
Post-structuralist 
feminism 
 What does the ambivalence in the state‟s actions 
around abortion indicate about the contradictory, 
non-unitary state? 
 What are the ways in which abortion – and those 
who seek it – is constructed by the various state and 
non-state actors? 
 How do current laws on abortion regulate women‟s 
sexual identities? 
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Third World state 
perspectives  
 What is the impact of neo-patrimonialism on the 
Kenyan state‟s handling of gender issues in colonial 
and postcolonial times? 
 How do patronage and clientelism influence the 
state‟s gender regime? 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to identify and develop appropriate theoretical and conceptual 
tools for analysing and understanding the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the unsafe 
abortion question. An analysis of the state is important because both anti- and pro-
abortion actors appeal to the state in their attempts to institutionalize their 
positions. A review of the existing Western feminist approaches to the state 
showed that none is sufficient on its own. I therefore have proposed Critical 
African Feminist Perspective, which takes into consideration the importance of 
neo-patrimonialism in understanding the African state in general and the Kenyan 
state‟s treatment of the abortion question in particular. I note that, in addition to 
patriarchy, liberalism and capitalism, neo-patrimonial politics also impede African 
and Kenyan women‟s ability to access justice. These concepts, alongside the 
others identified Figure 1, guided this study. In the next chapter, I provide a 
detailed account of this study‟s research design, including methods of data 
collection and analysis. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology 
3.0. Introduction 
Although Kenyan women‟s reproductive capacity has for a long time been a 
political battleground for wars of colonialism, religious faith, Africanness, 
constitutional rights, human rights and dignity, little scholarly attention has been 
directed at the political and social implications of state regulation of women‟s 
bodies, and specifically of women‟s access to abortion. Indeed, as noted in 
Chapter 1, the focus of most studies on abortion includes rates of incidence, the 
socio-demographic characteristics of women who abort, measures of risk, 
morbidity and mortality, correlation with contraceptive use and family planning, 
post-abortion care, and teenage pregnancies and abortion. This is mainly because 
most of the studies apply quantitative surveys and structured questionnaires, 
which fail to reveal the political, cultural, social and policy contexts critical to 
making sense of women‟s experiences of abortion. In order to address the gap in 
the scholarly literature on the state and sexual politics in Kenya, this study is 
intended to unearth why unsafe abortion, which kills and maims thousands of 
women every year, remains largely unaddressed by the Kenyan state. Specifically, 
the study seeks to understand how the Kenyan state influences abortion politics 
through its policies and practices. 
In this chapter, I discuss the procedures and methods used to carry out my 
research. In the first section, I make a case for feminist qualitative research 
methodology and thereafter examine the importance of discourse analysis as a 
method of research in this study. The remaining sections provide details of the 
procedures used in identifying my research participants as sources of primary 
data, and how I chose my secondary data material. I also provide details of my 
data analysis process.   
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3.1. Feminist Qualitative Research 
As earlier noted, a feminist qualitative approach was considered suitable for this 
study. The question as to whether there is a feminist method has been debate for a 
long time, and although there is no definite answer (Harding, 1987), the general 
consensus of feminist scholars is that feminist research should be not just on 
women, but for women and, where possible, with women (Fonow &  Cook, 1991; 
Ramazanoglu & Holland, 2002). Additionally, feminist research is expected to 
adopt critical perspectives toward dominant intellectual traditions that have in the 
past ignored and/or justified women‟s oppression (Acker et al., 1983). 
Furthermore, feminist research is seen as being concerned with issues of broader 
social change and social justice and committed to changing the condition of 
women (Acker et al., 1983; Fonow & Cook, 2005). In fact, according to 
Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002, pp. 2-3), “feminist research is imbued with 
particular theoretical, political and ethical concerns that make these varied 
approaches to social research distinctive.” This study is thus feminist, as it has the 
political goal of transforming Kenyan women‟s experiences of abortion through 
an analysis of how the actions and/or inaction of the state and non-state actors 
impact on their lives. A second reason for situating my study as feminist has to do 
with the fact that abortion, the main subject of this study, is a feminist issue 
(Sherwin, 1991). Like most feminists, including myself, Sherwin argues that the 
decision to abort should be left to the pregnant woman, since she best understands 
her situation (ibid.). 
Qualitative research has been described as a form of social inquiry that focuses on 
the way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and the world in 
which they live (Holloway, 1997). It refers to a study process that investigates a 
problem where the researcher conducts the study in a natural setting and builds a 
complex analysis by way of rich description and explanation, as well as a careful 
examination of data (Creswell, 1998). Although there are different approaches 
within the wider framework of qualitative research,
31
 most of these have the same 
aim of understanding the social reality of individuals, groups and cultures.   
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 Qualitative research may be positivist, interpretive or critical (Myers, 1997). 
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Denzin and Lincoln (2000) have noted that qualitative research involves an 
interpretive and naturalistic approach, meaning that qualitative researchers study 
things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. As Malterud (2001) 
elaborates: 
Qualitative research, also called naturalistic inquiry, developed within the 
social and human sciences, and refers to theories on interpretation 
(hermeneutics) and human experience (phenomenology). They include 
various strategies for systematic collection, organization and interpretation 
of textual material obtained while talking with people or through 
observation. The aim of such research is to investigate the meaning of 
social phenomena as experienced by the people themselves. (p. 398) 
With the above observations providing the epistemological basis of this research, 
this study draws on a qualitative framework, which is much more a critical 
interpretation of the politics of abortion in Kenya, rather than its explanation. 
Interpretive studies generally provide a deep insight into “the complex world of 
lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Schwandt, 1994, p. 
118). Although my data did not emanate from individual Kenyan women who 
have experienced abortion first-hand, the importance of my research participants 
and the documents that were reviewed lies in the fact that the expressed opinions 
and perspectives have the capacity to influence state policy on abortion. As such, 
a qualitative approach enabled me as a researcher to identify the social 
constructions, meanings, and discourses that inhibit Kenyan women‟s ability to 
access safe abortions, as well as the possible solutions to unsafe abortion.  
The fact that the basis of qualitative research seems to lie in the interpretation of 
social reality was quite fundamental in my endeavour to analyze the politics 
surrounding the complex and seemingly private issues of reproduction and 
abortion in Kenya. Because social reality is seen as locally and specifically 
constructed, neither I as a researcher nor my sources of data could claim the 
position of knower. Instead, in line with Guba and Lincoln (1994), I assumed that 
my research findings would be literally and subjectively created as the 
investigation proceeded. This enabled me to work closely with my research 
participants and data as I sought in-depth insight into the varied positions on 
abortion, the factors underpinning those positions and their implications, and the 
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proposed mechanisms for dealing with the abortion problem. As Orlikowski and 
Baroudi (1991) observe, a key aspect of qualitative research is the idea that 
meaning is constructed by individuals in their uniqueness as part of a particular 
context and interactions, and those meanings are in turn reflected in state policy 
documents and laws.  
The view of social reality as being based on people‟s definition of it radically 
challenges the positivist hegemony of objective fact and objective reality. From 
this perspective, abortion neither exists independently of the meanings people 
attach to it, nor outside of the existing social practices, processes and meanings 
that are operative in Kenya, including values, ideas, culture and religion, politics 
and institutions. As such, how actors in the abortion debate construct and 
ultimately represent the social phenomenon of abortion is important in their 
attempts to influence state action as well as being understood as responses to the 
state. Ultimately, the proffered discourses determine Kenyan women‟s lived 
experiences of abortion. It is for this reason that discourse and discourse analysis 
is an important aspect of the methodology used in this study.  
3.2. Discourse and Discourse Analysis 
There are many definitions of discourse and discourse analysis in the literature, 
which may vary not just with discipline, but with intellectual persuasion (Phillips 
& Hardy, 2002; Sunderland, 2004).  Potter (1997) identifies five versions of 
discourse analysis. Three of these relate to linguistic and cognitive psychology 
and a fourth to the study of discourse as texts and talk in social practices. These 
are of limited interest here. The fifth version, which is attributed to Foucault and 
is of interest to this study, is based on the assumption that discourses, or sets of 
statements, constitute objects and subjects (ibid.). In this view, language, put 
together as discourses, arranges and naturalizes the social world in a specific way 
and thus informs social practices (Foucault, 1976). In other words, social practices 
are constructed within, and regulated by, existing discourses. 
Foucault‟s views of discourse and discourse analysis are also expressed by other 
scholars. For example, Hajer (2005, p. 1), defines discourse as “an ensemble of 
ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and 
physical phenomena” while Fairclough (2003, p. 124), identifies discourses as 
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“ways of representing aspects of the world”. As defined by these scholars, 
discourses can be summed up as the structuring principles of society (Weedon, 
1987), and because discourses are constitutive of the way of talking and writing 
about a particular issue, they frame the way people understand and act with 
respect to that issue (Watson, 1994). Abortion discourses in this study are thus 
understood as structured discussions of abortion by different actors, with each 
discourse providing its own version of the truth asserting why abortion is 
acceptable or unacceptable and proposing different strategies for dealing with the 
issue. In other words, a discourse is a political strategy that different groups use to 
try to shape the way policy issues are understood, to discredit opponents, and to 
bring about change. 
Foucault (1978) suggests that although discourses both reflect and shape the way 
we experience and interpret the world around us, the public spaces where 
discourses interact and are deliberated are seldom fair or equal. Rather, the voices 
and interests of the powerful, or the dominant discourses, often have an upper 
hand. The dominant discourses not only get institutionalised in key discursive 
sites such as state laws and constitutions, but also become reference norms, thus 
silencing and/or marginalising all other opposing discourses. In Kenya, for 
example, the criminalization of abortion in the Penal Code is a clear sign of the 
institutionalization of the anti-abortion discourse.  
Foucault further explains that discourse and power are established through the 
principle of exclusion, so that some discourses become historically fixed over 
time as truth and fact, constituting the formation of a dominant discourse or truth 
regime (Foucault, 1974). If power works to hide its mechanisms of operation, as 
Foucault argues, then the true discourse is particularly powerful: because it hides 
its will to power behind an apparent truth (Foucault, 1974). To be situated within 
a dominant discourse means that only certain types of realities are highlighted, 
while others are not. For example, although thousands of Kenyan women die 
annually from unsafe abortion, the dominant institutionalised discourse, which 
disapproves of abortion, ignores these deaths and instead pays particular attention 
to discarded aborted foetuses. Additionally, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 7, 
although unprotected sex, the same process that leads to unwanted pregnancies, 
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also spreads HIV/AIDS,
32
 the reality of HIV/AIDS has received policy attention, 
perhaps because it is high on the international agenda and affects both men and 
women, unlike abortion and unwanted pregnancies, which have remained largely 
unaddressed. It is important to note here that discourses are neither uniform nor 
stable; rather they have to be seen as fragments that can be combined and 
employed in different ways to match different strategies of power (Foucault 
1978). Perhaps in the future, abortion will become less stigmatised, as has 
happened with HIV/AIDS. 
Discourses are embodied and enacted in a variety of texts and although they exist 
beyond the individual texts that compose them, texts can be considered a 
discursive unit and a material manifestation of discourse (Alba-Juez, 2009). Texts 
may take many forms, including written texts, spoken words, pictures, symbols, 
artefacts, and so forth (Grant et al., 1998). For the current research, written texts 
and spoken interviews were analysed as manifestations of given discourses. 
As a methodological frame, discourse analysis concentrates on the analysis of 
knowledge formations, which organize institutional practices and societal reality 
on a large scale (Talja, 1997). Discourse analysis can thus be seen as “...a 
perspective on social life that contains both methodological and conceptual 
elements ... [It] involves ways of thinking about discourse (theoretical and 
metatheoretical elements) and ways of treating discourse as data (methodological 
elements) ... [as] an alternative to the perspectives in which those methodologies 
are embedded…” (Wood & Kroger, 2003, p. 3). Since the focus is not on 
language as an abstract entity but as the medium for interaction, analysis of 
discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do and say. Discourse analysis 
thus involves systematizing the different ways of talking about a phenomenon, 
with the aim of making visible the perspectives and starting points on the basis of 
which knowledge and meanings are produced. According to Foucault (1972), 
expressed perspectives are based on background assumptions, which are 
themselves the necessary and implicit starting points behind a particular way of 
speaking about a phenomenon. For example, the perspective that abortion is 
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 Most infections in Africa result from heterosexual encounters. 
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unacceptable because it is the murder of an unborn child may be informed by a 
religious ideology. 
In the present study, discourse analysis functioned to explore how the texts from 
major actors in the abortion debate in Kenya are made meaningful and how they 
contribute to the constitution of state policies on women‟s sexuality, on the one 
hand, and abortion, on the other, as social realities. Fischer (1995) observes that 
through a systematic study of texts, it is possible to view the strategies implicit in 
the creation of different discourses and show the links between how discourse is 
constructed and how it can function to establish a group‟s political power. 
Consequently, an analysis of the discourse and language surrounding abortion is 
significant in demonstrating how the conservative approach towards the issue has 
been institutionalised, maintained and entrenched by the state in Kenya, and for 
what purpose. After all, any given legislation is often an expression of specific 
discourses which frame both its policy-making process and outcome. Therefore, 
fundamentally, the current legal framework around abortion in Kenya is a 
manifestation of the gender regime of the dominant and powerful groups in the 
country, a regime which has historically had and continues to have a negative 
impact on women‟s rights and lived experiences (see Chapter 5).  Through 
analysing the discourses expounded by various actors, my interest is to point out 
the power and rationalities that underpin given discourses, and to analyze their 
potential societal and institutional functions and effects (Hajer, 1995). In this I 
follow Wood and Kroger (2000) who see discourse analysis as:  
Fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent 
structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as 
manifested in language ... [it] ... aims to investigate critically social 
inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on 
by language use (or in discourse). (p. 1) 
Consequently, in selecting my sources of data, I targeted textual sources and 
participants who already were, or were likely to be, directly involved in the debate 
on abortion. The details of how I collected and analysed data are provided in the 
following section. 
62 
 
3.3. Research Methods 
This section provides information on the methodology and fieldwork undertaken 
to collect and analyse data for this research. I made use of two qualitative 
methods: semi-structured in-depth interviews and document analysis.  
3.3.1. Semi-structured In-depth Interviews 
Although various data collection techniques are used in qualitative research, 
interviews, and more specifically face-to-face semi-structured interviews, were 
considered the most appropriate for this study. Mathers et al. (1998) have noted 
that, although personal interviews are labour intensive, they are also the best way 
of collecting high quality data, especially when the subject matter is very 
sensitive, if the questions are very complex, or if the interview is likely to be 
lengthy. I conducted 32 interviews with state and non-state actors in the abortion 
debate in Kenya in 2009.
33
 In selecting the participants, I was guided by the fact 
that my aim was to provide an understanding of the nature of the Kenyan state and 
how this shapes the state‟s treatment of the issue of abortion. As such, I  first 
identified specific institutions with the ability to influence abortion policy in 
Kenya, or that had been at the forefront of the abortion debate, before narrowing 
down to specific participants. I discuss the selection of research participants 
below.  
3.3.1.1. Selection of Research Participants  
This study focuses on abortion politics in Kenya, and specifically on how the 
Kenyan state shapes sexual politics in general, and abortion in particular, through 
its policies and practices. As such, my focus was more on shared ideas that could 
influence discourses and policies on abortion, rather than individual opinions. 
Thus, before identifying in-depth interview participants, I first selected state and 
non-state institutions and organizations that I considered relevant to the issue of 
abortion in Kenya. State bodies were considered important because any policy 
changes to abortion laws would involve the government. Non-state organizations 
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 I also visited Kenya in August 2010. However, during the two weeks of my stay, I did not 
conduct interviews but mainly collected newspaper articles, press releases, and any information I 
could find regarding the just concluded debate on Kenya‟s draft Constitution. 
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on the other hand were considered significant actors in the debate as they were 
involved in appealing to the state to either decriminalize abortion or sustain the 
law criminalizing it.  
In selecting participating organizations, I began by identifying the two major 
categories: state and non-state actors. For each of these categories, I made a list of 
all institutions that could be influential in decisions concerning abortion in Kenya, 
or that had been involved in the debate on abortion. In the category of state actors, 
I included Parliament as the central legislative authority in the country. In this 
category, I was targeting Members of Parliament (particularly female MPs) and 
Cabinet Ministers and/or their assistants in Ministries such as Health, Public 
Health and Sanitation, Gender, Children and Social Development, and 
Constitutional Affairs. In addition to the politicians, I also settled on senior civil 
servants, and specifically on permanent secretaries, since they function as chief 
accounting officers, charged with the implementation aspect of work of the 
government ministries. Due to the fact that officials from these ministries who 
participated in this research requested anonymity, their positions or departments 
cannot be identified. The choice of the state actors was in line with my analytical 
framework, the Critical African Feminist Perspective, which recognises the 
importance of considering the nature and structure of the state when seeking to 
understand the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the issue of abortion. 
Three other state bodies that were considered included the Kenya National Human 
Rights Commission, the Kenya Law Reform Commission, and the National 
Council for Population and Development. The Kenya National Human Rights 
Commission, mandated to protect and promote human rights in Kenya, was 
considered instrumental in providing information on the government‟s position on 
abortion as a woman‟s right. On its part, the National Population Council for 
Population and Development was important because it is the first government 
body to promote a broader examination of abortion in the country. The Kenya 
Law Review Commission was established as a primary agency to spearhead law 
reform and review processes. Since decriminalization of abortion would require a 
review of the Penal Code in Kenya, participation from actors from the Review 
Commission was considered ideal for shedding more light on the government‟s 
plans in relation to the laws governing abortion. For these organizations, I targeted 
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the Chief Executive and their assistants. I selected these individuals because by 
the virtue of their positions, they were capable of speaking on behalf of the 
organizations or departments that they were heading. 
Non-state organizations were divided into two categories: those in support of 
abortion law liberalisation, and those opposed.
34
 The organisations in favour of 
decriminalisation included the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA-Kenya), the 
Coalition on Violence Against Women Kenya (COVAW), the Kenya Medical 
Association (KMA), the Kenya Human Rights Commission, the Centre for the 
Study of Adolescents, and the Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance (RHRA). 
These bodies have been at the forefront in the campaign for the legalization of 
abortion in the country. In this category were also two women‟s organisations, 
Maendeleo ya Wanawake (the Progress of Women), and the National Council of 
Women of Kenya (NCWK).
35
 Various international non-governmental 
organisations were also included in this category: International Projects 
Assistance Services (IPAS), Planned Parenthood, and Marie Stopes Kenya. These 
organisations have been very active in the campaign to legalise abortion in Kenya 
and are known to have helped introduce Manual Vacuum Aspiration (MVA) 
equipment in the country. Further, Marie Stopes Kenya provides a broad range of 
reproductive health services, including menstrual regulation, through its 
expanding clinic network, while IPAS has conducted numerous studies in relation 
to abortion in the country.  
The publicly known non-state actors opposed to abortion law liberalisation tended 
to be religious bodies. Those targeted included the Catholic Church, the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), and the Supreme Council of Kenya 
Muslims (SUPKEM). The NCCK is a fellowship of Protestant churches and 
Christian organisations, while SUPKEM is an umbrella body of all the Muslim 
organisations, societies, mosque committees and groups in Kenya. The NCCK 
and the Catholic Church have been the most vocal in speaking out against any 
attempts to initiate policy reform in regard to abortion in the country. For the 
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 It was easy to identify the organisations and their stand on abortion as this was publicly known. 
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 It is worth noting that these two organisations have not campaigned for abortion 
decriminalization. Being the largest women‟s organisations in the country, I was interested in 
understanding their failure to champion an issue that affects numerous women in the country.  
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NCCK, I targeted the General Secretary and another officer who wished to remain 
anonymous. At SUPKEM, I interviewed a Sheikh and two other officials of the 
organization. With the Catholic Church, I was interested in talking to at least one 
Bishop, a senior officer of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and 
another from the Health Commission. 
3.3.1.2. Conducting in-depth interviews 
I used several strategies to secure and conduct formal interviews. As already 
noted, because my target participants were people with the capacity to influence 
public policy, they tended to be more powerful than me. As such, the issue of 
access was quite fundamental. While the issues involved in researching people 
who are less powerful have been widely dealt with, the challenges of studying up 
have often been overlooked (Nader, 1974). Researchers have however 
acknowledged the difficulties of getting access to more powerful and influential 
people (Gilding, 2002) as they are usually keen to maintain their privacy through 
a range of strategies, including the appointment of gatekeepers such as personal 
assistants, secretaries and advisers (Burrage, 2002).  Because they are also often 
more knowledgeable on the research topics than the researchers, have more 
money, and assume a higher status, they are generally a sophisticated group to 
interview (Gillman, 2005; Harvey, 2010; Odendahl & Shaw, 2001).  
In the case of senior state officials and politicians who were included in my list of 
potential participants, accessing them proved to be a difficult task. I visited their 
offices and requested interviews through their personal assistants or secretaries. 
This was not always granted, with explanations proffered that they were either 
busy or were travelling outside of the city or country.
36
 In such instances, I left 
behind my information sheet and contact details (Appendix D), with the hope that 
I would be subsequently informed regarding when an interview could be offered. 
In the majority of cases, this did not happen. I had to make numerous visits to the 
said offices and although I sometimes managed to interview the targeted 
individuals, this was not the norm. In some instances, senior officials directed me 
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 Sometimes this was untrue. I do not know if the gatekeepers intentionally barred me from 
accessing their bosses or the bosses themselves did not want to be seen. I did however notice that 
if a powerful looking individual sought to see the bosses while I was waiting, they were allowed 
to.   
66 
 
to their juniors while in other cases, I eventually had to give up. In such instances, 
I relied on publicly available documents such as newspaper articles that reported 
their views or comments on the issue of abortion.  
It is important to mention that non-state actors, except for very senior religious 
leaders,
37
 were much easier to access.  In these cases, I was able to walk into their 
offices and request interviews. In a majority of cases, a date for the interview was 
immediately fixed. In cases where I couldn‟t meet the targeted individuals and 
there was a secretary, I left them with my contact details and information sheet 
and, in most cases, I was contacted either through email or telephone. Participants 
in this category were also very helpful in suggesting other individuals whom they 
thought would be of use to my research.  
3.3.1.2. 1 Interview process 
All interviews were conducted in the research participants‟ offices and interviews 
began only after participants had read through and signed a consent form 
(Appendix E). The interviews, which lasted between 40-120 minutes, were guided 
by open-ended questions to facilitate the discussion (see Appendixes A, B, C). I 
had three sets of open-ended questions, one for each of the three categories of 
participants identified earlier. Although some questions in the three sets overlap, 
each set of questions was tailored to elicit information specific to the category of 
participants being interviewed. For instance, with state actors, I pointed out the 
fact that senior government officers had publicly given contradictory statements 
on abortion and asked the participants why that was the case and also enquired on 
the government‟s official position. I hoped that their explanations would point 
towards the neo-patrimonial nature of the Kenyan state and how it affects Kenyan 
women in general and the issue of abortion in particular, as noted in my analytical 
framework (see Chapter 2). I however required all participants to share their 
opinions on women‟s position in the Kenya. With this question, I hoped to get 
participants‟ views on the various ways, including laws and practices, by which 
women are discriminated in the Kenya. If answered in details, the participants‟ 
answers would address some of the aspects noted in my analytical framework (see 
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 I managed to interview a Catholic Bishop and a senior Anglican Church official but only 
through the intervention of colleagues from the University of Nairobi. 
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Table 1) and specifically how patriarchy, gender discriminative laws, poverty, 
women‟s underrepresentation in governance, among other factors, contribute to 
Kenyan women‟s disadvantaged position. Importantly though, the guide questions 
were used only as a guideline for the interview and to facilitate discussion. They 
were in no way imposed upon my research participants whom I allowed to 
structure and define the abortion issue as they saw it. This is more so because 
follow-up questions depended on the response received. By allowing my research 
participants to direct the interview, I was able to get information about their 
views, outlooks and prejudices on abortion, some of which I had not even 
considered myself. 
I conducted the interviews with due care, taking into consideration the moral, 
cultural and political overtones of the abortion issue. The sensitivity of the 
abortion issue was demonstrated by the constant promises I had to make to assure 
my participants that the information they provided was for research purposes only 
and that it would not find its way into the newspapers. This is understandable 
because many participants expressed opinions which they would otherwise not 
express in public. It is possible that the fear of publicity was behind senior 
officials‟ decisions to refer me to their juniors when I sought interviews. In other 
instances, participants whom I had approached as representatives of their 
organisations insisted on speaking in their individual capacities, either because 
they were not aware of the state‟s official position, or were uncomfortable with it.  
During the interviews, I was always aware of my own pro-abortion stance and 
how this could shape this research. As I sought to know from my research 
participants their opinions on abortion, why they held their positions, and how 
they thought the government should deal with the issue of unsafe abortion, I made 
a conscious effort not to influence them by using a non-judgmental conversational 
style that allowed them to speak freely. Although I may not have been completely 
free of bias, the fact that I was aware of my own potential bias made me work 
harder at communicating a balanced view. For example, when participants said 
they were opposed to abortion, I asked them to explain why they felt so without 
necessarily trying to convince them why abortion should be legal. 
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The collected data was documented in two major ways. First, I kept a field 
notebook in which I entered daily events and observations. Secondly, I used an 
audio recorder to record the interviews with my research participants. In the two 
instances where participants did not wish to be recorded, I made entries into my 
notebook. Once I came back to New Zealand in August 2009, I manually 
transcribed 30 of the 32 interviews that I conducted. While in Kenya, I had 
transcribed two interviews for research participants who had indicated a wish to 
review the transcripts. Although the transcripts of recorded interviews are 
verbatim, expressions of emotion were generally left out unless considered 
important, for example, if a participant seemed hesitant in expressing his or her 
position on abortion. 
3.3.2. Document Collection  
A wide array of secondary material was also used extensively. During the research 
design period, I had intended to use documents from the Kenya National Archives 
in Nairobi for background information on the history of abortion in Kenya, which 
dates to the colonial time, when abortion legislation was instituted. I had hoped 
that an understanding of the discourses informing the criminalisation of abortion 
at the time would provide a basis for explaining its continued illegal status. 
Unfortunately, no such information was available because at the dawn of 
Independence, the colonial state either destroyed or took away most of the 
documents that were in their possession, and perhaps also because the Kenyan 
Penal Code, in which the abortion policy was listed, was based on the Indian 
Penal Code, which was transferred to Kenya with minimal amendments (Luongo, 
2011). However, I was able to obtain some historical information on female 
circumcision, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, has useful parallels with the 
abortion issue today. I obtained letters and memos exchanged among the colonial 
government‟s officers, and also those exchanged with and among Christian 
missionaries, all of whom were major actors in the debate on female circumcision. 
This information is dated from 1926 to 1956. I also visited a library run by the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) from where I retrieved 
information on female circumcision and on the organisation‟s position on 
contraceptive use.   
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Government reports, survey data and policy documents, including Acts of 
Parliament, demographic and health reports, and census reports, among others, 
were also used for information on the magnitude, causes, and effects of abortion 
and related issues. Parliamentary proceedings and specifically Hansard records, 
were consulted to provide information on Parliamentary deliberations focusing on 
abortion and related issues such as family planning, female circumcision, violence 
against women, and child welfare. These documents cover the period from 1959, 
when the colonial Legislative Council debated and adopted the Affiliation Act, up 
to 2012, as discussions continue on the implementation of a new Constitution 
adopted in 2010. 
Documents produced by non-state organisations were also widely used. This is 
mainly because campaigns for improved access to reproductive health care in 
general, and abortion in particular, have been spearheaded by non-governmental 
organizations. The documents include reports by various groups, among them the 
Kenya Medical Association, Guttmacher Institute, Center for Reproductive 
Rights, FIDA (Kenya), and the Centre for the Study of Adolescents. These 
documents provide information on the magnitude of abortion in Kenya, 
characteristics of women who have abortions, factors influencing women‟s 
reproductive choices, and also critiques of the law criminalizing abortion.  
Other notable sources of secondary data were academic publications (books and 
journals). These documents provided me with an opportunity of reviewing the 
existing studies on abortion in Kenya. Other information came from newspapers, 
radio, television channels, local magazines and press releases, as well as internet 
sites such as facebook, blogs and official websites of organisations. These were 
particularly suitable for capturing popular comments on issues relating to 
abortion, family planning and gender relations. Besides, both state and non-state 
actors in Kenya often use mass media to release findings on abortion or to make 
counter statements.  
While the period that the documents cover appears long, it is important to clarify 
that documents on abortion are not extensive. This is mainly because debate on 
abortion is usually episodic, reacting mainly to reports on its magnitude and 
effects, or reactions to discovered discarded foetuses or abandoned new born 
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babies. The only period that extensive discussion on abortion took place was 
between 2009 and 2010, as Kenyans discussed a new Constitution, whose most 
contested issue was abortion. 
3.4. Data Categorisation and Analysis 
Data analysis has been said to be one of the most difficult and most crucial 
aspects of qualitative research (Basit, 2003). The objective of analysing the data is 
usually to determine the categories, relationships and assumptions that inform 
research participants‟ views on the issue being studied (McCracken, 1988). In this 
section, I discuss the procedures through which I interpreted and analysed my 
data. 
It is important to highlight that the aim of the data analysis undertaken for this 
study was not to test or justify the Critical African Feminist Perspective developed 
in Chapter 2. Rather, the analytical framework was used as a heuristic tool to try 
to demonstrate how the nature of the Kenyan state shapes its treatment of gender 
issues in general, and the issue of unsafe abortion in particular. It was therefore 
essential to conduct data analysis carefully and, to the extent possible, in a manner 
that avoided imposing my own personal opinions on the data.  
The transcripts, together with secondary data, were labelled and filed for analysis. 
Because I had already divided my research participants into three major categories 
– state actors, actors opposed to abortion legalisation, and those in support of 
legalisation – grouping the material was simplified. All the information that was 
collected from government sources, including transcripts from interviews with 
state actors, was stored in one file and labelled SA. I did the same for information 
received from non-state actors in support of abortion, and those opposed to 
decriminalization.  
However, as I read through the documents to familiarize myself with the content, 
I realized that my earlier grouping of the data was not sufficient. Firstly, I realised 
that my initial intention to analyse data from state actors and documents in order 
to identify state discourses on abortion was faulty, since the Kenyan state actors 
and documents did not exhibit any consistent discourses. Rather, state officials, as 
well as government documents, expressed multiple, and at times contradictory, 
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positions. For example, as will become clear later in this study, Kenyan state 
officials seemed to adopt different positions on abortion when in different 
contexts. Similarly, government documents exhibited contradictions. For 
example, although the National Reproductive Health Strategy (NRHS) 1997-2010 
was identified as having been developed to enhance equitable, efficient and 
effective delivery of quality reproductive health services, the policy document 
made no mention abortion, not even as an acknowledgement of the magnitude of 
unsafe abortion in the country (Ministry of Health, 1996). These contradictions 
made me realize that rather than concentrating on the Kenyan state‟s discourses 
on abortion, it was more productive, as noted in my analytical framework (see 
Chapter 2), to concentrate on how the nature of Kenyan governments, both 
colonial and post-colonial, has shaped sexual politics in general, and abortion 
discourses and practices in particular.  
In relation to the transcripts and documents emanating from non-state actors, an 
initial reading also revealed that categorizing actors as either pro- or anti-abortion 
was erroneous. The documents revealed that two research participants whom I had 
categorised under those opposed to abortion decriminalisation were actually 
supportive of abortion in specific circumstances such as when a pregnancy 
threatens a woman‟s life or in cases of pregnancies resulting from rape. Because I 
had wanted to interview the participants as representatives of their organizations 
and they still shared a majority of the organisations‟ ideals, I did not move their 
transcripts to the file containing information from those in support of abortion 
decriminalization. Rather, I decided to make it clear that they were representatives 
of religious organizations when, and if, they are cited in the study. During the data 
familiarization stage, I also discovered a medical doctor who was opposed to 
legalised abortion, although I had interviewed her as a member of the Kenya 
Medical Association, which supports abortion. For this particular participant, I 
moved her transcript to the file containing information from individuals and 
organizations opposed to decriminalization. This was mainly because her 
opposition to abortion was publicly known as she was the leader of an active 
organisation campaigning against legalisation of abortion.
38
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 I chose not to identify the organisation as this would reveal her identity. 
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I named the file containing information and documents from state participants and 
organizations SA (State Actors) and the file with information from those opposed 
to abortion legalization RA (Religious actors). Additionally, the code NSA (Non-
state Actors) was attached to the information from participants supporting 
abortion law liberalization and AA (Anonymous) to information from sources that 
could not be clearly identified, such as callers to radio stations and bloggers in 
online sites. For further clarity and differentiation of the transcripts, I added 
numerals, using the order in which I interviewed the participants. For example, 
NSA7 refers to the seventh pro-abortion actor that I interviewed, while RA3 refers 
to the third religious or anti-abortion participant I interviewed.  
After reading and rereading the hundreds of pages of transcripts as well as other 
texts in the four files, I was able to recognize emerging themes such as the 
Kenyan government‟s treatment of the abortion issue and the factors influencing 
the state‟s actions and/or inaction, and also the arguments provided by both pro- 
and anti-abortion actors to support their positions. For instance, as envisaged in 
my analytical framework, the patriarchal, authoritarian, and neo-patrimonial 
nature of the Kenyan state was identified as significantly contributing to the 
state‟s inability to conclusively deal with the issue of abortion. Furthermore, 
poverty, women‟s underrepresentation in government, lack of sufficient sex 
education, gender discriminative cultural practices, and the general lack of 
political will, were specifically singled out as hindering Kenyan women‟s ability 
to access safe legal abortions. 
Having identified the major themes, I embarked on the final stage of the data 
analysis process which involved mapping and interpretation of the information. At 
this time, the objective was to explore and uncover the functions and effects of 
different discursive structures out of the conviction that particular discursive 
practices were designed to fulfil certain functions. As envisaged in my research 
questions (see Chapter 1), it was important to account for the factors behind the 
privileging of particular discourses by actors in the debate, and with what degree 
of success. For example, I wanted to find out why pro-abortion actors privileged 
health and economic discourses, while sidelining the rights discourse. This stage 
is one where the researcher seeks “to regroup the statements, describe their 
interconnection and account for unitary forms under which they are presented” 
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(Foucault, 1972, p. 35). By the end of my analysis, it became clear how and why 
the Kenyan state has enabled the institutionalisation of anti-abortion discourses, 
while at the same time not enforcing the law criminalising abortion.   
3.5. Ethical Considerations 
Because of the sensitive nature of the issue of abortion in Kenya, careful attention 
to research ethics in this study was crucial. The ethical questions reflected in the 
process of collecting, collating and presenting this study included issues such as 
informed consent, confidentiality, and bias. Formal ethics clearance was obtained 
from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee 
at the University of Waikato. I also sought a research clearance permit from the 
Government of Kenya. 
At the beginning of each interview, I explained the nature of my study and asked 
the participants to read through and sign a consent form (Appendix E) to 
demonstrate their willingness to participate in my research project. Two research 
participants declined to sign consent forms but verbally gave consent. All 
participants were informed of their voluntary participation and their right to 
withdraw from the study any time during the interview, or up to two months after 
the interview. The participants were assured of confidentiality, and that neither 
their names nor their official designations would be used so specifically as to 
reveal their identity. Although four research participants expressed their wish to 
be formally identified, I chose to use numbers to both respect and protect the 
identity of those who did not wish to be identified and for uniformity. The only 
exception to the use of numbers however was when comments or opinions were 
cited as a matter of public record. For example, as cited in written documents or 
expressed in public speeches. 
During the interviews, I made a conscious effort to phrase probing questions in an 
unbiased manner, in ways that would not direct my participants into saying things 
I wanted to hear. I took utmost care not to divulge my personal views on abortion 
and revealed my personal pro-abortion beliefs only to those participants who 
asked me directly about them. 
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 3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research methodology that guided the study. The 
methodology and methods presented in this chapter were chosen and designed to 
help analyse the politics of abortion in Kenya. This chapter has explained the 
purposes of employing discourse analysis as the most appropriate approach for 
revealing not just the discourses used by both pro- and anti-abortion discourses, 
but also how the actions and viewpoints of the actors are influenced by the neo-
patrimonial nature of the Kenyan state. In the next chapter, as stipulated by the 
analytical framework discussed in Chapter 2, I demonstrate how the colonial state 
introduced neo-patrimonial politics and its attendant norms such as patronage, 
patriarchalism, clientelism and corruption, which have shaped and continue to 
shape policies concerning women‟s sexuality and access to safe abortion, as well 
as their access to political and economic resources. Using the female circumcision 
controversy as an example, I show how the colonial state introduced and provided 
an entry point for a previously unknown situation in which the state could regulate 
people‟s bodies and sexuality. 
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Chapter Four 
Colonial Sexual and Body Politics in Kenya: The Female 
Circumcision Controversy 
4.0. Introduction 
Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of 
necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it 
and often fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense 
transfer point for relations of power: between men and women, young 
people and old people, parents and off-spring, teachers and students, 
priests and laity, an administration and a population.  
Michel Foucault (1976, p. 103) 
Discursive struggles pertaining to the meaning of, and policy regarding abortion 
more often than not intersect with other issues such as class, race and gender 
(Beisel & Kay, 2004; Brodie, 1994). In line with Foucault‟s observation that 
sexuality is a transfer point for relations of power (Foucault, 1980), this chapter 
demonstrates that sexual politics in Kenya concerns two key issues: firstly, the 
abortion politics relates to attempts to control women‟s bodies and the meaning of 
motherhood as a means of defining women‟s social space, and secondly, the 
politics is used by the political elite for their own political benefit.  
As a precursor to the analysis of abortion discourses in the next four chapters, I 
will, in the first section of this chapter, provide an historical analysis
39
 of the 
Kenyan colonial state and its regulation of sexual politics, which continue to 
affect women‟s lives in general, and the abortion debate in particular. Informed by 
the Victorian vision of the natural roles of men and women, the European 
colonists, in addition to criminalising abortion, contributed to the establishment of 
a myriad of legislation, commonly known as customary law, that shaped the 
private lives of women in the domestic sphere. Instituting these laws also began a 
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 The information in this chapter draws on a range of written materials and data, including official 
published and unofficial documents, newspaper reports and interest group material, and academic 
journal papers and books. 
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process in which gender reforms were, and continue to be, motivated by a desire 
to strengthen elite, patriarchal political power. The colonialists‟ system of indirect 
rule gave rise to powerful patterns of clientelism and patrimonialism, which have 
been related to the continued subordination of women economically, socially, and 
politically. 
In the second part of the chapter, I focus on the 1929-1932 Female Circumcision 
Controversy among the Kikuyu people which erupted around the attempt by the 
colonial state and Christian missionaries to ban the practice (Frederiksen, 2008; 
Peterson, 2004).
40
 I demonstrate that the politicization of issues concerning 
women, such as abortion and female circumcision, often leads to the 
disappearance of women as subjects, leaving control over decisions regarding 
women‟s bodies in men‟s hands. At the same time, politicization also leads to a 
simultaneous shift of focus from the effect that these practices have on women, to 
how the elite would be affected by any state action or inaction on the issue. In this 
process, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, women‟s and gender rights issues 
are often trumped by patriarchal, nationalist and/or capitalist concerns, which as 
claimed by liberal, radical and socialist feminists, lead to women‟s subordination 
in all spheres of life.  
The importance of analysing the female circumcision controversy in a study on 
abortion politics is twofold. Firstly, it provides a means of demonstrating how the 
actions of the colonial state not only introduced but also provided an entry point 
for the civil management of women‟s sexuality for state and elite interests. 
Secondly, the female circumcision controversy enables me to show how the neo-
patrimonial politics introduced by the colonialists through the establishment 
patron-client relationship with African elite men established a process of public 
policy making influenced by conflicts, negotiations and exchanges of interests, as 
noted by post-structural perspectives. I show that although the controversy was 
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 Although the British attempt to ban female circumcision affected other countries such as Sudan 
and Tanzania (Boddy, 2007; Fiedler, 1996), attention has tended to focus on the Kikuyu 
experience mainly because of the role the controversy played in the mobilization of the Kikuyu 
people‟s anti-colonial struggles through the Mau Mau uprising (Njambi, 2007).  
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about female circumcision, the main actors – the colonial state, the nationalist 
movement, and the Christian missionaries – all had other motives in either 
opposing or supporting the ban on female circumcision.  Of central interest in this 
chapter is the way in which the colonial state and the local nationalist movement, 
who were otherwise divided on the issues of land alienation and political 
independence, appeared to agree on retaining female circumcision, although for 
different reasons, least of which was women‟s welfare. Similarly, the 
contemporary abortion debate in Kenya has seen diverse groups such as Muslims, 
Christians and politicians across political ideologies forming alliances against 
legalization. Evidently, the regulation of women‟s sexual morality and 
reproduction is one of the few areas where agreement can be reached among 
otherwise divergent male dominated interest groups.  
4.1. Representation, Colonialism, Body and Sexual Politics 
In this section, I provide a discussion of the ways in which political discourses 
construct individual and collective women‟s bodies and how state policies create, 
or do not create, spaces for women‟s agency (Harcourt, 2005). By focusing on 
pre-colonial and colonial body and sexual politics, I hope to show not just how 
bodies and politics come together in technologies of regulation and of resistance 
(Bell & Sheffield, 1994) but also how the human body, and specifically the 
female body, functioned for the colonial government as “text, social object, and 
field for the inscription and operation of colonial power” (Gouda, 2008, p. 175). 
Through the establishment of networks of power relations operating at the 
personal and political level of the body, the colonial state was able to regulate 
populations and discipline individuals, with the aim of producing docile bodies 
and pliant minds (Scheper-Hughes & Locke, 1987, p. 8) to serve its interests. For, 
as de Certeau (1984, p. 139) observes, “There is no law that is not inscribed on 
bodies. Every law has a hold on the body.” Furthermore, the history of the African 
female figure has been linked to colonialism, as the sex and gender role conflicts 
in post-colonial Africa are partly as a result of social structures that arose during 
the colonial period (Little, 1973; Mbilinyi, 1988). This is mainly because the 
hierarchical gender roles and discriminatory relationships in politics, economics, 
religion and culture that were introduced by the colonial state were retained at 
independence (Aniekwu, 2006). 
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The onset of official colonialism was not the initial contact between the Western 
world and Africa. Rather, travellers‟ and explorers‟ tales of their experiences in 
Africa and in other uncertain continents had produced a folklore that presented 
these places as libidinously erotic (Busia, 1989/90; McClintock, 1995; Magubane, 
2004). Thus, long before the nineteenth century, these geographical areas had 
become what McClintock (1995, p. 22) describes as “porn-tropics for the 
European imagination.” Africa, in addition to having been established as a place 
of perverse negation, was also figured as occupying a different geographical space 
and zone.  It was portrayed as a place out of time in modernity and historically 
abandoned in prehistory. Africa‟s black population, like their continent, were 
assigned an inferior rank as the earliest human beings on the evolutionary scale 
(Gilman, 1985; Tamale, 2011). They were seen as the embodiments of prehistoric 
promiscuity and excess, in addition to being described as proud, lazy, treacherous, 
thievish, and addicted to all kinds of lusts (Magubane, 2004). Unlike their white 
counterparts, Africans were seen to lack history, reason, and proper domestic 
arrangements (O‟Barr, 1994). These negative depictions of Africans helped the 
colonial governments to legitimize their right, even mandatory role, to intervene 
in African societies in order to help them progress (Levine, 2004; Povinelli, 
1994). 
While black people were collectively figured as primitive and savage, African 
women much more than men were perceived as the epitome of sexual aberration 
and excess. The African female, the lowest point on the ladder of the evolutionary 
hierarchy, was seen as possessing not just a primordial sexual lust but also the 
external signs of this temperament, as evidenced by her primitive genitalia 
(Gilman, 1985). African women were the antithesis of European sexual mores and 
beauty, as evidenced by Sara Baartman, the Khoisan woman from South Africa 
who was exhibited at European balls and human zoos as the Hottentot Venus 
because of what was perceived as her anatomical abnormality (Schiebinger, 
1993). Her large breasts, buttocks and elongated labia, referred to as „primitive 
genitalia‟, were said to mirror her primitive sexual appetite (Qureshi, 2004). Upon 
her death in 1815 her skeleton, genitals and brain were displayed in a Paris 
museum (BBC News, 2002). In 1994, President Nelson Mandela formally 
requested the return of her remains and France agreed to this request in 2002. 
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In addition to metaphorically marking the symbiotic boundaries of European 
national identities and white supremacy, African women‟s sexuality was also 
considered a threat to the fiscal economy of the imperial state (Davis, 1997; 
Levine, 2004). Depicted as sexually insatiable, ignorant, stupid and inherently 
subversive, African women were subject to increasingly vigilant and violent 
policing (Magubane, 2002; McClintock, 1995).
41
 It was within this framework 
that sexuality became a significant state policy issue as well as a key site of 
colonial anxieties in the state‟s attempt to create individuals who were particularly 
suited to the colonial society (Foucault, 1978). For example, in an attempt to 
encourage African men to seek paid work, the colonial state criminalised 
adulterous sexual relations between African men and married African women 
(Barnes, 1992). Informed by their views of African women and their sexuality, 
European colonialists blamed the women‟s sexual demands for African men‟s 
reluctance to work away from home. 
Said (1979) has noted that the colonialist‟s ideological construction of the 
colonized Other as different and subordinate was important in creating a clear 
binarism between the colonizers and the colonized, thus not only justifying 
unequal treatment but also suppressing the voice of the Other. However, and more 
importantly, the exotic and alluring representations of the colonies by colonial 
states served the purpose of inciting virile and adventurous soldiers and workers 
into the unknown, uncharted and virgin soil of Africa (Ponzanesi, 2005). Using 
masculine sexual metaphors that exhibited an overlap between sexual domination 
and colonialism, colonies were seen to occupy the same space as a beautiful, 
docile and sexually available local woman, but one whose beauty was a snare and 
an enticement to destruction.  As Steen (1941) observes: 
Africa is a woman, a dark devastating witch of a woman, coiling herself 
around you like a snake, making you forget everything but her burning 
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 Schimidt (1991) observed that colonial administrators saw African women as responsible for 
drawing African men into temptation and therefore as the principal offenders in adulterous 
liaisons. Hence, adultery was criminalised. Furthermore, women, especially prostitutes, were 
blamed for the spread of venereal diseases and illegal beer brewing (Bujra, 1975). Consequently, 
women often underwent forced testing for diseases and were subject to constant harassment, arrest, 
imprisonment and fines (ibid.). 
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breasts... Listen to the drums of Africa reminding every man of things he 
forgot ... when he left his mother‟s womb. (1941, p. 319) 
Discourses of rape, penetration and impregnation guided the use of African 
female bodies as metaphors for the conquered land (Young, 1995). The colonies 
were seen to occupy the same space as women whose evident nakedness, like 
their land, made them ready to be violated and exploited by the imperialists. In 
this “male power-fantasy,” the Orient was penetrated, silenced and possessed. 
(Said, 1979, p. 207)  
Additionally, the colonialist‟s self-declared superior understandings of sexual 
conformity, gender relations and civil progress availed the state grounds for 
intervening in the local social practices of the colonised people. By portraying 
Africans as sexually irregular and socially disordered, colonial governments were 
able to justify intervention in, and regulation of, local marriage customs and 
economic activities for state and European settlers‟ benefit. By so doing, 
Europeans introduced in Africa a previously unknown social notion that rational 
sexual and gender relations are produced by the civil state‟s intervention 
(Povinelli, 1994). By imposing Western morality on African communities, the 
colonial state altered the dynamics of gender and sexuality especially because its 
overt support for patriarchy challenged the cooperative and dual sex-gender 
concepts embedded within African cultures and communities (Busia, 1951).
42
 
4.2. Colonial Sexual Politics in Kenya 
These pre-colonial and colonial European representations of African women and 
sexual and body politics clearly influenced the relationship between the colonised 
and coloniser in Kenya. In particular, they influenced the colonial state‟s attempts 
to discipline women‟s sexuality and behaviour for the good of the empire (Baines, 
2003). In what follows, I seek to demonstrate the power of the state to operate at 
                                                          
42 Busia (1951) explains that although male dominance existed at many levels, including the 
domestic/household level and level of popular culture, the cooperative and dual sex structures 
created a façade of egalitarianism by allowing women a voice in certain leadership roles and 
public female representation. 
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both the personal and political levels of the body and more specifically at the level 
of women‟s bodies.   
The inter-war period (1918-1939) saw the British change their policy towards 
African colonies. The economic and political crises of World War I and 
parliamentary demands for low-cost colonial rule encouraged colonial officials to 
seek inexpensive ways of sustaining the colonies (Parpart, 1994). Besides, as John 
Cell (1999, p. 249) notes, “the widespread disillusion of inter-war Europeans with 
Western civilization” also played a role in the acceptance that the war had 
destroyed European‟s prestige as civilisers of so-called  backward and primitive 
peoples (Adas, 2004; Crowder, 1964). Consequently, the colonialists abandoned 
the civilising mission to instead promote stability and economic growth, 
especially to counter Germany‟s emerging industrial and naval power (Shadler, 
2006).  
In order to govern the colonies less expensively, with less reliance on military 
force and administrative personnel, strengthening traditional African male 
authority presented a logical solution (Parpart, 1994). As Lovett (1989) has noted, 
social control necessitated maintaining and strengthening those social relations of 
power and privilege on which pre-colonial societies were constructed. Colonial 
authorities thus sought to incorporate pre-existing polities, with their own 
structures of authority and political processes, into colonial structures. Henceforth, 
African ideas of custom and of law were to be incorporated into the new state 
systems as ideological and financial underpinnings for European colonial rule 
(Shadle, 1999). This system of indirect rule, in which the local rulers confirmed 
by the colonial administrators could exercise their own power personally, 
arbitrarily, and corruptly, has been identified as the root of contemporary neo-
patrimonial governance in Africa (Ekeh, 1975; de Sardan, 2009; Njoku, 2005). De 
Sardan (2009) has argued that rather than importing the same type of bureaucracy 
that existed in their home countries, the colonialists implemented a system in 
which the gap between colonial administrators and the local people was much 
greater. To him, this gap and some of the features it engendered such as 
despotism, privilegism and the role of intermediaries, have proved to be 
seemingly intractable problems for postcolonial African states.  
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By seeking to rule through traditional African authorities in order to appropriate 
their legitimacy, colonial administrators had found a vehicle through which they 
could not only legitimize colonial state, but also to mould African societies to 
meet their needs (Chanock, 1982; Ranger, 1983; Roberts & Mann, 1991). 
Convinced that the pre-colonial societies must have had some form of authority 
that governed day-to-day life, the colonial government reconstituted indigenous 
male African rulers and freshly imposed leaders where none had existed (Lange, 
2004; Mamdani, 1996). As Sir Donald Cameron, a British colonial governor, 
explained: 
The rule of the Chief is deeply rooted ... the people have a real attachment 
to their Chief and the system of tribal government to which they belong. It 
would surely be mere vandalism to set out to smash an organisation like 
this .... Their loyalties to their own institutions ... [which] form one of the 
most valuable possessions which we have inherited ... make for law and 
order in the land as nothing else can. (Cameron, 1937, pp. 5-6) 
Chiefs, installed as colonial functionaries of the local state apparatus, were 
endowed with broad legislative, judicial, and executive powers (Boone, 1994; 
Chanock, 1985; Mamdani, 1996; Merry, 1991; Migdal, 1988; Roberts & Mann, 
1991; Schneider, 2006). A chief had the right to pass rules governing persons 
living under his domain, he executed all laws, and was the administrator in his 
area, in which he settled all disputes. In Mamdani‟s words, “the authority of the 
chief thus fused in a single person all moments of power: judicial, legislative, 
executive and administrative” (1999, p. 874).  Scholars have blamed the colonial 
introduction of the system of authoritarian chieftaincy to many contemporary 
African problems, among them corruption (Njoku, 2005), patrimonialism and 
clientelism (de Sardan, 2009), and state illegitimacy (Englebert, 1997). It is 
important to note the gender aspect in the appointment chiefs as the colonial rulers 
appointed only men, because they considered a chief the patriarchal head of a 
patriarchal tribal order (Trotha, 1996). As will become clear later in the chapter, 
the consequent patriarchal alliances struck between various colonial 
administrations and African chiefs and male elders resulted in the systematization 
and codification of patriarchy across African states (Bozzoli, 1983). As radical 
feminists would argue, women‟s subordination got embedded in state apparatus, 
procedures and structures (Mackinnon, 1989). 
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Alongside the reconstitution of tribal leadership, a customary law intended to 
regulate non-market relations in land and in personal/family and community 
affairs amongst the locals was implemented (Maddox, 1996). Charged with 
adjudicating according to customary law, African chiefs and male elders invented 
customs that expanded their powers vis-a-vis women (Allman & Tashjian, 2000; 
Ault, 1983; Geisler, 1992; Mbilinyi, 1988; Parpart, 1988; Shadle, 2003). 
Consequently, what was codified as customary law emphasized the rights and 
authority of males and elders while also emphasizing the powerlessness and 
deference of women and junior men (Chanock, 1982; Schmidt, 1990). Most 
affected were laws in the area of personal law in regard to matters touching on 
gender relations in the context of marriage, divorce, inheritance, child custody, 
and property rights within marriage (Chanock, 1982; Schmidt, 1990).  
These laws reduced women‟s access to productive resources, such as land and the 
labour market, which reinforced the capture of female labour for the benefit of 
male patriarchs, capitalism and the state, as argued by socialist feminist theories 
(see Chapter 2). On their part, colonial officers accepted this version, of course 
with their own input,
43
 because they recognized that colonial order depended on 
male elders maintaining local control. Further, the authority of local leaders was 
enhanced by the establishment of the Native Authorities and Native Authority 
Courts to enforce the reconstituted customary law (Parpart, 1994).
44
 
According to many scholars, these legal changes deeply compromised women‟s 
status in the courts and in society at large (Mbilinyi, 1988; Jeater, 1993; Lovett, 
1989; Parpart, 1988; Penelope, 1987). It is notable that in the period before the 
introduction of indirect rule, a degree of female emancipation had been 
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 In accepting what could constitute customary law, colonial administrators introduced a 
repugnancy test which they used to gauge which African practices were inadmissible (Ndulo, 
2011). However, the colonial administrators‟ choice for what was repugnant has been criticised 
because provisions that were struck out were mainly those that empowered women and were 
contrary to the Victorian views as to the role of women in society. For example, practices that 
were declared repugnant included woman-to-woman marriage and paternity rules (ibid.). 
Surprisingly, many contemporary contentious issues such as female circumcision, polygamy and 
discriminatory inheritance practices were not challenged. 
44
 The government established two parallel court systems, one under the administration for 
Africans and another under the judiciary for others such as Europeans (Mamdani, 1999). African 
courts handled customary law disputes, involving matters such as bride-wealth, adultery, runaway 
wives and daughters, minor assaults, theft and land, while disputes involving whites or Asians, and 
other more serious offenses such as rape and murder, were heard by magistrates. Muslims could 
take their disputes to the local Islamic court (Shadle, 1999, 2008).  
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encouraged by European missionaries and the colonial state,
45
 who considered 
practices such as child-pledging and forced marriage repugnant (Schimdt, 1990). 
During this period, African women and girls were able to take advantage of 
colonial courts to challenge fathers, husbands, and guardians (Vaughan, 1987) or 
run away to the emerging towns, farms, and mission stations to escape patriarchal 
control in the countryside. This was not supported by newly appointed local 
leaders who accused the colonial state of doing away with the restraints of 
indigenous laws and customs without providing an alternative means of control 
(Parpart, 1988). In the interests of economic development and the financial well-
being of the colony, government officials chose to help and support African men 
in exercising their rights over women, who were at the time seen as posing a 
serious threat not just to African male authority, but also to the entire system of 
indirect rule (Little, 1973; Mbilinyi, 1988; Robertson & Berger, 1986). Notable 
here is the implied relationship between patriarchal control over female mobility 
and sexuality and the survival of indirect rule (Mbilinyi, 1988; Robertson & 
Berger, 1986). 
In addition to addressing African male elders‟ concerns about women‟s 
independence, the colonial state was also interested in the control of women for 
political and economic reasons. Recognition of the importance of rural women‟s 
productive and reproductive labour to the national as well as domestic economy 
made European state officials advocate for increasingly stronger legal measures 
for the control of African women‟s mobility (Schimdt, 1991). Following the 
introduction of compulsory labour for communal and European private purposes, 
women‟s labour participation was important (Kilson, 1955).46 As Thuku observes: 
A settler who wanted labour for his farm would write to the D.C. (district 
commissioner) saying he required thirty young men, women or girls for 
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 In the period before 1925, there was a strong feeling that British justice should transform 
African society. However, between 1925 and 1945 the commitment to revolutionary change was 
replaced by more conservative ideas of gradual evolution which involved supporting legitimate 
local leaders and relying on functionalist definitions of tribe-based culture (Shadle, 2006). 
46
 On October 23, 1919, the Northey Circular was issued, declaring that henceforth the British 
government‟s labour policy in Kenya would seek to induce Africans to leave their reserves and 
take up work on European farms. To this end, all colonial officials responsible for the 
administration of the African reserves were directed to use their influence to secure an adequate 
supply of African labour for work on the European farms (Kilson, 1955). 
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work on his farm. The D.C. sent a letter to a chief or headman to supply 
such and such a number, and the chief in turn had his tribal retainers to 
carry out this business. They would simply go to the people‟s houses, very 
often where there were beautiful women and daughters, and point out 
which were to come to work. Sometimes they had to work a distance from 
home, and the number of girls who got pregnant in this way was very 
great. (Thuku, 1970, p. 16) 
Women‟s position was worsened by their loss of land to white settlers, the 
introduction of Hut and Poll taxes,
47
 and the subsequent migration of male labour 
(Kanogo, 1987). The colonial state-imposed taxes, intended to coerce African 
men into finding jobs on settler farms or in urban areas in order to be able to pay 
their taxes (Kitching, 1980; Okoth-Ogendo, 1991; Stichter 1982), led to a massive 
male out-migration.  This resulted in women becoming indirectly responsible for 
men‟s tax obligations as husbands and sons commonly spent longer periods of 
time away (Oduor & Kabira, 2000). Women‟s labour time thus became over-
utilised as they had to maintain agricultural production in the absence of their 
men, in order to feed themselves and their children (Silberschmidt, 1999). The 
new policies had the effect of laying the legal groundwork for social, cultural and 
economic changes in African women‟s roles. For example, the fact that the 
colonial labour market favoured male employees made men the primary income 
earners which in turn altered the gender identities of rural African women as they 
were no longer the primary source of income or wealth (Redding, 1993). This, on 
the one hand, lifted men from traditional economies to tangible economic 
endeavours, while on the other, it relegated women to the private world of unpaid 
domestic work on production and human reproduction. This scenario not only 
altered gender power relations and marginalized women further (Okeyo, 1980), 
but also demonstrates the co-optation of gender relations and elite control of 
women in the interests of state and patrilineage. 
It should be noted that although the colonial state sought to control women‟s 
migration into cities by requiring them to carry passes (Robertson, 1996), those in 
paid employment, small-scale business women, and prostitutes were tolerated 
(Parpart, 1994; Schimdt, 1990). These women were seen as contributing to the 
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 The 1901 Hut Tax Regulation imposed a tax, payable in kind or labour, upon every native hut in 
British East Africa. 
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European economy through their own employment and sale of cheap farm 
produce. Further, by providing domestic and sexual services to male workers, 
prostitutes helped in the reproduction of the migrant labour force and also the 
development of colonial capitalism that was predicated on that labour (White, 
1990).  Clearly, as noted by radical and socialist feminists, African women‟s 
relationship with the state was anchored on what the state could gain from them. 
Researchers have demonstrated that the “unholy alliance” (Schmidt, 1991, p. 753) 
of African men and the colonial state resulted from their shared interest in 
tightening their control over women‟s sexuality and mobility (Barnes, 1992). For 
the state, women‟s agricultural production in rural areas lowered the cost of 
reproducing the urban workforce, as the money the men earned was not enough to 
live on. Moreover, containing women in the rural areas was intended to ensure 
men‟s return to the native reserves and thereby slow down the processes of 
African proletarianization (West, 2002; Wylie, 1977). African men, on the other 
hand, were anxious over their loss of control over women‟s mobility, income, and 
sexuality. While many women had run off to the cities to become domestic 
workers or prostitutes (Shadle, 1999; White, 1990), others had become small-
scale businesswomen. In response, the men were, on the one hand, uncomfortable 
about their meeting with strange men, and, on the other, desirous of controlling 
their income (White, 1990).  
Notably, some of the laws intended to bring African women under control also 
reduced them to the status of permanent legal minors, especially with regard to 
access to productive resources – particularly land – codified polygamy and also 
bridewealth payments (Jeater, 1993; Ncube, 1987; Shadle, 2006). In the interests 
of bolstering male authority in exchange for maintaining law and order, colonial 
state officials chose to ignore such customs that would have otherwise been 
considered repugnant to the European sense of morality. For instance, although 
colonial officials were highly critical of bridewealth transfers and polygamy, these 
practices were not considered so offensive as to warrant state intervention and the 
provocation of the older men‟s anger (Schimdt, 1990). 
It should, however, be clear that the colonial era did not invent female 
subordination and the control of women‟s fertility. Rather, contrary to claims 
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made by ethnologists such as Kenyatta (1938) and Leakey (1977), gender 
relations were modified and distorted to fit the changed circumstances. In the 
words of McClendon (1995, pp. 535-536), “the cloth of female subordination was 
resewn in a new social order”. For example, in most pre-colonial Kenyan 
societies, the fertility of women was symbolically linked to the fertility of the 
land. Because society‟s well-being was perceived as directly related to women‟s 
ability to bear healthy children, their sexuality was constantly governed and 
regulated (Kenyatta, 1938; White, 1990). This was achieved through the 
institutionalization of patriarchal households for controlling fertility, as well as the 
rites of passage such as circumcision, which licensed women and men to become 
sexually active and reproduce (Guy, 1981; Kenyatta, 1938). However, although 
gender relations were unequal, women‟s role as agricultural producers and as 
social and biological reproducers gave them forms of power and status, and hence 
they were not merely passive victims of male dominance (Atkins, 1993). They 
possessed the latitude to exert influence on daily life, land ownership, religious 
rituals, and even the political realm. It has been observed that: 
On marriage, women were given access to productive land, which they 
worked themselves. They were in control of the process of agricultural 
production and retained for their own use a substantial proportion of the 
product of that land and their labour. Work was heavy but it took place in 
a community which provided substantial security. The value attached to 
fertility gave the possessors of that fertility social standing and social 
integrity (Guy, 1981, p. 46). 
With the arrival of Europeans in Africa, this relatively autonomous position took a 
drastic turn as the gender power of patriarchy within traditional cultures 
reinforced that of colonialism (Lihamba et al., 2007). Despite this, it is noteworthy 
that women often successfully resisted and strategized to evade control, gain 
individual autonomy and exercise command over the course of their own lives. 
For example, barren women,
48
 those in unhappy marriages, or those who wanted 
to escape forced marriages often sought refuge at religious mission stations, left 
their husbands to elope with other men, or absconded to cities and towns where 
they contracted non-bridewealth marriages or lived independently as prostitutes. 
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 Infertile women were able to retain their status by marrying other women who gave birth to 
children on their behalf (Muriuki, 1974; Njambi & O‟brien, 2000). 
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Indeed, prostitutes were among the first African landlords in Nairobi (White, 
1990). 
The above discussion has shown how colonial ideologies on sexuality and gender 
arrangements influenced the lives of men and women in the African colonies. In 
an attempt to gain maximum economic benefits, the colonial state, in conjunction 
with African male elders, engineered a „customary‟ law which helped to entrench 
patriarchal control over women and junior men, but at the same time weakened 
women‟s claims to productive resources, and especially land. In the interests of 
maintaining law and order, state officials accepted the premise that African 
females were perpetual minors under the tutelage of a male guardian, whether it 
was their father, uncle, husband, or son (Schmidt, 1990). This led to the 
establishment of a state that was openly patriarchal, sexist, and capitalist, as 
argued variously by liberal, socialist and radical feminists‟ theorisations of the 
state (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, the fact that the authoritarian colonial state 
was grounded in patron-client relationships with local big men introduced the 
concept that access to the state and state resources was dependent on patrimonial 
relations, thereby marking the beginning of neo-patrimonial politics in Africa. 
Because neo-patrimonial governance is based on assembling political supporters 
through patronage rather than issues, policies tend to be chosen on the basis of 
gaining clients and the end product is generally influenced by negotiations and 
exchanges of interests, as claimed by post-structural feminist theorization of the 
state. In the following section, I focus on the female circumcision controversy in 
Kenya and demonstrate how negotiations and exchange of interests played a 
leading role in determining state policy on abortion.  
4.3. The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Introduction 
As is so often the case, the debate concerning these women is less about 
the women themselves than about the appropriation of women as political 
symbols. In other words, it is about the use of women as ammunition in a 
polemic of central concern to their lives, but where the issue at stake is not 
the women‟s own interests but, rather, the consolidation of the powers of 
others to define those interests. (Winter 1994, p. 939) 
In this section, I focus on the Female Circumcision Controversy (1929-1932) to 
demonstrate how circumcision became a battleground on which male actors 
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sought to showcase their power “through the body-scape of women” 
(Bhattacharji, 2004, p. 5), and to illustrate Kikuyu women‟s subsequent reaction. 
While it may appear illogical to talk about female circumcision in a study 
intended to provide an analysis of abortion politics in Kenya, my reasons are 
threefold. First, an analysis of the controversy that arose from the colonial 
government‟s and Christian missionaries‟ attempts to ban female circumcision 
provides an opportunity to not only showcase how the colonial experience 
introduced state and civil management of human sexuality, but also that state 
action and/or inaction in implementing policies is guided by its own interests 
rather than those of citizens. Secondly, I intend to highlight the similarity between 
the political debates underlying the treatment of female circumcision and those 
that inform the state‟s handling of abortion. I will demonstrate that what is at 
stake in contemporary Kenya‟s abortion debate is not women‟s lives and/or 
health, but a political contest between powerful, and primarily male, elite groups. 
As in the female circumcision controversy, women are not seen as actors but as 
objects and symbols to be manipulated by others who have taken centre stage. 
Lastly, I will also demonstrate women‟s ability to challenge state and male 
control. 
The female circumcision issue brought together three groups, all arguably 
patriarchal – the local nationalist movement, the colonial state, and Christian 
missionaries – in a head-on confrontation mainly for political legitimacy, in which 
women and their sexuality became the battleground. Although each group 
purported to be championing women‟s needs, women were never consulted; 
perhaps because they were not viewed as able to construct their own positions and 
interests. Instead, their bodies became sites of acute struggle between the 
contending hierarchies of authority, each seeking to stake a claim to power over 
women. For the nationalists, a circumcised female body was not just a flesh and 
blood ethnic boundary; rather, circumcision became a means of demonstrating 
loyalty to tradition, as a measure of challenging colonial rule. The colonial state, 
on the one hand, used the controversy to discredit the nationalist movement in the 
eyes of European sympathisers, while on the other, it chose not to interfere with 
the practice for fear of African men‟s reaction. The European missionaries, in 
contrast, thought banning female circumcision would eliminate the immorality 
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and physical dangers they associated with the practice. On their part, women 
challenged attempts to ban circumcision by continuing with the practice. 
An understanding of how female circumcision was, in the colonial period, utilised 
as a tool to gain political mileage, especially by the nationalist movement, will 
help explain the post-colonial Kenyan government‟s treatment of gender issues 
and sexual politics. Research has suggested that unequal gender relations during 
independence struggles laid the basis for post-independence gender inequality and 
discrimination (Chadya, 2003; Kanogo, 1987). Instead of addressing women‟s 
issues arising from the customary law introduced by the colonial government, the 
Kenyan nationalist movement worsened the situation by manipulating the 
women‟s question for the benefit of ideological propaganda (Cutrufelli, 1983). 
Upon independence in 1963 after a brutal war of liberation in which women 
actively participated,
49
 the gender and generationally discriminative customary 
law (Phillips, 2004) was appropriated by elitist male African leaders to continue 
serving their interests at the expense of women and younger men (Stamp, 1991). 
With power structures remaining unchanged, juridical independence led neither to 
democracy nor to social justice for Kenyan women following the 
institutionalization of male bias in state bureaucracies and policy formulation 
(Geiger, 1996; Goertz, 2002; Kanogo, 1987; Parpart & Stuardt, 1989). In fact, it 
wasn‟t until 2001, when Kenya adopted the Children‟s Act, that female 
circumcision was made illegal for girls under the age of 18 years.
50
 
Serious concern about female circumcision surfaced in Kenya after the First 
World War when a number of missionary societies denounced the practice and 
forbade it among their members (Kenyatta 1938; Peterson 2004).
51
 In 1929, three 
Protestant missions, the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM), the African Inland 
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 Women were involved in a variety of active roles in the independence war, including 
scouting/spying, smuggling guns, supplying food and medicine, recruitment, administering oaths, 
and combat (Edgerton, 1989; Geiger, 1996; Kanogo, 1987; Maloba, 1993; Odhiambo & 
Langsdale, 2003; Otieno, 1998). 
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 Section 14 of the Children‟s Act states that, “No person shall subject a child to female 
circumcision, early marriage or other cultural rites, customs or traditional practices that are likely 
to negatively affect the child‟s life, health, social welfare, dignity or physical or psychological 
development” (Children‟s Act 2001). 
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 There is no evidence of any internal opposition to female circumcision before the arrival of 
Europeans (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
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Mission (AIM), and the Gospel Missionary Society (GMS), issued a formal 
declaration that required African followers to sign a disavowal of female 
circumcision (Natsoulas, 1998). The Protestant missionaries demanded that their 
African faithful sign a pledge (called a kirore, or thumbprinp) to the effect that 
they would not participate in female circumcision
52
 or join the nationalist Kikuyu 
Central Association (KCA), a nationalist party of which Jomo Kenyatta was the 
general secretary. The reaction of African congregation to the missionaries‟ 
demand was immediate as it led to a massive boycott of mission schools and 
churches. The breakaway Africans established their own schools and churches, 
independent of government and missionary management, and allowed female 
circumcision (Ahlberg et al., 2000; Maina 2004).  
In what follows, I examine the responses of the major actors following the 
Protestant missionaries‟ attempts to ban female circumcision, as their reaction at 
the time reflected the shared assumptions and different agendas which underlay 
the process of negotiating colonial rule. I will begin by examining the colonial 
government‟s reaction, followed by the missionaries‟, and those of the nationalist 
movement. In the last section, I examine colonial administrators‟ understanding of 
women‟s subjectivity in the female circumcision debate, and how this 
understanding shaped the colonial state‟s campaign against the practice. I also 
elaborate on the factors behind Kikuyu women‟s unwillingness to abandon female 
circumcision.  
4.3.1. The Female Circumcision Controversy and the Colonial State in Kenya 
As early as 1906,
53
 Christian missionaries had been campaigning for the 
eradication of female circumcision, condemning it as barbaric, pagan and 
unacceptable to a proper Christian lifestyle (Snively, 1994). However, it wasn‟t 
until 1925 that the colonial state agreed to a cautious policy of urging Local 
                                                          
52 It was primarily men who were to renounce the rite either on behalf of their daughters or, in the 
case of young men, by promising to marry uncircumcised girls.  
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 It is at this time that Dr. John W. Arthur of the Church of Scotland Mission (CSM) and the 
leading Protestant opponent of the practice publicly announced his opposition to female 
circumcision and began to actively campaign against it. Dr. Arthur was also the representative of 
African interests on the colonial government‟s Executive Council (Pederson, 1991). 
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Native Councils to encourage less substantial operations, rather than to ban it 
(Ambler, 1989). The Female Circumcision By-laws that were originally adopted 
by Embu Local Native Council and later passed by majority councils read in part: 
1. No person other than one duly authorised by the Embu Local Native 
Council shall, within the Embu district perform or assist in the 
performance of the operation of clitoridectomy. 
2. No person subject to the jurisdiction of the Embu Local Native Council, 
in the Embu district when performing or assisting in the performance of 
clitoridectomy shall make an incision of greater extent or depth than is 
necessary for the removal or excision of the clitoris. Any other incision 
into or mutilation of the private parts of a woman shall not be performed 
or permitted to be performed. 
3. No person may perform more than one operation of clitoridectomy and 
no person may permit more than one such operation to be performed on 
any woman to whom he is in the position of parent or guardian. 
4. Any person affected thereby who shall refuse, neglect or fail to comply 
with the aforesaid resolutions shall, be guilty of an offence punishable 
under section 8(2) of the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance of 
1924.
54
  
Notably though, these regulations, designed to ensure that the practice was under 
the control of the government while at the same time appearing to remain in the 
hands of the local people, were more often than not flauted (Ambler, 1989). It is 
as a result of this that the Christian missionaries attempted, in 1929, not just to 
enforce the restrictions but actually prohibit female circumcision among their 
adherents. The consequent establishment of independent churches and schools by 
aggrieved Africans, under the leadership of the local nationalist movement, did 
not augur well for the colonial state administrators for several reasons. First, state 
administrators were worried that they would not be able to control what was being 
taught and/or practised in the independent schools and churches. Secondly, at 
about the same time in Britain, female parliamentarians
55
 and feminists were 
urging the House of Commons to ban the operation because of the danger it posed 
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 K.N.A. PC/CP 8/1/2 cited in Native Affairs Department Circular #16, 23 June, 1931. 
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 Duchess of Atholl and Eleanor Rathbone, raised the subject for debate in the House of 
Commons (Pederson, 1991). 
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to infants and mothers during childbirth (Pederson, 1991; Shadle, 2006). Thirdly, 
the colonial state was also faced with the development of African political 
consciousness engineered by the new breed of missionary-educated political 
leaders who had spawned a variety of political associations, among them the 
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the most radical political organization in this 
period (Schilling, 1976).  
The colonial state‟s reaction to the emergent controversy over female 
circumcision demonstrates the close connection between politics and sexuality in 
colonial governance (Levine, 2004). Despite pressure from Europe, colonial 
officers in Nairobi were reluctant to endorse the missionaries‟ actions in banning 
female circumcision among their adherents or even to initiate aggressive anti-
circumcision campaigns for fear of losing ground in their patron-client 
relationship with local male power bases (Mufaka, 2003). When the missionaries 
refused to back down from their demands, Sir Edward Grigg, the Governor of 
Kenya at the time, not only disassociated the government from the missionaries‟ 
actions but also asked their leader, Dr. Arthur, to resign as the representative of 
African interests on the government‟s Executive Council (Pederson, 1991). While 
admitting that circumcision was physically damaging to women, the government 
saw its abolition as rather more dangerous to the colonial order (Boulanger, 2008; 
Snively, 1994). By incorporating individuals into the Kikuyu social order, 
circumcision was deemed beneficial to the provision of tribal discipline and 
indirectly to the stability of the colonial state (Pederson, 1991). To the state, 
therefore, the missionaries‟ ban on the practice was jeopardizing the stability of 
the existing tribal structures and hence of the colony. Besides, legislation to 
prevent the practice was not only difficult to enforce but also had the likelihood of 
uniting the Africans against the Government. 
The colonial government, by agreeing to legislate only against the more brutal 
form that included the removal of the labia, but not against clitoridectomy 
(Mufaka, 2003; Pederson, 1991),
56
 seems to have chosen to concentrate on female 
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 It is not clear which operation was more dominant because researchers have presented 
conflicting information. Leakey (1931) and Njambi (2004) have claimed that the mild one which 
involved the removal of the clitoral hood was the norm. However, Pederson (1991) notes that the 
colonial state in Kenya claimed the more brutal form that involved the removal of all external 
genitalia was the most common. 
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circumcision‟s impact on women‟s reproductive health and specifically on 
complications arising from circumcision during childbirth, rather than on its 
physical effects on women‟s bodies. It has been noted that the colonial 
government was at the time facing serious labour scarcity and circumcision had 
been identified as contributing to maternal mortality and morbidity (Boddy, 
1982).  Since clitoridectomy, which involved the partial removal of the clitoris, 
had no such consequences, the state may have found no need to legislate against it 
(Pederson, 1991). In support of the state‟s position, Dr. Baedeker, in a report to 
the Director of Medical and Sanitary Services, intimated: 
Regarding the results of female circumcision, I do not think there is 
any doubt that after the operations the open wounds become 
severely septic owing to the lack of cleanliness and antiseptic 
measures with the result that the inflammatory conditions 
following circumcision must ultimately end in adhesions in the 
vagina itself and incidentally causing a contracted vaginal orifice 
in cases of childbirth.
57
 
However, a Kenyan ethnographer, Leakey (1931), refuted the doctor‟s claims by 
arguing that increased problems during childbirth were a result of multiple factors, 
including operations by unskilled circumcisers and an increased faith in medical 
doctors which led to severe cases of health complications finding their way to 
missionary or government hospitals. For Leakey, the few complicated cases were 
not representative of the majority of women, who were not incapacitated by 
circumcision. 
Whatever the pain and danger involved in these operations, the colonial 
administration was extremely reluctant to support the missionaries‟ attempts to 
give the 1925 regulations teeth. Further, in contrast to the anti-female 
circumcision debate in Europe at the time, colonial state discourse in Kenya 
ignored the physiological effects of female circumcision on women‟s sexual 
response (Pederson, 1991). Instead, the colonial officers in Kenya felt that 
continued interference with the female practice would negatively affect the colony 
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 K.N.A. PC/CP 8/1/1; Report from Baedeker to Director of Medical and Sanitary Services 
forwarded to the Chief Native Commissioner, August 1930. 
 
95 
 
by drawing the local people into the arms of the nationalist movement, which had 
been provided with an issue around which solidarity could be fostered (Brendon, 
2010; Natsoulas, 1998). To strengthen their case, colonial state administrators in 
Kenya warned the central government in London of the possibilities of rape, 
murder and/or circumcision of white women in the colony if the ban was enforced 
(Hetherington, 1998).
58
 This argument by the colonial settlers in Kenya seems to 
imply that the safety of white women was dependent on the recognition of 
Kenyan men‟s rights (as seen in the persona of the nationalist movement), to 
speak for black women. Thus, in choosing to back down on the campaign against 
female circumcision, the Labour government in Britain seems to have accepted 
that the right to speak for women of one‟s own race and culture comprised a 
central component of male political rights (Pederson, 1991; Winter, 1994). 
Clearly, the female body was intrumentalized in the establishment of male 
prerogatives. Additionally, by withdrawing the legislation for fear of African 
men‟s reaction, the state adjudicated a situation in which women‟s needs, as 
claimed by traditional feminist analysis of the state, were bypassed in favour of 
those of men. 
Notable here, as I will demonstrate later in the chapter, is the alignment of the 
colonial state‟s interests and those of the nationalist movement on the issue as 
both supported the retainment of female circumcision. As with the reformulation 
of customary law earlier noted, it seems that men‟s anxieties about women‟s 
sexuality provided a point on which the opposing groups could reach agreement. 
For the colonial state, however, sustaining female circumcision also played a 
more important role in the discipline of African men who were seen as a threat to 
the maintenance of social order through possible unrest and uprising. Thus, 
despite the hostility that developed on both sides, the result of the circumcision 
controversy was the production of a regime in which the Kikuyu patriarchy and 
the colonial patriarchy colluded to silence Kikuyu women, as, although they were 
the central figures in the debate, they are conspicuously silent. 
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 This was given impetus by the murder of a white elderly missionary, Miss Hulda Stumpf, who 
some settlers in Kenya claimed had also been circumcised during the attack (Rosberg &  
Nottingham, 1966) 
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It is also worth noting that some researchers have accused European law makers 
and feminists who opposed female circumcision of hypocrisy for claiming to 
rescue Kenyan women and African societies while turning a blind eye to the 
brutality of colonialism and the benefits accruing to all Europeans in general 
(Boulanger, 2008; Njambi, 2007). Their purpose in interfering with female 
circumcision seems even more contradictory when viewed alongside the vested 
colonial political and economic interests. After all, the colonial administrators‟ 
initial support for the ban on female circumcision could not have been rooted 
simply in moral indignation over clitoridectomy, because this practice was also 
current in Europe in some quarters (Harcourt, 1988).
59
 Rather, colonial officers 
were wary of the political threat presented by the nationalist movement and the 
harm caused to their labour source, as newly circumcised youths would be out of 
work for months following the procedure (Boulanger, 2008; Robertson, 1997). I 
thus contend that the colonialists‟ earlier dignified arguments that the female 
circumcision ban was intended to protect African women from a barbaric rite of 
passage had been used to mask their real interests in colonial labour control and 
economic development, as the practice was widely held to account for low birth-
rates and high levels of infant and maternal mortality, hence lost population and 
ensuing low levels of production and consumption of imperial wares.  
4.3.2. Christian Missionaries and Female Circumcision 
For their part, while the Christian missionaries‟ discourse was ostensibly about 
protecting African women‟s bodily integrity, their attempt to ban female 
circumcision was implicitly motivated by broader concerns regarding women‟s 
sexual morality. In addition to pub1icly licensing sexuality, the missionaries 
thought circumcision simultaneously licensed the social reproduction of 
backward, heathen bodies which needed to be brought into the realm of Christian 
morality. Thus, hidden behind the publicly more acceptable discourse of women‟s 
protection was not just the racist ideology that defined Africans as immoral, but 
also an attempt to reorder African women‟s sexuality as a means of redeeming 
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 At the turn of the century, European and American doctors used clitoridectomy as a cure for 
masturbation, nymphomania, lesbian inclination, hyper-sexuality, hysteria, epilepsy, catalepsy, 
melancholy, and even kleptomania (Harcourt, 1988; Lightfoot-Klein, 1989). 
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Africans.
60
 An examination of missionaries‟ response is important as it provides 
an opportunity to demonstrate that, contrary to traditional feminist perspectives 
that portray the state as a monolithic entity (see Chapter 2), the state is better 
understood as a site of struggle and compromise, wherein different groups, such 
as the missionaries, compete to influence state action and/or inaction. 
Examination of this issue also reveals how religious organisations have 
historically silenced women‟s voices in their female circumcision debates, just as 
they now do in the abortion debate in contemporary Kenya.  
As noted earlier, Protestant missionaries demonstrated their opposition to female 
circumcision by initiating a campaign requiring their followers to sign a pledge 
disavowing the practice. The by-laws legislated in 1926 demonstrated their 
attempt initially to modify the practice so as to make it less repugnant to the 
Christian conscience (Brendon, 2010; Snively, 1994). The by-laws limited female 
circumcision to the removal of the clitoris and required that only one operation be 
performed on a girl. Further, the government restrictions permitted only trained 
and registered women to perform the operations. However, it seems that by 1929, 
the Christian missionaries could no longer stand the practice and were intent on 
eliminating an operation that they thought painful, sometimes fatal, and always 
irreversible (Rosberg & Nottingham, 1966). Strangely, in response to the resultant 
abandonment of their schools and churches by their African faithful, Christian 
missions keen on retaining their young members, who would have otherwise left 
the churches or schools to get circumcised, chose to appropriate and christianize 
the circumcision ceremonies (Boulanger, 2008). This was done by encouraging 
girls to have the circumcision carried out by trained midwives in their mission 
hospitals and dispensaries (Murray, 1976; Natsoulas, 1998). For example, the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS) 1931 Female Circumcision Guidelines read in 
part: 
 That the ceremony be performed hygienically and without publicity, and 
that only communicants of the church be present. But in the event of girls 
belonging to parents not baptised, the same be entrusted to Christian 
women duly chosen by the parents. 
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 This will be demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, where it will be shown the same ideology is 
behind religious anti-abortion discourse, as well as HIV/AIDS prevention measures that promote 
abstinence. 
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 That the ceremony be entirely disassociated from repugnant customs 
before and after, and that antiseptics be supplied free.
61
  
While Christianizing and medicalizing the operation addressed the missionaries‟ 
concerns about the threats it posed to women‟s health, the explicit exclusion of 
ceremonies that, according to the missionaries, placed “undue emphasis on sexual 
life” (Thomas, 2003, p. 22), raises questions regarding why missionaries had 
wanted to ban circumcision in the first place. Effectively, by abolishing the public 
celebrations, the songs, the dances and the feasting which imparted sexual 
knowledge to the newly circumcised girls, the missions engineered the separation 
of the physical operation from its social meaning. In fact, the missionaries not 
only ignored circumcision‟s social role in promulgating morality, but actively 
denied and simultaneously reversed any social role it may have had. Dr. Arthur, in 
a Church Missionary Society (CSM) memo, claimed that: 
It has been stated that, where initiatory in character, the rite is usually 
accompanied by definite instruction on social matters. Among the Kikuyu 
however, little, if any, specific instruction is given. On the other hand, the 
incidental teaching of village life, and the sex appeal of the dance-song, 
begun in early childhood, and culminating in the emotionalism of the 
circumcision ceremony, undoubtedly constitute a full preparation for 
sexual life. There is little doubt, however, that this preparation is 
corrupting in its effect, and, moreover, psychologically dangerous in the 
undue emphasis on sexual life which it engenders in the mind of the 
initiate.
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A major consequence of the separation of circumcision‟s social meaning from the 
physical operation was that without public visibility, the physical operation, the 
very centre of controversy, could now be done secretly. In other words, the female 
circumcision ban reduced it to a clandestine excision thus making it more 
dangerous as it could be performed by incompetent people (Thomas, 2003). This 
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has happened with abortion in Kenya where women resort to untrained 
individuals since legal abortions are unavailable. 
The fact that female circumcision was provided in mission hospitals and 
dispensaries demonstrates that the physical operation itself was not the contested 
aspect of the practice. Missionary opposition to the female circumcision 
ceremonies can therefore be deduced as being grounded in circumcision‟s 
relationship to sexuality, as noted by the above quotation. As far as missionaries 
were concerned, far more damaging than the removal of the clitoris was the fact 
that circumcision allowed women, or more specifically, adolescent girls, to 
become sexually active (Leakey, 1931; Murray, 1976). To the missionaries, 
described by Murray (1974, p. 48) as “puritan „Victorians‟ in the fullest sense of 
the word” and for whom “drinking, smoking, dancing, and other worldly 
amusements were regarded as sinful”, the circumcision ceremonies not only 
undermined the moral formulations of British middle-class culture, but worse still, 
made sexuality a social and public issue by making initiates witness a 
demonstration of sexual intercourse by an elder couple (Snively, 1994). 
Additionally, after circumcision and before marriage, men and women were 
allowed to engage in a form of limited sexual activity termed Nguiko, a form of 
mutual masturbation which stopped short of actual intercourse (Edgerton, 1989; 
Kratz, 1994; Leakey, 1977; Maloba, 1993; Shaw, 1995). The Nguiko normally 
followed a public dance in which dancing partners were kept for the night either at 
a man‟s thingira (bachelor‟s house) or a woman‟s Kiriri (girl‟s sleeping place) 
(Njambi, 2007; Shaw, 1995). In Leakey‟s (1977) words, the boys were “instructed 
to lie with a girl, caress her breast and have a form of mutual masturbation”. Thus, 
unlike European girls who were chaperoned in order to observe chastity, Kikuyu 
girls had to accomplish this by remaining virgins in a sexually charged 
environment (Shaw, 1995).   
It is this sexual freedom that Leakey (1977) and Kenyatta (1938) cite when 
asserting the superiority and humanity of African traditions over those of 
Europeans (Njambi, 2007; Shaw, 1995). Kenyatta (1938), for example, argues 
that Europeans, who kept their youths separated and chaperoned, could not 
understand the moral strength and restraint exercised by Kikuyu youths. To him, 
the European traditions denied unmarried people legitimate ways to express their 
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sexuality in exchange for spiritual purity. Kenyatta observes that, “In order not to 
suppress entirely the normal sex instinct, the boys and girls are told in order to 
keep good health they must acquire the techniques of practicing a certain 
restricted form of intercourse, called umbani na nguiko (platonic love and 
fondling)” (1959, p. 149). Through Nguiko, Kikuyu women were trained to 
respond to a wide range of bodily sensations in addition to allowing them time to 
appreciate their bodies‟ responses in preparation for marriage (Shaw, 1995). 
Furthermore, sexual activity between the men and women circumcised together 
during the same ceremony could take place for the rest of their lives, regardless of 
marital status. 
Female circumcision and Nguiko are quite relevant to the current research on 
abortion in Kenya. Nguiko played the dual role of preventing premarital 
pregnancies while at the same time acknowledging premarital sexual needs and 
desires (Njambi, 2007). In fact, increased instances of unwanted pregnancies at 
the time were blamed on restrictions placed on the practice by the colonial officers 
and church missionaries. Kenyatta (1938) notes that in the pre-colonial 
communities, sexual restraint was demanded of couples and punishment for 
noncompliance included ostracism. In his words: 
The stigma attached to the ostracism was far greater and very much 
worse than that attached to the European form of imprisonment. 
Many Gikuyu would prefer to go to jail rather than to be 
ostracised. The fear of this was one of the chief factors which 
prevented the people from committing crimes. (1938, p. 230) 
Following the establishment of the colonial government, many young people 
awakened to the fact that under the new regime, there was no punishment for 
premarital pregnancy, and so they began to engage in full intercourse (Leakey, 
1931). The natural result was young women getting pregnant after circumcision, 
which led to a rising clamour for terminations. Note ought to be taken that like 
state officials, the missionaries paid little attention to the physiological effect of 
female circumcision. Pedersen (1991) argues that this was because female 
sexuality had not been overtly politicized at the time, and hence those who wished 
to defend female sexual pleasure lacked a language in which to phrase their 
objections to circumcision.  
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A rather intriguing element in the missionary response was the silence of the 
Catholic Church in the female circumcision controversy. Catholic Missions in 
Kenya had no problem with circumcision since, as far as they were concerned, it 
posed no threat to salvation (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Snively, 1994). Calverra, a 
Catholic Bishop of the Consolata Catholic Mission, observed that:  
I had the opportunity to discuss the matter of female circumcision 
with some leading Christians of Embu in the past days. They insist 
that the act is not necessarily connected with ceremonies repugnant 
to the Christian conscience; it can be, and actually is in many 
cases, performed in a nonobjectionable way, purely as a tribal 
custom to mark the passage of a girl to maturity. In these 
circumstances I wish to make it clear that to say that the Catholic 
Church heartily condemns it would overstate the case and lead to 
confusion. If there are immoral ceremonies and practices involved, 
these are condemned, not the act itself, which the Church considers 
indifferent on the moral point of view. May I suggest that it is for 
the Doctor, not for the Church, to say the final word on the 
matter.
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Since Catholic missions did not consider the operation an impediment to one‟s 
ability to be a good Catholic, it became common for young women who wanted to 
have the procedure done to turn to Catholic churches (Snively, 1994). It is 
possible that, since the controversy happened at a time when missions were 
competing for members, the Catholic mission‟s position was influenced by the 
need to attract more worshippers. Or, conversely, because the Catholic Church at 
the time did not have hospitals affiliated to them, they may not have experienced 
firsthand the health consequences of female circumcision, as did the Protestant 
missions. 
Although the above discussion is historical, and may seem out of place in a 
discussion on contemporary abortion, it has been important in showing the origin 
of Christian missionaries‟ interests in controlling women‟s sexuality which 
continues to date. Furthermore, I have also demonstrated how powerful forces 
such as religious groups may be in a position to influence public policy. In the 
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following section, I examine the nationalist movement‟s reaction to the 
missionaries‟ attempt to ban female circumcision.  
4.3.3. The Nationalist Movement and the Female Circumcision Question 
Issues of sexuality and reproduction often become central to nationalist politics 
because, as Yuval-Davis (1997) notes, discourses of gender and nation normally 
intersect and become mutually constitutive. In what follows, I argue that the 
Kenya nationalist movement‟s support for female circumcision was part of a 
tactic of social and political inclusion that was meant to yoke as many people as 
possible to the nationalist struggle, but without any consideration for women‟s 
welfare. Like in other African nationalist struggles, the Kenyan Central 
Association (KCA) sought to accomplish their objectives regardless of whether it 
deepened women‟s subordination (Chadya, 2003; Muhoro, 2002). 
The Kikuyu people found the missionaries‟ ban on female circumcision strange 
because the operation was seen as the equivalent of the male operation, which was 
not being contested. Although, as earlier noted, the ban exacerbated the 
nationalists‟ quest for schools and churches independent of the missions‟ control, 
it also provided a good opportunity for the Kikuyu Central Association 
(henceforth KCA) to attract considerable support by advocating a rejection of 
mission teachings and by defending Kikuyu tradition. This tendency of 
nationalists to be “retraditionalisers” (Nagel, 1996, p. 193), and to embrace 
tradition as a legitimating basis for nation-building and cultural renewal, has been 
noted in other places, including India.
64
 Citing the biblical passage that there was 
no difference between the circumcised and uncircumcised, and the fact that the 
Kikuyu translation of the Bible used the term muiritu – a circumcised but 
unmarried young woman – to refer to the Virgin Mary, the Kikuyu accused the 
missionaries of ulterior motives in banning the operation (Snively, 1994). They 
also found no specific prohibition of polygamy, in addition to discovering heathen 
practices such as animal sacrifice and circumcision in the Bible (Maina, 2004), all 
of which had been banned alongside female circumcision. Since the Kikuyu word 
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for circumcision, irua, does not distinguish between the male and the female 
versions of the practice (Leakey, 1956; Murray, 1976), many Kikuyu defended 
and continued to circumcise with the practice as they felt the missionaries were 
not sincere in banning female circumcision.  
To express their dissatisfaction with the missionaries and the colonial 
government, the Kikuyu developed a genre of scurrilous songs called muthirigu 
(Peterson, 2004; Thomas, 2003).
65
 These protest songs, sung by men and women, 
ridiculed and chastised Europeans and blamed the signers of the kirore for selling 
Kikuyu land and Kikuyu girls to the whites (Clough, 1998; Muhoro, 2002; 
Njambi, 2007; Peterson, 2004). The importance of these songs lies in the fact that 
the lyrics demonstrate how a defence of the Kikuyu sexual order became 
entangled with long-standing Kikuyu grievances about mission influence and 
access to land, and more importantly, a mark of loyalty to the incipient, as yet 
imaginary, nation (Boulanger, 2008; Muhoro, 2002; Pederson, 1991). Further 
politicization and sexualisation of the practice is evident in some muthirigu songs‟ 
claims that uncircumcised Kikuyu girls would not find husbands among the 
Kikuyu men and, therefore, would turn to Europeans who would not only marry 
them, but also would use them to obtain more Kikuyu land (Natsoulas, 1998).  
Evidently, the nationalist association had managed to reframe the debate from one 
about health and Christianity as presented by Protestant missionaries, to one 
centred on nationalism, land, and the integrity of traditional culture (Keck & 
Sikkink, 1998). The consequence of the elevation of female circumcision to being 
a symbol of cultural nationalism meant that the nationalists came to treat the 
missionaries‟ campaign against female circumcision as an act of cultural 
imperialism (Leakey, 1931). It appears that to the nationalists, circumcision was 
the dominant symbolic marker of one‟s membership in the Kikuyu social body 
and as such, its demise would ultimately lead to the demise of Kikuyu society. 
Jomo Kenyatta (1959), in defence of the practice, has argued that: 
The real argument lies not in the defence of the surgical operation or its 
details, but in the understanding of a very important fact in the tribal 
                                                          
65
 Because the means of passing information was limited, the muthirigu provided a convenient way 
of passing secret messages through songs which could be sung anywhere and at any time. 
104 
 
psychology of the Gikuyu, that this operation is still regarded as the very 
essence of an institution which has enormous educational, social, moral, 
and religious implications, quite apart from the operation itself. For the 
present, it is impossible for a member of the tribe to imagine an initiation 
without clitoridectomy. Therefore the abolition of the surgical element in 
this custom means to the Gikuyu the abolition of the whole institution. The 
real anthropological study, therefore, is to show that clitoridectomy, like 
Jewish circumcision, is a mere bodily mutilation, which, however, is 
regarded as the condition sine qua non of the whole teaching of tribal law, 
religion and morality. (p. 133) 
To nationalists and their supporters, blocking circumcision for women was 
tantamount to blocking self-procreation for the entire population (Maina, 2004). 
As such, an attack on female circumcision was perceived as an act of aggression, 
not merely against individual women‟s bodies, but also against the Kikuyu body-
politic (Snively, 1994). In this way, the nationalist movement sought to show the 
political function of clitoridectomy as that of maintaining the whole Kikuyu 
society. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) note, the missionaries‟ desire to intervene in 
the most intimate practices of the home strengthened the association between 
home and nation. In a way then, Kikuyu women became pawns in the struggle for 
dominance between the colonial state, missionaries, and traditional Kikuyu 
interests (Presley, 1992). This politically gendered angle to the nationalist 
campaign confirms Cynthia Enloe‟s observation that nationalisms have “typically 
sprung from masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised 
hope” (Enloe, 1989, p. 44). 
The Kikuyu Central Association was not the only nationalist movement in Kenya 
at the time. The Progressive Kenya Party (henceforth PKP) was, however, unlike 
the KCA, in support of the missionaries‟ attempts to ban female circumcision. 
Notably though, although PKP members claimed that female circumcision was an 
infringement of women‟s moral and physical integrity, their major reason for 
supporting the ban was because it was good politics (Peterson, 2004). With a 
membership of the influential chiefs, merchants, and teachers, the party supported 
the ban with the hope of becoming clients to the British colonial patrons as they 
lobbied for local representatives on the Legislative Council, from which they were 
exempted (ibid.). As some party members explained: 
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The beginning of civilization is in the honoring of women, because the 
strength and power of a people comes from its women. The nation which 
belittles women, we know that they do not go forward but go back.... We 
of the PKP hate customs which bind the Kikuyu and prevent them from 
knowing the true religion, and going forward in civilization and becoming 
a strong people, able to receive their inheritance in mind and body. We 
want [women] to be whole in body, able to speak the truth, and give 
evidence in their cases, so that the Government can trust us as being a full-
grown nation with clean customs. (PCEA, 1931 as cited in Peterson, 2004, 
p. 87) 
Additionally, some members of the PKP, who were mainly the ruling African 
elite, were also interested in protecting their authority, which was threatened by 
the young leaders of the KCA who had begun to castigate the Local Native 
Councils and denounced both senior chiefs and generation elders for their support 
of female circumcision reform (Ambler, 1989). In conjunction with colonial 
officers, the African elders agreed that the activities of the KCA were a sign of a 
broader and highly disturbing breakdown of male elder domination which was 
detrimental to the maintenance of law and order. Evidently then, like the KCA, 
the PKP was also using the female circumcision issue to further its own political 
aspirations. In fact, as soon as the members realised that the colonialists would not 
share power with them, the PKP crumbled in 1932, only four years after it was 
founded (Peterson, 2004). 
It is notable that the nationalist movement, the Christian missions and the 
government focused on the effects of female circumcision on female bodies that 
were decontextualized, depoliticized and conceived as essentially passive. In other 
words, when the female circumcision issue became politicized, women seem to 
have disappeared, both as participants and as political subjects from a discourse 
that was ostensibly about them. The focus on the possible effects of the ban on the 
stability of the colonial state effectively led to a discursive shift away from the 
personal implications of the rite for real women‟s experiences to its political 
implications. Consequently, there was a simultaneous shift from a focus on 
women to a focus on men, and, specifically on their political actions and interests. 
In fact, as I demonstrate in the following section, colonial state‟s discourses on 
female circumcision construed Kikuyu women as passive observers, rather than 
active participants.  
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4.4. Kikuyu Women in Colonial State’s Discourses of Female Circumcision  
The failure of the colonial government‟s and missionaries‟ campaigns against 
female circumcision could have resulted from their failure to understand the 
significance of the practice from the perspectives of the women concerned. 
Hetherington notes that: 
The conclusion that none of the participants in these debates had any idea 
about how to control female circumcision is irresistible. The rhetoric on 
the subject came almost entirely from African and European men, all of 
whom seemed greatly concerned about this issue, but none of whom 
considered consulting the women who controlled this activity (1998, p. 
122). 
By controlling the terms of the discourse, the Europeans assumed changes in 
practices carried out by women could be negotiated through particular groups of 
men, and therefore failed to address the political motivations behind the women‟s 
support and continued participation in circumcision (Hetherington, 1998). In what 
follows, I discuss colonial administrators‟ understanding of women‟s subjectivity 
in the female circumcision debate, and how this understanding shaped the colonial 
state‟s campaign against the practice. I also elaborate on the factors behind 
Kikuyu women‟s unwillingness to abandon a practice that marked their formal 
initiation into womanhood.  
In her description of colonialism, Mohanty (1991) notes that local men and 
women were inserted into systems of rule that were constructed and defined in 
fundamentally gendered ways. For example, the colonists constructed politics as 
an exclusively male domain because from their perspective, colonised women 
lacked any formal power. As a result, local women were “scarcely if at all to be 
considered a part of civil society” (Spivak, 1988, p. 217) and any relationships 
with the local people were thus conducted with men who were, as Mohanty 
(1991) and Busia (1989/90) have noted, the real objects of colonial rule.  Thus, 
during colonialism, African women lost even their previous status as political 
actors within traditional politics, since colonial administrators did not consider 
them worthy clients.  
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On the one hand, the European construction of African women as passive 
participants in local politics meant that women remained largely invisible to the 
colonial administrators.
66
 On the other hand, the colonialists remained ignorant of 
the power women wielded in the community at large, and over female 
circumcision in particular (Thomas, 2003). Their ignorance can be deduced from 
official documents in which women are mentioned only as daughters or wives. 
For example, while explaining the reasons behind local opposition to the female 
circumcision ban, Lambert, a colonial District Commissioner, identified 
detribalisation as one of the major factors. He observed that:  
a. Fathers of girls who had repudiated female circumcision or married to 
men who had repudiated female circumcision could naturally have no 
more to do with their daughters and sons-in-law; this means that they 
would probably suffer loss owing to the tribal system of payment of 
dowry over an extended period; when payment of the whole dowry 
was claimed at once it was rarely obtained, since sons-in-law were too 
poor to pay it. 
 
b. The alienation of father from son [who marries an uncircumcised girl] 
was a bad thing from many points of view and was unjust to the 
father. A son was provided with a wife from his father‟s property, not 
his own. In return the father expected support from his sons and 
grandsons in his old age. If his sons repudiated tribal law he would 
have neither sons nor grandsons and the family inheritance had been 
squandered for the procreation of an alien tribe. 
 
c. Land was in the hands of the muhiriga (lineage), and could not be 
owned in any sense by people of another tribe. The self-detribalised 
sons could have no right to clan land and had better be provided with 
plots on Mission land. Fathers naturally wished their sons to inherit 
but no father dare be so disloyal to the tribe as to allow a “Kavirondo” 
(foreigner) to inherit from him.
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In this official discussion about a female operation, women not only appear 
merely as wives or daughters, but also as a group with no interests at all in a rite 
performed on their bodies.  Although focus is directed toward the possible 
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economic losses that men could suffer, an uncircumcised girl would not fare any 
better. She probably would remain unmarried and poor because land was usually 
provided by a husband (Leakey, 1931; Kenyatta, 1938). Additionally, like the 
father cited above, the mother of a detribalised son would similarly have no 
daughters-in-law to take care of her in her old age.  
Encouraged by African Christians who had repudiated female circumcision, state 
officials had hoped their attempts to control the practice would be interpreted and 
appreciated as saving local women from a rite they considered unnecessary (Keck 
&  Sikkink, 1998; Njambi, 2007). As such, the Europeans were surprised by 
women‟s participation in muthirigu protest songs, as well as by their refusal to 
abandon the practice. However, instead of interpreting the women‟s refusal as 
political, the Europeans blamed it on their backwardness and traditionalism 
(Njambi, 2007; Snively, 1994).  Informed by ideologies which defined men as 
more reasonable and African women as especially barbaric (Shaw, 1995; Stones, 
1926), colonial officers argued that: 
a) Most of the opposition comes from the old women, who are pushing 
their husbands into opposition. The elders admit that they are not unduly 
worried about breaking the custom, but they are very worried at the 
thought of losing bride price, and say that men will refuse to marry 
uncircumcised girls, and that the parents will suffer loss. 
b) The younger men are perfectly prepared to accept the ADC law, but are 
a little afraid that their mothers will refuse to allow uncircumcised women 
into the house.
68
 
Notable here is the fact that although the colonial officer acknowledges women‟s 
influence on their husbands‟ stance against the ban, he does not dwell on the 
reasons behind the women‟s position. Significantly, while the colonial officers 
ignored women‟s power over the rite, African men seem to allude to it by making 
reference to wives‟ and mothers‟ authority. It is therefore difficult to understand 
why, unlike African men, the colonial administrators failed to identify women‟s 
resistance as political even when African men demonstrated their willingness to 
defer to women‟s authority. I would suggest that by continuing to perform 
clitoridectomy and dance Muthirigu, women were laying claim to autonomy from 
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the African men who were attempting to take control of the female body,
69
 and 
resistance to the colonial power attempting to control African politics. As 
Lambert, a colonial administrator noted, the ban yielded nothing and: 
The only results of all the controversy have been a vastly increased 
membership of the Kikuyu Central Association, an extreme distrust of the 
Mission by the people, and almost universal antagonism to the Pastorate 
Committees. Nothing whatever has been achieved in the direction of the 
abolition of the rites or towards purging the church of pagan customs.
70
 
Of importance here is the fact that not all women were opposed to the ban on 
female circumcision. There was a small but consistent group of local people who 
had converted to Christianity and it is they who gave the missionaries and colonial 
officers the leverage to intervene in the first place (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). In 
1928, this group of women had formed an organisation “Ngo ya Tuiritu” (Shield 
of Young Girls) to protect girls who wanted to avoid circumcision (Peterson, 
2004).
71
  They depicted female circumcision as an unwanted loss of autonomy 
and agency. Using arguments that show their views had become intertwined with 
those of the white missionaries and colonial officials, the women reasoned as 
follows:  
We have heard that there are men who talk of female circumcision and we 
get astonished because men do not give birth and feel the pain. Some 
[women] die and others become infertile and the main cause is 
circumcision. Therefore circumcision should not be forced. People are 
caught like sheep; one should be allowed to find her own way either to be 
circumcised or not without being dictated to about one‟s body 
(Presbyterian Church of East Africa-PCEA, 1931, as cited in Peterson, 
2004, p. 86). 
However, at the time, the KCA succeeded in making the ban on female 
circumcision a critical mobilizing force in generating Kikuyu anti-colonial 
sentiment (Edgerton, 1989; Kenyatta, 1959; Kratz, 1994; Maloba, 1993; 
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Odhiambo & Longsdale, 2003). In explaining the KCA‟s growing influence 
during the controversy, Maloba wrote: 
It became the chief advocate of Kikuyu cultural traditions and the 
necessity of female circumcision. This appealed to a large section of 
people and won it a lot of temporary supporters. In championing the 
circumcision issue, the KCA appeared responsible and respectable to both 
the young and old in Kikuyu society who were worried about the loss of 
their cultural heritage at the hands of Christianity as taught by white 
missionaries. (1993, p. 48) 
It can therefore be said that for both men and women, the female circumcision 
controversy was a political issue framed by nationalist sentiments triggered by 
economic hardship, land deprivation/alienation, cultural suppression, imposition 
of taxes, violence, racism and forced labour (Edgerton, 1989; Kratz, 1994; 
Molaba, 1993; Odhiambo & Longsdale, 2003; Ogot, 2003). However, for women, 
female circumcision was much more than that, as I demonstrate in the next 
section. 
4.4.1. The Importance of Female Circumcision for Kikuyu Women 
Imperialist power did not come to emancipate us .... Imperialist scholars 
could write about us Africans as barbaric, uncivilized, morally, mentally, 
and sexually debased people while ignoring their barbaric, uncivilized 
aggression against our men and women. (Saadawi, 2005, p. 24) 
Contrary to the colonial government‟s belief, women‟s participation in female 
circumcision was not a result of blind adherence to tradition, naked patriarchal 
power, or false consciousness. Neither was it a result of African women being 
barbaric, primitive or uncivilised. Rather, the circumcision had social, economic 
and cultural significance for the women. I would like to make clear that in making 
this claim, I am not seeking to justify female circumcision. Rather, my intention is 
to bring to the fore the often overlooked factors behind African women‟s 
unwillingness to abandon the practice. Additionally, I also intend to demonstrate 
the inability of Western-based theories to account both for the actions of Third 
World states, and for the lived experiences of the women who live there. 
Contemporary debate on female circumcision is often heated, with African 
feminists accusing their Western counterparts of adopting discourses that depict 
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African women as inferior, barbaric, silenced, and in need of saving (Saadawi, 
2005, p. 24). This Western view, like the colonial state in Kenya, has been 
characterised as silencing African perspectives, reproducing stereotypes, and 
deploying a profound ignorance of African culture and contemporary realities in 
ways that simultaneously construct the Western world as civilized and sexually 
egalitarian (Ehrenreich & Barr, 2005; Korieh, 2005). As critics point out, while 
attacking female circumcision, mainstream Western feminists ignore similar but 
equally problematic types of genital surgeries that occur in their own countries 
(Njambi, 2004). These surgeries, like African female circumcision, are performed 
to make these individuals‟ genitalia and bodies conform to societal expectations 
and are not only equally unnecessary, but often result in pain, infection, sexual 
and physical dysfunction, and permanent disfiguration (La Barbera, 2009). 
Cosmetic surgeries to which some Western women consent in order to have their 
bodies conform to patriarchal gender norms include breast augmentation surgery, 
hymen repair, vaginal tightening, clitoral hood removal (clitorodomy), 
liposuction, designer vaginoplasty, and even genital reconstruction (Ehrenreich & 
Barr, 2005). 
Among the Kikuyu, as in other communities that practice it, circumcision was a 
significant rite of passage for men and women. It celebrated their passage into 
adulthood and, through genital operations on the body, marked them as full 
members of society. As African elders discussing the ban on female circumcision 
explained to a state colonial officer:  
Those who had taken the oath [to support the ban] must repudiate it or 
suffer the full consequences of detribalisation. Tribal privileges could only 
be accorded to members of the tribe; no uncircumcised person could be a 
member of the tribe and no person who refused to allow his children to 
become members of the tribe could be granted tribal privileges, since he 
had failed in his main duty to his tribe, which was to support its integrity 
and maintain its strength by bringing up his children to become members 
of it.
72
  
In addition to being accepted into the society, an initiate also became an adult 
woman and thus ready to be a wife and mother (Njambi, 2007). Uncircumcised 
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  K.N.A. PC/CP 8/1/1; extract from Confidential file of DC Embu, 15 Oct. 1929. 
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girls were not considered capable of giving birth, and if a girl became pregnant, 
she was severely punished and at times forced to have an abortion or arrange for 
the baby‟s murder at birth (Shell-Duncan et al., 2000). In some instances, both the 
girl and her father could be killed together by the tribe. Such a punishment implies 
that a father who failed to protect the chastity of his daughter would be equally 
severely punished (Hetherington, 1998). 
Female circumcision served as an introduction to, and a mark of respect for, a 
hierarchy of women in which the senior age-grades wielded significant authority 
(Robertson, 1991). By transforming adolescent girls into women, circumcision on 
the one hand differentiated them from younger girls, and on the other, facilitated 
their mothers‟ advancement to the privileged position as members of Kiama gia 
aka, the Women‟s Council (Njambi, 2004).  Membership of this privileged and 
prestigious council, which dealt with agricultural matters like food crops, rainfall, 
and land use, and also the discipline and regulation of the social life of girls and 
women, was every Kikuyu woman‟s dream (Robertson, 1993). Goldschmidt 
(1986) suggests that circumcision enhanced women‟s status by binding them 
together as a group in possession of ritual secrets revealed through initiation; men 
respected and feared these secrets, thereby offering women greater leverage in 
male/female interactions. Additionally, all the girls circumcised at the same 
ceremony heightened each other‟s status by binding them together in particular 
riika (age-set) that fostered solidarity, mutual aid and sisterhood (ibid.).  
In addition to ignoring the social significance of the practice, colonial debates on 
the abolition of female circumcision failed to pay attention to the economic 
importance of circumcision to women. On marriage, a woman was allocated land 
and some livestock in her husband‟s family (Kenyatta, 1938). Since polygamy 
was the norm, a woman exercised a considerable amount of authority in her own 
household, which could eventually grow to include her sons, daughters, and 
daughters-in-law (Mackenzie, 1986; Obbo, 1976). Amongst the Kikuyu, 
cultivation rights “were inherited by individual sons on marriage, each son being 
allocated a portion of land cultivated by his mother for his wife‟s use” 
(Mackenzie, 1986, p. 383). In other words, a woman “was the medium through 
which individual rights to land were transmitted to her sons” (Mackenzie, 1986, p. 
383) and by extension to their wives. Consequently, the relationship between a 
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woman and her mother-in-law was both political and economic. To access rights 
to the productive resource, it was important for a girl to have been properly 
initiated into tribal membership through circumcision. Otherwise, she would be 
rejected by her mother-in-law to be. 
Another important part of circumcision was the knowledge imparted to the 
initiates (Njambi, 2004). This involved traditions, laws, manners, the duties of 
adults, ideas of appropriate behaviour regarding sexual intercourse, child rearing, 
or generally any knowledge necessary to function as a successful adult in Kikuyu 
society (Leakey, 1931). As Kenyatta (1938, p.110) observes, during the 
circumcision ceremonies “boys and girls must be given full knowledge in the 
matters relating to sex, to prepare them for future activities in their own 
homesteads and in the community”.  
At another level, circumcision functioned to define sex and gender identity 
(Grande, 2004). As evidenced by general African popular culture, it was believed 
that people were not born men or women; rather, they became so (Forna, 2006). 
Because children were born androgynous, the removal of the foreskin and the 
clitoris was intended to rid them of the outward signs of sexual duality before 
assuming adult bodies and roles.  Boddy (1982) observes that in strictly sex-
segregated societies, women achieved social recognition not by becoming like 
men, but by emphasizing their differences. Thus, by removing that part of the 
external genitalia thought to most resemble that of the opposite sex, circumcision 
was believed to enhance the masculinity of boys and the femininity of girls 
(Helander, 1988; Winter 1994).  Besides, the excised body was viewed as having 
achieved the aesthetic norm, since genitals in their natural state were considered 
unaesthetic, unclean, or even as harmful to women‟s health (Finke, 2006).  
Lastly, through circumcision, cultural and historical events were recorded upon 
the bodies of women and men, whose age-set was allocated a specific name to 
signify both the established bonds and the particular historical event that took 
place during that moment. Kenyatta (1959) observed that: 
The history and legends of the people are explained and remembered 
according to the names given to various age-groups at the time of the 
initiation ceremony. For example, if a devastating famine occurred at the 
114 
 
time of the initiation, that particular irua group would be known as 
„famine‟ (ng‘aragu). In the same way, they have been able to record the 
historical moment when Europeans introduced a number of maladies such 
as syphilis into the country, for those initiated at the time when this disease 
first showed itself are called gatego, i.e., syphilis. Historical events are 
recorded and remembered [in the body] in the same manner. Without this 
custom a tribe that had no written records would not have been able to 
keep a record of important events and happenings in the life of the nation. 
(pp. 129-30) 
As Kenyatta explains, ritual female circumcision cuttings were fundamental to the 
tribal psychology, asserting and reinforcing the educational, social, moral, and 
religious belonging to the society. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, I looked at sexual and body politics in colonial 
Kenya and how these influenced the dealings of the coloniser with the colonised 
people. By demonstrating how the colonial state‟s reconstitution of tribal 
leadership and customary law disadvantaged women, I have shown the 
importance of focusing on colonial experiences in the formulation of feminist 
theories of the state. Specifically, the chapter demonstrates the need to consider 
how the nature of neo-patrimonial politics introduced by colonialism, as stipulated 
in the Critical African Feminist Perspective, continues to affect women in general, 
and gender politics in particular. Even after independence in 1963, the interplay of 
the gendered and religious legacies of colonial rule have continued to impede 
gender reforms as they remain embedded in a seemingly static artificial and 
patriarchal customary law, in contrast to neoliberal economic reforms which have 
progressed relatively rapidly. In fact, rather than being seen as a remnant of the 
past, what is today presented as tradition in fact reflects more the interaction of 
the colonial administration‟s ideas about correct gender relations with those of a 
conservative male elite, and those of the Christian missions. As such, although 
abortion in pre-colonial communities was an acceptable remedy for unwanted 
pregnancies, a common argument against its legalisation in contemporary Kenya 
is that it is unAfrican (as discussed in Chapter 6).  
In the second part of this chapter, I used the female circumcision controversy to 
demonstrate how the colonial state‟s attempts to redirect African women‟s bodies 
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and sexualities into the service of the state and capital had the effect of 
institutionalising a previously unknown situation in which the state could regulate 
people‟s bodies and sexuality. I have shown that the colonial state abandoned 
plans to ban female circumcision because, as far as colonial officers were 
concerned, they had little to gain and much to lose in the form of social order by 
interfering with the local practice. Similarly, by resisting the ban, the local 
nationalist movement had much to gain by attracting more supporters. Between 
these two groups of men, therefore, there was little incentive to upset the cultural 
norm. Even Christian missionaries, who supported the ban on female 
circumcision, were interested not in women‟s rights to bodily integrity and self-
autonomy, but rather in enforcing their own version of Christian morality.  The 
colonial state‟s failure to consider women‟s interests in the issue, as shown in the 
last section of the chapter, demonstrates the problems inherent in using women‟s 
issues to negotiate political ends. 
The importance of this chapter to the study of abortion discourses in Kenya lies in 
the fact that the colonial state‟s reaction to female circumcision provides a 
template for post-colonial Kenya‟s treatment of the unsafe abortion issue. By 
choosing not to enforce laws against female circumcision to forestall a 
confrontation with the Kikuyu people and more so the members of the nationalist 
movement, the colonial state seems to have opted to embrace a tactic of strategic 
ambivalence, exemplified by its failure to articulate a clear and consistent 
standpoint on the issue. As will become evident in the next chapter, rather than 
address an issue that kills and maims thousands of women every year, Kenya‟s 
political elite, like the colonial officers of old, choose to ignore the issue for fear 
of alienating politically powerful forces such as traditionalists and religious 
leaders.  
This chapter also shows that unlike earlier western feminist theories of the state 
which evaluated the state using institutional and functionalist terms such as 
whether the state is good or bad for women, the Critical African Feminist 
Perspective, which configures the state and politics as a set of debates and 
struggles over meaning, best describes women‟s experiences during Kenya‟s 
colonial domination. As was clear during the development of customary law as 
well as during the controversy over female circumcision, all actors in the debate, 
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including the state, were involved in a struggle to articulate and institutionalize 
their interests. Although the colonial state may have had the power and authority 
to always act in its interests, that did not always happen as was evident during 
debate over female circumcision. As such, it is better to see the state as a site of 
struggle, not lying outside society and social processes, but having, on the one 
hand, a degree of autonomy and on the other, being permeated by the society. 
Additionally, by presenting African women‟s response to attempts to ban 
circumcision, I highlighted women‟s ability to resist state control, in direct 
contrast the picture created by Western feminist theories of the state (see chapter 
2). This is however not to dismiss the state‟s ability to influence women‟s lives. 
Rather, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter where I discuss the Kenyan 
state‟s abortion politics, the neo-patrimonial nature of the state significantly 
contributes to the creation of particular forms of gender relations and gender 
inequality. 
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Chapter Five 
The Governance Structures of Modern Kenyan State: The 
Emergent Politics of Abortion 
5.0. Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, an estimated three hundred thousand Kenyan women 
undergo induced abortion every year. However, although unsafe abortion has 
figured increasingly in public discourse, it has yet to be conclusively addressed by 
the Kenyan state. As a result, the question of what ought to be done about it is 
mired in ambivalence, obscurity and compromise, with the attendant problems of 
female mortality and morbidity being tacitly recognized but only partially 
addressed.
73
 In light of the divisive possibilities of the abortion question, 
successive post-independence Kenyan governments have favoured the strategy of 
sitting on the fence, an approach that is not unlike that of the colonial state in the 
case of female circumcision. However, inaction and ambivalence have become 
untenable as a result of various factors, among them public and media pressure to 
address the issue, and the increased ability of different groups to express 
themselves and influence the course of debate. The social actors in the debate 
include women‟s and other non-state organisations that have been asking the state 
to legalize abortion, and anti-abortion groups galvanised mainly by Christian 
churches, which have worked to prevent major policy change by the government. 
In this chapter, I provide an analysis of the Kenyan state‟s response in addressing 
the issue of abortion. Drawing on the Critical African Feminist Perspective, I 
examine the neo-patrimomial nature of the Kenyan state to unearth how and to 
what extent this influences the interplay of gender discourses and political 
practices that shape the process of dealing with abortion. I argue that the Kenyan 
political elite attempt to ensure and increase their political power, popularity and 
legitimacy, by adopting a neo-patrimonial system of governance (see Chapter 2), 
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The government has in the recent years taken steps to extend access to emergency contraception 
and improve post-abortion care. At the time of my fieldwork in 2009, for example, there were 
numerous advertisements for emergency contraception. 
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which, because of its accompanying patriarchal norms,
74
 tends to negatively affect 
women much more that other groups in the society. That is, although the political 
elite may not necessarily be opposed to abortion legalization, the patriarchal and 
neo-patrimonial nature and structure of the state has greatly influenced the state‟s 
response to the problem of unsafe abortion.  
My analysis revealed many reasons why abortion has failed to command a higher 
agenda status, and why attempts to revise the colonial abortion policy have been 
unable to gain traction. The discussion in this chapter focuses on three sets of 
factors: (1) political obstacles emanating from the patriarchal and neo-patrimonial 
state structure; (2) women‟s marginalisation from the socio-economic and 
political arena and the resultant low priority given to gender issues, particularly 
women‟s reproductive health; and (3), the resultant contradictory abortion 
politics. Although I have made a conscious effort to deal with each of the three 
issues separately, there are significant overlaps between them, as will become 
apparent in the following discussion. 
As a framework for examining the Kenyan state and its treatment of the abortion 
problem, I will begin by exploring the nature of the Kenyan state. Although this 
discussion may take the form of a Foucauldian genealogical analytics, my interest 
in the historical perspective stems not from a need to reconstruct the past, but 
from the need to understand and provide a context for the present Kenyan state. 
By locating traces of the present in the past (Foucault, 1979), I will endeavour to 
explain and contextualize the institutions of patriarchy and neo-patrimonialism, 
both common features of states in Africa (Lindberg, 2003), as well as demonstrate 
the development of a collaboration between patriarchal and state interests by 
which men are accorded patriarchal power in exchange for serving state interests. 
This has resulted in Kenyan women, like women in a majority of countries in 
Africa, remaining largely unrepresented in state governance (Tripp, 2001). A 
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 It has been noted that the state often uses patriarchalism in establishing its power (Adams, 2005; 
Charrad, 2011). Patriarchalism, understood to operate as part of patrimonial politics, is defined as 
including a combination of male dominance, extension of family symbols to politics, collectively 
useful marriage alliances, and expectations of reciprocal obligations (Charrad, 2011, p. 53). 
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direct consequence of such political exclusion from the state has been the 
sidelining, and perhaps disregarding of, women‟s issues such as abortion.  
5.1. The Political Landscape in Kenya: Neo-patrimonialism, Patriarchy and 
Abortion 
As noted earlier, the Kenyan state has opted to embrace a tactic of strategic 
ambivalence, exemplified by its failure to articulate a clear and consistent 
standpoint on the abortion issue. In an attempt to account for the Kenyan state‟s 
position on abortion, I will, in this section, focus on the evolution of neo-
patrimonialism in Kenya, and how the accompanying patriarchal characteristics 
have hindered the development of coherent and consistent policies. I demonstrate 
that, as is typical of neo-patrimonial states in Africa (see chapter 2), the Kenyan 
state lacks a coherent set of positions on abortion, which produces unpredictable 
state behaviour and an environment of uncertainty for both state officials and 
citizens. In such an environment, all actors in the debate appeal to both formal and 
informal institutions in an attempt to overcome the insecurity produced by 
uncertainty. This, in a way, mirrors Chabal and Daloz‟s (1999) observation that 
politics in sub-Saharan Africa are characterised by the “political 
instrumentalization of disorder”, wherein elites derive political and material gain 
from uncertainty and informality. Because such uncertainty enables contestation 
of legitimate positions (Leftwich, 2000), political and bureaucratic elites are 
unlikely to move towards greater institutionalisation of policy positions as this 
would rob them the benefit of changing their stands whenever it is considered 
necessary.
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The neo-patrimonial bureaucratic state that dominated Kenyan political life after 
Independence established an all-powerful executive through a broad range of 
constitutional amendments (Thompson, 2009). Although colonial rule had been 
manifestly authoritarian, the 1963 Independence Constitution had some 
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 For example, Charity Ngilu, a past Presidential candidate and a Minister for Health, has often 
communicated different messages on abortion depending on the audience.  In March 2003, for 
instance, she told a meeting of the International Planned Parenthood Federation that it was a gross 
violation of human rights to continue to deny women access to safe motherhood and abortion 
services (Coleman, 2003). Contradictorily, while addressing Parliament after the discovery of 
discarded fetuses in 2004, she is noted to have said that abortion would not be legalized and 
implied that the practice is morally repugnant and completely unacceptable (BBC News, 2004). 
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democratic safety-valves that resulted in wide dispersal of power within the 
country‟s political system (Gatheru, 2005; Mutua, 2008). Some of the features of 
the constitution included a bicameral parliament, a semi-federal system of 
governance that gave the regions relative autonomy from the central government, 
and separation of powers between the three organs of the state, among others 
(ibid.). However, given the ethnically divided nature of post-Independence Kenya, 
the leaders considered national unity and national development as the most urgent 
goals and consequently set in motion a series of constitutional amendments that 
also altered the existing democratic safety-valves (Mutua, 2001).  
Constitutional amendments began in 1964 when Parliament made Kenya a 
Republic.
76
 This amendment combined the powers and functions of the offices of 
Prime Minister and Governor-General and vested them in the new Office of the 
President (Ochieng, 1995; Omollo, 2002). With that change, the relationship 
between the President and Parliament also changed; it was no longer a system in 
which the President derived legitimacy from Parliament, nor one in which the 
President was constitutionally separate from the legislature, but one in which 
Parliament in reality came to derive its legitimacy from the President (Ocaya-
Lakidi &  Mazrui, 1973). This meant that Members of Parliament, and by 
extension their constituents, surrendered their constitutional rights to the 
Presidency. Thereafter, more constitutional amendments
77
 not only effectively 
installed a dictatorial order but also saw the Presidency ascend in power relative 
to Parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, the civil service, the local government 
and civil society organizations (Omollo, 2002). Some of the amendments gave the 
President the sole power of appointing judges, the Attorney General, the Chief 
Justice, nominated Members of Parliament and members of the electoral 
                                                          
76
 The 1963 Independence constitution had established a federal (majimbo) system of government 
with an executive Prime Minister and the British monarch as head of state (Mutua, 2001). 
77
 Among the amendments that were made were: that which unified the offices of the head of state 
and the head of government in 1964; that which removed the constitutional protection against the 
redrawing of regional and district boundaries or the creation of new regions or districts in 1964; 
that which reduced the percentage required for Parliament to approve a state of emergency from 65 
per cent to simple majority in 1965; that which removed the time limitations on state of 
emergencies in 1966; that which required Members of Parliament who defect or start a new party 
to seek a fresh mandate from their constituents in 1966; that which gave the President the authority 
to appoint the 12 nominated Members of Parliament in 1968; and that which allowed the President 
to waive the penalty (i.e., being banned from contesting elections for five years) on persons found 
guilty of an election offence in 1975 (Mutua, 2008). 
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commission (Andreasse, 1993).
78
 The Executive‟s control of Parliament and the 
Judiciary meant that the Office of the President was in a position to manipulate 
and influence the functions of the only two branches of the government that pro-
abortion activists could appeal to in order to have the law criminalizing abortion 
changed. Moreover, the unencumbered dominance of single party rule
79
 
exacerbated politics of patronage and sycophancy wherein individuals who 
displayed unwavering loyalty to the President were rewarded generously and 
those who did not were threatened with jail terms or detained (Mbondenyi, 2008). 
As such, the President‟s opinion on all issues including abortion was likely to be 
adopted by politicians and civil servants who wanted to retain their positions. 
Seemingly, both Parliament and the Judiciary, among other government agencies, 
were reduced to mere rubber stamps for the Executive. 
An important aspect of power centralisation is the role played by patriarchalism in 
providing cultural and political legitimacy of the extended authority. Political 
power became not only paternalised but also personalized, as both President 
Kenyatta and President Moi constructed themselves as baba wa taifa (father to the 
nation)
80
 (Branch & Cheeseman, 2008; Ogola, 2005). In fact, President Moi went 
further by adopting the same familial metaphors with regard to his political party, 
which became baba na mama (father and mother) (Ogola, 2005). In the moral 
matrix of legitimacy, the President is not just seen as standing in the same 
relationship to Kenyan citizens as a father to his children (Schatzberg, 1980); 
rather, he is both a matriarch and a patriarch, who would nourish and protect his 
subjects if they offered him respect and obedience in return. In addition to 
legitimising the President‟s unwillingness to share power, the family metaphors 
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 This was done in 1986 when Parliament enacted Act No. 14, which was followed in 1988 by 
Act No.4 which imposed limitations on the independence of the judiciary. Sections 61(1) and (2) 
of the Constitution empower the President to appoint the Chief Justice and appeal judges 
respectively upon the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), which is also 
appointed by the President. The 1986 and 1988 constitutional amendments provided for the 
removal of the security and tenure of the Attorney General, the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal.  
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 A 1982 constitutional amendment made Kenya a de jure single-party state. 
80
 In 1981, for example, Moi sternly warned former Vice-president Odinga, then a potential rival 
by stating, “I am the only father, the only head of government of this country” (Schatzberg, 2001, 
p. 59). 
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also implicitly legitimised patriarchal rule in general, and paternal authority 
specifically.  
These changes had consequences for women in general, and abortion politics in 
particular. In addition to entrenching and legitimating patriarchal norms, 
independent Kenya‟s paternalised patriarchal government also structured politics 
in a way that limited, if not prevented, the potential for women‟s leadership. 
Politics and the state were dominated by a predominantly male ruling political 
class that was also unapologetically masculinist (Nyokabi, 2008). In an attempt to 
achieve hegemony, the post-colonial state also used women‟s subordination and 
the ideology of male domination as unifying factors that could galvanise support 
from men as a group, alongside the adoption of neo-patrimonial politics. Thus, 
despite the low legitimacy and tribal politics that divided the ruling classes, a 
unifying male ideology helped shape alliances between African state institutions 
and patriarchal kin and family structures to perpetuate customary traditions that 
were discriminatory towards women.
81
 Using a similar argument, Fatton (1989) 
has argued that the marginalisation of women in Africa was a result of ruling class 
hegemony in post-colonial African states. Lacking legitimacy as a result of having 
inherited the colonial legacy of “bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-
client relations, and a complex ethnic dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and 
competition” (Berman, 1998, p. 305), the ruling class concentrated on defending 
their interests at the expense of subordinate groups, among them women. In that 
process, gender was used as “a means to consolidate the closure of classes” which 
partly involved the ruling class blocking entry to independent and autonomous 
women by eliminating their independent groups of representation and by reducing 
their participation in decision-making (Fatton, 1989, p. 47-57).  
This meant that post-colonial African leaders reneged on promises made to 
address women‟s concerns and gender equality during the nationalist struggles. In 
fact, rather than sharing with women the fruits of liberation, successive post-
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 A good example is the 1969 repeal of the Affiliations Act, which had allowed unmarried 
mothers to legally demand that the fathers pay for children they have outside wedlock. During 
debate in Parliament, male Members of Parliament who were otherwise divided on tribal politics 
employed a rhetorical strategy pitting the traditional against the modern and the customary against 
the civil, to galvanize support from men as a group and therefore institutionalized a law that 
preserved men‟s privileged legal position, while disempowering women (Thomas, 2003). 
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Independence governments across Sub-Saharan Africa sought to re-domesticate 
women and to construct the real African woman (as opposed to her Western 
emancipated counterpart) as the embodiment of tradition and a symbol of African 
nationalism (Soothill, 2007, p. 75). This construction was also generally 
accompanied by morality discourses that focused on women‟s sexuality, which 
became central to notions of nationhood and national belonging. The discourses 
idealised motherhood to the exclusion of women‟s other social and economic 
roles, and as Obbo (1989) has noted, discourses about the proper woman and her 
reproductive potential were also crucial to notions of national belonging. It is 
therefore very unlikely that such governments could propose or even support 
decriminalization of abortion. 
The unfavourable impact of patriarchy and male domination in structures of 
power has been exacerbated by the neo-patrimonial nature of Kenyan politics. By 
creating an environment in which state power is sought for personal enrichment 
(Cammack et al. 2007; Dorman, 2006), the agenda of most politicians and 
political parties has been to gain power, which is sustained through the allocation 
of public positions to political supporters and the distribution of public resources 
amongst ethnic power bases that in turn provide political support and legitimacy 
(Dorman, 2006; Kebonang, 2005). Because these patron-clientele relationships 
often have a gender element in their composition and operation, and negotiations 
are normally done outside the public forum, just like during formal colonialism, 
Kenyan women as a group have largely been excluded as benefactors in state-
linked clientelism (Tripp, 2001). Instead, male political elites at the national level 
maintain power through collusion with male leaders of sub-national ethnic and 
religious groups. Elections are therefore unusually competitive and some 
candidates engage in electoral malpractices such as violence and bribery to win 
(Kagwanja, 2003). All of these factors prevent women as a whole group – despite 
their class and ethnic differences – from exercising their constitutional right to 
vote and participate in politics.  
Women‟s exclusion from patronage has meant women remain largely 
unrepresented in state governance, which has in turn allowed women‟s issues to 
be sidelined (Fatton, 1989). While there has been a sprinkling of women in 
Kenyan politics, they have been too few and have either been socialized into an 
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androcentric political ethos, or too connected to the ruling class through 
femocracy to be of significant use to the larger majority of women. Mama (1995b) 
defines femocracy as: 
An anti-democratic female power structure, which claims to exist for the 
advancement of ordinary women, but is unable to do so because it is 
dominated by a small clique of women whose authority derives from their 
being married to powerful men, rather than from any actions or ideas of 
their own.
82
 (1995, p. 41) 
To Mama, femocracies exploit the commitment of the international movement 
towards greater gender equality in the interests of a small female elite. In Kenya, 
femocracy has not only ensured that only elite women benefit from patronage 
networks, but also helped reinforce patriarchal social systems. This stems from 
the fact that the femocrats assume the right to represent all female citizens and 
their concerns, while in fact endorsing their husband‟s and/or male relations 
political agendas (Gouws, 2004). In addition to these women being unlikely to 
support issues with potential to embarrass the men they are associated with, they 
are also unlikely to support female candidates who may independently seek 
elective positions, and may actively campaign against them. For example, while 
speaking against the Presidential candidature of a female aspirant in 1997,
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Zipporah Kittony, the leader of the largest women‟s organisation in Kenya and a 
relative of President Moi, urged women to vote for Moi because Kenyan women 
were not yet ready to rule the country (Aubrey, 2001). She told the female 
Presidential candidate, Charity Ngilu, that Kenyans still needed the fatherly 
guidance of the then president, Daniel arap Moi (Juma, 2003). 
Clearly then, neo-patrimonial politics, which facilitates patriarchal privileging and 
advances men‟s interests, has had a negative effect on Kenyan women since 
issues affecting them are, as Connell (1994) has noted, articulated in relatively 
peripheral parts of the state apparatus. Moreover, since the Kenyan state is 
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 It is important to distinguish this definition from the Western conceptualization. Eisenstein 
(1996), who first conceptualized the term femocrats in relation to Australia, argues that feminist 
bureaucrats representing feminist goals bring feminism into state institutions, thereby promoting 
the feminist gendering of policies. To her, Australian feminists succeeded in making women‟s 
issues like child care and domestic violence part of the mainstream political agenda. 
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 The female candidate, Charity Ngilu, has on some occasions supported abortion legalization in 
the country. 
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characterised by the cultural masculinisation of authority, women‟s place in the 
state is defined by men, who, because they benefit from the patriarchal structures 
as men, support the status quo. For, as Hartmann (1994, p. 570) has noted, “all 
men, whatever their rank in the patriarchy, are bought off by being able to control 
some women.”  
After this descriptive analysis of the nature of the Kenyan state, I will, in the next 
sections of this chapter, demonstrate how patriarchal ideologies, exacerbated by 
neo-patrimonial politics and its attendant norms such as corruption, have shaped 
policies concerning access to contraception, abortion and comprehensive sexuality 
education, and thereby impeded women‟s ability to make independent sexual and 
reproductive health choices. In line with the Critical African Feminist Perspective 
proposed as means of analysing the Kenyan state‟s abortion politics, I argue that 
neo-patrimonialism, coupled with patriarchal tendencies, have been behind the 
failure to effect policy changes on the abortion issue. I will show why the two 
bodies that could institute changes in this area, the Kenyan bureaucracy and the 
Kenyan Judiciary, have consistently failed to do so. Guided by information 
provided by my research participants and other secondary material, I examine 
how each of the facets of neo-patrimonialism – the concentration of political 
power, systematic clientelism, and the misuse of state resources (corruption) –, as 
well as patriarchy, have affected the abortion debate. I will begin by 
demonstrating how power concentration in the political elite, and more so in the 
Presidency has affected the government‟s ability to decriminalise abortion. 
5.2. A powerful Patriarchal Bureaucracy and the Abortion Debate 
The centralization of power in the executive as shown in the previous section has 
had a significant effect on the abortion issue in Kenya. This can be deduced from 
the following observations made by two pro-abortion participants in my research: 
I do think that one of the biggest factors that undermines the status of 
women in Kenya has a lot to do with the fact that for twenty-four years 
during Moi‟s regime, women were ignored because this was the attitude of 
the President himself: that women were neither to be seen nor heard. You 
could see it in his government for he never appointed any women in his 
government or cabinet. (NSA7) 
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I was in a delegation of the Committee of Experts from the Kenya 
government to the second meeting of the experts that were working on the 
draft Maputo Protocol [Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
People‟s Rights on Women in Africa]. At the time, we had no issues, 
unlike some countries that had put reservations on the issue of 
reproductive health among others. The draft went through and was adopted 
by Heads of States. Two years later, I asked the minister in-charge why the 
protocol had not been ratified. While answering the question in 
Parliament, this minister claimed that his ministry was working on it. But 
in private, he told me he was a Catholic and that he was uncomfortable 
with the abortion provision. I reminded him that the government had 
already committed itself, and as such, his personal opinions had no place. 
Unfortunately, our constitution does not factor in our commitment to 
international laws and therefore decisions in this country are made on the 
basis of personal convictions. So if a particular minister is a male 
chauvinist, nothing happens.
84
 (NSA4) 
In earlier sections, I have suggested that Kenyan elites have enjoyed enormous 
power over state apparatus and their personal opinions and preferences have often 
functioned as legitimate sources of social and political policies. As noted by 
NSA7 above, President Moi‟s opinion about women seems to have influenced 
their lack of participation in his government. In fact, the only time President Moi 
appointed a woman into the cabinet was just prior to the Fourth World Conference 
on Women held in 1995 in Beijing (Juma, 2003). It is possible to argue that the 
appointment was a result of shame arising from the fact that previous delegations 
to women‟s world conferences had routinely been led by men.85 The reasons 
behind his exclusion of women from governance became evident when, while 
opening a regional women‟s seminar in Nairobi on March 6, 2001, he accused 
women of having little minds and therefore being non-achievers. In his words, 
“You [women] can achieve more, can get more but because of your little minds, 
you cannot get what you are expected to get” (Warungu, 2001).  To him, it was 
not his sexist attitude that was responsible for women‟s exclusion; rather it was 
women‟s mental capacity. Apart from being an insult to women, the President‟s 
                                                          
84
 Although Kenya is signatory to the Protocol, it is yet to ratify it. Only 28 of 53 member states 
have ratified the Protocol (African Union, 2010). 
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 It is worth noting that the appointed female minister, Nyiva Mwendwa, was herself a member of 
the elite as she was the wife of a former Chief Justice, Kitili Mwendwa.  
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statement and opinion justifies discrimination against women as well as 
patriarchal domination.  
Similarly, the powerful Cabinet Minister referred to by NSA4 also failed to ensure 
the Kenyan government‟s ratification of a Protocol that guarantees women access 
to safe abortion because of his personal religious beliefs. In a country where 
personal opinions of the privileged ruling class influence public policy, it is highly 
unlikely that a controversial issue such as abortion can muster support particularly 
in a community where, to win elections, leaders require not just support, but 
sometimes the endorsement of religious groups. For example, President Jomo 
Kenyatta aligned himself with Protestants, whereas President Moi was an active 
and born again member of the African Inland Church (AIC). The current 
President, Kibaki, is a Catholic and has on various occasions publicly expressed 
his opposition to abortion. All the three religious groupings do not approve 
legalised abortion. 
However, I would argue that the Kenyan Presidents‟ and elites‟ public 
pronouncements and actions that suggest they are opposed to abortion are in fact 
primarily a political tactic intended to forestall the political fallout that could 
result from either complete enforcement of the law or abortion decriminalization.  
In the words of one research participant (NSA4), “the leaders want to have their 
cake and to eat it too.” By publicly opposing abortion but also ignoring 
clandestine abortions, and even providing post-abortion care for those who need 
it, political leaders are able to appease both anti- and pro-abortion actors, but also, 
and more importantly, male constituents who are generally opposed to abortion 
decriminalization (Kumba & Muiruri, 2009). This is consistent with neo-
patrimonialism, wherein unpopular and at times illegitimate leaders are often 
unwilling to jeopardise their political power bases by supporting policy issues that 
have the potential to undermine their popularity and legitimacy. As Cammack et 
al. (2007) have noted, insecure leaders in such states are usually more interested 
in maintaining their power rather than running the country. Consequently, they are 
likely to support solutions that are capable of delivering short-term political gain, 
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such as publicly opposing abortion,
86
 instead of coherent policy-making and long-
term development planning that could address the large number of deaths and 
health complications resulting from unsafe abortion. 
The fear of losing support, as well as the need to maintain support from powerful 
interest groups such as Christians and traditionalists, can be said to be behind 
Kenyan leaders‟ overreliance on populist policies, and also explains their 
contradictory messages and actions on the abortion issue. In 1998 for example, 
President Moi, without consultation with policy makers, gave into pressure from 
religious groups
87
 (The Economist, 1998) and shelved a Sessional Paper on 
family-life education even before it was debated by Parliament. If adopted, the 
paper could have provided mechanisms for the introduction of sex-education in 
schools. Unfortunately, although the benefits of sex-education in relation to 
unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortion have been acknowledged world-wide, 
Kenyan schools are yet to provide it because of opposition from religious groups 
(Kabirua et al. 2010).  
The ban on sex education in Kenyan schools, which persists to date despite the 
HIV/AIDS scourge, has resulted in a huge knowledge gap among school-going 
children and teenagers regarding their reproductive health. A research participant 
working for a state agency responsible for formulating and overseeing the 
implementation of population policies, strategies and programmes (SA10) 
explained how his institution‟s attempts to provide Kenyan young people with 
accurate information on their reproductive health needs and rights, as required by 
the Adolescent Reproductive Health and Development Policy (ARH&D Policy 
2003),
88
 were thwarted by religious leaders‟ representatives to the organisation. 
He explained that when his organisation was writing a reference book for youths 
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 In a country where more than 70 per cent of the population identifies as Christian and largely 
anti-abortion, this is certainly populist. This will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Catholic bishops and anti-abortion activists in Kenya have always been opposed to sex education 
being offered in schools. Following plans to introduce it, religious leaders led big demonstrations 
that included a public burning of condoms and other contraceptives in Nairobi (Kigotho, 1997). 
The religious leaders swore that no Catholic school would be allowed to offer sex education. 
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 The document can be found at 
http://hivaidsclearinghouse.unesco.org/search/resources/Kenya_Adolescent_Reproductive_Health
_and_Development_Policy.pdf 
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and adolescents, religious representatives objected to the inclusion of a chapter on 
modern methods of family planning. After lengthy negotiations, the religious 
leaders agreed to its inclusion as an appendix.
89
  This participant said religious 
leaders were able to influence the outcome after appealing to the President, who, 
being a Catholic, tacitly supported them. Although President Kibaki has publicly 
supported family planning, it is possible that his support for religious leaders‟ 
demand was political as he may have been wary of upsetting an important section 
of his supporters.
90
 This becomes more significant when considered alongside the 
fact that this was the year of the 2005 Constitutional referendum and the President 
needed the support of clergy men to have the Draft Constitution passed. The 
President seems to have succeeded since, unlike the 2010 Constitutional 
referendum when they campaigned against the Draft Constitution, religious 
leaders in 2005 urged their followers to follow their own conscience when 
deciding on whether to vote for the adoption of the Draft Constitution or not.
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The lack of sex education, which in turn leads to ignorance about contraceptive 
methods, was identified by the majority of my research participants as being one 
of the prevailing causes of high unwanted pregnancy rates and consequent unsafe 
abortions. In fact, research in Kenya has also shown that around 85 per cent of 
girls aged 15 to 19 years and 72 per cent of women aged 20 to 24 years reportedly 
do not use contraceptives (Gathara, 2010). While a further 70 per cent of 
adolescents in Kenya reportedly engage in unprotected sex, a survey conducted in 
Kenyan schools found that a mere third of the male students and a quarter of 
female students knew that contraceptive pills have to be ingested by females and 
not by males, and even fewer knew that these pills have to be taken every day and 
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 It is important to mention that this research participant said that when his organization sought 
feedback on the reference book from students, they were surprised to find the appendix was the 
most popular. 
90
The First Lady, Lucy Kibaki, has consistently campaigned for sexual abstinence as a means of 
containing HIV/AIDS spread. She once caused controversy when, against government policy that 
promotes condom use, she urged high school girls to avoid using condoms. In her opinion, “Those 
who are still in school have no business having access to condoms. Those who are in university 
and are not married have no business having condoms in their halls of residence” (BBC News, 
2006). 
91
 For instance, the head of a church of which I was a member said we were free to vote the way 
we chose. However, being a tribesman of the President, the clergyman advised us to also read the 
Draft Constitution carefully so as to notice the good things it had to offer. 
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not just prior to sexual intercourse (ibid.). It is therefore not surprising that a study 
by Taffa et al. (2003) found that 49 per cent of the female adolescents they 
interviewed had had sexual intercourse in the past, and that of these, 42.8 per cent 
had been pregnant at least once. The importance of these findings to the current 
research is that most of the pregnancies were reported as unwanted (ibid.). 
It is, however, important to add that it is not just young people who lack 
knowledge about contraceptives in Kenya. A research participant working for a 
women‟s organisation (NSA12) had the following to share:  
After the post-election violence at the end of 2008, we went to visit 
internally displaced women in Limuru during the International Women‟s 
Day. At that time, I was working with an organization called.... and we 
were accompanied by two nurses. After we had given them general legal 
information on their rights, the nurses started discussing family planning 
methods. Those women were shocked and after the meeting, many women 
came to speak to the nurses privately because they wanted contraceptives. 
They did not know there were ways of preventing pregnancy! 
This observation clearly suggests that for increased uptake of family planning 
services, awareness about the available services is paramount. In fact, recent 
research findings show that in Kenya, the likelihood of a woman using family 
planning services would be 26 per cent higher for women with knowledge of 
family planning services than those without (Oketch et al., 2011). A 2009 study 
on perceptions of family planning among low-income men in Western Kenya 
found that men also lack sufficient knowledge about sexual and reproductive 
health (Wambui & Alehagen, 2009). The researchers note that some adult men 
had no idea what family planning meant, with some saying it meant „having 
children with some kind of plan‟ (ibid.). Coupled with the fact that condoms tend 
to be associated with extramarital affairs and are thus most commonly used 
outside marriage, it is not surprising that married women are significantly 
represented in unsafe abortion statistics (see Chapter 7). 
Power concentration at the administrative level, in addition to leading to 
overreliance on populist policies, also leads to political interference in the public 
service. This is often easy because, as noted earlier, Kenyan Presidents and 
political executives have had the power to appoint all senior civil servants. This 
has had two major results in relation to abortion. On the one hand, public civil 
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servants function to please their appointing authorities, while on the other, 
because they normally do not owe allegiance to the citizens, civil servants 
generally have more incentive to act in favour of their private, as opposed to 
public interests. This factor may be behind the Kenyan state‟s treatment of 
reproductive health and, by extension, abortion as business as usual rather than as 
a crisis issue that it should be. One research participant (SA5) explained that 
because heads of government ministries (Permanent Secretaries) are political 
appointees, they often prefer to concentrate on curative services rather than 
preventive ones because these are more visible and are likely to improve their 
appointing master‟s political ratings. As such, difficulties in securing government 
prioritization of reproductive health care can be construed as having to do with 
political leaders‟ need for quick fix policies that also have the ability to deliver 
greater political impact. Unfortunately, because abortion, which is not only 
controversial but also highly contested, is unlikely to increase political popularity, 
it is never considered to be an emergency, unlike other health issues such as 
malaria, cholera, diarrhoea and, of late, HIV/AIDS. This participant (SA5) noted 
that the Kenya Service Provision Assessment Survey of 2004 had found that in 
the five years preceding the survey, the proportion of health facilities offering any 
method of family planning declined from 88 to 75 per cent. Unsurprisingly, the 
2003 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) revealed increases in 
unmet need for contraception and high contraception discontinuation rates 
(Blacker et al., 2005). Moreover, due to the culture of bureaucratic 
authoritarianism and personalism in Kenyan politics, elite are able to influence 
and to concentrate on policy issues that are less controversial and those that would 
deliver greater political advantage to themselves.  
At another level, the Kenyan elite‟s quest for power centralization saw it take 
control over autonomous bodies, among them women‟s organisations. President 
Moi, at the height of his power, ordered the affiliation of the Maendeleo Ya 
Wanawake Organization (MYWO), the oldest and largest national non-
governmental organization for women, to KANU, the ruling party (Stamp, 1991; 
Tripp, 2001).  As noted by a non-state actor (NSA7), the co-optation and placing 
of this organisation under the leadership of a fervent supporter of the ruling party 
not only introduced sycophancy but also allowed the state to have control of the 
organisational agenda, which in turn reduced its political role. Because the co-
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optation also involved older, less educated middle class women, it created what 
Amina Mama (1997, p. 148) calls “state feminism”, wherein the state is able to 
mobilise women on its own terms rather than offering them an opportunity for 
representation in governance. Nzomo (1996) has noted that ruling-party affiliated 
women‟s organisations not only found it difficult to establish their own 
independent agendas, but their focus was narrowed down to a set of development 
issues such as nutrition, health, women‟s morality, childcare and homemaking 
skills, in addition to dancing for the President and his supporters at political 
rallies. This situation obviously hindered Kenyan women‟s organisations‟ 
capacity to develop a strong pro-abortion movement, as has occurred in other 
countries such as the USA.  
Additionally, because male politicians penetrated the organisation by ensuring 
their wives and female relatives assumed leadership positions, the organisation 
became completely apolitical since the women were unlikely to pursue agendas 
that were inconsistent with their sponsor‟s interests. In fact, as will become clear 
in Chapter 7, women leaders actually used their newly acquired positions not just 
to demonstrate loyalty to the President, with the hope of getting nominated to 
parliament.
92
  Such leaders were therefore unlikely to engage in campaigns on 
issues such as abortion, which had the potential to “make them appear like 
American radical feminists and thereby ruin their chances of getting government 
appointments” (NSA4). For example, in December 2001, the ruling party KANU 
introduced a parliamentary motion aimed at reducing the number of female 
nominees to the East African Legislative Assembly (Nasong‟o, 2005).93 Three 
KANU-nominated female Members of Parliament, one of them the leader of 
Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO), absented themselves from the 
vote while a female nominee of another party actually voted for the motion to 
avoid rubbing their political godfathers the wrong way.  
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 The President was constitutionally allowed to nominate twelve Members of Parliament. 
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 The East African Legislative Assembly is an organ of the East African Community established 
under Article 9 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The East 
African Legislative Assembly has 27 selected members, 9 from each of the three partner states. 
Assembly rules require political parties to ensure that at least a third of their nominations to the 
East African parliament are women.  The gender aspect proved inconvenient to the Kenya African 
National Union (KANU) ethnic/regional based nominations and the party sought an amendment to 
the rule, with the result that it nominated one instead of two women (Nasong‟o, 2005). 
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Although the behaviour of the Kenyan women leaders is atypical and does not 
invalidate research which suggests that having women in politics may help solve 
problems that affect them (Maathai, 2006; Neuman, 1998), Kenyan women 
leaders‟ failure to question the rationale behind attempts to hinder women‟s 
political participation is intriguing. This is more so because a study conducted by 
Lawless and Fox (2001) concluded that Kenyan female political candidates 
expressed little interest in either prioritising or focusing on women‟s issues. 
Instead, women candidates‟ attitudes were found to reflect more accurately the 
attitudes of male politicians, much more than they did those of the general 
citizenry. The study also found that although a majority of the women candidates 
expressed their gender sensitivity and familiarity with the plight of other women, 
their priorities and attitudes did not seem to reflect any concern. 
A likely explanation, as noted by a leader of a women‟s organisation, lies in the 
fact that almost all female political leaders are in one way or another associated 
with the ruling elite. This was said to cushion the women politicians from some of 
the life experiences of the majority of Kenyan women, such as unsafe abortion, 
with the result that the female leaders‟ pet issues such as inheritance, equal pay or 
equal access to employment, are less immediately pressing to a large pool of 
Kenyan women. This has led to the female leaders being viewed as embodying 
interests that are irrelevant to those of the majority of Kenyan women,  since by 
class and by marriage to elite men, the women leaders‟ interests are those of the 
ruling classes. 
However, unlike a non-state research participant (NSA3) who blamed female 
politicians for failing to champion women‟s rights, I would suggest that the 
Kenyan women leaders‟ failure to champion the women‟s agenda is related to the 
fact that in a majority of cases, the appointments of women to leadership positions 
is no more than political tokenism and patronage intended to serve elite interests. 
Consequently, the women leaders‟ political and policy influence is usually 
dependent on their connection to the head of state and to their nominating political 
parties, rather than on their seats in the legislature. As Njoya (2008) argues, for as 
long as Kenya‟s political systems and structures are guided by what he refers to as 
flawed masculinities, the few women who manage to get into politics are unlikely 
to alter gender relations since they get malestreamed. A lack of effective and 
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systematic gender analysis of the structural barriers to women‟s participation, 
coupled with the failure to support women‟s participation through capacity 
building at all levels, has meant that elite-led nominations fall short of any 
potential to effectively mainstream gender into political processes. For as Okeyo 
(2003) has noted, such steps do not necessarily amount to gender equality since 
they do not respond to the dynamics of the processes and institutional structures 
which breed gender-based discrimination and differentiation. In other words, it 
should not be assumed that placing women into positions of authority 
automatically translates into a move towards gender equality, justice and peace.  
In this section, I have demonstrated how neo-patrimonialism has shaped the 
Kenyan state‟s policies towards abortion, as well as women‟s organisations‟ 
ability to pursue gender related issues. In the next section, I show why the 
judiciary has also not succeeded in decriminalising abortion in Kenya. 
5.3. The Kenyan Judicial System and the Abortion Issue 
When I asked a senior lawyer at the Federation of Kenya Women Lawyers 
(FIDA-K) if the organisation had considered using the law courts to demand 
decriminalisation of abortion, she explained that: 
Using the judiciary would require two scenarios. First, there would need to 
be a pregnant woman or girl willing to come out and sue the state for 
denying her the right to a safe abortion. However, because of the 
antagonistic and sometimes violent nature of abortion debates in Kenya, 
no woman has been willing to do so. Secondly, attempts to discuss 
ambiguity in laws governing abortion with the Attorney General have 
often fallen on deaf ears although he has been ratifying all sorts of 
conventions for us. It is unfortunate that he is a renowned human rights 
advocate. 
Although the Attorney General‟s hypocrisy is presented here as partly responsible 
for the lack of policy changes to the abortion law, the general Kenyan laws, and 
their conservativeness, are also seen as responsible for the judicial officers‟ 
opposition to and/or unwillingness to display creativity in decision making. In the 
above quoted lawyer‟s words:  
Our laws are very retrogressive. They don‟t create an enabling atmosphere 
where you could read into the international instruments. The judiciary is 
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very conservative and they do not like to look at law in a progressive 
manner, unlike other jurisdictions where laws can be interpreted widely 
and rely heavily on international instruments. Our judiciary is very 
reluctant to do that. 
Another non-state research participant and former Member of Parliament (NSA4) 
also noted: 
Even though we are signatories to CEDAW and even to the Maputo 
Protocol, it is unfortunate that Kenyan laws are construed in such a way 
that unless we domesticate, which means introducing legislation, we are 
not held accountable locally. We are held accountable internationally but 
not locally unless either Parliament or the courts decide to open up that 
space because courts can also make laws. But our courts have decided to 
be very conservative on women‟s rights. Our courts are simply not 
adventurous enough. They just read the law to the letter and in a very plain 
and narrow way.  
The above participants‟ claim that Kenyan courts have been discriminative 
towards women in interpreting laws is not contested. A widely known case is one 
in which the Court of Appeal decided that under Luo customs, a widow had no 
right to bury her deceased husband, as this was a prerogative of the members of 
her husband‟s clan (Stamp, 1991).94 Such court decisions, as rightly noted by the 
above research participants, have served to re-emphasise prejudices against 
women, whether in criminal matters, in property matters, succession matters and 
in civil matters. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, an amendment to the Independence Constitution 
led to the removal of the security and tenure of the Attorney General, the judges 
of the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
95
 This obviously undermined the 
independence of the judiciary by allowing a serving President to directly assert 
control over judicial officers. In fact, it is no secret that the Kenyan judiciary, 
especially during President Moi‟s tenure, was not independent and judicial 
officers often had to be careful not to render decisions unpopular with the regime 
or backtracked once presidential displeasure became known (Mutua, 2001; 
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 Luo are an ethnic group in Kenya. 
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 This was done in 1986 when Parliament enacted Act No. 14 which was followed in 1988 by Act 
No.4. 
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Stamp, 1991). Therefore, because all post-Independence Presidents have been 
against legalised abortion, judicial officers, who have always served at the 
pleasure of the serving President, have been unlikely to favour judgements that 
would have made abortion accessible to women. I suggest that as a result of lack 
of independence, coupled with the judiciary being reflective of the general society 
wherein controversial issues and those affecting women are easily ignored, the 
Kenyan judiciary has failed to seek a constitutional interpretation on the legality 
of abortion in Kenya, as well as attempt to consolidate the multiple, unclear and 
conflicting laws that govern abortion.  
For example, under Section 240 of the Kenyan Penal Code, “A person is not 
criminally responsible for performing in good faith and with reasonable care and 
skill a surgical operation upon any person for his benefit, or upon an unborn child 
for the preservation of the mother‟s life, if the performance of the operation is 
reasonable, having regard to the patient‟s state and to all the circumstances of the 
case.”  This law can be interpreted as creating a lawful exception to illegal 
abortion, especially when looked at alongside Section 214 which provides that a 
child becomes a person when it has completely proceeded in a living state from 
the body of its mother, whether it has breathed or not, and whether it has an 
independent circulation or not, and whether the umbilical cord is severed or not. 
However, Sections 158 to 160 of the Penal Code, Cap. 63, spell out offences 
related to the performance of an unlawful abortion or miscarriage with both the 
woman and the person who provides the abortion liable for prison sentences of up 
to 15 years if found guilty.
96
 
There thus exists a clear ambiguity in the laws stated above. Although Section 240 
of the Penal Code creates a lawful exception to illegal abortion, the provision is 
complicated by, on the one hand, the failure to provide guidance on the 
circumstances that may constitute the preservation of the woman‟s life, and, on 
the other hand, by the fact that Sections 158–160 are prohibitive without also 
                                                          
96
 Cap 63 Laws of Kenya 
137 
 
defining what might constitute a lawful abortion.
97
 This omission would certainly 
be confusing to both Kenyan women and medical providers and most probably 
has resulted in denial of access to safe abortion even when it would have been 
permitted under the law.  
To elaborate the extent of this lack of clarity, a research participant (NSA3) made 
reference to, among others, the Nursing Council‟s Code of Ethics and the 
Professional Conduct for Nurses in which performing or assisting in illegal 
procedures such as procuring abortions was listed as a malpractice offense. 
Evidently, the code makes no mention as to when abortion may be legal. This is 
especially significant if one takes into consideration that in some areas of Kenya, 
the doctor-patient ratio is 1:129,999 (Mwaniki & Dulo, 2008). In such areas, 
nurses may often be the only medical health professionals available for the 
general public (ibid.), and without training or understanding of the law, these 
nurses may not be fully equipped to provide post-abortion care or related services 
to women and girls. As for doctors and clinical health officers, the legal 
perspective is generally absent in their training and so most of them remain 
ignorant as to the circumstances in which abortion could be legally offered. 
Strangely, the Sexual Offenses Act (2006) as well as the Ministry of Public 
Health‟s National Guidelines on Management of Sexual Violence provides for 
abortion if a pregnancy is a consequence of rape (2009).
98
 This lack of clear 
definitions of when life begins, what constitutes a woman‟s life being in danger, 
and what the legal definition of abortion is vis-à-vis the medical definition, leaves 
both women and medical professionals confused and afraid of being hauled into 
court for breaking the law.
99
  
My research participants were of the opinion that the ambiguity in the abortion 
law could have easily been dealt with through a constitutional interpretation. 
Unfortunately, this has not happened because, as noted by a senior official of the 
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 In July 2004, for example, while answering a question in Parliament, the Minister for Health 
indicated that no government hospitals or health centres had recorded termination of pregnancies 
on the grounds of incest or rape in the last three months. 
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 Available at: http://www.svri.org/nationalguidelines.pdf 
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 It is however important to note that the ambiguity also benefits those health professionals who 
choose to provide abortion, since sustaining a case against them is very difficult.  
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Law Society of Kenya, “the Court of Appeal and the High Court are yet to be 
called upon to decide whether abortion is legal or illegal.” Moreover, since the 
country‟s independence in 1963, the Kenyan High Court has not addressed the 
legality or illegality of abortion, and neither has the Attorney General elaborated 
on what should or shouldn‟t be prosecuted under Kenya‟s abortion law. This is 
more surprising because abortion related cases have often been dismissed. A 
widely known example is the court case which followed the discovery of 15 
foetuses along Mombasa Road in Nairobi on May 26, 2004, in which a doctor and 
two nurses were arrested and charged with murder under Section 203.
100
 Lady 
Justice Rawal however acquitted the accused doctor and his accomplices on the 
grounds that the unborn children, whom the accused persons were charged with 
murdering, were, according to Section 214 of the Penal Code, incapable of being 
killed. It is worth noting that instead of acquitting the accused, the judge could 
have sought to charge them using the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 
in Section 181(2) and (3) which provide for the following 
(2) When a person is charged with murder or manslaughter of a child or 
with infanticide, or with an offence under section 158 or section 159 of the 
Penal Code (relating to the procuring of abortion), and the court is of the 
opinion that he is not guilty of murder, manslaughter or infanticide or an 
offence under section 158 or section 159 of the Penal Code, but he is 
guilty of the offence of killing an unborn child, he may be convicted of 
that offence although he was not charged with it. 
(3) When a person is charged with killing an unborn child and the court is 
of the opinion that he is not guilty of that offence but that he is guilty of an 
offence under one of the sections 158 and 159 of the Penal Code, he may 
be convicted of that offence although he was not charged with it. 
I would argue that it was not by coincidence that, firstly, the prosecution chose to 
charge the accused persons under Section 203 of the Penal Code which relates to 
murder and not Sections 158 to 160 which relate to procuring abortion and 
miscarriages. Secondly, it is unclear why the accused, after the dismissal of the 
murder case, were not charged with abortion related crimes. It is probable that it 
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was a strategic decision intended to address the competing interests of the pro- 
and anti-abortion activists who were involved in violent clashes during court 
hearings (Rice, 2004). State judicial officers may have sought or were compelled 
to address both the interests of anti-abortion activists who had emotionally 
demanded that the health professionals be charged with murder, and the medical 
professionals who were outraged by the charges against the doctor and the co-
accused
101
 (Mbugua, 2005). Seemingly, the continued ambiguity and ambivalence 
within various abortion laws serves state interests by providing an avenue through 
which they can somehow uphold the status quo. While the political elite, led by 
President Kibaki, would not have wanted to lose the support they enjoyed from 
religious groups and particularly the Catholic Church, they also would have been 
embarrassed if medical health professionals actualised their strike threat. 
I am not oblivious to the fact that I am suggesting the presiding judge may have 
been compelled to balance the competing interests of the different actors on behalf 
of the state.
102
 But, as earlier noted, the Kenyan executive has a history of 
influencing court rulings in Kenya. Mutua (2001), for example, notes that:  
The judiciary has been subservient to the executive. The judiciary has 
shown no ability or inclination to uphold the rule of law against the 
express or perceived whims and interests of the executive and individual 
senior government officials, their business associates, and cronies. The 
government has acted swiftly and expeditiously to discipline or dismiss 
individual judges and magistrates who occasionally have failed to carry 
out its wishes. The judiciary has ruled consistently in favour of the KANU 
elite and its supporters in cases involving their corrupt practices and 
political interests. (p. 98-99) 
Furthermore, my argument becomes more credible when one considers that the 
Attorney General had, on various occasions, publicly said abortion was illegal, 
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 During the first court appearance, there was a confrontation between religious groups, led by 
Father Ngugi, and a group of doctors led by the chairman of the Kenya Medical Association, Dr 
Stephen Ochiel (Mbugua, 2005). 
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The First Lady, Lucy Kibaki, for example, called for the doctor to be charged with murder and 
not abortion. This outraged medical officers who claimed that the case had been obscured by 
religious fanatics who were confusing medicine and religion. Medical health professionals argued 
that the accused persons should have been charged with carrying out abortions and not of 
committing murder (Rice, 2004).  
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although without detailing the circumstances in which it could be legally available 
(Mulama, 2004). For instance, soon after the discovery of the earlier referred to 
discarded foetuses in Nairobi, the Attorney General, while addressing Parliament, 
is noted to have said “I wish to state that in appropriate cases, where I have found 
sufficient evidence, I have prosecuted suspects found to have procured and/or 
attempted to procure abortion” (Mulama, 2004). The Attorney General‟s claims 
are important for two reasons: first, instances of successful prosecution of 
abortion related cases are unknown. Secondly, by claiming that he had prosecuted 
suspects of abortion related crimes, it becomes evident that he was all along aware 
doctor Nyamu and the accused nurses‟ crime related to abortion, yet they were 
formally charged with murder. The explanation for his actions may be inferred 
from his speech as he addressed the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 
March 2005. When he was asked if the Kenyan government had considered 
legalising abortion, the Attorney General explained that although some activists 
had been campaigning for legalization, there was also a very strong opposition 
lobby led by the country‟s Catholic and Muslim communities. The Attorney 
General‟s observation seems to imply that, as I have suggested, the state had no 
intention of mediating between the competing interests of the opposing groups. 
Rather, as is evident in his final statement “How this debate will end is anyone‟s 
guess” (Lifesitenews, 2005). Seemingly, he was content in leaving the situation as 
it was. 
In addition to unsuccessful prosecutions, the judicial failure to clear the 
ambiguity in Kenya‟s abortion law has also led to the false belief that abortion is 
illegal under any circumstances. Research carried out by Mitchell et al. (2006) 
reported that most young people in Kenya were under the false impression that 
the law prohibits abortion entirely. In their study population, almost a third of 
students believed, incorrectly, that abortion was never permitted in Kenya, and 
another 14 per cent reported that they did not know whether it was ever legal or 
not. Lack of clarity has led to multiple interpretations with the result that women 
qualifying for therapeutic abortions are rarely able to access them in Kenya‟s 
public hospitals and health clinics.
103
 This is evidenced by the case of Ruth 
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Njeri, who was gang-raped and impregnated during the 2008 post-election 
violence: 
A couple of months after the incident, she reported to the health clinic 
within the camp [for internally displaced persons] that she has missed her 
period. She was tested, but the medical staff were evasive about the 
results although they continued counselling her.  After six months, Njeri 
wanted to terminate the pregnancy but was not allowed to. (Rehal, 2009)  
This denial is against the country‟s Ministry of Health Sexual Violence 
Guidelines,
104
 which allow for abortion in cases of rape. The lack of clear, 
authoritative decision-making criteria forced Njeri to carry the pregnancy to 
term although, in her words, “I wondered how I could have a child whose father 
I did not even know, and who would be a constant reminder of my humiliation” 
(cited in Rehal, 2009). When she insisted on having an abortion, hospital staff 
told her it was too late and advised her not to hate the child because it was part 
of her, and that it was innocent. 
In this section, I have sought to demonstrate that the abortion law in Kenya is 
ambiguous. This problem could, however, have been solved through a judicial 
interpretation to provide guidelines as to when abortion could be legally 
provided. While this oversight can easily be blamed on the lack of independence 
within the Kenyan judiciary, it should be noted that it is entirely consistent with 
neo-patrimonialism wherein state officials fail to invest in effective and 
systematic policy planning. They instead settle for policies that provide greater 
political impact, even if they may be oppressive to some less significant part of 
the population. By maintaining but not enforcing the abortion law, the state is 
able to appease both anti- and pro-abortion actors. In the words of one research 
participant, “since image is everything, the law, like a double-edged sword, is 
                                                                                                                                                               
of Professional Conduct and Discipline (Code of Conduct), and in some cases of rape under the 
Ministry of Health‟s National Guidelines on the Medical Management of Rape/Sexual Violence 
(Sexual Violence Guidelines) (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010). 
104
 The guidelines note that rape survivors should be given information on child adoption or 
termination of pregnancy as available options. In case the woman decides to terminate the 
pregnancy, counselling should be provided before and after termination of the pregnancy to 
prevent long term consequences of the pregnancy termination. Available at 
http://www.svri.org/nationalguidelines.pdf 
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used to cut both ways” (NSA7). However, as I demonstrate in the section that 
follows, corruption in Kenya is also a significant contributing factor to Kenyan 
women‟s experiences of abortion.   
5.4. Neo-patrimonialism, Corruption and Abortion Politics in Kenya 
Corruption is the most talked about problem in Kenya (Menya, 2010). As such, it 
was not surprising that my research participants brought it up during our 
discussions on reproductive health and abortion, and specifically as a major cause 
of unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions. Corruption was identified as a 
major contributing factor towards widespread poverty in the country.  On the one 
hand, poverty was said to expose women to unwanted pregnancies and unsafe 
abortions while on the other, poverty was identified as one of the main reasons 
some women and girls cannot access quality maternal care services. Additionally, 
corruption was seen as responsible for the hiring of incompetent civil servants 
who were incapable of fulfilling their mandates. This is evident in the following 
comment by a senior officer in the Ministry of Gender: 
One of the major impediments to women‟s health is the government. I 
don‟t know what to say but because of infighting and a lot of corruption, 
money that is meant for certain services does not go to those services but 
ends up in people‟s pockets. This denies poor people, and mainly women, 
access to health facilities. Because they don‟t get the medical attention 
they need, mortality levels will continue to grow. I think ending corruption 
will help improve health for all and for women particularly. (SA1)  
Although the above quoted participant does not say so, corruption is a general 
logical outcome of neo-patrimonial systems (O‟Neil, 2007). The diversion of 
public resources by the political elite to service particularistic patronage networks 
through granting clients access to economic benefits in exchange for marshalling 
ethnic, tribal or clan power bases generally exacerbates poverty for those who are 
outside of state patronage. As earlier noted, because women as a group tend to be 
excluded from the political elite sanctioned patron-client relationships, they are 
generally more likely to be poor, in comparison to other social groups (Ellis et al., 
2007).  
Consequently, it is not totally unexpected that studies carried out by some of the 
organisations I visited during my fieldwork identify poverty and material 
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deprivation, a consequence of government inefficiency and corruption, as pushing 
women and girls into activities that expose them to sexual exploitation and 
survival sex. Poverty is seen as a critical factor in both causing unwanted 
pregnancies and motivating women‟s decisions to terminate a pregnancy. A 2003 
study carried out by the Centre for the Study of Adolescence (CSA), which I 
visited during my fieldwork, found that 56 per cent of secondary school girls had 
exchanged sex for money to purchase items like cell phone airtime, chips, pocket 
money and even sanitary towels. A 2006 study by the Kenyan government and 
UNICEF also noted that 30 per cent of teens in coastal areas traded sex for cash 
(PlusNews, 2008). The study surprisingly further found that underage sex with 
tourists in exchange for money was also rampant, sometimes without protection, 
thus exposing the girls to unwanted pregnancies. This not only increases the 
likelihood of the girls having unsafe abortions, but also a possibility of sinking 
deeper into poverty if a child is born. A seventeen year old teen with a six-month 
old child is reported to have said: 
I try to use condoms every time, but sometimes they refuse or offer much 
more money if we don‟t. If I am offered 300KSH ($3) by a mzungu (white 
man) for sex with a condom, or 1,000KSH ($15) for sex without, then I 
don‟t use condoms. I have to feed my baby. (Afrol News, 2008) 
 A different study in a different area also revealed that eight out of ten adolescents 
had engaged in sexual activity before reaching the age of twenty years. Thirteen 
per cent of 14-year-old girls confessed to having been pregnant and either had 
children or had procured abortions (Waiganjo, 2009). In Kisumu, a city on Lake 
Victoria in western Kenya, female fishmongers were reported to be sleeping with 
male fishermen to get stock to sell so as to make a living (IRINnews, 2010). A 
woman who had quit the business explained that: 
Many women selling fish have died of HIV and many are sick; we have 
been living at the mercy of fishermen who demand sex before they can 
give you fish. We have resolved to only buy fish with money and not with 
our bodies. (IRINnews, 2010, p. 1) 
Unsurprisingly then, research has shown that Kenyan women procure abortions 
because they associate mistimed entry into motherhood with negative 
socioeconomic and livelihood outcomes. The women resort to induced abortion 
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not just as a form of protection against shame, but primarily as a shield against 
poverty and loss of economic wellbeing (Izugbara et al., 2009).  
Because of their social roles as caretakers, Kenyan women also encounter 
corruption which affects them much more directly. A research participant working 
for a state organisation (SA4) explained that many women are forced to pay 
bribes for things like accessing utilities, securing school enrolments for their 
children, obtaining business licenses, getting medicines, or even seeing a medical 
doctor. In such situations, poor women often cannot pay bribes and some are 
forced to pay with sexual services, thereby exposing themselves to the risks of 
unwanted pregnancies and the attendant need for abortion. Additionally, 
corruption was said to have made women suspected of abortion, as well as 
doctors, a gravy train for police officers who threaten them with arrest unless 
bribes are paid. At the time of my fieldwork in 2009, I attended a medical doctor‟s 
conference in which a nurse shared an incident that happened at her place of 
work:  
One day, I was surprised when police entered the hospital ward and began 
harassing the patients, questioning one about the nature of her medical 
care. The patient told the police that she required an abortion because of 
foetal deformity. Even though that was the truth, the police officers 
confronted the doctor on duty and demanded a bribe. They only left after 
receiving some money.  
It is however important to note that although healthcare providers have been 
victims of police harassment, research has also identified them as often engaging 
in corrupt practices. A study conducted by the Center for Reproductive Rights 
reported bribery as one of the obstacles to, and requirements for, obtaining care 
(Center for Reproductive Rights, 2010). For example, in a focus group discussion 
with young women in a Kenyan slum, one participant said, “The public hospitals 
will definitely ask for bribes when providing post-abortion care. They will 
threaten to turn you into the police unless you pay them” (cited in ibid: 91). At 
another focus group discussion in Mombasa, Kenya, participating women were in 
agreement that: 
People charge money on top because it‟s illegal. If you want them to take 
care of you immediately, you need to pay a bribe in a government hospital, 
otherwise they‟ll take you to the ward and leave you there all day. You 
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bribe them so they don‟t call the police too (Center for Reproductive 
Rights, 2010, p. 90). 
The net effect of corrupt health professionals has been to hinder women‟s access 
to post-abortion care for fear of harassment as well as lack of money to pay the 
required bribes. A 2012 study by the Population Council has also revealed that 
women seeking pregnancy related services in Kenyan hospitals are usually 
subjected to inhuman treatment ranging from denial of privacy, demeaning 
physical and verbal abuse, to forced female genital mutilation (Onyango, 2012). 
Pregnant women‟s experiences at the hands of health workers are identified as 
being partly to blame for the high number of women seeking the care of 
traditional birth attendants. Presently, just four in every 10 Kenyan women have 
children in a hospital or a health facility (ibid.). The report quotes a man who said 
he had paid a nurse 200 Kenya Shillings (3$US) to take care of his wife at a 
birthing facility. However, without seeming to justify public officers‟ corrupt 
practices, it is important to view corruption in the context of deepening economic 
crisis, which may compel state employees who do not earn enough to sustain their 
livelihoods, to seek alternative sources of income. 
The introduction of political pluralism in 1992 after decades of single-party rule 
did not change political structures in Kenya (Mutua, 1992a; 1992b). 
Unfortunately, contrary to the world‟s expectation, the democratization did not 
deliver good governance or economic reforms to reduce poverty (Young, 1999). 
Instead, even though the one party political system had been replaced with a more 
democratic, donor driven multi-party system, the dynamics of neo-
patrimonialism, clienteles and “belly” politics continued (Kanneworff, 2008, p. 
118). Obviously, adaptation to Western democracy did not change Moi‟s core 
methods of rule. Like other African leaders, President Moi continued to oversee a 
repressive regime of power abuse that left the majority of the population in gross 
poverty and neglect. 
The 2002 general elections won by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) saw 
a resounding rejection of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Daniel 
Arap Moi‟s legacy of endemic corruption and mismanagement. Unfortunately, 
although the country experienced a significant economic recovery during the 
period between 2002 and 2007, the reform process soon ran into trouble as the 
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governing coalition disintegrated (Githongo, 2007). This reduced the 
government‟s commitment to change, and grand-scale corruption and 
mismanagement of public resources went on unabated (Githongo, 2007; Otieno, 
2005).
105
 As such, the Kenyan people continue to live in poverty as the political 
elite strategize to gain power during the next general election to be held in March, 
2013. Such leaders are unlikely to be involved in debate on abortion, not just 
because it is considered petty, as will become clear in the next section, but more 
so because of its controversial nature. 
5.5. Women, Patriarchal Neo-patrimonialism, and the Politics of Abortion  
In the preceding sections, I have noted that neo-patrimonial logic and practices, 
coupled with patriarchal norms, have impeded both the political elites‟ and 
Kenyan judiciary‟s ability to conclusively deal with the issue of unsafe abortion. 
In this section, I concentrate on the effects of the collusion between Kenyan 
political structures and patriarchal processes and how these exert control on 
gender relations in general, thus making it difficult for women‟s experiences, 
views and ideas to be incorporated in policy decisions since their participation in 
politics is generally constrained. 
Feminist research has shown that when women get into leadership and 
management positions, they can bring a different perspective on political 
leadership (Maathai, 2006; Thomas & Wilcox, 2005). Some scholars have argued 
that having women in governance could help solve problems that mainly affect 
women. For example, writing about women legislators in the United States of 
America, Neuman (1998) and Epstein et al. (2005) have noted it was only after 
women joined Congress that issues such as health care, child care and support, 
sexual harassment, domestic violence and gender-based wage differentials among 
others, were given priority. A non-state research participant seems to support this 
observation in claiming that: 
Women‟s participation in governance will benefit society because women 
are more likely to press for laws that benefit families, women, children and 
marginalized groups. (NSA14) 
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 For example, at the beginning of 2004, the Kenya government granted a contract worth about 
$US41 million to an entity that did not exist (Githongo, 2007). 
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This participant further elaborated that although women constitute half of Kenya‟s 
population, this is not reflected in senior Government positions. This is evident 
from the elections held in December 2007 in which only fifteen women were 
elected as Members of Parliament out of a total number of two hundred and ten. 
Another six were nominated as Members of Parliament by political parties which 
can lawfully nominate up to twelve members, making women‟s share of Kenya‟s 
parliament 9.5 per cent, up from 3.8 per cent in 2002 (Wilke-Laune, 2009). In the 
cabinet formed in April 2008, women were given seven ministerial and six 
assistant ministerial positions, out of a total of 90 (ibid.). Although the number of 
women in the cabinet increased from three cabinet ministers and four assistant 
ministers in 2008, the underrepresentation of women is evident. Women‟s 
exclusion from state institutions extends to the public service where only 30.9 per 
cent of those employed are women, 72 per cent of who are in the lower cadres 
(Kamau, 2010). 
My research participants blamed the exclusion of women from governance and 
policy making positions for the consistent blocking of legislative initiatives 
intended to address women‟s issues, as well as the passing of legislation intended 
to protect male interests.
106
 When I asked a former woman Member of Parliament 
to comment on why abortion, like many other problems affecting Kenyan women, 
remains largely unaddressed, she had the following to say: 
Due to their insignificant number, Kenyan female MPs are unable to bring 
women‟s issues to the fore of the parliamentary agenda. Even when that 
happens, women‟s issues are likely to be trivialized or defeated, as has 
happened with the Equality, Domestic Violence and Affirmative Action 
Bills which were thrown out of Parliament because a majority of male 
legislators failed to support their enactment. Moreover, being majority 
members in Parliament has allowed men to pass laws that protect their 
interests such as the repeal of the Affiliations Act which required men to 
financially care for children fathered out of wedlock. (NSA12) 
Two other participants also noted: 
Many senior government positions are held by men. And it appears that 
they subscribe to international requirements just for the sake of winning 
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 A notable example is the repeal of the Affiliations Act in 1969, which required men to care for 
children born out of marriage. 
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votes because when it comes to real practice, the government doesn‟t do 
anything. For example, even though President Kibaki publicly declared 
that every sector of his government would have a minimum of 30 percent 
representation of women, this is not the case. This is why sexism is still 
live in government. (SA1) 
We have female judges and they have helped. But all their judgments go to 
the Court of Appeal. And the Court of Appeal is largely male dominated 
and very conservative and only one woman is a judge. There should be 
seven judges in the court including the Chief Justice. For the last two 
years, there have been six judges and we have been campaigning that the 
position be given to a woman. Unfortunately, they would rather keep it 
vacant than appoint a woman.  Women‟s lobbyists are still trying. Even in 
the USA, issues of reproductive health are very important. How you 
compose the highest court of the land matters because these are issues that 
are open to interpretation. When people say Kenya has become gender 
sensitive, we ask them to look at the highest institutions and if there are no 
women there, then Kenya has a long way to go. (NSA4) 
These three research participants seem to suggest that a lack of political will and 
patriarchal tendencies on the part of Kenyan leaders, coupled with lack of 
women‟s representation in both government and the judiciary, are responsible for 
the sidelining of women‟s issues. The problem of lack of state access to women 
can be construed to lie in the fact that, because state institutions are predominantly 
controlled by men, state machineries operate with a massive bias towards men‟s 
interests. For the Kenyan elite, male bias has been institutionalised, sustained and 
legitimised because of a lack of significant and sustained protest from women. As 
a result, political leaders can comfortably make promises to women in order to 
win their votes, but have no obligation to keep the promises. For example, during 
the run up to the 2007 general elections, President Kibaki promised that 30 per 
cent of all public appointments and elective positions would be reserved for 
women. Raila Odinga, the current Prime Minister, on his part had said 50 per cent 
would go to women if he was to win the Presidential election (Kassilly & 
Onkware, 2010). Unfortunately, although both men are now in power, their 
pledges have not been fulfilled as women remain largely unrepresented.  
A good example of how patriarchy and lack of political will to deal with gender-
related issues plays out, and which was constantly referred to by my research 
participants, is evident in the way the Kenyan political elite treated the 
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Reproductive Health and Rights Bill 2008. In June 2008, a network spearheaded 
by the Kenyan chapter of the International Federation of Women Lawyers 
(FIDA), the Coalition on Violence Against Women, and the Kenya Medical 
Association had produced a draft Reproductive Health and Rights Bill 2008.
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However, even at the time of my fieldwork in 2009, it had not been discussed in 
parliament.
108
 Strangely, as noted by a senior lawyer at FIDA (Kenya), senior 
political leaders, among them the President, had already publicly condemned the 
draft bill even before it was officially presented in Parliament, and perhaps even 
before reading it. For example, at an event held to install a new Catholic Bishop, 
President Kibaki promised not to support the legalisation of abortion as proposed 
by the Reproductive Health and Rights Bill 2008.
109
 He is alleged to have said, “I 
see no reason, now, or in the future, why anyone would want to legalize abortion 
in Kenya” (White, 2008). At the same public function, Mutula Kilonzo, Minister 
for Nairobi Metropolitan Development, also spoke against the bill, promising that 
if it reached Parliament, he would marshal the parliamentary forces to “shoot the 
bill down” (ibid.).  
Notably, these leaders‟ condemnation of the bill does not acknowledge or even 
consider the women-only problems that could be addressed if its 
recommendations were adopted. In fact, in their refusal to support the bill, the 
above noted politicians do not provide justification for opposition. I contend that 
the politicians are playing politics since, by opposing the proposed bill, they are 
able to appease anti-abortion actors while at the same time avoid offending pro-
abortion actors by not openly criticising the bill. Notably though, if passed, the 
bill sought to address various reproductive health issues, including a push for 
easier access to abortion. It proposed, for instance, that a statement by a pregnant 
woman or any other proof that her pregnancy was a result of sexual assault, rape, 
defilement or incest could guarantee a legal abortion. The Bill also sought to 
repeal the Penal Code offences of attempting to procure abortion and of supplying 
                                                          
107
Available at http://www.strathmore.edu/pdf/reproductive-health-bill.pdf 
108
 The Attorney General moved it in Parliament on 16
th
 October and the Bill received its first 
reading. 
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 It is important to pay attention to the context in which the pronouncements are made. The fact 
that it is a Church shows how important it is for the President and his supporter to appease 
religious leaders and their followers, obviously in exchange for political support. 
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drugs or instruments to procure abortion. Additionally, it allowed the termination 
of a pregnancy after consultation between only a health care provider and the 
pregnant woman if there was a risk to the woman‟s health, if the foetus would 
suffer from physical or mental abnormality, or if the pregnancy resulted from an 
assault, defilement, rape or incest. Of importance to the Kenyan situation, where 
most women undergo abortion because of economic hardship, the draft bill 
recommended the inclusion of extreme social deprivation and contraceptive 
failure as other grounds for legal abortion. Unfortunately, the Bill was never 
discussed after Parliament went into recess and its time lapsed. The Bill has never 
been reintroduced.  
The absence of coherent policy-making and long-term development planning 
evident in the Kenyan government‟s treatment of the Reproductive Health and 
Rights Bill 2008 is a common trait of neo-patrimonial states. Participants in this 
research overwhelmingly felt that because policy decisions in Kenya are largely 
guided by the need to gain or retain power, partisan interests, and more 
specifically the interests of male powerful groups, such as traditionalists and 
religious leaders, often supersede those of the victims of unsafe abortion in the 
country. To the participants, if this were not the case, unsafe abortion, a major 
public health crisis accounting for over 35 per cent of Kenya‟s maternal deaths, 
could have been addressed. A non-state research participant (NSA7) was of the 
opinion that Kenyan leaders‟ unwillingness to ensure access to safe abortion is a 
result of their failure to identify with the problem. In view of the fact that unsafe 
abortion affects poor and younger women, as safe abortion is usually available for 
those that can afford to pay, she argued that leaders, including female Members of 
Parliament, may be too far removed from the problem to identify with it. Thus, as 
noted by socialist feminists, class determines who has access to safe abortion, and 
who does not. This participant‟s claim is supported by a 2007 study of Kenyan 
female politicians showed that the only period they focus on issues of social and 
gender equity is at the beginning of their careers (Nyokabi, 2008). After getting 
elected, their career progression is noted to be accompanied by an increasing 
integration into and orientation towards the male mainstream (ibid.).  
As such, it is possible that the political leaders may not consider it worthwhile to 
commit political suicide for an issue that not only does not affect them directly, 
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but also may not be popular with male colleagues who might themselves be the 
female politicians‟ patrons.  My research participants argued that the failure to 
identify with the problem of unsafe abortion had to be the reason behind the 
different consideration accorded to HIV/AIDS as compared to abortion. Because 
it affects both men and women, Kenyan leaders support programmes targeting 
HIV/AIDS to directly benefit themselves. In Kenya, married or cohabitating 
couples are the populations at the highest risk for HIV/AIDS transmission and 
acquisition (Kaiser et al., 2011). In fact, 44 per cent of all new infections occur in 
couples who engage in heterosexual activity within a union or a regular 
relationship (ibid.). Since it is most probable that a majority of policy makers and 
Kenyan elite fall into this category, their willingness to support HIV/AIDS 
programmes may be driven by self-interest. 
Two additional factors that might influence Kenyan leaders‟ willingness to focus 
on HIV/AIDS but not abortion may be that, firstly, HIV/AIDS, after a period of 
being moralised has since come to be viewed and addressed as a public health and 
medical issue (de Waal, 2006). Since a similar shift in discourse has not happened 
for abortion, perhaps because of the controversy surrounding foetal life, abortion 
continues to be considered mainly as a moral issue in Kenya and so unsafe 
abortion and its consequences receive little policy attention. Secondly, major 
international donors, such as the United States of America, are often generous in 
providing funding for HIV/AIDS prevention activities, but the same has not been 
extended to unsafe abortion. In fact, during the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in Australia in 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron 
warned that future development aid to Africa would be contingent on recognition 
of gay rights (BBC News, 2011). Although the prominence of the gay issue might 
lie in the publicity that the issue has received, it is unclear why the Western 
donors have also not threatened to withdraw aid to countries that continue to 
watch as denial of reproductive rights kills and maims thousands of African 
women annually.  
The logic of protecting one‘s skin was also evident in conversations with male 
colleagues at the University of Nairobi during my fieldwork in 2009.  While most 
of them said they did not support legalisation of abortion because “their wives 
would comfortably have sex with other men”, they admitted to having paid for 
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their girlfriends‟ and/or female relatives‟ abortions. Their explanations for the 
selective support of abortion revealed their patriarchal attempt to control their 
wives sexuality while their support for other women‟s abortions exhibit their 
disdain at the prospect of having to support a relative‟s or girlfriend‟s child. These 
responses illustrate the kind of male hypocrisy that a former cabinet minister, 
Martha Karua, made reference to in 2004 when she argued: 
Let us not bury our heads in the sand, let the hypocrisy attached to the 
debate end and let sobriety prevail. Let us not perform abortion for 
ourselves, our wives and daughters in private, but pretend to condemn the 
practice in public because it is politically and socially right to do so.... Let 
us respect the bodily integrity of women and not make their bodies a 
battle-ground. (Karua, 2004) 
The fact that Kenyan men would be willing to support some women‟s abortions 
but disapprove of the practice for other categories of women suggests that their 
opposition to legalising abortion stems from their constructions of women‟s 
subjectivities as noted by post-structural feminists, rather than abortion per se. It 
is thus plausible to argue that, since their opposition is neither based on religion 
nor on tradition but on the assumption that women would be unfaithful, the men‟s 
opposition is intended to control the targeted women‟s sexuality. Furthermore, the 
fact that my colleagues support only abortions for which they have control over in 
terms of paying for them also points to patriarchal control as claimed by radical 
feminists (see Chapter 2). 
Similarly, Kenyan legislators‟ interest in patriarchal control of women was cited 
by my research participants as having been the reason for their failure to support 
the Marriages Bill 2007,
110
 which was intended to make Kenyan marriages more 
gender equal.
111
 Originally proposed in 1981, the bill was voted down by male 
politicians, who condemned it for granting women too many rights, especially the 
right to specify at the time of the marriage, whether or not a husband may choose 
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 The Kenyan law at the time recognised four types of marriage: African Customary, Muslim, 
Hindu and statutory marriages. Two of the systems, statutory law and Hindu, recognised only 
monogamous marriages while customary and Muslim laws also recognised polygamous unions 
(Mucai-Katambo et al., 1995). In polygamous marriages, females are not considered equal partners 
in matters pertaining to child custody in case of divorce or marital property upon divorce. It is for 
such reasons that the marriage laws have generally been considered discriminatory against women. 
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to take more wives in the future. Not surprisingly, Kenyan men in general were in 
support of the leaders‟ action, as evidenced by readers‟ comments to related 
newspaper articles. For instance, an anonymous reader of an online newspaper 
article expressed his/her support for curtailing women‟s rights in marriage by 
blaming divorce on gender equality in  marriage.
112
 To the individual, women‟s 
dependency on the husband would ensure long-lasting African marriages. In 
her/his words: 
The high divorce rates in the West are due to the kind of laws that give 
women equal rights in divorce where property is divided in half even if the 
woman had 0 accounts. When women are given equal rights they end up 
being above men. In the West they benefit from divorce since they get 
alimony payments, child support and custody rights. Some get child 
support from so many different men. (AA1) 
After stalling in 2007, the Bill was reintroduced in March 2009 and this time 
addressed legislators‟ concerns by eliminating a wife‟s right to stipulate the 
monogamy or polygamy of the marriage.  However, in September 2009, faced 
with opposition from Christian and Muslim leaders, a cabinet meeting chaired by 
President Kibaki stopped debate on the draft Marriage Bill, Matrimonial Property 
Bill and the Family Protection Bill, to pave the way for further consultations with 
Members of Parliament and other stakeholders (Leftie, 2009).
113
 Unfortunately, 
the issue was ignored until it came up during parliamentary discussion on the 
Draft Kenya Constitution. In January 2010, members of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the constitutional review process exhibited their patriarchal 
tendencies when they voted to delete sub-clause 42(4) which sought to guarantee 
women and men equal rights at the onset, during, and at the dissolution of a 
marriage (Mathenge & Shiundu, 2010). This decision was reached despite 
protests from the five female members of the twenty-one member committee 
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 I came across this reader‟s comment as I was reading Kenyan newspapers online. The article‟s 
authors are Mathenge and Shiundu (2010).  
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According to the draft copies of the Bills, among the other proposals noted were that a couple 
would be deemed to be legally married if they cohabit for two or more years. The bridegroom and 
the bride would also be allowed to decide whether their marriage would remain monogamous or 
become polygamous at some stage, so long as they both gave consent in writing. The Bills further 
granted a widow the right to marry a person of her choice. The Marriage Bill also recognized 
marriages under the Islamic and the Hindu faith, while allowing the registration of customary 
marriages, as opposed to the current situation where no Act of Parliament provides for such 
marriages. 
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(ibid). It is possible that if there were more women in the committee as stipulated 
by liberal feminists who support women‟s equal representation, the result could 
have different.  
The relationship between inequality in marriage and unsafe abortion in Kenya can 
be deduced from the fact that married women are significantly represented in 
cases of women receiving post-abortion care in public hospitals (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2008). One of the major causes is marital rape, which, according to the 
2008-09 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, affects 13 per cent of married 
women (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, & ICF Macro, 2010). A women‟s 
organisation leader (NSA12) explained that during debate on the Sexual Offenses 
Bill in 2006, Kenyan male Members of Parliament denied the existence of marital 
rape through claims that there could be no rape in African marriages. For 
example, Kenneth Marende, the Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, said 
“Kenyans can still have sex with their partners even when they are asleep so long 
as they are married”. Another male legislator, Paddy Ahenda, went even further 
by claiming Kenyan women were too shy to openly say “yes” to sex and usually 
say “no” unless it is a prostitute ( IOL News, 2006). Notably, although this 
comment sparked protest from female members, with 12 of the 18 female 
legislators staging a walk out, it was met with applause and foot thumping by 
male members (ibid.). Seemingly, there is no recognition of the fact that 
condoning marital rape fosters a broader social acceptance of violence against 
women and legitimizes sexual assault as a form of political violence or social 
punishment.
114
 Additionally, legal impunity for marital rape fosters a culture in 
which violence against women is state endorsed or at least quietly accepted. This 
perhaps ascertains radical feminists‟ view that reproductive freedom for women 
cannot be guaranteed by a patriarchal state (Jaggar, 1983). 
                                                          
114
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The above male legislators‟ arguments ignore the connection between unwanted 
sex and unwanted pregnancies, and the consequent need for abortions. A 2009 
report showed about 62 per cent of the women who sought post-abortion care 
services in Kenya were in a marriage union (Okwemba, 2009). Not unexpectedly 
therefore, a 2008 study by Emenike et al. (2008) showed that a slightly higher 
percentage of abortions in the country are procured by women who have 
experienced intimate partner violence than by those who have not. Considering 
that only 38 per cent of married women use contraception, high levels of 
unwanted pregnancies are to be expected (Okech et al., 2011).  
The discussion preceding the passing of the heavily adulterated Sexual Offences 
Act in 2006 reveals interesting but otherwise intriguing gender and sexual politics 
in Kenya that I would like to share. I found it surprising when a female research 
participant (NSA12) explained that female promoters of the Sexual Offenses Bill 
urged men to support its adoption because, “these days, boys and men are getting 
raped too.” While rape is unacceptable irrespective of the victim‟s gender or age, I 
found the connotation that men should only care about the issue because it could 
happen to them disturbing. On one hand, it demonstrates the proponent‟s  
determination to have the Bill adopted, while on the other, it explicitly exhibits 
the amount of strategising demanded of proponents of gender equality given  
patriarchal norms and a lack of political will to pass legislation and policies that 
protect and secure the place of women. Perhaps, if there were more women in the 
Kenyan Parliament, the Bill would have been passed in its original form and more 
women friendly laws would also have been passed. As it is, Kenya‟s Parliament is 
a patriarchal institution imbued with deeply masculine values and norms, which is 
used by the Kenyan elite to pass laws that not only discriminate against women, 
but also legitimise these discriminations through codification. On abortion, a 
research participant (NSA8) was categorical that: 
A Parliament that is capable of supporting heterosexual rape while 
criminalising consensual lesbian and gay sex cannot possibly let women 
control the products of such sex by allowing them the right to abortion. 
This research participant‟s observations are reiterated by Sara Longwe‟s (1994) 
claim that gender inequality does not arise from any accidental or irrational 
imbalance. Rather, it is intrinsic to a system of patriarchal control, which is 
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operated by men for their own benefit. In contrast to other East African countries 
where the issue of women‟s representation has been dealt with through the 
adoption of affirmative quota policies, affirmative action motions have been 
defeated thrice in the Kenyan parliament.
115
 Seemingly, attempts to dismantle the 
patriarchal structure of the Kenyan state as advocated by socialist feminist 
theories of the state have not been successful (Dietz, 1987). 
However, insufficient representation of women may not be the only reason for the 
Kenyan state institutions‟ failure to support women‟s empowerment in general 
and abortion in particular. Connell (1994) has noted that the gender regime of the 
state often reflects that of society. If that were the case, it can be argued that the 
Kenyan political elites‟ claims that traditional African culture and gender equality 
are incompatible result from the fear of an increasingly changing gender regime, 
and men in general are making attempts to retain patriarchal control over women 
in the face of social reform and modernisation. The resultant changes in sex roles 
and gender relations can be said to have given rise to actual and sometimes 
perceived threats to reinvented traditional male supremacy, leading to some 
aspects of women‟s autonomy, among them sexual rights and access to abortion, 
being frequently labelled as foreign, unAfrican and immoral. For example, 
increased cases of women dressed in trousers, miniskirts, or shorts being beaten 
and stripped by men for dressing inappropriately (read unAfrican) have been 
reported in various African cities including those in Kenya (Oriang‟, 2012; 
Muthengi, 2000).
116
 This observation is supported by African researchers such as 
Silberschmidt (2001), who suggests that African men have been feeling 
increasingly threatened for a variety of structural and ideological reasons, among 
them increasing unemployment and the growth of feminist ideas. In response to 
such trends, African men and elites have been known to pursue male self-interest 
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A woman Member of Parliament, Phoebe Asiyo of Ford-Kenya party, first presented the 
Affirmative Action motion in Parliament in April 1997 but the motion was defeated in the male-
dominated Parliament. In the year 2000, the Affirmative Action motion came up again through a 
female Member of Parliament, Beth Mugo of Social Democratic Party, but was again defeated. 
The Bill proposed that at least 33 per cent of the total number of seats in Parliament and Local 
Authorities be reserved for women. In 2007, a government-sponsored Affirmative Action Bill was 
thrown out through a technicality of lack of quorum all designed by the male MPs who claimed 
that the Minister for Justice, Hon. Martha Karua, did not consult enough (Kamau, 2010). 
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 Surprisingly, before contact with Europeans, people in most Sub-Saharan Africa wore very 
minimal clothing.  
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through various avenues, among them the manipulation and instrumentalization of 
African cultural traditions that reinforce sexist and patriarchal prejudices 
(Soothill, 2007), but without acknowledgement that most of what is today 
considered culture was a construction of colonialists and African male elite (see 
Chapter 3).  
For its part, the Kenyan state has been willing to succumb to the attitudes of male 
supporters and the traditionalists within society in order to maintain its own 
integrity and legitimacy. To appease men who are largely the constituents to 
whom the patriarchal state is responsible, state officials ignore or often condone 
injustice against women. For instance, while commenting on the controversy 
emanating from debate on the Sexual Offenses Bill, Moody Awori, at the time the 
Vice-President, is noted to have said, “the government supports the Sexual 
Offenses Bill, but we do not want to give men or women unnecessary advantages 
over the other and are ready to review the contentious areas” (Nation Reporter, 
2006). The Vice-President‟s comment makes explicit male leaders‟ unwillingness 
to address gender discrimination, since the unnecessary advantages are not seen as 
a problem with regard to laws and policies that discriminate against women while 
giving undue advantage to men. Thus, as is the case elsewhere in Africa, Kenyan 
women‟s rights are easily successfully attacked in search of consensus, more so 
because women as a group form a politically weak constituency. Political use of 
women‟s rights as bargaining chips to appease contending forces has been found 
to be common in Africa (Owen, 2007). 
Evidently, as would be argued by liberal feminists, Kenyan women‟s 
underrepresentation in governance institutions has certainly had very detrimental 
results for them. A study by Kamau (2010) also affirms that the lack of a critical 
mass of women in Parliament is a major constraint on women politicians to 
effecting significant and positive change towards transforming the male-
dominated culture of Parliament, public policy, and influencing resource 
allocation in a gender equitable manner. Although women‟s limited participation 
in political leadership may be attributed in part to cultural conceptions of political 
leadership as a traditionally male role, the patron-client relations that characterise 
Kenyan patriarchal neo-patrimonial politics were identified as equally important. 
To my participants, the paternalistic construction of the state, as well as patronage 
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politics, impose structural constraints on the political participation of Kenyan 
women. Because negotiations in patron-client relations are often done outside of 
the public forum, the majority of women rarely become benefactors in state-linked 
clientelistic relations (Tripp, 2001). Moreover, since clients are usually expected 
to mobilise political support for the patron, the mainly male patrons often choose 
to do deals with male tribal king-pins who control and govern specific areas, and 
wield considerable power and authority. Such males, most them traditionalists 
who need the support of other kingpins or religious leaders to sustain their support 
base, are unlikely to support legal abortion. 
5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated through a feminist analysis that the Kenyan 
post-independence state‟s attempts to ensure gender equality have been hindered 
by the political elite  who have found dismantling the colonial framework of 
governance to be inimical to their own individual interests. This observation 
confirms liberal, socialist and radical feminists‟ theorisations of the state that 
present it as patriarchal and capitalist. In a manner reflective of these traditional 
feminists‟ claims, the Kenyan state excludes women from governance positions, 
which has in turn led to the establishment of a patriarchal state that pursues the 
interests of men in general, the ruling elite, and capitalists. Additionally, in line 
with the post-structuralist conception of the state as a site of struggle, the Kenyan 
state has many diverse actors, all of whom struggle to influence state policy and 
exercise control over aspects of the state. As such, the ruling elite is often engaged 
in bargains with powerful forces such as religious groups and traditionalists, and 
these bargains often disadvantage women as a group since their bargaining power 
and capacity is generally minimal.   
I have shown that although these Western-based conceptualisations of the state 
partly explain the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the unsafe abortion issue, neo-
patrimonialism has a very significant influence. The lack of political will to 
address gender issues in general and unsafe abortion in particular is due in part to 
the neo-patrimonial nature of politics. Because having control of the state 
machinery is the only way that the elite can ensure access to economic surpluses, 
patrimonial and clientelistic relations are generally important as they provide the 
159 
 
means to achieving political control and financial aggrandizement. As such, in 
their pursuit of power, the Kenyan ruling elite has been willing to use women‟s 
rights, and in this study women‟s right to abortion, as a bargaining chip when 
seeking political support from conservative religious and traditional groupings. 
That is, in order not to antagonize religious and traditional leaders, Kenyan 
political elites have covertly left the areas of sexuality and gender relations to 
quasi-religious-cultural interpretations.  
Additionally, as a result of a convenient kind of collaboration between neo-
patrimonial political structures and patriarchal processes, women have remained 
largely unrepresented in governance and public policy making, and therefore, 
women‟s issues and experiences have been easily neglected. Thus unlike Western 
states that subordinate women mainly in the interests of patriarchy and capital, in 
the Kenyan case, women‟s subordination is linked to needs to gain and/or 
maintain patrimonial and clientelistic relations that enable the elite to stay in 
power. It is my contention therefore that the strategic ambivalence of the Kenyan 
state‟s treatment of the abortion question cannot be fully understood without 
acknowledging the crucial role played by neo-patrimonialism. In the next chapter, 
I demonstrate the how the nature of the Kenyan state influences both the activities 
and discourses espoused by anti-abortion actors.  
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Chapter Six 
Deploying Religion, Science and Health: An Analysis of Anti-
abortion Discourses in Kenya 
6.0. Introduction 
The patriarchal and neo-patrimonial nature of the Kenyan state has enabled the 
legitimation and institutionalisation of anti-abortion discourses, and also led to the 
cultivation of networks of reciprocity between secular political leaders and anti-
abortion actors. The resultant mutually supportive relationship on the one hand 
provides a means of ensuring and increasing political leaders‟ power, popularity 
and legitimacy, while on the other hand, it ensures the support of government 
authorities‟ for anti-abortion policies. In this chapter, I investigate the discourses 
and discursive strategies used by Kenyan anti-abortion actors in establishing the 
legitimacy of their stance. The ability of anti-abortion religious groups to 
influence public policy validates the Critical African Feminist Perspective‟s view 
of the state as a differentiated set of institutions, wherein various actors, among 
them the state,  struggle to influence policy in ways that meet their interests. 
The involvement of religion in politics has had a particularly detrimental impact 
on women‟s rights in general, and abortion rights in particular, since patriarchal 
religious ideals, buttressed by state support, have served to perpetuate women‟s 
inequality in both the public and the private sphere. This is more so because, as 
feminist researchers have noted, one of the main policy areas in which religions 
choose to intervene is that pertaining to women‟s issues, such as family policy, 
abortion regimes, and legislation pertaining to women‟s equality (Minkenberg, 
2003). For instance, many Christian missionaries believed that African sexuality 
needed to be contained (Schmidt, 1990). In order to accomplish this, they 
enforced a new moral order wherein social, cultural, political and economic power 
became tied up with maleness, whereas domesticity and reproduction were 
promoted as the defining characteristics of femaleness (Becker, 2005). Because 
the new gender order erased traditional differences between men and women 
which had been based on rank or age (ibid.), it led to African women‟s 
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unprecedented dependence on men, and their subordination in all spheres of life 
including, social, economic and political (Marsh, 1978). Unfortunately, the 
missionaries‟ constructions of appropriate gender relations are today presented as 
traditional culture and therefore any attempts to institute changes are rejected 
with arguments such as the need to preserve African traditions. 
The main anti-abortion actors in the debate are religious groups, with the major 
players being the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church of Kenya, the 
Presbyterian Church of East Africa, the Deliverance Church of Kenya, the 
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and other smaller groupings 
such as Human Life International and individuals.
117
 These actors, galvanised by 
the strong lead of the Catholic Church, the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya (NCCK),
118
 and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), have 
managed to establish and institutionalise their opposition to abortion and have 
worked hard not just to keep the issue from public purview, but also to prevent 
major policy changes. They have done this by deploying four major discourses: 
(a) that abortion is murder of unborn children, (b) that abortion is detrimental to 
women‟s health, (c) that abortion is both immoral (d) that abortion is unAfrican. 
The policy preference within these discourses overwhelmingly favours more 
restrictions or the need to preserve current ones. 
Ferree et al. (2002) have noted that the playing fields on which contests about 
abortion are waged usually influence the direction of the debate since they may 
provide either advantages or disadvantages to the actors. As such, in order to 
contextualize the Kenyan anti-abortion discourses, in the first section of this 
chapter, I provide a detailed characterisation of the anti-abortion actors. An 
introduction to the actors and the context in which they frame their discourses will 
assist in understanding their anti-abortion stance, as well as the factors behind 
their ability to influence abortion policy in Kenya. This section will highlight how 
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 As in other African countries, there is a significant presence of contemporary Evangelical 
Christianities, especially driven from the United States of America. With about 1,337 American 
Protestant missionaries as of 1992, Kenya was host to the largest concentration of US Protestant 
mission personnel in Africa (Hearn, 2002). However, the majority of people who define 
themselves as Christian are likely to be affiliated to the mainstream Catholic or Protestant 
churches historically associated with colonial conversion (Maia, 2003). 
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 The NCCK is a fellowship of Protestant churches and Christian organizations. 
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the strategic choices exercised by anti-abortion actors in presenting their 
arguments take into account and are shaped by the material circumstances in 
which they produce the discourses. 
In the second section of the chapter, I explore the four major discourses that are 
used by anti-abortion actors to oppose decriminalisation of abortion, in addition to 
illuminating the national and international contexts in which these discourses are 
articulated. At the same time, I will also focus on the policy implications of the 
anti-abortion actors‟ patterns of framing abortion. As Bacchi (1999) has noted, the 
construction and discussion of social problems such as abortion do not occur in a 
social vacuum. Rather, the interpretive process is profoundly influenced by 
historical, political and socio-cultural circumstances, all of which play key roles in 
the Kenyan case. 
6.1. Anti-abortion Actors in Kenya 
Religious groups constitute the major organised opponents of abortion 
decriminalization in Kenya. Although not all anti-abortion crusaders are 
necessarily religious representatives, it is worth noting that, firstly, an 
overwhelming majority of anti-abortion actors base their opposition on religious 
and moral tenets, and secondly, these largely anti-abortion actors have been 
successful in influencing state decisions in the sphere of sexuality and 
reproduction in general, and abortion in particular. The circumstances through 
which the religious groups have come to have such enormous political 
significance and power in the country‟s political field have to do with complex 
social and historical processes, such as colonialism, which are analysed in this 
section.  
It is widely acknowledged that Christianity was an important component of 
colonial conquest and administration (Maia, 2003). Colonial conquest and control 
provided a political environment that facilitated missionary activity, while at the 
same time, missionary support for colonialism played an important role in 
providing religious justification of colonialism. The success of missionary 
evangelisation is evident in that, at present, 78 per cent of Kenyans consider 
themselves Christians. Of these, Protestants constitute 45 per cent, and Catholics 
33 per cent (Otieno, 2010). With such a powerful presence, it is no wonder that 
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the church in Kenya has been an important player in influencing state 
interventions in the fields of reproductive health and abortion. As already noted, 
the anti-abortion movement in Kenya is a flagship for Christian morality and 
ethics, firmly placing the vast majority of Christians on the pro-life side of the 
debate. 
Another significant factor contributing to Christian religious anti-abortion actors‟ 
ability to influence public policy relates to the particular forms of administration 
which colonial rule imposed. As noted in Chapter 4, colonial governance in 
Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, used indirect rule through Native Authorities and 
the institution of the tribe to ethnicize and localise political control (Mamdami, 
1996). Native administration over tribal areas, combined with the demarcation of 
missionary spheres of influence, created situations in which specific ethnic groups 
came to be associated with specific Christian identities (Maia, 2003; Ragsdale, 
1986). As such, it was easy for missionaries to assume a mantle of cultural as well 
as religious leadership, allowing them to become champions of local issues. This 
positioning enabled Christian missions to consolidate themselves as patrons of 
specific ethnic groups, thereby winning their loyalty (Maia, 2003). This loyalty in 
turn enabled them to accumulate power and influence which considerably 
increased their status in society and consequently their ability to persuade people 
to adopt their stances, including those that sanctioned women‟s subordination 
(Moss, 1999).  
The importance of religious missionaries was exacerbated by the colonial 
government‟s refusal to invest in state welfare programmes for Africans, instead 
leaving it to charities and missionary groups to exchange their spiritual wares for 
material support in education, health, or other social services (Sabar-Friedman, 
1997; Strayer, 1978). Thus, in addition to numerical strength, religious groups‟ 
traditional involvement in the provision of education and healthcare in Kenya 
increased their ability to exert influence on the general public and on the state. 
After all, their involvement in the provisioning of social and educational services 
principle enabled religious groups to determine to a large extent, the contours and 
the policy of these public services (see Chapter 4). 
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Upon independence, the Christian religious denominations that had been 
recognised and privileged in the period of formal colonialism continued to play 
similar and dominant roles in directing the affairs of newly independent Kenya 
(Sabar-Friedman, 1997). Therefore, although Independent Kenya‟s Constitution 
established a secular state, religious organisations, through their historical control 
of social welfare and more specifically the education and health sectors, continued 
to influence the conduct of state affairs and the formulation of public policy 
(Hassan, 2008), mainly because of the state‟s inability to replace the church in the 
provision of such services. For example, there are 974 religious-based health 
facilities, 964 belonging to the Kenya Episcopal Conference (KEC) and the 
Christian Health Association of Kenya (CHAK), together providing 40 per cent of 
national health services (Mandi, 2006).  Additionally, at independence, 90 per 
cent of the schools in the country were connected to one or other of the 
churches.
119
 In the aftermath of economic structural adjustment programmes, 
combined with the gradual erosion of state capacity and control since the 1980s, 
religious organisations have acquired the opportunity for more formal engagement 
with the state as significant agents in the facilitation of social and economic 
development. Moreover, Western governments and non-governmental 
organisations have often preferred working with religious organisations which are 
considered more accountable and less corrupt (Haynes, 2004; Hearn, 2002). 
Researchers such as Gifford (1998) argue that the Christian church is probably the 
most powerful institution in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Religious groups‟ control of the education and health sectors has had significant 
effects on the abortion debate in the country. Because missionary education was 
used as an instrument of evangelism, the curriculum tilted strongly towards the 
Christian religion with scripture and the catechism taking a central position 
(Ragsdale, 1986; Sabar-Friedman, 1997; Strayer, 1978). As missionaries regarded 
traditional African religions and practices as primitive and heathen, education 
became a tool for denigrating and destroying indigenous political orders, resulting 
in the decline of traditional religious institutions and practices (Gellar, 2006; 
Moss, 1999). This included attacks on female practices, among them female 
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circumcision (see Chapter 3) and abortion. Although not encouraged, most 
traditional African communities allowed abortion in cases of unwanted 
pregnancies (Bleek, 1990). It was used when taboos were broken in cases of 
adultery, unsanctioned pregnancy during the lactation period, or when a girl was 
considered too young for pregnancy (ibid.). Colonial officers and missionaries 
condemned abortion and advocated its ban amongst African women in the hope of 
enforcing what they perceived to be women‟s roles, and also to facilitate the 
creation of a large pool of African labourers for European settler farms (Boddy, 
2007; Thomas, 2000). It is worth noting that in emphasizing the restriction of 
African women‟s access to abortion, the colonialists were not driven by the need 
to protect the rights of the unborn, but were concerned about the unnecessary loss 
of prospective labour (ibid.).  
Additionally, missionary education for the colonised people ensured that on the 
eve of Independence, men
120
 with strong Christian roots
121
 emerged as leaders in 
many African countries, including Kenya. This could have affected the abortion 
debate in two major ways; firstly, the presumably religious political leaders were 
unlikely to support policies that could go against their religious beliefs, and 
secondly, the resultant political elite‟s association with religious organisations 
meant that the organisations came to command significant influence over Kenya‟s 
public life, especially because influential positions in the government were held 
by church lay members. For example, Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General at the 
time of Independence, was a close ally of President Kenyatta and a lay member of 
the Anglican Church (Sabar-Friedman, 1997) and his anti-abortion stance was 
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 While colonial officers and missionaries were in agreement that Africans were to be given 
minimal education, women were particularly disadvantaged. On the one hand, the Christian 
missionaries were middle-class educated men with Victorian ideals and considered women only as 
wives, mothers, and housewives (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1997). African women were thus offered 
domestic science and home life education, emphasising skills such as cooking, food preserving, 
clothes making and laundering. To justify their differential treatment of women, missionaries 
insisted that “all authority came from God through the image of the father…the Christian way 
called for the father to dominate his children and family head to dominate the private 
farm…considering it indecent for women to work outdoors” (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1997, p. 144). 
By offering them an education that ensured their subordination to men, it was to be expected that 
women were unrepresented in most post-colonial governments.  
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 Both President Kenyatta and President Moi called their churches the consciences and 
watchdogs of the society, while President Kibaki is noted to have stated that the church and the 
state are inseparable (Kulczycki, 1999). 
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public knowledge (Thomas, 2003).
122
 Although such appointments and 
consequent policy implications exemplify the close relationship between state and 
religion in Kenya, it is also a reflection of the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic 
nature of the Kenyan state, as discussed in Chapter 2, and demonstrated in 
Chapter 5. Since political leaders rely on patronage to access or remain in power, 
religious organisations and their elite personnel are often targets for cooptation 
into what may be referred to as reciprocal assimilation (Bayart, 1993; Gifford, 
1998; Lemarchand, 1992). In the resultant you scratch my back, I scratch yours 
kind of relationship, religious leaders not only receive material and economic 
benefits,
123
 but also support political leaders who are willing to pursue their 
interests, including the criminalization of abortion.  
Although attempts were made after independence to make education relevant to 
the needs of the Kenyan society, the Ominde Commission of 1964 and the 
Education Act of 1968 both emphasized the importance of teaching Christian 
religious education in schools under the guidance of various churches which 
sponsored them (Ojiambo, 2009). By being able to influence the religious beliefs 
of young Kenyans, Christian religious leaders have not only been able to shape 
the opinions of a majority of Kenyans, but have also been able to maintain many 
devout followers despite growing secularisation. For example, because churches 
sponsor many secular schools, religious groups have been able to successfully 
resist the introduction of sex education (see Chapter 5), despite research showing 
that school-based programmes are an important element of efforts to improve the 
reproductive health of young people (Kirby et al., 1994; Kubicek et al., 2010; 
Strouse & Fabes, 1985). Religious influence in the school curriculum is evident in 
the following excerpt from an official school text book: 
Young people who procure abortion often end up leading depressed, 
frustrated, unwholesome and lonely lives which usher them into a further 
abyss of depravity and drug addiction. 
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 Interestingly, in 2004, Charles Njonjo, exhibited a change of stance as he is noted to have said 
he was in support of legal abortion (Njonjo, 2004). He argued that unsafe abortion was leading to 
unnecessary deaths of women and girls. 
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 Because religious actors suffer from the same economic problems as the general population, 
many strive to develop contacts with political elites with the hope of advancing their own self-
interests (Haynes, 2004; Maia, 2003). 
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A girl will always know and live with the reality that she wilfully 
smothered and killed her unborn child. It is fairly haunting and dauntingly 
prickly to one‟s conscience. Hallucinations, dementia and ultimate 
madness are the likely consequences for the victims. (Otiende et al., 2001, 
p. 26) 
Unsurprisingly, a recent study conducted by Adanji et al. (2010) on the attitudes 
of Kenyan in-school adolescents on abortion and unwanted pregnancies showed 
that the attitudes of the respondents were largely conservative with a majority of 
participants disapproving of induced abortion for school girls with unwanted 
pregnancies. The negative attitude, which is in conflict with the high rates of 
abortion among in-school adolescents (see Chapter 7), can be a result of the 
pervasive influence of Christian teachings as discussed above.  
Religious organisations‟ direct involvement in the provision of education and 
healthcare has also meant that religious leaders are in contact with large numbers 
of people, especially in poor rural areas, where they may be the only providers. 
This not only allows the organisations to consolidate themselves as significant 
power brokers in the regions, but also makes it easy for religious leaders to set 
themselves up as local elites controlling key resources for the poor. Although 
most religious organisations claim to be apolitical (Maia, 2003), they are 
generally active social actors engaged in local and national political processes. 
This may be the reason behind religious leaders‟ enjoyment of significant 
credibility and legitimacy within the communities in which they work.  
The ability of religious leaders to command respect and obedience from the 
general population was constantly referred to by most of my research participants 
as being behind political leaders‟ unwillingness to rub them the wrong way. State 
leaders were presented as being afraid that religious leaders could influence their 
supporters into voting them out of elected or appointed positions. For example, a 
pro-abortion non-state research participant, NSA3, explained that Cardinal Njue, 
the Catholic archbishop of Nairobi, had threatened to marshal his followers to 
vote out politicians who dared to vote for the adoption of the draft Reproductive 
Health and Rights Bill (2008), which sought to legalise abortion in specific 
circumstances (see Chapter 5). This participant explained that the fear of “being 
out of Parliament” made many legislators afraid of publicly supporting abortion 
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legalisation. At another level, religious leaders‟ power may emanate from their 
being personally and closely associated with ruling regimes, through the 
patrimonial and clientelist networks referred to earlier. Being a member of the 
state sponsored patronage network not only gives religious leaders opportunity to 
amass personal wealth, but also binds them to the state in a mutual project to 
maintain hegemonic domination over society (Haynes, 2004). 
Another factor behind religious leaders‟ power relates to their proven ability to 
initiate political change. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Catholic and 
Protestant clergy actively participated in criticising the violations of human rights 
and the absence of fair and open elections during President Moi‟s regime 
(Haynes, 2004; Lynch, 2006).
124
 At the time, attempts by the state to silence 
religious leaders failed because of the support they enjoyed amongst the general 
public and the fact that most of them had elaborate international and foreign links 
(Matanga, 2000). As one Kenyan cleric stated: 
The absence of other organizations of a political nature (eg. political 
parties) that can confront the excesses of the state means that the church is 
the only nationwide body which because of its institutional strength and its 
sense of obligation for public morals and social justice can speak and act 
in implicitly political ways. The social evils of our time (eg. corruption, 
political patronage in employment, interference of the state with basic 
human freedoms, electoral rigging, detention without trial, torture, gagging 
of the press etc.) are so great...that Christians with any compassion cannot 
be indifferent to or complacent about the effects of such evils upon human 
lives in Kenya. (The Nairobi Law Monthly, as cited in Sabar-Friedman, 
1997, p. 30) 
Religious leaders‟ relentless pressure, in a context where churches were virtually 
the only formal organisations with the capacity to mobilise large sections of the 
population without recourse to government control, eventually forced President 
Moi to retire and to hold fair elections. In addition to endearing religious leaders 
to the general public, this also demonstrated to political leaders the potential 
power of the Church as both a central mobilizing force and the only independent 
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 Although this may seem like a contradiction to the earlier noted close working relationship 
between the political elite and the clergy, increased abuse of human rights and state-manipulated 
tribal clashes by President Moi made it impossible for church leaders to remain silent (Adar, 
2004). However, even amongst the members of the clergy, only a handful were willing to openly 
criticise the government. 
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organization capable of creating solidarity within a multi-ethnic Kenyan society. 
The fear of religious leaders‟ fury may thus be construed as being behind Kenyan 
political leaders‟ use of religion as a tool for strengthening their legitimacy among 
the constituents, a majority of whom are religious. Such leaders are unlikely to 
publicly support the decriminalisation of abortion, although they may actually be 
pro-abortion at a personal level. It is probable that this was behind some of my 
research participants‟ continued need for reassurance that the information they 
shared, especially in favour of liberating abortion laws, was to be used only for 
my thesis and that it would not find its way to newspapers. 
In this section, I have argued that religious organisations, which form the bulk of 
anti-abortion actors, command significant power over political opinions in Kenya. 
I have further provided an analysis of the factors behind their ability to wield such 
power. In the next section, I provide an in-depth analysis of the discourses used by 
anti-abortion actors in Kenya, and explore the arguments that they raise in 
arriving at their understandings of the scope and nature of the abortion problem. 
At the same time, I demonstrate how the neo-patrimonial nature of the Kenyan 
state influences, or is influenced, by the discourses espoused by anti-abortion 
crusaders in Kenya.  
6.2. Anti-abortion Discourses in Kenya 
Anti-abortion actors in Kenya present abortion as unacceptable because it is 
murder of unborn children, is detrimental to women‟s health, is immoral, and 
unAfrican. These views of abortion points towards an anti-abortion policy 
recommendation, while at the same time condemning not just women who have 
abortions, but also those who may support abortion legalization.  I discuss these 
discourses below. 
6.2.1. Religious and Foetal Life Anti-abortion Discourses 
Religious and foetal life discourses are the most commonly invoked anti-abortion 
discourses in Kenya. It was difficult to untangle the two because they were 
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referred to simultaneously and used to reinforce each other.
125
 The fundamental 
issue for those using these discourses is the sacredness of human life. Within this 
frame, the foetus is presented as an unborn child and abortion, irrespective of any 
mitigating circumstances, is the taking of a human life. By framing abortion in 
terms of protecting human life, Kenyan religious and foetal life discourses express 
support for an anti-abortion policy, as is evident from the following anti-abortion 
research participant‟s comment in defence of foetal life: “The church is against 
abortion because abortion destroys and has no respect for the sanctity of human 
life” (RA1). In opposing abortion, this participant finds justification in a Christian 
religious master frame,
126
 which draws on conservative religious ideologies and 
Biblical scripture. Other anti-abortion participants, more so the Church hierarchy 
in association with organized groups and individuals, also regularly used specific 
references to doctrinal sources such as the Bible and statements by the Vatican to 
affirm the sanctity of life. Rev. Peter Karanja of the NCCK,
127
 for example, said: 
Life begins at conception, when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm. Refer 
to the following verses in the Bible: Job 31: 15; Psalms 139: 13 – 16; 
Isaiah 44: 2; Isaiah 46: 3 – 4; Isaiah 49: 5; Jeremiah 1: 4 – 5; Luke 1: 41 – 
42, 44. In all of them, God is referred to as having made the person in the 
womb, at conception.  
The above quoted Book of Psalms, which states, “For it was you who created my 
being, knit me together in my mother‟s womb”, and the Fifth Commandment, 
“Thou shalt not kill,” were consistently invoked in anti-abortion actors‟ attempts 
to reiterate the humanity of the foetus and the unacceptability of abortion.  
There are two important points worth noting with regard to foetal life-focused 
discourses. Firstly, given Kenya‟s colonial political history and culture as 
discussed earlier, religiously justified foetal life discourse is the most dominant in 
the country and receives ample political and popular support. Secondly, the policy 
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 Research participants who opposed abortion on foetal life tenets justified their opposition on 
religious grounds. 
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 Master frames can be conceptualized as general symbolic frames that are culturally resonant to 
a particular situation (Swart, 1995). For more information on master frames, see Snow and 
Benford (1992). 
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 The Reverend‟s office also provided a written statement which he had used in an earlier press 
conference. 
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tendency within this foetal right to life frame overwhelmingly favours more 
restrictions on abortion or the need to preserve and enforce the current laws 
criminalising abortion. Below, I will elaborate on these factors while providing 
examples of how they have influenced the direction of the debate. 
As noted earlier, the neo-patrimonial nature of Kenyan politics has, on the one 
hand, resulted in a lack of clear separation between the Church and state as 
political and religious leaders tend to be involved in mutually beneficial 
patrimonial and clientelist relationships. On the other hand, the relationship has 
legitimised the invocation of religion, and more specifically Christianity, on issues 
of public policy. The former President Moi, for example, while explaining his 
anti-abortion stance argued that abortion has no place in Christianity. He is noted 
to have said that “as a Christian, my conscience cannot allow me to support a law 
that leaves so much leeway for abortion to take place” (Mkawale, 2010). The use 
of religion is enabled by the fact that a majority of Kenyans identify themselves as 
Christians, and as such, the discourse of foetal life as a sacred canopy used by 
anti-abortion actors receives general acceptance as it resonates within the larger 
society. This being the case, political leaders and policy makers also articulate this 
discourse because they may themselves be religious, or, alternatively, they are 
persuaded to support the majority view.  
Furthermore, in a country where access to both power and economic wealth is 
dependent on patrimonial relations, support from religious leaders, and by 
extension their adherents, is likely to be an important contributing factor to 
retaining or gaining power. As such, those intent on getting voted in or appointed 
to powerful positions are likely to be unwilling to support issues the church may 
be uncomfortable with. In fact, this may explain why Kenyan leaders, both 
political and public civil servants, seem not to hold fixed personal opinions on 
abortion but instead express different opinions depending on the audience. For 
example, in 1999, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, Professor 
Julius Meme, when opening an African regional workshop for journalists on law 
and reproduction, noted that: 
I have seen so much misery at the Kenyatta National Hospital...where 
women with abortion-related problems have died and others lost uteruses. 
There is no doubt the existing laws are colonial and too strict in the 
173 
 
modern society (Ngwiri, 1999, as cited in Center for Reproductive Rights, 
2010, p. 11). 
Although the Permanent Secretary‟s call to legalise abortion was supported by 
pro-abortion organisations, anti-abortion crusaders, and specifically the Catholic 
Church, were enraged and called for his resignation (Daily Nation, 1999). But 
despite support from the pro-abortion organisations, the Permanent Secretary later 
retracted his statement after the Vice-President, Professor George Saitoti, publicly 
declared that, “Abortion is against the sanctity and dignity of human life and 
should never be legalised” (Nation Correspondent, 1999).128 Considering that 
Permanent Secretaries are political appointees in Kenya, Professor Meme 
undoubtedly withdrew his support for legalised abortion in order to safeguard his 
job. 
To ensure the continued dominance of their anti-abortion foetal life-focused 
discourse in the country, anti-abortion actors have consistently sought to have 
their opposition to abortion entrenched in public policy. During the National 
Constitutional Conference held in 2004,
129
 for example, religious leaders 
successfully
130
 resisted attempts by pro-abortion activists to have the draft 
Constitution provide for abortion and reproductive health rights. Later on, when 
the abortion issue was reintroduced by the proposed Reproductive Health and 
Rights Bill (2008) which sought to have abortion legalised in specific 
circumstances, Cardinal Njue issued a pastoral letter on 28 September 2008 
warning the government against passing the said Bill. The letter read in part:  
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 It is important to note that the Vice-President, who was also the Minister for Planning and 
National Development, made the comments at a Catholic Church service in which a priest was 
being ordained. 
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 The National Constitutional Conference was convened on 12 January 2004 to deliberate on and 
produce a draft Constitution which was to be subjected to a referendum. On 15 March 2004, 
delegates to the conference adopted the Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2004. The referendum was 
held on 21 November 2005 but the proposed new Constitution was voted down by a 58 per cent 
majority of Kenya‟s voters. 
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  Notably, the consequent Draft Constitution prohibited abortion in principle but left open the 
possibility for Parliament to develop legislation that could expand the lawful grounds for the 
procedure. 
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Abortion is not merely the removal of some tissue from a woman‟s body. 
Abortion is the removal of a living “thing” that would become human if it 
were allowed to remain inside the woman‟s body. Abortion is the 
destruction of an unborn baby. Pregnancy is the period for this new human 
life to mature, not just to “become human”. It already is human. This is 
why the Church considers abortion the killing of a human being, and why 
the Second Vatican Council called it an “unspeakable crime.” I remind 
you all to maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of 
conception. Even under threat, never use your knowledge to do what is 
contrary to the laws of humanity. 
As earlier noted, the Cardinal, like other anti-abortion actors, makes reference to 
various sources, among them the Vatican, to emphasize the humanity of the 
human foetus.  
Similarly, when in 2009, negotiations on a new Constitution resumed after the 
2004 draft was rejected in a referendum, religious leaders and their anti-abortion 
supporters again insisted that a clause specifying that life begins at conception be 
included. They were categorical that Kenya‟s Constitution 
Should be clear on the sanctity of the human life, ensure life is properly 
safeguarded and protected. A good constitution should be clear on rights 
and duties, and where life begins and ends. Life does not hang in the air; it 
begins and ends somewhere. There can be no legislation that says 
otherwise. (Mathenge, 2009a) 
Considering the already alluded to power wielded by religious leaders and the fear 
that they may scuttle plans for a new Constitution, a clause meeting their demands 
was added. A pro-abortion research participant (NSA7) explained that: 
The original draft Constitution by the Committee of Experts
131
 made no 
reference to the definition of life or any provision with reference to 
abortion. But when the draft was handed to the Parliamentary Committee, 
the Catholic Church and the NCCK persuaded the politicians to include 
new subsections; one recognizing that life begins at conception and the 
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 The Committee of Experts was the main technical organ in the Constitutional Review process. 
It comprised of nine experts and two ex officio members who were nominated by the National As-
sembly and appointed by the President. The committee was mandated to finalize the Constitutional 
Review process and deliver a new constitutional dispensation for Kenya.  
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other stating clearly that abortion is not permitted, unless in the opinion of 
a registered medical practioner, the life of the mother is in danger. 
It is important to note that, firstly, the Parliamentary Select Committee that added 
the clauses recognising life as beginning at conception was made up of Members 
of Parliament, and secondly, religious representatives began to acknowledge 
pregnant women in their anti-abortion discourses for the first time. These two 
factors can be accounted for if one keeps in mind that, in agreeing to overrule the 
Committee of Experts‟ decision not to define where life begins in the draft 
Constitution, the Members of Parliament in the committee were keen on 
appeasing religious leaders who had threatened to campaign against its adoption 
in the forthcoming referendum. Religious leaders, led by the NCCK and the 
Catholic Church, had threatened to reject the draft constitution if the Bill of Rights 
did not define that the life of a person begins at conception and ends at natural 
death. Reverend Peter Karanja of the National Council of Churches, for example, 
warned: 
Should the harmonised draft remain as it is without defining when life 
begins, we shall explore legitimate options as stipulated under the Kenya 
Constitution Review Act, 2008 to seek amends. What is clear is that this 
issue needs to be taken seriously as it will definitely take centre-stage with 
regards to the referendum. (Anyangu-Amu, 2009) 
Although the willingness of Kenyan Members of Parliament‟s to give in to the 
religious leaders‟ wishes could have resulted from their unwillingness to sacrifice 
support from a rather large Christian constituency, the importance of a new 
Constitution for the Kenyan elite cannot be overlooked. In the aftermath of the 
2008 post-election violence, one of the major decisions reached between Kenyan 
leaders and international peace mediators
132
 was the writing of a new 
Constitution. For the Kenyan elite, therefore, the adoption of the draft 
Constitution was not a commitment just to the people of Kenya, but also to the 
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 The international mediation team was under the leadership of former United Nations Secretary 
General, Dr. Kofi Annan, as key negotiator, acting on behalf of the African Union‟s Presidency 
together with Graca Machel for the AU‟s African Peer Review Mechanism, and former Tanzanian 
President Benjamin Mkapa for the AU‟s Forum of Retired African Presidents. 
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international community which was closely monitoring the process.
133
 It is 
therefore plausible to argue that in agreeing to disagree with the Committee of 
Experts, the members of the Parliamentary Committee were executing the wishes 
of the political elite who were keen on having the new Constitution passed. 
Moreover, for President Kibaki, a new Constitution provided a chance for a 
worthy legacy,
134
 while for the Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, delivering a new 
Constitution would benefit his future campaign for the Presidency. Thus, as noted 
in Chapter 5, Kenya‟s patriarchal political elite were willing to sacrifice women‟s 
access to safe abortion in order to make political gains.  
It is important to note that religious leaders‟ request to have anti-abortion clauses 
in the draft Constitution for the first time acknowledges the acceptability of 
abortion in instances where pregnancies threaten women‟s lives. While this may 
appear to be a shift from their earlier wholesale condemnation of abortion, I 
contend that the anti-abortion actors were merely strategically ignoring the fact 
that the law as it was, already provided for abortion in those circumstances. 
Unfortunately for them, because the public debate on a new Constitution had 
enabled many people to become aware of the abortion law provisions at the time, 
the religious leaders had no other options but to recognize the need for abortion on 
health grounds. However, it can also be argued that the religious leaders‟ apparent 
interest in women‟s health was intended to attract voters during the referendum, 
rather than genuine concern for women. As I will show in a later section of this 
chapter, religious leaders in Kenya also oppose abortion with the argument that 
abortion negatively affects women‟s health. Thus, just like political leaders, the 
religious leaders can be seen as playing politics with women‟s lives and health. 
The foetal life discourse and more specifically the claim that life begins at 
conception was however not present in all religious anti-abortion discourses. In 
what appears to be an interesting twist on the foetal rights discourse, a senior 
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Doughman, 2010). The American President is also said to have sent the Vice President, Joe Biden, 
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(ibid.).  
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 President Kibaki was serving his final term in office.  
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academic scholar and Sheikh of the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
135
 
explained that although the Koran does not encourage abortion, any woman with 
valid reasons is allowed to have an abortion during the first four months of 
pregnancy. In his words: 
All Muslim scholars agree that the foetus changes to a human being after 
120 days of conception. But after the stage of ensoulment, abortion is 
completely prohibited except where it is imperative to save the mother‟s 
life. (RA8)  
Further, while the Christian anti-abortion leaders and their supporters insist that 
abortion is unacceptable under any circumstances, the Muslim scholar said Islam 
allows abortion on medical, health or social grounds. He elaborated: 
Health concerns that are permitted include when a woman conceives and, 
according to doctors, she cannot give birth. Here, abortion is permissible, 
otherwise, the pregnancy will take a toll on her health and endanger not 
just her but also the unborn baby. Medical reasons include when a woman 
has complications like a heart disease and has been warned against 
becoming pregnant. In cases of pregnancies arising from rape or 
incestuous relationships and other similar traumatising conditions, Islam 
allows such babies to be aborted before the fourth month. By doing that, 
Islam takes care of the social implications such a baby could have on the 
woman. Whenever she looks at the child for the rest of her life, it will 
remind her of her ordeal. (RA8) 
Although the Sheikh‟s interpretation of the Koran appears to address a woman‟s 
needs in case of an unwanted pregnancy, it is important to note that the power to 
decide whether an abortion should be offered is not left to the woman. Rather, 
the Sheikh says Islamic doctrines dictate that in the event a woman needs to 
secure an abortion, the decision should be tabled and approved by a panel of 
professional doctors. In his words, “It should not be simply left to a woman to 
decide because there is a possibility that this could be abused by some people”. 
Considering that the Kenyan doctors are more likely to be male, access to safe 
abortion is thereby left under male control. Moreover, this requirement may 
discourage many women, who may find the process of convincing doctors, 
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whether male or female, stressful. Seemingly, although abortion is not banned 
by Islam, access is nonetheless most likely to be rather difficult for most women. 
Noticeably though, the Sheikh‟s view that abortion is not completely banned by 
the Koran is not shared by a majority of Muslims in the country. An opinion poll 
carried out during the period of my fieldwork in 2009 showed that among 
Kenya‟s religious groups, Muslims were the most conservative, with 74 per cent 
objecting to abortion under any circumstance (Kumba & Muiruri, 2009). Unlike 
their religious leaders, Christians expressed more liberal views, with almost half 
of them (46 per cent) supporting abortion but under conditions (ibid). 
Seemingly, the views of religious leaders, whether Muslim or Christian, are not 
always shared by their adherents. In addition to casting doubt on the religious 
leaders‟ mandate to speak on behalf of their followers, it also raises the question 
of whether there could be other underlying reasons behind Christian religious 
leaders‟ opposition to abortion. As I will show later in this chapter, it is possible 
that the foetal-focused discourse is less about abortion and more about 
promoting a patriarchal culture and controlling women‟s sexuality, which, as 
demonstrated earlier, began with the advent of Christian missionaries. As 
Bamforth and Richards (2008) have noted, calling abortion murder draws its 
appeal from long-standing patriarchal stereotypes of gender and sexuality that 
idealise mothers as, at once, asexual, and infinitely self-sacrificing. Because this 
discourse does not show any commitment to the equality and well-being of 
women, it is plausible to conclude that foetal right to life claims serve to 
reinforce patriarchal conceptions of women‟s appropriate roles as child-bearers. 
In this section, I have examined the anti-abortion foetal life discourse, which 
purports to be concerned with the defence of foetal life. I have shown that 
because it resonates with the majority of Kenya‟s population who are religious, 
it is the most dominant and thus receives ample support from the political elite. 
In the next section, I provide a discussion of another discourse that advances 
medical science to provide an argument against legalising abortion. 
6.2.2. Pseudo-Scientific Discourses of Abortion 
Although not as widespread as the foetal life and religious discourses, a second 
category of anti-abortion discourses used by anti-abortion crusaders in Kenya 
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appealed to pseudo-medical and scientific tenets. These discourses emphasised 
that ultrasound images have scientifically confirmed human foetuses are human 
because they look like real humans and should therefore access human rights like 
everybody else. The discourses referred to supposed medical facts such as a 
foetus‟ heart begins to beat at six weeks, a foetus responds to stimuli such as pain, 
can suck its thumb and has different blood cells from its mother. In explaining 
why unborn babies ought to be protected, an anti-abortion female gynaecologist 
(RA1) who participated in this research explained: 
A foetus is a human being with the right number of chromosomes like you 
and me. As a medical doctor, to say otherwise would be misleading. In 
fact, the foetus is not a part of the mother since he/she is genetically 
distinct from the mother. A woman just has that privilege of sheltering 
another human being. (RA1) 
Further discussion with the doctor established that she screens the video The 
Silent Scream for her patients in her clinic‟s waiting room.136 When I enquired 
why that was necessary since her opposition to abortion, as the head of an anti-
abortion movement, was publicly known, she said it was to commend her patients 
for not having chosen abortion, and to recruit more anti-abortion crusaders. The 
video purports to show a twelve-week-old foetus being aborted and presents it as 
conscious and able to sense pain. However, this claim has been refuted by 
scholars who point out that: 
At twelve weeks the foetus has no cerebral cortex to receive pain 
impulses; that no “scream” is possible without air in the lungs; that foetal 
movements at this stage are reflexive and without purpose; that the image 
of rapid frantic movement was undoubtedly caused by speeding up the 
film (camera tricks); that the size of the image we see on the screen, along 
with the model that is continually displayed in front of the screen, is nearly 
twice the size of a normal twelve-week foetus, and so forth (Petchesky, 
1987, p. 267). 
Petchesky further notes that although the video is more a cultural representation 
than medical evidence, the foetal images are powerful and may help to recruit 
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 The Silent Scream is a 1984 film video about abortion directed and narrated by Bernard 
Nathanson, an abortion provider turned pro-life activist, and produced in partnership with the 
National Right to Life Committee (Petchesky, 1987). 
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anti-abortion activists (ibid.).  As such, the doctor‟s intention in screening the film 
is well acknowledged.  
An important aspect of the images used in anti-abortion texts such as The Silent 
Scream is that they usually exclude visualisation of the woman carrying the foetus 
(Condit, 1990). By presenting the tiny helpless foetus as a being whose life is 
threatened by its own mother, people are invited to identify with the unborn child 
and not with the woman whose life may also be at risk (Sherwin, 1992; Thornton 
& Paltrow, 1991). The resultant construction of an adversarial relationship 
between the foetus and the woman enables the creation of a gap between mother 
and foetus, which in turn allows anti-abortionists to isolate the foetus, presenting 
it as distinct and unconnected to the woman. By so doing, anti-abortion actors are 
able to ignore the fact that the foetus inhabits a woman‟s body and is wholly 
dependent on her for its maintenance (Heumann, 2007). As Sherwin (1992, p. 
106) notes, “one can only view the distinction between being in or out of a 
woman‟s womb as morally irrelevant if one discounts the perspective of the 
pregnant woman”. Furthermore, this strategy of removing women and their rights 
and needs from the debate pulls the abortion discussion away from the reality of 
women‟s lives, thereby making invisible most of the pro-abortion discourses that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The emotional experience expected from the viewing of foetal images is usually 
intended to foster the anti-abortion construction of the foetus as autonomous 
(Hopkins et al., 2005). However, the impossibility of such a claim is well captured 
by the Illinois Supreme Court explanation in rejecting an application to expand 
the concept of foetal rights to permit a foetus to sue its mother for prenatal injuries 
resulting from the mother‟s actions during pregnancy:  
The relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus is unlike the 
relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant. No other plaintiff 
depends exclusively on any other defendant for everything necessary for 
life itself. No other defendant must go through biological changes of the 
most profound type possible at the risk of her own life, in order to bring 
forth an adversary into the world. It is after all, the whole life of the 
pregnant woman which impacts on the development of the foetus. As 
opposed to the third-party defendant, it is the mother‟s every waking and 
sleeping moment which for better or worse shapes the prenatal 
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environment which forms the world for the developing foetus. That this is 
so is not a pregnant woman‟s fault: it is a fact of life. (Stallman v. 
Youngquist, 125 Ill.2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355, 1988)
137
 
As the court rightly upholds, claims of foetal personhood ignore the relational 
dimension of foetal development, in addition to presenting women as 
unconcerned about the foetuses that they carry. However, this is not the case, 
since most women actually express concern over their foetuses. For example, in a 
study carried out on abortion in Kenya‟s Central Province, while men‟s narratives 
suggested that abortion was women‟s strategy for concealing their waywardness, 
unfaithfulness, and promiscuity, women saw it as a way of protecting themselves 
against the negative socioeconomic consequences of mistimed childbearing 
(Izugbara et al., 2009). In deciding to abort, these women were found to take into 
consideration not just other children that they may already have, but also the 
unborn. This is clear in the following extract: 
If she is married, and she sees that she has children at home and these 
children are suffering and she is also suffering. And this husband...maybe 
he is not concerned much about the situation...the woman may say if I 
have another child poverty will continue to increase. So it is better if I 
abort and so she aborts (as cited in Izugbara et al., 2009, p. 409). 
Evidently then, presentations of foetuses as autonomous and pregnant women as 
unconcerned about their welfare are misleading.  
Moreover, the construction by religious and scientific discourses of foetuses as 
seemingly independent and autonomous beings is not supported by indigenous 
languages. In a majority of Kenyan languages, the word foetus and related terms 
such as embryo are not commonly used, except by people who are well conversant 
with English. As such, most public talk about the foetus makes reference to the 
baby, since Kenyan languages do not seem to have words that specifically refer to 
a foetus. A linguistics University of Nairobi lecturer with whom I had an informal 
discussion explained that because of the fear of spirits and/or witchcraft as well as 
the danger associated with pregnancy, most communities avoided making direct 
reference to pregnancy and/or the foetus. This scholar, whose first language was 
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Kikuyu, noted that a direct translation of the statement, “Mary is pregnant”, would 
be “Mary ena nda‖, whose direct translation is “Mary has a stomach”. While any 
speaker of the language would certainly understand that stomach in that context 
refers to pregnancy, it should not be lost that this meaning is an extension of the 
word‟s referents since under normal circumstances, nda, refers to stomach. 
Moreover, it is also unlikely that speakers of Kikuyu language could not 
differentiate between pregnancy and stomach. This observation becomes even 
more intriguing when one considers that, in a related language, Kikamba, the 
direct translation of the statement “Mary had an abortion”, would be Mary 
nuunaumisye ivu, which literally means “Mary removed stomach”. 
Two conclusions can be deduced from the above observations. Firstly, there is no 
mention of the baby or foetus. This, coupled with the use of the verb remove, 
which can be used with any noun including cup, water, and clothes, presents a 
meaning that is devoid of any moral judgment toward a woman who has an 
abortion. In other words, if having an abortion can be talked about using the same 
verb as removing one‟s clothes, this can only point towards the acceptability of 
the action denoted by the verb. This observation agrees with anthropological 
research which has shown that although not encouraged, abortion was commonly 
used in traditional African societies as a remedy for unwanted pregnancies. 
Thomas (2003), for example, notes that among the Meru people of Kenya, when 
an uncircumcised girl got pregnant, she usually procured an abortion. Afterwards, 
she got circumcised alongside her age mates and got married. No stigma was 
attached to the procedure.  
Secondly, the use of “stomach” to refer to pregnancy can be interpreted as 
pointing towards the dependent nature of a foetus. This is evidenced by the 
grammaticalization of body parts found in the majority of African languages 
(Brown & Ogilvie, 2009).
138
 In these languages, body parts are often used as 
“structural templates to express deictic messages” (Simango, 2004, p. 97), so that 
a word such as stomach usually can indicate spatial concepts for „in(side)‟ (Heine 
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& Kuteva, 2002). Looked at in this way, it might be possible to explain why 
Kenyan languages have no specific words referring to the foetus, since it can only 
be defined as being inside the woman. As such, it is not possible to talk of a foetus 
as an autonomous being, since it is not possible to talk about it independently. 
This is very different to the English language, which allows speakers to speak of 
foetuses without making reference to the pregnant woman. 
It is therefore my contention that the valuing of the foetus over the pregnant 
woman, and its justification through science, was introduced by either Christianity 
or the English language. Perhaps a more significant pointer to this is the fact that 
infanticide was rather common in the majority of African traditional societies 
(Milner, 2000). For instance, although children were highly valued, the Kikuyu 
people of Kenya also practised ritual killing of twins (LeVine & LeVine, 1981). 
Moreover, because pregnancies conceived by uncircumcised girls were believed 
to pose grave moral dangers, the girls were usually required to procure abortions 
or arrange for such babies‟ murder after birth (Thomas, 2007). This practice has 
also been found among the Bemba people of Zambia, as well as the Akan people 
of Ghana (Bleek, 1990). Audrey Richards (1982, pp. 33-34) has noted that 
children born to uninitiated girls were considered “creature[s] of ill omen” who 
brought misfortune to their home villages by stopping rainfall, making granaries 
empty quickly, and compelling their parents and themselves to be driven into the 
bush. Although such accounts of condemnation of uncircumcised girls‟ 
pregnancies point to the importance of female circumcision in readying girls for 
socially acceptable conception and childbirth, they also demonstrate that the 
societies, by recommending infanticide or abortion, placed higher value on the 
future lives of women and girls. As a proverb in my mother tongue, Kikuyu, 
summarises, “it is better to save the pot than to break the pot while attempting to 
save the water it contains”. 
At another level, allocating the foetus the status of personhood on the one hand 
blurs the legal distinction between a foetus and an already born baby, while on the 
other hand allowing anti-abortion actors to claim to act as litigators on its behalf. 
This is further achieved through the earlier noted presentation of the foetus as 
vulnerable, fragile and unable to defend itself. In doing so, anti-abortion actors 
reinforce the acceptability of people, other than the mother, acting on behalf of the 
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interests of the foetus. Such reasoning must have informed Kenyan anti-abortion 
activists who disrupted a mock tribunal organised by pro-abortion actors in 2007 
and demanded representation for unborn children. The demonstrators shouted, 
“This forum is one-sided, who is speaking for the children? We have heard the 
testimonies of the mothers. Who will speak for the children?” (White, 2007). 
Obviously, the anti-abortion activists had appointed themselves as the 
representatives of the unborn, but without any consideration for the pregnant 
woman, except in a way that is the subject of the following section.  
It is worth noting that the pseudo-scientific anti-abortion discourse is not 
particularly popular with the Kenyan political elite, as compared to the foetal-life 
discourse. My take is that because Kenyan politicians make public 
pronouncements on abortion to attract votes and/or political support from 
religious leaders, opposing abortion on religious grounds presents a better choice.  
6.2.3. Abortion and Women’s Health 
An additional category of anti-abortion discourses in Kenya constructs abortion as 
problematic because of the risks it poses to women‟s health. For instance, while 
contesting Article 26 (paragraph 4) of the 2009 proposed draft Constitution that 
provided for legal abortion if a pregnancy was a threat to a woman‟s life or health, 
the Catholic Kenyan Episcopal Conference argued that:  
Is a danger to the health of the mother a sufficient reason to abort a child 
in the womb? Is the stress which a young schoolgirl undergoes on 
discovering that she is pregnant a sufficient threat to her health, so that she 
can demand and obtain an abortion? (Kenya Episcopal Conference, 2010) 
It is important to note that in this extract, the Catholic Bishops in Kenya limit 
pregnant women‟s health problems to stress, while downplaying and/or ignoring 
the well known fact that pregnancy and child-birth remain among the most serious 
threats to women‟s health. The hypocrisy of caring about abstract women‟s 
emotional wellbeing while ignoring their physical circumstances is also evident in 
the Catholic Bishops‟ claim that any danger to the health of the pregnant woman 
is likely to be a result of an abortion. They assert that: 
There are many “trained health professionals” who vouch for the fact that 
the guilt or trauma known as “post-abortion syndrome” is a factor that can 
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damage a woman‟s emotional life. This is a result of aborting the child – 
an act that cannot be reversed. (Kenya Episcopal Conference, 2010, pp. 1-
2) 
Notable is the attempt to attain scientific legitimation through reference to the 
objective use of medical authorities. A similar argument was advanced by the 
American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (AAPLOG), 
who called on the Kenyan government to protect the life of the unborn in the 
country‟s new Constitution. Using an equally medicalised discourse, members of 
the association claimed that induced abortion has been associated with a 
significant increase in major depression, suicide, self-destructive behaviour and 
also increased substance abuse among those who have procured abortions 
(Catholic Information Service for Africa, 2010). Although these claims have been 
contested, they are commonly articulated by anti-abortion actors in Kenya, who, 
like the Catholic Bishops and AAPLOG, focus on what they allege to be its 
negative mental health consequences. For example, one of my research 
participants associated induced abortion with madness, while another made 
reference to some form of psychological problem resulting from pregnancy 
terminations: 
Legalised abortion leads to an increase in its incidence. We will have more 
mad women walking the streets as a result of psychological problems 
resulting from the guilt of knowing that one killed their own baby. (RA4) 
Women suffer a lot as a result of abortion. If one had the abortion say in 
September, they get sick every year during that month while others hear 
voices of crying babies. I know a woman who cries whenever she sees a 
child of the age her aborted one would have been. (RA1) 
In relation to RA4‟s claim, legalised abortion has been found not to lead to an 
increase in its incidence (Cohen, 2009). Rather, legal abortion leads to a reduction 
in deaths and health complications that women experience as a result of unsafe 
abortions (ibid.). As for the claims that abortion results in mental health problems, 
it is possible to argue that the anti-abortion research participants have consciously 
chosen to focus on the abstract negative mental health consequences of abortion 
because establishing or conclusively disproving a causal relationship between 
abortion and subsequent behaviour is difficult (Cohen, 2006). This is unlike 
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abortion‟s physical safety, which science has generally attested to when 
performed under medical supervision (ibid.).
139
  
The argument by anti-abortion activists that abortion has negative effects on 
women‟s mental health is well documented (Bazelon, 2007; Cohen, 2006; 
Coleman, 2006; Fergusson et al., 2006; Lee, 2003; Reardon et al., 2003). These 
anti-abortion researchers have insisted that abortion poses significant risks to 
women‟s mental health and carries a greater risk of emotional harm owing to 
feelings of guilt, unresolved loss and lowered self-esteem, than childbirth does 
(Speckhard & Rue, 1992). Claims of the mental health risks of abortion, referred 
to as post-abortion syndrome (PAS), gained visibility from the mid-1980s when 
Dr. Vincent Rue, who has been credited with developing the argument, insisted 
that the psychological effects of the decision to have an abortion could generate 
psychological distress (Speckhard & Rue, 1992). To support their claims, abortion 
opponents have focused on research, such as a 2008 New Zealand study whose 
findings reported a 30 per cent increase in mental disorders for women having 
abortions (Fergusson et al., 2008). These findings have, however, been disputed 
because firstly, most abortions in New Zealand are anyway authorized on the 
basis of mental health indications,
140
 and secondly, the results were based on 
after-the-fact interviews with the women, which could have skewed the results 
(Casey et al., 2008;  Fergusson et al., 2009; Major et al., 2009). 
Conversely, a more recent study in Denmark showed no credible evidence that 
elective abortion of an unwanted pregnancy causes mental health problems 
(Munk-Oslen et al., 2011). This study confirms the findings of the American 
Psychological Association that abortion carries no more mental health risk than 
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 In order to obtain a legal abortion in New Zealand, a woman must obtain the approval of two 
specialist consultants, and the consultants must agree that either (a) the pregnancy would seriously 
harm the life or the physical or mental health of the woman, (b) the pregnancy is the result of 
incest, (c) the woman is severely mentally handicapped, or (d) a foetal abnormality exists. An 
abortion will also be considered on the basis of the pregnant woman‟s young age or when the 
pregnancy is the result of rape (Major et al., 2009, p. 871). 
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carrying a pregnancy to term (Carey, 2008). A task force
141
 commissioned by the 
APA to collect, examine, and summarize the scientific research addressing the 
mental health factors associated with abortion, reported that: 
The best scientific evidence published indicates that among adult women 
who have an unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health 
problems is no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester abortion 
than if they deliver that pregnancy. The evidence regarding the relative 
mental health risks associated with multiple abortions is more equivocal. 
Positive associations observed between multiple abortions and poorer 
mental health may be linked to co-occurring risks that predispose a woman 
to both multiple unwanted pregnancies and mental health problems 
(American Psychological Association, 2008, p. 4). 
The panellists were, however, careful to add that mental health among women 
who experience an unwanted pregnancy may be a reflection of pre-existing and 
co-occurring conditions in a woman‟s life that place her at greater risk for poor 
mental health in general, regardless of how she resolves her pregnancy (ibid.). 
Seemingly, the socio-cultural contexts in which a woman lives are likely to affect 
her mental health following an abortion (Major et al., 2009). A qualitative study 
by Goodwin and Ogden (2007) showed that: 
Those [women] who described how they had never been upset or 
experienced a linear recovery also tended to conceptualize the foetus as 
less human, reported having had more social support and described either 
a belief that abortions are supported by society or an ability to defend 
against a belief that society is judgmental. In contrast, patterns of 
emotional change involving persistent upset or negative appraisal were 
entwined with a more human view of the foetus, a lack of social support 
and a belief that society is either overly judgmental or negates the impact 
that an abortion can have on a woman. (Goodwin & Ogden, 2007, p. 4) 
Notably, the key factors identified by Goodwin and Ogden (2007) as being 
associated with stress following abortion – a more human view of the foetus142 
                                                          
141
 The task force evaluated all empirical studies published in English in peer-reviewed journals 
post-1989 that compared the mental health of women who had an induced abortion to the mental 
health of comparison groups of women or that examined factors that predict mental health among 
women who have had an elective abortion in the United States (American Psychological 
Association, 2008). 
188 
 
and overly judgmental society
143
 – are precisely the views and attitudes adopted 
and promoted by anti-abortion actors in Kenya. As such, although the anti-
abortion actors in Kenya have not commissioned any studies to support their 
claims, it can be assumed from the existing scholarship that if such studies 
established mental health problems associated with abortion, these would be a 
result at least partly, of a socio-cultural context that stigmatises both abortion and 
women who seek terminations. To demonstrate the unlikelihood of most Kenyan 
women suffering emotionally after successful illegal and generally unsafe 
backstreet abortions, a pro-abortion research participant said, “a woman who has 
the courage to risk her life by pushing a crochet needle into her vagina to rid 
herself of an unwanted pregnancy could be nothing but happy if she succeeds”. 
(NSA12) 
Feminist scholars have argued that the production of the seemingly woman-
protective anti-abortion discourses that purport to promote women‟s health are 
drawn from ideas about maternity and more specifically, ideas concerning the 
desirability and naturalness of motherhood (Boyle, 1997; Siegel, 2008). To such 
scholars, the mental health claims do not appear to be fuelled by genuine care for 
women‟s health, but by anti-abortion activists‟ interpretation of abortions as 
representing a rejection of motherhood, which for them is normal for women. 
Such a view is not only paternalistic but also presents women as emotionally 
unstable and lacking agency (Suk, 2010). In the Kenyan case, this view is 
exacerbated by the fact that these claims only became prominent during debate on 
Kenya‟s new Constitution in 2009, when a clause legalising abortion to protect 
women‟s health and lives was included by the drafters. Faced with an 
unprecedented legitimisation of pro-abortion discourse in the draft Constitution, 
anti-abortion actors appear to have appropriated the women‟s health-focused 
discourse in order to counteract pro-abortion activists‟ focus on the health and 
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economic consequences of unsafe abortion (see Chapter 7). In other words, anti-
abortion actors‟ appeal to women‟s health appears to have been an attempt to 
broaden its support base, rather than reflecting a genuine concern for women‟s 
health. In fact, as I will demonstrate in the next section, the anti-abortion actors‟ 
real intention may have been to preserve what they assume to be the moral 
integrity of the African society. 
As already noted, the mental health discourse is a recent development and is not 
very popular even with anti-abortion actors when compared to the foetal-life 
discourse. However, it was almost totally absent from discussions that I held with 
state official and even in secondary materials that I used for this study. A possible 
reason could be that, as with the pseudo-scientific discourses discussed in the 
previous section, political actors may find no need to refer to it since it does not 
directly appeal to the target audience, who in this case, are religious leaders and 
their followers. For the political elite, acting religiously is likely to earn more 
political support than acting smart in discussing the mental health problems that 
could result from abortion. 
6.2.4. Abortion and the Corruption of Africa’s Societal Morals 
Anti-abortion actors in Kenya additionally oppose abortion legalisation with 
claims that it is immoral. As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, foetal 
life-focused abortion discourses present abortion as morally unacceptable because 
it results in the death of unborn babies. However, in this section, I focus on a 
slightly different anti-abortion morality discourse in which abortion is presented 
as immoral because it is a Western project that violates African traditions and 
culture. 
The Kenya Episcopal Conference, while opposing a conference on maternal 
health and reproductive health organised by the Medical Association of Kenya, 
accused the medical professionals of propagating a misguided practice alien to 
Africa‟s moral fabric. In their words: 
The acceptance of abortion - an unspeakable crime - in the popular mind, 
in behaviour and even in law itself, is a telling sign of an extremely 
dangerous crisis of the moral sense, which is becoming more and more 
incapable of distinguishing good and evil, even when the fundamental 
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right to life is at stake. Rather than provide abortion on demand, we should 
ask ourselves what is the fundamental problem at hand? Why is there an 
increase of unwanted pregnancies in the country, increasing the rate of 
abortion? And a further question, when did unborn children become 
„unwanted‟ when according to our traditional values all children were 
considered valued members of the community? What is the source of these 
alien and non-African values we now propagate? (Catholic Health 
Commission of Kenya, 2011[emphasis added]) 
A non-state anti-abortion participant (RA1) also noted that: 
Abortion is totally immoral. It is not just about killing women or babies, 
but about wiping out generations. It is about eugenics with which the West 
is targeting less developed countries. African cultures had systems that 
discouraged immorality. What we need is to uphold African morality 
rather than adopt European behaviours, some which encourage 
immorality. An African‟s conscience wants to be moral. You encourage 
morality not by encouraging abortions, but by banning them. Teach young 
people about character moulding and morality, and also abstinence. 
Encourage them to „chill‟ until they are married [emphasis added]. 
On his part, Peter Karanja, the head of the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK),
144
 had the following to say about abortion: 
The reason for these evils is indicated in the Bible in the book of James 4: 
1 – 3, which reads: What causes fights and quarrels among you? Don‟t 
they come from your desires that battle within you? You want something 
but don‟t get it. You kill and covet, but you cannot have what you want. 
You quarrel and fight. You do not have because you do not ask God. 
When you ask, you do not receive, because you ask with wrong motives, 
that you may spend what you get on your pleasures.” As shown in these 
verses, the root of evil, even killing (whether born or unborn people), is 
selfish desires and a craving for pleasure. Among other results of these 
actions and desires, there is an ever increasing deterioration in morals and 
respect for life. 
In the above quotations, abortion, in addition to being construed as murder of the 
unborn, is also presented as unacceptable because it is against African moral 
traditions. Furthermore, as Reverend Karanja implies, an unwanted pregnancy is a 
manifestation of women‟s engagement with illegitimate sex. To him therefore, as 
to RA1, access to abortion should be curtailed since it enables women to escape 
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the consequences of their evil desires and actions. Additionary, for anti-abortion 
activists in Kenya, abortion affects not just individual women‟s lives, but also has 
serious implications for the family, religion and society in general as is evidenced 
by RSA1 reference to abortion‟s negative effects on African moral structure. The 
same view can be deduced from the following statement by Kenyan Catholic 
Bishops who were opposed to a mock tribunal organised by pro-abortion actors to 
sensitize the public on the negative consequences of unsafe abortion: 
There is no reason or motive that can ever objectively confer the right to 
dispose of another‟s life. Abortion, whether legal or not, kills babies, 
damages women, harms families, degrades the medical profession, 
weakens nations and destroys churches. (White, 2007) 
The Catholic Bishops claims presents a picture of an anarchic society in which the 
family, the moral foundation of society, is destroyed as a result of women‟s 
uncontrolled sexual desires and abortion.  
From the above noted quotations, it is evident that anti-abortion crusaders in 
Kenya equate abortion with social and cultural disorder. As such, it is possible to 
argue that embedded in their earlier discussed right-to-life arguments are implicit 
assumptions about women‟s roles and lives. The anti-abortion actors‟ concerns 
can thus be interpreted as relating not just to the immorality of abortion or to 
saving foetuses‟ lives, but, more importantly, to the maintenance of heterosexual 
relationships in which reproduction not only occurs within the confines of 
marriage, but also men dominate and control women‟s sexuality. In other words, 
as Oldfield (1996, p. 68) has noted, abortion is a critical battleground in the 
defence of traditional family values, upholding “a model of the family capable of 
resisting secular pressures and transmitting evangelical values to the next 
generation”. I would argue that because the anti-abortion foetal-focused and 
morality discourses do not propose mechanisms for dealing with the multitude of 
factors that lead women to procure abortions, the moral question of the foetus is 
no more than a license to control women‟s reproductive freedom. As researchers 
such as Green et al. (1996) have argued, a variety of battles over abortion are 
aspects of a larger struggle to reclaim what are seen as traditional values. Abortion 
is central and often stands as a representative of them all, as opposition to abortion 
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often takes additional significance as an affirmation of distinctive gender roles, 
opposition to feminism, and opposition to sex outside marriage (Luker, 1984). 
An interesting observation relating to the anti-abortion discourses is the appeal to 
both African tradition and Christian doctrinal sources of legitimation. As shown in 
Chapter 4, the two systems of knowledge have often been used as though they are 
mutually exclusive. On the one hand, Christian religions in Kenya have often 
accused traditional African cultures of not just being a stumbling block to 
evangelisation, but also of hindering women‟s advancement through support for 
repugnant practices such as female circumcision, widow inheritance and 
polygamy. Thus, for Christian religious adherents to make reference to African 
traditions as justification for their opposition to abortion is a significant 
turnaround from past practices of seeking modernization of social values.  In the 
same way that anti-abortion actors‟ argument about women‟s health may be 
intended to increase their support base, appeals to African tradition in opposing 
abortion may also be an attempt to earn religious leaders support from 
traditionalists. Seemingly, when the need arises, Christianity can co-exist with 
African traditions just as Christian missionaries were willing to accommodate 
female circumcision for the sake of retaining their African followers (see Chapter 
4). Additionally, it also should be noted that the tendency to simultaneously 
deploy religion and culture, both powerful instruments of perpetuating patriarchal 
hegemony, has been acknowledged by feminist researchers (Stopler, 2008). 
The appeal to African moral traditions by anti-abortion actors is usually 
articulated alongside discourses that present abortion as a foreign concept being 
advocated by Westerners for the purpose of population control. This perception is 
often coupled with a widespread belief that the push for abortion legalisation and 
access to contraceptives, even for teenagers, is linked to a eugenics movement 
aimed at reducing the populations of what one research participant (RA1) referred 
to as “lower poor races”. Kenyan Catholic bishops have, for example, identified 
abortion as part of a larger international effort to impose the anti-child mentality 
of Western feminism onto Kenyan society (White, 2007). To them “high levels of 
poverty and unemployment in an agricultural economy and a relatively high birth 
rate of 4.82 children born per woman makes Kenya a favoured target of 
international population control organizations, largely funded through the US” 
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(ibid.). Such concerns about eugenic motives are concretised by the fact that much 
international aid work in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, emphasizes population 
control, abortion, sterilization and contraception as ways of reducing poverty and 
enhancing development. RA1 for example claimed that the World Bank and other 
donor organisations always demand that 20 per cent of all borrowed money be 
dedicated to population control-related projects, which to her include those 
concerned with the provision of contraceptives and abortifacients. 
Fear of African population manipulation was also evident during the Synod of the 
African Catholic bishops in Rome in 2009, with one bishop warning against the 
incursions of Western NGOs into Africa, saying that they have “hidden agendas” 
in pushing contraception and abortion as part of population control policies 
(White, 2009). Another participant at the same Synod, Cardinal Wilfred Napier, 
claimed that one Western notion classifies pregnancy as “a sexually transmitted 
disease” (ibid.). The same worry was evident in a comment by a caller to an FM 
radio call-in session,
145
 who wondered:  
How can one explain how clinics like Marie Stopes are flooded with 
contraceptives, abortificients and condoms while there are absolutely no 
other drugs available to treat other diseases that actually kill more Kenyan 
women? How is it possible that if a woman went to Marie Stopes suffering 
from malaria or typhoid, they would be turned away, but would be 
attended to immediately if they wanted a termination of pregnancy, 
sterilization or contraception?  
Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that the concentration of population control 
policies in the developing world and among minority populations in the developed 
countries is real and is also well documented (Kuumba, 1993). While population 
growth in the developed first world is encouraged, family planning approaches 
towards people of colour in the rest of the world are emphasised. Although pan-
African and some feminist researchers have claimed population policies are a 
strategy in the process of dominating Africa and manipulating its population 
(ibid.), I contend that the need for women to control their reproductive capacities 
should not be ignored. Moreover, allocating women the burden of ensuring the 
survival of the African race but without providing them with the social and 
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economic mechanisms to do so is hypocritical. Compared to men, African women 
remain relatively poor, even though they are expected to take primary 
responsibility for the care of their children.  
It is notable that arguments which present reproductive health, including abortion 
and family planning, as Western concepts tend to receive a lot of publicity from 
anti-abortion crusaders, politicians and media houses in Kenya. The fact that they 
seem to appeal to Africans to resist cultural colonialism and foreign impositions 
also makes them popular with the general population. This, when coupled with 
claims that abortion and family planning are propagated by Western feminists 
who sit on their men, makes pro-abortion discourses become more unacceptable 
in a predominantly patriarchal society. For the political elite, for whom it is often 
necessary to appear to defend a commitment to African values or otherwise risk 
being seen as stooges of Western powers, the abortion is unAfrican discourse is 
common. Overall, this leads to debate on the issue of abortion becoming more 
controversial and confrontational, while rendering reproductive health policies as 
a whole particularly vulnerable to weak political and policy commitment. As 
already noted, as a result of the nature of Kenyan politics, Kenyan leaders are 
unlikely to support or take a personal position on controversial issues. This is 
exacerbated by the tendency to equate reproductive health with abortion and 
homosexuality, both of which are unpopular with the general public. According to 
a lawyer working with a women‟s organisation, “equating reproductive health 
with abortion is one reason why the proposed Reproductive Health and Rights Bill 
(2008) was ignored by the Kenyan Parliament. Although there were many positive 
aspects in it, people chose to focus on the clause allowing for the termination of 
pregnancies. It is like throwing away the baby with the bath water” (NSA12). 
A feminist critical analysis of claims that abortion is unacceptable because it is a 
foreign imposition reveals two contradictory ideas. First, it is ironic that religious 
leaders, the main proponents of moralistic religious anti-abortion discourses, 
ignore the fact that their religions are also relatively speaking foreign. At another 
level, this may actually be the reason behind the need to appeal to African moral 
traditions as a way of bolstering the authenticity of religious claims. Secondly, 
arguments that oppose abortion predominantly on the basis that controlling 
fertility is a Western concept ignore the fact that women in traditional African 
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societies also controlled their fertility using herbs, among other methods. As a 
research participant (NSA4) explained:  
The whole issue of controlling and managing fertility was very well done, 
whether it was spacing of children or unwanted pregnancies. Our 
traditional communities had ways at all times of dealing with that. What is 
so amazing is how now we want to be Africans, as an African nation. We 
want to modernize but we don‟t want to modernize on the issue of 
women‟s rights. We want to be modern and to drive German cars and own 
laptops but we don‟t want to give women rights in marriage or in 
reproductive health. I don‟t understand that at all, and therefore think we 
are a very hypocritical society because we did have those systems. They 
were there, they were broken down and we failed to replace them and 
think that it is what it should be. I think we are actually living abnormally. 
As noted by this participant, claims that family planning is unAfrican are not only 
false but are used to construct women as custodians of African culture. In the 
African nation, everyone else is allowed to be modern, except for the women. 
However, as noted in Chapter 4, what is today presented as primordialist and 
ahistorical African tradition and/or culture is in fact a reflection of the interaction 
of the colonial administration‟s ideas about correct gender relations with those of 
a conservative African male elite, and those of Christian missions. The conceptual 
fusing of women with culture and tradition has two particular implications for 
women. Firstly, women not only become symbols in a battle to construct 
particular versions of modern versus traditional society, but also symbols of 
cultural integrity or resistance to Euro-American domination (Walley, 1997). 
Secondly, the association between women and tradition has meant that our 
tradition has often been used to legitimate attempts to increase and/or maintain 
control over women. Seemingly, where gender relations in general and women‟s 
empowerment in particular are concerned, tradition as culture is viewed as 
timeless and unchangeable, whereas change is acceptable, particularly when it 
relates to improving men‟s lives. 
Additionally, claims that abortion is a Western practice also assumes a 
paternalistic ideology that presents African women as being in need of protection 
from Western feminists and non-governmental organisations that coerce them into 
having abortions. Implicitly, it is suggested that African women who have 
abortions do not in fact want them; rather, they are influenced by Western culture, 
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which also condones other evil practices such as homosexuality. This discourse 
presents African women as vulnerable, dependent, and uninformed, and therefore 
in need of abortion restrictions to protect them from harmful foreign influences, 
which in turn frees them to fulfil their traditional African role as mothers. 
In this section, I have discussed anti-abortion actors‟ claims that abortion is 
unacceptable in Kenya because it is not just unAfrican, but it is also an imposed 
Western practice. I have, however, demonstrated that the problematic nature of 
the claims and shown that their real intention is to instrumentalize women as 
symbols of Africanness in opposition to Euro-American cultures, in the same way 
that the nationalist movement utilised the issue of female circumcision as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In the next section, I look at the general policy 
implications of the anti-abortion discourses as well as their proposed solutions to 
the problem of unsafe abortion in Kenya.   
6.3. Implications of Anti-Abortion Discourses 
As the above analysis reveals, anti-abortion discourses in Kenya can be 
characterised as moralistic, foetal life-focused and generally popular. An 
important element of the explicit claim that a human foetus is a rights-bearing 
unborn human child from the moment of conception is the overt implication that 
abortion is murder and thereby a violation of the most fundamental human right 
(the right to life). In the words of a Presbyterian religious leader (RA6) who 
participated in this research, “a society that can deny a human being the right to be 
born cannot possibly claim to be in a position to protect any other human right”. 
This conferring of human rights to foetuses not only places the foetus and the 
pregnant woman on the same level as bearers of human rights, but also 
intentionally interprets the foetus as a citizen, whose life the state has a specific 
obligation to protect. This has two possible consequences. In addition to positing a 
fundamental dichotomy between the rights of the woman as a person and the 
rights of the foetus, claiming rights for foetuses in a country where women are 
themselves unable to access equal rights with men (see Chapter 5) weakens the 
women‟s case by silencing them. Secondly, by presenting both pro-abortion 
activists and women who have abortions as selfish or insensitive to the life or 
death of foetuses, foetal life-focused discourses not only demonize women but 
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also create a situation in which foetuses are in need of protection from their 
murderous mothers.  
Feminist scholars, and particularly radical and socialist feminists, have claimed 
that the discursively constructed opposition between the rights of a pregnant 
woman and the foetus‟ right to life is not a coincidence but is often invoked by 
anti-abortion actors as a rationale for efforts to control women (MacKinnon, 
1989). It is generally agreed that one of the major ways of reducing the number of 
abortions is by giving women complete control over their own reproductive lives 
through making available contraceptives and information on their use (Cohen, 
2009). However, religious organisations in Kenya, led by the Catholic Church are 
opposed to contraception, advising women to refrain from sex until marriage. This 
is clear in the following comment by the leader of the National Council of 
Churches in Kenya, Reverend Peter Karanja: 
The Bible teaches that sex is to happen only between a man and his wife. 
The concept of protected or unprotected sex is an illusion and a lie that 
some illicit sex is “safer” than any other. In the end, all illicit sex leads to 
death since it is a sin. 
This statement makes it clear that the Canon is opposed to sex outside of the 
institution of marriage, rather than to birth control per se.  
Another consequence of the privileging of foetal life is the silencing of women 
who have abortions. By focusing all attention on the foetus, these discourses 
significantly obscure the actual reasons behind women‟s abortions, and, 
consequently, offer little in the way of practical responses to these needs. Making 
abortion unavailable, as proposed by Kenyan anti-abortion actors does not, for 
instance, address the needs of women who seek abortion because they were raped, 
or are living in abusive relationships, or lack access to effective contraception, or 
will have to drop out of work or school to raise an unwanted child. Banning 
abortion also does not address the needs of women who cannot emotionally or 
financially provide for their other children, and neither does it help women control 
the timing of motherhood. Research in Kenya has shown that women have 
abortions for all these reasons, which restrictive abortion laws cannot and do not 
address.  
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At another level, voicing concern for abstract unborn babies provides anti-
abortion crusaders, and more so religious and political leaders, with a chance to 
appear to be addressing issues affecting the society without actually doing 
anything about them. In a community where more than half of the population lives 
in poverty, and where women have the primary responsibility for taking care of 
children, the anti-abortion actors‟ choice of what to be concerned about can be 
interpreted as out of touch with the reality. This view is well captured by an 
anonymous caller (AA2) to a radio station who wondered: 
If these holier than thou fellows are so worried about children getting 
killed, how is it that they do not offer to take in the unwanted babies? 
Besides, why haven‟t they bothered to first of all care for the thousands of 
live chukuras (street children) who live like abandoned animals on our 
streets?  
As noted by this caller, anti-abortion actors in Kenya condemn abortion but fail to 
provide mechanisms for dealing with the consequences of unwanted pregnancies. 
As for the political elite, opposing abortion makes them worthy leaders in clerics‟ 
eyes, thereby assuring them of support during elections.   
In addition to silencing Kenyan women who have abortions, the religious and 
moral anti-abortion discourses also portray women who fail to embrace 
motherhood in the face of unwanted pregnancies as the embodiments of a social 
problem themselves. When a journalist presented the spokesperson for the 
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) with data on deaths and health 
complications resulting from unsafe abortion, he was quick to say: 
Our position is that the abortions shouldn‟t be happening in the first place. 
Pregnancies should not be terminated. What is required is education for 
the women so that they don‟t get pregnant if they are not interested in 
getting the baby. (Alsop, 2010)  
Another cleric, a Presbyterian Church religious leader (RA6) also claimed that, 
“No one should get pregnant and then decide on abortion by claiming that they do 
not have resources to bring up the child”. These Kenyan religious leaders not only 
castigate women for getting pregnant when they shouldn‟t have, but also seem to 
imply that all that women need to do to avoid abortion is to avoid getting pregnant 
in the first place. That being the case, it is unclear why clerics in Kenya oppose 
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termination of pregnancies resulting from rape, since such women would have had 
no means of avoiding getting pregnant. A religious leader, RA5, expressed no 
sympathy for pregnant victims of rape as he wondered, “why should the baby be 
killed and he/she is not the criminal? Besides, there is no law which stipulates that 
one should be killed if their father is a criminal”. By making such arguments, 
religious leaders fail to perceive the contradiction between their belief that women 
just need not to engage in sex in order to avoid abortion, and their failure to 
support abortion for women on whom pregnancy is forced through rape. Although 
the religious leaders do not overtly blame such women for getting pregnant, the 
clerics not only fail to exhibit any sympathy through their demonization of the 
choice to have an abortion under any circumstances, but also fail to recognise the 
crime against the raped woman and the immorality of forcing her to suffer its 
consequences.  
A possible consequence of the above religious leaders‟ claims which ignore the 
circumstances in which pregnancies and abortions happen is that it makes it 
difficult and controversial to legislate against elements of domination such as rape 
and sexual coercion (see Chapter 5). Implicit assumptions behind discourses that 
present women as responsible for unwanted pregnancies include, on the one hand, 
that sexual intercourse leading to conception is usually voluntary, and on the 
other, that women have control over that sex. This is evident in the following anti-
abortion male research participant‟s observation:  
Why do women in this country or elsewhere for that matter want to go 
ahead and get pregnant and then procure abortions? Why are we not 
realizing that the way you can avoid going through the whole problem of 
abortion is just by not getting pregnant? (RA7) 
Feminist research has, however, shown that heterosexual intercourse is not always 
coequally determined, but is instead often defined in terms set by men 
(MacKinnon, 1987). As such, it is difficult to assume that women just need to 
avoid sexual activity to avoid pregnancy in an environment where sex can be used 
as an expression of male dominance. In fact, the choice to avoid sex is not 
available to Kenyan women as a result of the sexist nature of a patriarchal society 
which constantly struggles to enforce men‟s control over women‟s sexuality and 
reproduction, as claimed by radical feminists.  Kenyan men‟s dominant role in 
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controlling sexuality is evidenced by widespread sexual violence, with at least 21 
per cent of Kenyan women being victims (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics & 
ICF Macro, 2010). Moreover, as further noted by a children‟s welfare activist: 
The era of HIV/AIDS has increased sexual violence against girls and 
younger women. There is a general feeling among men that young girls, 
especially those living in the rural areas, are safer sex partners because 
they are considered free of the disease. Additionally, there is also this 
strange belief that if a HIV/AIDS positive man has sex with a virgin, they 
could be cured. Although it is just superstition, it has increased young 
girls‟ vulnerability to sexual perverts. (NSA2) 
This participant‟s claims are supported by reports which have consistently shown 
that rape, especially of schoolgirls, is rampant (Wane, 2009). As such, anti-
abortion moralizing religious and foetal life claims that present women as being 
responsible for unwanted pregnancies, as well as the sexual intercourse leading to 
the pregnancy, are misleading, since clearly, there are circumstances where 
pregnancy is not a choice but rather is forced. 
Unfortunately, even in the midst of widespread sexual violence in Kenya, women 
and girls cannot rely on contraceptives to prevent conception. The 2008–09 Kenya 
Demographic and Health Survey revealed that 26 per cent of married women in 
Kenya have an unmet need for family planning, 13 per cent for spacing and 13 per 
cent for limiting. Moreover, contraceptives are often unavailable in government 
hospitals, government health centres, and clinics, which provide contraceptives to 
57 per cent of users (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro, 2010). 
Although they are available in private hospitals and pharmacies, the price is 
usually prohibitive. For instance, when they are available, female condoms retail 
at a cost of up to US$2, more than ten times the cost of a male condom. Not 
surprisingly, 45 per cent of pregnancies in Kenya are unintended (Anyangu, 
2009), driving up the rate of illegal terminations.  
The failure of foetal life focused anti-abortion discourses to acknowledge 
pregnant women‟s lived realities also ignores the biological reality that women do 
not make themselves pregnant. As noted by a pro-abortion research participant 
(NSA4), since foetuses do not rain from heaven like manna, women‟s lived 
experiences as well as their circumstances at the time of conception cannot be 
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wished away. After all, as MacKinnon (1984) has also noted, a woman does not 
just happen upon a foetus. By failing to take into account men‟s contribution to 
unwanted pregnancies, foetal life-focused discourses present a partial view by 
ignoring the role played by men in women‟s decisions to have unsafe abortions. 
Research on abortion in Africa has shown that although men are generally 
opposed to abortion, they play very significant roles in women‟s decisions to seek 
or not seek abortion. For example, qualitative explorations of men‟s attitudes 
towards abortion in Burkina Faso, Uganda, Kenya, and Zimbabwe have found that 
because of men‟s opposition to abortion, women normally procure abortions 
secretly and in most instances, unsafely, since they often lack funds to pay for 
safer services (Chikovore et al., 2002; Izugbara et al,. 2009; Moore et al., 2011; 
Rossier, 2007). If the men would be supportive, perhaps deaths and complications 
resulting from unsafe operations would be minimised. 
An additional consequence of Kenya‟s anti-abortion discourses, especially the one 
that portrays abortion as unAfrican, is the silencing of African women‟s sexuality 
in general, and Kenyan women‟s in particular. Abortion relates in major ways to 
issues of sexual independence by allowing women to control the unwanted 
consequences of heterosexual sex, especially in circumstances where 
contraceptives are unavailable. This was evident from readers‟ comments in an 
online poll that asked readers to state if they were supportive of or opposed to 
abortion liberalisation in Kenya, and why.  One male reader was convinced that 
“legalising abortion will erode morals by making women and girls able to engage 
in irresponsible sexual behaviours since they can access abortion” (AA3). 
Evidently, only women‟s freedom to engage in casual sex seems to be questioned, 
while that of the men with whom they have sex is not even alluded to. Seemingly, 
the act of women engaging in non-reproductive sex seems to be interpreted as 
presenting a great challenge to gendered heterosexual relations.  In fact, in Kenya, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe, men have been found to be opposed to contraceptives and 
abortion because these would make it difficult to know if their wives have sex 
with other men (Chikovore et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2011). Because the men 
themselves reported having sex with other women, their opposition can be 
construed as grounded in the fear of women being able to enjoy sex in the same 
way they do – without the fear of an unwanted birth. Clearly, the battle against 
abortion is not merely about the sanctity of life or the unAfricanness of the 
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practice, but also about controlling sexual access to women their bodies and 
sexuality.
146
 As radical feminists have claimed, women‟s liberation can only be 
achieved through a revolution in which women seize control over their 
reproductive capacities (Firestone, 1970). 
Moreover, because women‟s sexuality is often publicly reduced to their 
conventional mothering role and conflated with their reproductive capacities 
(Tamale 2001), Kenyan women‟s right to choice and sexual freedom is often 
ignored or swept aside by political elites seeking patronage from religious and 
traditional leaders (See  Chapter 5). As a result of the condemnation, women who 
have abortions are stigmatised, since abortion is seen as presenting a challenge to 
the deep-seated masculine power that governs African sexual relations by 
disrupting the core of the heterosexist social order. For, as in Butler‟s (1990) 
observation, patriarchal societies are heteronormative and usually require men and 
women to perform their gender by actively participating in heterosexual activity.  
Lastly, the anxieties generated by women‟s sexual control have been noted to 
overlap with parallel consternation over the changing roles and duties of women 
in society. As a result of economic structural adjustment programmes and 
globalisation, among other factors, large parts of Africa have experienced great 
socio-economic polarization (Lugalla, 1995). The resultant unemployment and 
low wages has made it difficult for men to fulfil their assumed traditional male 
roles as heads of the households and breadwinner, while, as stipulated by liberal 
feminists, increased participation of women in the labour market has led to a 
conspicuous emergence of independent women.
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 Weeks (1985) has noted that as 
a result of women‟s increased independence, social discontent tends to be 
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 Ethnographic research has shown that a key element of successful African manhood is 
heterosexual success, and this is proven by being able to win desirable women, preventing them 
from being seduced by others, and showing evidence of being a man in control (Wood & Jewkes, 
2001). In fact, as was demonstrated during Jacob Nzuma‟s rape trial in South Africa, essentialist 
conceptions of African culture tend to be patriarchal and masculinist (Robins, 2008).  
147
 Kenyan women have joined the labour force in large and increasing numbers over the last two 
decades due to increased access to education. At the same time, as a result of various factors 
among the structural adjustment programmes, there has been declining job opportunities for men 
(Suda, 2002).  
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articulated via preoccupations with matters of gender, which is often accompanied 
by increased surveillance of women‟s sexuality. As such, men‟s attempts to 
increase control over women can be purported to be a result of hard economic 
times, as also been noted by Silberschmidt (2001). She argues that African men‟s 
social value, identity and self-esteem, have been eroded by economic changes that 
have left those with a patriarchal ideology bereft of its legitimising activities, 
which has in turn led to not only increased instances of sexually aggressive 
behaviour, but also increased attempts to control women and their sexuality to 
strengthen male identity and sense of masculinity. A research participant, for 
example, explained that men who participated in rape during Kenya‟s post-
election violence in 2008 said it was the only way they could assert their 
masculinity (NSA11). In such circumstances, abortion is likely to receive 
opposition from men as a group, and from political leaders who require their 
support to access or remain in power. 
6.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that anti-abortion actors deploy four major 
discourses: that abortion constitutes murder of unborn children; that it negatively 
affects women‟s health; that it is both immoral; and it is unAfrican. However, as 
an analysis of these discourses has shown, embedded in the explicit anti-abortion 
discourses are implicit assumptions focused on African women‟s roles and lives, 
as well as sexual lives. The anti-abortion actors‟ concerns do not just relate to 
foetal life and the unAfricanness of abortion, but more importantly to the 
maintenance of heterosexual relationships in which men dominate and control 
women‟s sexuality. Moreover, by preaching and campaigning against abortion 
legalization, anti-abortion actors, and more so religious leaders, attempt to remain 
relevant in an environment of liberalism.  
I have also demonstrated that, as purported by the Critical African Feminist 
Perspective (see Chapter 2), the neo-patrimonial nature of the state plays a crucial 
role in enabling the legitimisation and institutionalisation of anti-abortion 
discourses. To access and to remain in power, the state and ruling elite cultivate 
patron-client relationships in which the patrons (rulers) provide economic 
resources, jobs, development assistance, and other favours in exchange for 
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political support from key regional and local leaders (clients), among them 
religious leaders. The resultant mutual networks of reciprocity ensure that 
political leaders and policy-makers in Kenya take into account the interests of 
clergy when formulating public policy which of course hinders women‟s ability to 
access legal abortions, and also legitimise patriarchy.  
The degree of anti-abortion actors‟ influence on abortion policies in Kenya 
demonstrates that the state is not a homogeneous entity capable of functioning 
independently as presented by traditional feminist theorisations of the state. 
Rather, the state, as claimed by the Critical African Feminist Perspective, is a 
convergence of institutions, all of which continually struggle to influence public 
policies. Notably though, while some actors are successful in institutionalising 
their favoured opinions, some may not be, as demonstrated in the following 
chapter where I discuss pro-abortion discourses, which remain largely ignored and 
unacknowledged by the state.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Pot Bearer Understands its Weight: An Analysis of Pro-
abortion Discourses in Kenya 
 7.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of pro-abortion discourses in Kenya.  It 
focuses on the arguments, philosophical principles, narratives and other important 
rhetorical strategies that are employed by pro-abortion actors in an attempt to 
counter the institutionalised, foetal focused and moralising anti-abortion 
discourses discussed in the previous chapter. In their struggle to achieve 
liberalisation of the abortion law, pro-abortion actors in Kenya have sought to 
construct discourses that resonate with the dominant discourses they oppose, in 
the hope of winning popular support and patriarchal state elite allies. As 
demonstrated by the Critical African Feminist Perspective discussed in Chapter 2, 
the neo-patrimonial nature of states in Africa significantly shapes public policy 
making processes since patrimonial and clientele relationships often push political 
leaders into serving the interests of their political supporters, including, in most 
instances, tribal patriarchs and religious leaders, who are unlikely to support 
women‟s right to safe abortion. That being the case, pro-abortion discourses in 
Kenya largely concentrate on the effects that unsafe abortion has on women‟s 
health rather than women‟s right to safe abortions. The discourses therefore 
present aborting women, much like foetuses are presented in anti-abortion 
discourses, as victims of social, cultural and political circumstances over which 
they have no control and for which they are not responsible. This is achieved by 
constructing the subjectivities of women who have abortions as young and/or 
poor. In this interpretive frame, because the ultimate cause of abortion is 
presented as being external to the woman herself, the remedy for unsafe abortion 
is sought in reforms aimed at removing the cultural, political, social and economic 
factors that expose women to unwanted pregnancies, in addition to state 
decriminalization of abortion. This mirrors socialist feminists‟ view that demands 
for reproductive freedom cannot be separated from the need for social and 
economic change, since the impediments to reproductive freedom are to be found 
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in structures of social and sexual relations (Petchesky, 1981). Thus, unlike liberal 
feminist abortion discourses that focus on women‟s rights to bodily integrity, pro-
abortion discourses in Kenya emphasise the strong link that exists between access 
to safe abortion and the more politically acceptable realm of women‟s health and 
its connection to developmental goals. 
Drawing on supporting evidence from various local studies on abortion, pro-
abortion actors argue that Kenyan women‟s abortion narratives illustrate the 
essential role access to safe abortion plays in shielding them from the negative 
socioeconomic consequences of mistimed childbearing and unplanned entry into 
motherhood, including poverty, loss of employment, divorce, abuse, loss of 
marital viability, social exclusion, and poor educational outcomes. For the pro-
abortion activists in Kenya, as long as women bear the primary responsibility for 
social and biological reproduction, claims of foetal rights to life make women 
shoulder the burden of taking care of children without being assured of the 
necessary resources to do so. One research participant (NSA3), summarised this 
with a common Kenyan saying which implies that, since women are bearers of the 
pot [pregnancy], they are the only ones who understand how much it weighs 
[effects of unwanted pregnancies on their lives].  
In analysing pro-abortion discourses, this chapter draws on interviews with 
individuals, including public, private and non-governmental service providers and 
officials, and other representatives of the institutions and organisations concerned 
with reproductive health and abortion in Kenya. The chapter also relies 
significantly on published and unpublished material provided by the organisations 
I visited during my fieldwork, as well as pamphlets, press releases and newspaper 
articles. Notably and not surprisingly, a majority of participants from non-state 
organisations were unwilling to talk openly about their own positions on abortion, 
but felt safe enough to share their organisation‟s publications.  
The chapter begins with a characterisation of pro-abortion actors in Kenya. This is 
important because the nature of the actors and their organisations has implications 
on the way their discourses are structured, as well as the choice of arguments. 
This section is followed by a discussion on pro-abortion discourses after which I 
discuss the implications of the pro-abortion discourses. 
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7.1. Non-state Actors in Kenya: Local and International Organisations 
Kenya has a large elite society and has hosted many women-related conferences, 
including the United Nations 3
rd
 World Conference on Women‟s in 1985. Yet 
there seems to be an absence of clearly defined pressure groups advocating policy 
reform on abortion despite there being a visible women‟s movement.148 In part, 
this is because of the patriarchal and neo-patrimonial nature of Kenyan politics. 
During President Moi‟s dictatorial regime, a majority of non-state organisations 
lacked space in which to express themselves and influence public life, while 
others were actually coerced into being co-opted by the state, such as Maendeleo 
ya Wanawake Organisation (See Chapter 5).
149
 Such organisations became tools 
to entrench the politicians in power rather than representing women‟s interests 
(Muigai, 1999).  
The lack of a vibrant women‟s movement may also be because a majority of 
Kenyan women‟s organisations tend to be welfarist informal groups, conceived as 
collective self-help organisations to provide economic and social assistance to 
women during crisis (Geisler, 2007; Muigai, 1999). This welfare approach is 
reflected in numerous small scale women‟s savings and credit groups and 
investment clubs – or, as they are commonly called, merry-go-rounds – in which 
members‟ contributions are pooled to provide credit to their own members or 
make investments (Geisler, 2007). The potential for using these groups as 
catalysts for women‟s rights activism is limited by the fact that the groups are not 
just mostly rural based but the organisations are likely to prioritize poverty 
alleviation rather than mobilising for political issues such as abortion legalization. 
As a research participant explained, women struggling to feed their families are 
likely to find the abortion campaign a joke (RA1).  
Although the Kenyan government‟s history of intimidation and harassment to 
stifle dissidence may have contributed to lack of a vibrant women‟s movement in 
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 In 2005, for example, there were about 1,333,135 women‟s groups with a total membership of 
over 5 million in Kenya (Geisler, 2007). 
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 Maendeleo ya Wanawake means „Development of Women‟ in the Swahili language. The 
organisation was founded in 1952 as a non-governmental organisation during the colonial era. Its 
main objective was to improve African women‟s welfare with an initial focus on strengthening 
women‟s capacity to generate income and manage their households (Staudt, 1984).  
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Kenya, my research participants expressed a general feeling that leaders 
committed to women‟s rights had joined the government soon after the 2002 
general elections that heralded the end of President Moi‟s authoritarian rule. 
While describing the problems facing women and other non-state organisations in 
Kenya, a senior officer at a government commission said: 
Since 2002 when the new NARC government came into power, I think the 
civil society sort of lost out on its role to check on government in terms of 
women‟s empowerment. I mean they went quiet and they were in comfort 
with the government.  But now I think it is getting clear that they need to 
find their voice because right now they are weak.  Civil societies are very 
weak which includes women‟s movements. So we hardly hear their voices 
any more. They just need to re-discover themselves and start again. 
(NSA7) 
This participant‟s sentiments are supported by events that occurred in the 1990s. 
At that time, the civil society, including religious organisations and women‟s 
organisations, with the help of international organisations, led the democratization 
struggle against the dictatorial regime of former President Daniel Arap Moi. 
During the struggle, although women‟s organisation played an active role in both 
promoting and articulating the ideals of gender equality and women‟s human 
rights (Tripp 2001), the main struggle was democratization and securing multi-
party elections. As such, gender issues, among them abortion, may have been 
considered „too trivial and controversial‟ and therefore an unnecessary burden to 
the furtherance of the transition to democracy. Unfortunately, even in the post-
Moi era, women‟s issues remained unaddressed because, according to one human 
rights activist, NSA4, key positions in the government formed after Moi‟s 
departure were filled by leading civil society activists and women‟s organisations 
leaders.  
The leadership vacuum created when the former activists joined the government 
as Members of Parliament, ambassadors and senior civil servants is said to have 
contributed to the consequent near collapse of the civil society in Kenya since 
those appointed could not continue criticising state actions and/or inaction 
(Maina, 2009). Moreover, government appointment of women and civil society 
leaders failed to translate into policies that could address the needs of women 
because, although a new democratic government had been installed, patriarchal 
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and bureaucratic structures of power discussed in Chapter 5 remained intact. As 
such, women and civil society leaders may have found it difficult to make any 
positive impact. Additionally, the co-optation of former outspoken civil activists 
into the government also meant that, for the new leaders who took over the 
organisations, interacting with the state was like interacting with old friends. 
Consequently, “a previously robust women‟s movement led by academics, civil 
society activists and others, all of whom had been extremely vocal about women‟s 
rights, went silent” (NSA13). The inability of the co-opted women and civil 
society leaders to institute positive changes into the government confirms the 
inadequacy of liberal feminists‟ exclusive focus on integrating women into state 
institutions without challenging its overall structure.  
As a result, unlike Western democratic states, where the push for abortion law 
reform has been supported by broad-based women‟s movements, the abortion 
debate in Kenya has been spearheaded by medical health professionals and 
specifically by the Kenya Medical Association. For example, since the 1993 
Annual Scientific Conference of the Kenya Obstetric and Gynaecological Society 
(KOGS) at which members passed a resolution asking the Minister of Health to 
present a cabinet paper on abortion as a health issue, highlighting the social, 
economic and health costs to the country, this organisation has consistently 
demanded that the government make safe abortion available (Oguttu & Odongo, 
2001).  
Another visible organisation has been the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), 
with whom the Kenya Medical Association has been working closely. In July 
2004, the two organisations spearheaded the formation of the Reproductive Health 
and Rights Alliance (RHRA), a coalition of individuals and organisations 
advocating for the creation of a legal, political and social environment that 
supports sexual and reproductive health and rights, including safe abortion in 
Kenya (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2010). Other member organizations 
include the Centre for the Study of Adolescents, the Coalition on Violence 
Against Women, Family Health Options Kenya, the Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, the Kenya Obstetrics and Gynaecological Society, the Reproductive 
Health Rights Organisation (IPAS), the National Nurses Association of Kenya, 
individual activists, and representatives from law firms, among others. Although a 
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senior official of the RHRA said members of the coalition meet on a regular basis 
to share information and experiences, this was not obvious during my visits to the 
member organisations as very few research participants talked about the Alliance. 
A significant number, however, talked about a mock tribunal held in June 2007 
which was intended to provide a platform from which the consequences of unsafe 
abortion could be discussed. In addition to commissioning various studies on 
abortion in the country, the RHRA also played an active role in ensuring that the 
new Constitution promulgated in 2010 guaranteed legal abortion in specific 
cases.
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Seemingly, the alliance is the only umbrella organisation advocating for the 
legalisation of abortion in Kenya. It is, however, noteworthy that the functioning, 
with respect to fundraising, financial and programmatic administration and 
reporting, of the Alliance is coordinated by the Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America. This has often been used to justify claims that attempts to legalise 
abortion in Kenya are foreign. On their website, the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of America (PPFA) in Kenya identifies their work as focusing on 
reducing maternal death and disability by increasing the availability of affordable 
safe abortion services and supporting advocates to decriminalize abortion in the 
country.
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A significant factor that emerged in the course of this research is that, because key 
players in the abortion debate are medical health professionals, pro-abortion 
discourses in Kenya emphasise the expansion of access through a medical focus 
on the dangers of clandestine abortion, rather than direct advocacy for policy 
change. Although, as I will demonstrate later, identifying abortion as a medical 
issue removes the procedure from its political, social and gendered context and 
effectively places control over the termination of a pregnancy within the medical 
domain, the involvement of doctors can be seen as not just imbuing the pro-
abortion debate with the power of scientific medical authority, but also as 
providing a discourse devoid of feminist rhetoric. In a society where politics 
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 For example, the organization held press conferences and provided press releases to counter 
anti-abortion activists‟ arguments against legalized abortion. 
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 The website is available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/international-
program/kenya-country-program-19010.htm 
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increasingly relies on stringently controlled and patriarchal gender relations (see 
Chapter 5), doctors‟ statements are likely to receive greater acceptance by 
political and ethnic leaders for being expert advice on a health and medical 
problem for which they are trained. This kind of reasoning was apparent during 
debate on Kenya‟s new Constitution in 2010. Anti-abortion activists campaigned 
against the adoption of the draft Constitution with the argument that allowing 
health professionals to decide when a termination of pregnancy was necessary 
was in fact an attempt to provide abortion on demand. In response, pro-abortion 
actors insisted that the issue should be left at the hands of medical health 
professionals because, as noted by a research participant (NSA5), “when you visit 
a doctor suffering from a disease, you do not instruct him/her on how to treat 
you.” The Minister for Medical Services, Professor Anyang Nyong‟o, who was 
opposed to the inclusion of an anti-abortion clause in the draft Constitution, for 
example argued that: 
People abort for very specific reasons. If a lady conceives as a result of 
rape, you put that lady under torture if she wants to abort and you refuse. 
They can even become a mental case! So abortion is something that should 
be dealt with by doctors, psychologists and family counsellors. (Karong‟o 
& Kaberia, 2010) 
Although the Cabinet Minister had publicly expressed support for abortion, his 
articulation of the medical health discourse seems to have been appropriate at a 
time when votes were necessary to pass the new Constitution. In addition to 
alluding to medical doctors‟ expert knowledge which allows them to speak 
authoritatively on health policy, the health discourse is politically safe for Kenyan 
political leaders, who, as a result of the neo-patrimonial nature of politics, seek to 
avoid dealing with controversial issues. 
Another significant characteristic of Kenyan pro-abortion actors is their reliance 
on foreign organisations and funding. The presence of external actors advocating 
for and supporting the implementation of population policies has had the effect of 
presenting reproductive health in general and abortion in particular as foreign 
concepts. Additionally, dependence on foreign aid has also had effects, not just on 
organizational structures, but also in terms of compromising policy development 
and decision-making. For instance, a significant number of my research 
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participants noted that in the past, foreign donors covered the costs of all 
government and non-government contraceptives and reproductive health 
campaigns. However, this changed in the second half of the 1990s, when external 
funding declined in the context of a shift in priorities to HIV/AIDS and donor 
fatigue (Cleland et al., 2006; Crichton, 2008). It is therefore not surprising that 
insufficient state funding for contraceptives was repeatedly cited by research 
participants as being responsible for the chronic lack of contraceptives in the 
country, and the resultant unwanted pregnancies and abortions.  
Overreliance on foreign donor funding for financial and logistical support was 
also said to affect the identification of priority areas as well as the manner in 
which programmes are implemented. The head of an organisation working with 
youth sexuality, for example, said that, following the Global Gag Rule,
152
 they 
had been unable to access funds that could help to effectively address Kenyan 
youths‟ sexuality needs. Because the Global Gag Rule limited non-USA based 
organizations receiving USAID funding from speaking about unsafe abortion in 
the context of liberalization, her organisation had had to ignore abortion as a 
factor in youth‟s welfare, even though unsafe abortions are responsible for health 
complications and deaths amongst young Kenyan women. As such, although the 
organisation was a member of the Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance 
(RHRA), it was not leading any efforts directly for fear of losing funding. 
Another problem associated with foreign funding for pro-abortion actors in Kenya 
related to competition for funds by organisations. A pro-abortion activist, NSA4, 
explained that following the formation of a new reformist state after Moi‟s 
dictatorial and neo-patrimonial regime in 2002, international donors who had 
previously worked with non-state organisations chose to align with the 
government‟s development priorities and began working more through state 
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 On March 2001, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum to the administrator of 
USAID, reinstating a policy that required foreign nongovernmental organisations to agree as a 
condition of their receipt of federal funds for family planning activities that such organisations 
would neither perform nor actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other 
nations. Under the Mexico City Policy (or Global Gag Rule), in order to receive USAID funding 
for family planning, foreign NGOs were prohibited from using their own funds to provide abortion 
services, provide counselling or referrals regarding abortion, or to lobby their own governments 
for abortion law reform (Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. At 17, 303). 
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programmes and agencies. An obvious consequence was not just a decline in the 
importance of civil society organisations but also a significant reduction in 
funding for their operations. Reduced funding negatively affected their ability to 
function and also led to serious competition among organisations, including those 
campaigning for abortion legalization, for foreign funding. As a result, non-state 
organisations in Kenya were said to concentrate only on issues that are likely to 
attract funding. This limitation on organisations‟ freedom is well described by an 
African scholar, Shivji (2004): 
We are funded by, and rely almost exclusively on foreign funding. This is 
the greatest single limitation. “Whoever pays the piper calls the tune” still 
holds true, however much we may want to think otherwise. In many direct 
and subtle ways, those who fund us determine or place limits on our 
agendas or reorient them. Very few of us can really resist the pressures 
that external funding places on us. (p. 689-90) 
The prevalence of project-based funding may provide an explanation as to why 
the abortion rights agenda has not been prioritized by major women‟s 
organizations.  For example, as noted earlier, Maendeleo ya Wanawake 
Organisation has largely ignored the issue of unsafe abortion. Unsurprisingly, 
maternal health is not identified as one its major programmes and neither is it 
included in the organisation‟s five year strategic plan 
(http://mywokenya.org/mission.html). A look at the organisation‟s working 
partners also shows that their choice of programmes may be dictated by their 
donors. In the list of partners are Kenyan government departments as well as 
foreign governments‟ international aid bodies, such as DFID (UK Department for 
International Development), GTZ (German Agency for Development Co-
operation), CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency), among others.  
The fact that well known international funders of abortion-related programmes 
such as Planned Parenthood and Ford Foundation are missing from the list may 
explain why abortion is not a priority for the Maendeleo ya Wanawake 
Organisation. 
Evidently, pro-abortion actors in Kenya work from an already disadvantaged 
position since they not only lack state and elite support but also have to struggle 
against a firmly institutionalised anti-abortion discourse. To this end, the pro-
abortion activists have developed their own discourses with which they attempt to 
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convince both the public and policy makers that decriminalising abortion would 
have positive consequences for society as a whole. However, before analysing 
pro-abortion discourses, it is necessary to unveil the image of women which pro-
abortion actors construct in an attempt to present abortion favourably. 
7.2. Subjectivities: It is Poor and/or Young Women Who Have Abortions  
As demonstrated earlier, institutionalised foetal right-to-life anti-abortion 
discourses present abortion as immoral and unAfrican. The women who have 
abortions are themselves constructed as promiscuous, prostitutes, sinful, selfish, 
irresponsible, heartless and murderous. To counter this hegemonic construct, pro-
abortion discourses in Kenya strategically seek to displace the image created by 
these discourses by presenting women who have abortions as needy and therefore 
deserving of sympathy and understanding. To this end, pro-abortion discourses 
strategically select and carefully weave an image of the victims of unsafe 
abortions as poor and/or younger women; that is, as women who may generally be 
considered vulnerable and less powerful. This is evident in the comment of a 
research participant who said: 
Unsafe abortion affects only poor women and young school girls since 
richer women can access safe ones. If you or I needed an abortion, we can 
walk into any hospital and pay for a safe procedure. Unsafe abortions 
involve women living in poverty, young women, and women in difficult 
living situations. Unsafe abortion is certainly a class issue. (NSA3)  
By pointing out that unsafe abortion mainly affects poor women, whether young 
or old, the pro-abortion discourse exemplified by the above participant aims at 
attracting public sympathy for the women victims, in the same way that anti-
abortion discourses seek sympathy for aborted foetuses. The focus on class 
mirrors socialist feminist view of women as differentiated by class, among other 
categories (Watson, 1990). Thus, unlike most Western countries where abortion is 
defined as a civil liberties‟ issue, Kenya‟s pro-abortion discourse construct an 
extremely needy subject who is intended to galvanise support in an overtly hostile 
patriarchal and religious society. In these discourses, women are portrayed as not 
wanting to have abortions, but as being forced to have them by external factors 
that are beyond their control. Thus, instead of being seen as immoral and/or 
unAfrican, the women are presented as good women who, in different 
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circumstances, would want to continue their pregnancies. This is evident in the 
following comments by pro-abortion research participants: 
What I know is that for every marriage in Africa, people get married to get 
kids. And I know married people get very happy when they have kids. So 
if at some point the woman says she wants an abortion, you should know 
that it is something big. It is either due to contraceptive failure or lack of 
it. But it is not intentional. Maybe she has eight children and they cannot 
afford another one. (NSA2) 
The religious people don‟t interrogate to understand the different reasons 
why women have abortions. If they did, they may find that women have 
abortions as a result of ignorance, non-availability of cheap accessible 
contraceptives and also because of contraceptive failure. The impression 
you get from them is that people who have abortion are immoral, or they 
are just girls looking for a good time and want to use abortion as 
contraception to cover it up. But, statistics show that most of the women 
who go for abortion are not just young girls but many are married women. 
They feel unwanted pregnancies can disrupt everything: child spacing, 
finances or stability of their marriages. (NSA4) 
As is clear from the above observations, presenting poor married and younger 
women as the primary victims of unsafe abortion plays a strategic role in enabling 
pro-abortion actors to construct a category of needy women, as well as providing 
an opportunity to introduce into the debate multiple factors, such as poverty and 
contraception unavailability, which clearly influence abortion decisions. 
An important characteristic of pro-abortion discourses that categorise victims of 
unsafe abortion as vulnerable is the ability of these discourses to resonate with the 
institutionalised anti-abortion discourses. As already established, hegemonic 
discourses on abortion in Kenya are foetal life-focused and moralistic. As such, 
presenting poor and younger women as victims of unsafe abortion provides a 
window through which pro-abortion discourses appeal to some aspects of the 
moral and religious anti-abortion discourses. Unlike anti-abortion discourses that 
present women who undergo abortions as immoral and selfish, pro-abortion 
discourses seem to claim that abortion is undertaken by poor women out of 
consideration and responsibility for both their unborn and existing children. By 
procuring abortions, women are neither defying motherhood nor being selfish, but 
are in fact seeking to be good mothers by avoiding having children who may end 
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up being chokoras (street children). This argument emphasises the fact that the 
choice to abort is not influenced by selfish or immoral interests, but is rather made 
for moral reasons that take into consideration the welfare of the unborn child. 
Implicitly therefore, the pro-abortion discourse constructs abortion as a necessary 
evil that society must live with if it is not willing to make motherhood comfortable 
for women. 
It is important to mention that the choice to highlight pregnant poor and young 
women may be strategically informed by the knowledge that, in the past, the 
Kenyan elite, particularly the male-dominated Kenyan Parliament, have tended to 
be sympathetic to young pregnant women‟s situation. Unlike adult and older 
women who are thought to be capable of making independent decisions regarding 
their sexuality, young schoolgirls tend to attract sympathy from the general public 
and policy makers. For instance, a former Attorney General, Charles Njonjo, 
while contributing to a motion on legislation to curb teenage pregnancy, argued 
that: 
There is a very serious problem in this country about young girls, some of 
them in schools, becoming pregnant. I suggest that the problem, in fact, 
must be shared equally by the man and the girl who is seduced. I have 
suggested in this house before what we ought to do – and it is something 
this House must think of seriously – is to see whether it is time that we re-
introduced the Affiliations Act, so that men who put girls in trouble accept 
responsibility and if they do not do that voluntarily they are made to 
accept the responsibility by the courts. 
Mr. Speaker, most of the Hon. Members here are parents and perhaps 
some of them are guilty of what we are talking about in this House. But we 
must all accept this responsibility, that we are ruining the future of young 
children. When you are seducing a young girl of 14 years, think of your 
own child of 14 years. If you do that, perhaps this will be a deterrent to 
this very serious problem that we are having at the moment. (Republic of 
Kenya, 1979, p. 1164)  
When a female Member of Parliament suggested that the government should 
bring about legislation that would require men to meet half of the cost of caring 
for children born outside wedlock instead of pleading with adult men to respect 
school-girls, the Attorney General   exhibited no sympathy for older women in his 
response: 
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My concern is with young girls who are still at school. You remember the 
one problem that we had with the Affiliations Act was brought about by 
women – grown up women – some of whom were 40, 50 or even 60 years 
of age.... I would like to suggest that a woman of 40, 50, or 60 years needs 
no protection from anybody because she is capable of protecting herself 
mentally and physically by saying “No”. However, a child of 14 years who 
is still at school should be the concern of everybody here (Republic of 
Kenya, 1979, p. 1165).  
Evidently, a young pregnant school-girl attracts sympathy because of her 
perceived innocence and age, unlike the older women who are considered as 
autonomous adults. However, I suggest that the choice to focus on younger 
women and more so school-girls has two other advantages. Firstly, as is evident 
from the Attorney General‟s comment, empathy for school-girl pregnancies seems 
to stem from the position of the father: “When you are seducing a young girl of 14 
years, think of your own child of 14 years.” Because pregnant school-girls often 
get expelled from school, this is not only seen as a waste of the concerned parent‟s 
investment in the girl‟s education, but also as a threat to her future prospects – 
ruining the future of young children. As such, Kenyan leaders‟ interests in school-
girl pregnancies can be said to stem from the need to protect their own interest as 
parents.  
Secondly, pro-abortion actors‟ choice of school-girls also fits well with wider 
developmental and elite interests. For instance, teenage pregnancy has often been 
cited as a constraint in the elimination of gender disparities in education, and in 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals of universal primary 
education and gender equality in education by 2015 (Kenya Human Rights 
Commission, 2010). Besides, the social benefits of educating women, such as 
improved agricultural productivity, improved maternal and child health and 
reduced fertility, are also likely to attract government and elite support for two 
main reasons. First, their achievement can lead to electoral gain for the politicians 
identified with the positive changes. Social researchers in Africa have in the past 
explored the instrumentalization of the provision of social welfare services and 
their importance to the legitimization of regimes (Cornwall et al., 2007). 
Secondly, for the political elite, appearing to be addressing gender issues is also 
likely to earn the government donor money. 
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A rather significant advantage of focusing on poor and younger women and 
presenting them as innocent victims is that it allows for the shifting of blame away 
from women to societal and economic factors that expose them to unwanted 
pregnancies, such as economic pressures and state-sanctioned gender inequality. 
By insisting that rich women often are able to access safe clandestine abortions, 
pro-abortion discourses present poverty as a major factor in exposing poor and 
teenage women to unwanted pregnancies and the attendant unsafe abortions. 
Abortion is thus presented as a practice firmly rooted in socioeconomic troubles. 
A senior state officer working with an independent government commission 
explained that: 
The level of poverty in this country has gone up, and as a result, women 
and girls are getting vulnerable to sexual advances. Think of a woman who 
has to survive, has to put food on the table for her children. The only way 
out is to sleep with a man who will give her money to buy a packet of 
Unga [flour] and it is happening in Ukambani. It was on TV the other day. 
So, would you call that woman immoral? How about female students at 
the university? Most students are poor, they come from poor families and 
they cannot afford to pay for their needs and the government is not 
providing anything for them, not even accommodation and food. What do 
you expect? Every Friday, as I am going to... university, I see all these big 
vehicles heading towards the female hostels. I am horrified by the number 
of old men picking those girls and going with them. Most of them are 
leaders, our leaders whom we know. I keep wondering, for these old men, 
where is their morality when they go stripping naked to a child who could 
be their grandchild? (NSA7) 
Another research participant working with reproductive health organisations also 
saw abortion as a problem emanating from economic considerations: 
What I know is that there is no woman in her right senses who wants to get 
pregnant so as to have an abortion. Because many of these women are 
poor, they usually wonder how they can bring another mouth to feed if 
they cannot even feed their own mouth. How can anyone condemn an IDP 
(internally displaced person) or a street woman for having an abortion? 
(NSA2) 
These quotations implicitly justify abortion for the girls and women involved. 
Abortion as an option is interpreted as emanating from socio-cultural and political 
circumstances over which the girls and women have no control, and hence, they 
are portrayed as deserving pity rather than reproach and condemnation. This 
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observation is confirmed by research which has shown that women from 
developing countries resort to clandestine and unsafe abortion as one of the few 
responses available to them given their lack of control over sex, lack of 
contraceptives, and the prevalence of culturally-defined fertility patterns (Lane et 
al., 1998, p. 1089). Abortion is thus seen as presenting the only key strategy for 
managing unwanted pregnancies that can not only worsen women‟s economic 
circumstances, but could also conflict with their future aspirations such as 
education, career and/or marriage. 
By presenting women who undergo unsafe abortions as victims of unintended 
circumstances, pro-abortion discourses seek to transfer blame not just to women‟s 
economic conditions but more so to circumstances, such as gender inequality, 
which may be responsible for unwanted pregnancies. This is what makes the 
inclusion of poor married women in the construction of victims of unsafe abortion 
particularly intriguing. An obstetrician-gynaecologist at a Nairobi city public 
hospital who participated in this study said that about 60 per cent of the women 
who sought post-abortion care services at the hospital were in a marriage union. 
This was followed by single women at 22 per cent, divorced or separated women 
at 12 per cent, while widowed women constituted only 4.4 per cent (NSA17). His 
observations are echoed by a study carried out by the Guttmacher Institute, which 
also found that 59 per cent of women admitted to a hospital in the Western 
Province of Kenya for post-abortion care were or had been married. Of the 
women, seventy one percent were housewives or unemployed (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2008).  
As noted in Chapter 5, the Kenyan Parliament has in the past failed to legislate 
against marital rape, with claims that there could be no rape in African marriages 
since sexual availability is implicit in the marriage contract.  While high rates of 
abortion among married women could be linked to infidelity, it could more likely 
be a pointer to the unequal nature of Kenyan marriages and, perhaps, women‟s 
inability to access contraceptives and the government‟s failure to provide them. 
Official figures from the government show that only 46 per cent married women 
use contraceptives (Okech et al., 2011), while 24 per cent of married women in 
Kenya have unmet contraceptive needs due to difficulties in accessing the 
necessary family planning facilities (Ian et al., 2009; Republic of Kenya, 2009).  
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An additional significant feature in the discursive construction of women who 
have abortions is the association that pro-abortion actors draw between the failure 
to provide safe abortion and Kenya‟s inability to meet larger development goals, 
among them the Millennium Development Goals and Kenya‟s Vision 2030.153 A 
pro-abortion activist working with an international women‟s organisation argued 
that “In order for Kenya to achieve Millennium Development Goal 5 on 
Improving Maternal Health, it is imperative that the issue of unsafe abortions is 
addressed, since this is a major contributor to the high maternal mortality rates in 
the country” (NSA12). The same idea was echoed by another participant from the 
Ministry of Gender, who also wondered how the Kenyan government intended to 
achieve the 2030 vision if women continued to die and suffer from a preventable 
problem (SA1). There thus appears to be a strategic attempt to align pro-abortion 
discourses with those that are most resonant with wider national development 
plans. This is not only expedient for the purposes of winning popular and elite 
support, but also for forestalling opposition attacks through connecting access to 
abortion with caring about the society as a whole. By claiming that unsafe 
abortion is a hindrance to the attainment of development goals in a developing 
country, pro-abortion activists hope to influence policy and practice. 
From the above discussion, an emergent shared characteristic of women victims 
of unsafe abortion in Kenya seems to be poverty, whether young, married, single 
or divorced. A logical conclusion to draw is that Kenyan women will continue to 
resort to unsafe induced abortion as a shield against the negative socioeconomic 
consequences of unplanned entry to motherhood. To elaborate the importance of 
abortion to women facing unwanted pregnancies, a reproductive health 
practitioner (NSA19) said that despite the numerous national media campaigns to 
sensitise the public to the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases through 
unprotected sex and multiple partners, most Kenyan users of emergency 
contraception (EC) were much more afraid of getting pregnant than they were of 
contracting HIV/AIDS. He said that 79 per cent of women identify pregnancy as 
                                                          
153
 Kenya Vision 2030 is the country‟s development blueprint covering the period 2008 to 2030. It 
aims to transform Kenya into a newly industrializing middle-income country providing a high 
quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030 (Republic of Kenya, 2007). 
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their biggest fear, while only 45 per cent consider the risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS through unprotected sex. Quoting from a study carried out by the 
Population Council, this participant noted that:  
Fifty-seven percent of women purchasing EC reported having infrequent 
sexual intercourse or sexual intercourse on an irregular basis. Nearly half 
(45%) of the respondents agreed that they might be at risk of getting HIV. 
Three-quarters (74%) indicated that it would be a “big problem” if they 
found out that they were pregnant, but only 38% reported using a modern 
method of contraception. (Keesbury, 2009, p. 12) 
These findings correspond with claims made by two other participants, NSA2 and 
NSA4, who, while explaining the danger of neglecting family planning goals at 
the expense of HIV/AIDS prevention, said that: 
We conducted a survey on the use of condoms, the pill and injectables as 
contraceptives. Do you know condoms came last? When we asked women 
if they preferred to use pills, condoms or the injection, condoms came last 
as the most preferred contraceptive method. The injection came first 
because it is very easy to use and to conceal.
154
 This was followed by the 
pill. This clearly shows you that the greatest danger that women perceive 
is pregnancy, not HIV/AIDS. That is why condoms came last. (NSA2)   
When HIV/AIDS was declared a national disaster, there was a big, big 
campaign on how to prevent infection. The Ministry of Health went on an 
overdrive, subsidizing male condoms and distributing them and right now, 
a packet of male condoms is 10 Kenya Shillings (less than one cent USD). 
However, it is so ridiculous. Now statistics are showing that women are 
the largest buyers of male condoms because women are the ones who 
think about safety, sexually transmitted diseases and contraception.  
Unfortunately, although they have to buy the male condom, they have to 
negotiate with a third person again, they don‟t have control of 
contraception. A packet of three female condoms costs about 400 Kenya 
Shillings ($5 USD). How come it is not subsidized when these are 
condoms women have control over? Why would the government choose to 
subsidized one gender and not the other when women are also taxpayers? 
(NSA4) 
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 A significant number of research participants noted that because men often do not support 
contraceptive use, women normally go on birth control behind their men‟s backs. In such 
circumstances, they are likely to choose the method that is easiest to conceal. 
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The above research participants‟ claims are supported by the Kenya Demographic 
and Health Survey (2009), which showed that only 32 per cent of women and 37 
per cent of men who reported having multiple sexual partners said they had used a 
condom during their last sexual encounter. The deputy head of the Department of 
Reproductive Health at the Ministry of Public Health, Dr Shiphiah Kuria, is also 
on record as having warned of a trend where women were more concerned about 
getting pregnant than contracting sexually transmitted infections (Wanja, 2010). 
This health expert said he was alarmed by the high usage of emergency 
contraceptives, especially on weekends and public holidays, although about 90 per 
cent of the users understand the method does not protect against STIs and 
HIV/AIDS (ibid.). For example, a survey carried out at the University of Nairobi 
found that only 43 per cent of students used condoms every time they had sex 
three months before the survey, meaning that 57 percent did not always use 
condoms (Ngirachu, 2010). Surprisingly, most of the students acted in full 
knowledge of the risks involved, since 77 per cent had been previously tested for 
HIV/AIDS and knew their status (ibid.).  
Although Kenyan women‟s behaviour can easily be explained as being informed 
by the knowledge that sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS can 
be hidden, whereas pregnancy and the attendant stigma cannot, it may also be a 
pointer to women‟s inability to negotiate safe sex, as a result of the patriarchal 
nature of both the government
155
 and Kenyan society in general. This is well said 
by Nairobi‟s street women, who explained to a newspaper reporter that their 
attempts to avoid sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies often 
fail because the street boys with whom they live often force them to have 
unprotected sex (Mwololo, 2011). One street woman explained that she fears 
pregnancy more than she does sexually transmitted diseases like HIV/AIDS 
because, “Enyewe, singetaka kuzaa tena. Ukimwi sio mimba, huwezi jua 
ikikushika.” (I wouldn‟t want to get another child. Unlike pregnancy, HIV is 
hidden) (ibid.). As such, it is plausible to conclude that constructing victims of 
unsafe abortion as young and poor allows for attention to be directed to the 
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structural factors that expose women to unwanted pregnancies, rather than their 
behaviour.  
On this basis, I argue that the image of victims of unsafe abortion created by pro-
abortion actors is not a coincidence. Rather, it is intended to produce a category of 
individuals capable of attracting the sympathy of both the public and policy 
makers in a context shaped by patriarchal and neo-patrimonial politics. 
Patrimonial and clientele relationships push leaders into serving the interests of 
their political supporters, including, in most instances, tribal patriarchs and 
religious leaders, who are unlikely to support women‟s right to safe abortion. 
However, it should be noted that although deeper causes of unsafe abortion that 
lie in poverty and gender discrimination in the society are brought to the fore, the 
political claims regarding abortion rights are not acknowledged. As such, although 
this strategic framing of pro-abortion discourses is expedient for the purposes of 
influencing policy and gaining public support, it does not address a core feminist 
issue in terms of women‟s right to control their own bodies. As will become clear 
in the next sections where the pro-abortion discourses of health, economics and 
rights are discussed, this depoliticisation of abortion has ensured that a women‟s 
rights discourse on abortion remains outside the core agenda of abortion politics 
in Kenya. 
7.3. Pro-abortion Discourses in Kenya 
7.3.1. Abortion as an Issue of Public Health 
A straightforward public health problem with a known solution has been 
allowed to become the killing fields of women in developing countries, 
particularly Africa (Sai, 2004, cited in International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (IPPF), 2006, p. 3). 
As noted in the above quotation, public health abortion discourses in Kenya, as 
elsewhere in Africa, focus attention on the health problems encountered by 
women due to unsafe abortions. Those in support of abortion law liberalization 
argue that thousands of women die and many more suffer irreparable harm as a 
result of dangerous procedures conducted by unskilled persons. A pro-abortion 
Professor of obstetrics and gynaecology who participated in this research noted 
that: 
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Official Kenya government statistics indicate that more than 800 women 
procure unsafe abortion every day. As a result, 30 to 50 per cent of all 
maternal mortalities in the country are as a result of unsafe abortion. 
(NSA7) 
This participant‟s claims are supported by both the government and non-state 
organisations which have demonstrated that more than 2,600 women die annually 
from complications of unsafe abortion, while a further 21,000 are admitted to 
public hospitals with complications (Geberselassie et al., 2005; Guttmacher 
Institute, 2012). As a result, women with unsafe abortion-related complications 
occupy more than 50 per cent of maternity beds in public hospitals. It is however 
important to note that although this figure was commonly used by pro-abortion 
actors, it was discounted by anti-abortion actors and by an officer from the 
Ministry of Health who said abortion related bed occupancy was about 20 per 
cent. He explained that there had been a reduction after the introduction of the 
manual vacuum aspiration (MVA) which meant that patients spent less time in the 
hospitals. He claimed, “They stay for a maximum of 24 hours since there is no 
need for women to be taken to the theatre” (SA2). Still, a majority of pro-abortion 
research participants were of the opinion that these figures may actually be 
underestimated since most studies in Kenya are hospital-based and use medical 
records which may omit clandestine abortions. Moreover, since there are 
restrictions on induced abortion, health facilities may deliberately fail to record 
abortion as a cause of death. It is also possible that for every woman who seeks 
medical care at a government facility, many more have other complications and 
usually seek out homemade cures, pharmacists or some other untrained persons 
for assistance.  
A senior official of the Kenya Obstetrical and Gynaecological Society (KOGS) 
observed that pregnancy-related deaths and suffering could be avoided if the 
government lifted restrictive laws on abortion so as to save the lives of women 
who seek the service illegally (NSA13). This participant explained that maternal 
mortality in Kenya has remained unacceptably high. Kenya‟s Demographic and 
Health Survey (KDHS) of 2008/9 reported a maternal mortality ratio of 488 per 
100,000 live births, which translates to approximately 8,000 pregnant Kenyan 
women dying each year from pregnancy-related complications (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics & ICF Macro, 2010). A study by the Ministry of Health in 
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2003 also identified unsafe abortion as one of the top five causes of maternal 
deaths: 
The FIVE TOP CAUSES--the BIG FIVE--or the TERRIBLE FIVE--of 
maternal deaths are haemorrhage, infections associated with delivery, 
hypertension induced by pregnancy, obstructed labour due to poorly-
monitored labour or delay in taking needed action and abortion that is 
procured unsafely and/or by untrained providers. (Otieno-Nyunya, 2004, 
p. 6) 
Deaths from unsafe abortion were also the concern of a female former Member of 
Parliament. She noted that: 
Those opposed to abortion don‟t want to talk about the lives of women. So 
I am like look, during the bomb blast,
156
 over two hundred Kenyans died 
and we were all so shocked. Yet in any given year, it is estimated that over 
two thousand women die due to abortion complication. Where is the 
lowering of the flag? How can there be such silence? Who are we to keep 
silent when so many women are dying? How can the Church accept these 
deaths? (NSA4) 
A notable characteristic of the focus on deaths from unsafe abortion is the 
attention paid to the fact that the problems result from the procedures being 
performed by untrained persons. As such, reports by pro-abortion actors are often 
accompanied by detailed information of the unhealthy conditions in which back-
street abortions are procured. For example, in a story reported by IRINnews 
(2009), a self-confessed abortionist told the reporter that, “They [the women] 
come to me and each pays me 50 shillings [US$0.70]. Most of them are sex 
workers who operate here in Majengo [a slum] and have conceived by mistake.” 
She said she uses a concoction of herbs to induce abortion, and admitted there 
were fatalities. However, she commented, “Even qualified drivers at times cause 
accidents; I do not do this job to kill anyone, but at times some are unlucky and go 
together with the child they came to abort” (ibid.). 
The concentration of pro-abortion discourses on the economic and social 
circumstances in which complications and deaths from unsafe abortions occur 
may not be a coincidence. Rather, this is a strategic effort which enables pro-
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 More than 200 Kenyans were killed in a bomb blast at the American Embassy on 7 August 
1998. 
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abortion actors to focus on the unhealthy conditions in which unsafe abortions are 
offered. This in turn provides them with the opportunity to demonstrate that if 
abortion were offered by trained health professionals, related deaths and health 
complications would be eliminated. By so doing, the health discourse posits that 
liberalising abortion laws can have a dramatic impact on reducing mortality and 
morbidity, which, even anti-abortion activists agree need to be reduced. In support 
of this claim, a pro-abortion research participant (NSA4) gave the example of 
South Africa where the liberalisation of abortion laws in 1996 reduced the 
incidence of infection resulting from abortion by 52 per cent and that of maternal 
mortality by 92 per cent. This pattern has been repeated in Turkey where, since 
the passage of a law legalising abortion, maternal mortality due to unsafe abortion 
almost disappeared, and the burden of unsafe abortion on the health care system 
greatly decreased (Shah & Ahman, 2009). 
Additionally, pro-abortion actors‟ focus on the circumstances in which unsafe 
abortion occurs enables the shifting of blame away from women and abortionists 
(as presented by anti-abortion activists) and towards external agents, such as the 
state and religious organizations, which, by stigmatising abortion, make women 
submit to procedures that threaten their lives. On the one hand, the state is accused 
of failing to provide contraceptives and access to safe abortion and, on the other, it 
is charged with failing to provide sex education. As a pro-abortion research 
participant explained: 
I don‟t think women have abortions for fun. Women have abortions 
because they feel they have no other choice and the government does not 
give them other choices. Abortion should be solution based. First of all we 
need to understand the real reasons why all this is happening. A lot of the 
abortions can be reduced if contraception is widely available.  And maybe 
we should start discussing whether or not and in which circumstances we 
should provide girls who are not yet adults with contraception. Of course 
that is another controversial area, but we must talk about it because we 
know from the age of twelve, girls have become sexually active and it has 
become fashionable to have more than one boyfriend and using condoms 
is not cool.  So we have these kids doing this. What are the options? I hear 
people talk about abstinence, which is wonderful but we must do much 
more than „chill‟ because actually, these kids are not chilling.  Until we 
have that discussion, thousands of women will continue to die every year 
from unsafe abortion. (NSA4) 
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This participant suggests that if the Kenyan government provided sufficient access 
to contraceptives, the number of unwanted pregnancies and the attendant unsafe 
abortions would be minimised. In fact, a majority of research participants, both 
anti and pro-abortion, acknowledged the relationship between unwanted 
pregnancies and unmet need for family planning as a key issue. A research 
participant working with the governmental body on population and development 
said the country has a 24 per cent unmet need for family planning. Although this 
was mainly blamed on reduced funding for population and reproductive health 
programmes as a result of the diversion of funding to HIV/AIDS, the state‟s 
prioritization of curative over preventive services was also problematised (NSA5). 
This participant explained that “reproductive health issues are not seen as 
important because unlike diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 
pregnancy-related issues are considered normal. If a woman is pregnant, they see 
it as just natural.”157 Treating pregnancy-related issues as normal has the effect 
that little funding is allocated to maternal healthcare, and the social, political, 
cultural and economic factors that play a strong role in women‟s health are 
strategically ignored. Moreover, as NSA5 elaborated, politicians often are 
unwilling to spend money on an issue that is not only controversial but also rather 
private. As this research participant explained, “You see, if an MP‟s constituents 
were dying of malaria or cholera for example, he/she will be very quick to call a 
press conference and demand government action. It is highly unlikely that any 
politician will openly campaign for family planning or abortion, unless they want 
to lose their seat in Parliament.” 
At a political level, too, Kenyan politicians were also said to be uncommitted to 
family planning and population control, and that the introduction of Kenya‟s 
population policy was to access donor money rather than out of genuine 
conviction (Chimbwete & Zulu, 2003; Kulczycki, 1999; Thomas, 2003). In fact, 
some senior politicians have openly expressed suspicion that family planning was 
imperialistic and a genocidal plot. A former Vice President in the post-
independence goverment, Oginga Odinga, for example argued that population 
control was unnecessary, since Africa remained a sparsely populated continent 
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 Kulczycki (1999) has claimed that one of the reasons behind the continued lack of recognition 
of problems resulting from unsafe abortions in Kenya is the fact that ill health is generally 
perceived as a natural part of being a woman.    
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(Warwick, 1982). Similarly, although his government continued to receive donor 
money, President Kenyatta never publicly supported family planning and forbade 
his name or photograph from being used in any family planning campaigns 
(Thomas, 2003).
158
 Additionally, as a result of tribal and ethnic politics, some 
politicians, instead of encouraging family planning, have continued to urge their 
supporters to have more children so as to boost their populations. The Deputy 
Director of the National Council for Population and Development Board, Mrs. 
Vene Lumumba, is noted to have warned: 
This [encouraging constituents to have more children] is one and very bad 
thing political leaders have done. While we are encouraging Kenyans to 
adopt family planning methods to avoid increase in population, they are 
encouraging them to give birth to as many children as they can so that they 
can have many electorates in their constituencies. Our efforts are being 
undermined and this is contributing to the level of poverty as Kenyans 
give birth to children and they are unable to bring them up. (Musyoka, 
2012) 
The behaviour of Kenyan politicians is similar to that of politicians in Western 
political systems who, as noted by Lovenduski and Outshoorn (1986), have often 
been unwilling to take a stand on issues that could potentially lead to loss of 
Parliamentary seats. Considering the patriarchal and neo-patrimonial nature of the 
Kenyan political environment (as shown in Chapter 5), politicians and policy 
makers usually choose to concentrate on the more populist curative policies. 
Supporting an issue which could potentially encourage women to become 
immoral, or one that could provide political opponents with ammunition to 
question their Africanness and/or religious faith, reduces the chances of the elite 
publicly supporting such legislation. It is therefore possible to conclude, alongside 
Cohan (1986), that: 
Abortion as a problem has remained at the margins of issue consideration 
for many reasons, two being the inferior status of women within the polity 
and the close supervision of such questions with a moral element by the 
religious institutions of society invariably controlled by men. (p. 27) 
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 In fact, contraceptive commodities were incorporated in the national government budget for the 
first time in the country‟s history in 2005 (Chrichton, 2008). 
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Kenyan leaders‟ need to appear morally upright in the eyes of significant 
constituents, such as religious organisations and local patriarchs, was also 
identified as being behind the government‟s inability to provide sex education. A 
research participant working with a youth organisation (NSA2) said this was 
unfortunate because his organisation‟s study on adolescent sexuality had shown 
that sex education at the early stages of life can significantly prevent unwanted 
pregnancies. In Kenya, sex education can only be offered in the context of 
teaching about HIV/AIDS. To this participant, this has meant Kenyan teens have 
little or no knowledge on how to prevent pregnancy, since the little sex education 
they receive promotes abstinence as the only means of prevention (See Chapter 
5). As a result of a campaign urging young people to chill or abstain from early 
sex, many young people in Kenya who know about the condom only know it as a 
means of preventing HIV/AIDS infection, but not as a birth control measure. This 
lack of information was identified as a major factor in unwanted pregnancies and 
abortion in Kenya: 
Abortion is mainly a youth problem.  And it is essentially due to lack of 
information because they indulge in sex, yet they don‟t know the dangers 
and they don‟t know how to protect themselves. I have talked to the young 
people and they are confused. They really don‟t know that you can use a 
pill and even they don‟t know where to get the pill. They don‟t know that 
the boy can use a condom effectively.  When they indulge in sex and the 
girl gets pregnant, the boy disappears. The girl must deal with it. So it is 
lack of information, correct information. (NSA5) 
This participant also identified confusion among government ministries as well as 
parents for the lack of proper information. He explained that: 
The HIV/AIDS policy requires information and services to be provided to 
any one that is sexually active, without specifically mentioning schools. 
But, on one hand, the Ministry of Education does not permit provision of 
information on contraceptives and condoms. On the other hand, youth 
reproduction policies are run by the Division of Reproductive Health 
(DKH) which is under the Ministry of Health. Since schools operate under 
the Education Ministry, heads of schools follow the Ministry‟s guidelines 
rather than those from the Health Ministry. Secondly, parents are also a 
problem. It is very difficult for parents to allow you to talk to the young 
people about reproductive health. There seems to be a feeling that doing so 
would make young people sexually active. Besides, the society seems to 
assume young people don‟t have sex. (NSA5) 
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Insufficient information on contraceptives is presented as a leading cause of 
unwanted pregnancies in the above texts. But, the government and the society at 
large are also presented as culpable. By failing to provide relevant sex education 
and contraceptives to young people, adults shut their eyes to the truth about 
teenage sex. But more importantly, avoiding dealing with the issue also makes it 
possible for those concerned to ignore their own contribution to the problem. For 
example, as noted in Chapter 5, lack of supervision in schools, as well as the 
absence of parental guidance, have been identified as two of the contributing 
factors which have led to an increased incidence of teenage pregnancies. This 
focus on contraception serves two functions: first, pro-abortion actors are able to 
present themselves as not being only interested in abortion, but also in the 
prevention of unwanted pregnancies. Secondly, it makes it possible to challenge 
anti-abortion activists who construct them as abortion addicts.  
The public health discourse on abortion in Kenya has also focused on the amount 
of medical attention required by women who have incomplete or septic abortions, 
which they contend, negatively affects the management of other patients. Such 
patients were said to absorb much of nurses and doctors‟ working time, leaving 
Kenyan hospitals unable to attend to or admit other patients. This argument 
pointed to the fact that if legalised, abortion would be much safer and cheaper, as 
it would be openly performed in licensed clinics with better facilities. This was 
made clear by a senior lawyer at FIDA who said: 
Instead of watching women die out of having unsafe abortions, or 
women being hospitalized and the government using a large percentage 
of its resources to then treat women who have had incomplete or unsafe 
abortions, why not then provide legislation whereby women feel safe and 
comfortable in terms of coming forward to have a termination of 
pregnancy? (NSA12) 
In response to the claims of anti-abortion discourses that legalisation of abortion 
would lead to increased cases, pro-abortion actors argued that since legal 
restrictions had not ensured fewer abortions, decriminalisation would just move 
abortions from the backstreet into proper medical facilities. In fact, in countries 
such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, where safe abortion is 
widespread and modern contraceptive use is high, the abortion rate is very low at 
10 per 1000 women of reproductive age, whereas in Africa, despite the legal 
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restrictions, abortion rates are high at 30 per 1000 women of reproductive age 
(Sedgh et al., 2007). Legislating against abortion can also be seen as responsible 
for preventing victims of unsafe abortion from seeking timely post-abortion care 
due to fear, ignorance about services, and stigma, in addition to the prohibitive 
cost of post-abortion care. As a result, the majority of women go to public 
hospitals only when complications are severe and complex, requiring more 
resources and extended hospital stays.  
In relation to the consequences of unsafe abortion, it is worth noting that 
complications and costs related to unsafe abortion could be significantly 
minimised by the use of the drug, misoprostol.  At the time of my fieldwork in 
2009, the Kenya Obstetrics and Gynaecological Society of Kenya (KOGS) was in 
the process of negotiating with the government on the mechanisms of expanding 
the registration of misoprostol to include use for gynaecological purposes,
159
 since 
at that time, it was registered for use only as treatment for stomach ulcers and as a 
painkiller. According a medical doctor who participated in this research (NSA17), 
because the drug is inexpensive, retailing across the counter for as little as 240 
Kenya shillings (roughly USD$3), it would be useful in saving the lives of many 
women who might otherwise die from unsafe abortions. The drug‟s easy 
accessibility and low cost could however create a problem. For example, during 
my fieldwork, I was able to purchase the drug from a couple of pharmacies 
without a prescription.
160
 Surprisingly, in all instances, I was neither asked why I 
needed the drug, nor was I provided with instructions on how to use it.  Although 
such laxity exposes women to considerable danger – since the drug, if not 
properly administered, can potentially be fatal (Briggs & Wan, 2006), – it should 
not be overlooked that to some extent, the easy availability of misoprostol 
provides a challenge to the medicalization of abortion by offering the prospect of 
abortions being available to women without the involvement of doctors.  
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 In July 2009, Kenya registered misoprostol for the treatment of incomplete abortion and 
miscarriage as a strategy for preventing maternal deaths due to complications of abortion. 
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 This is in spite of a 2008 study which showed that although 42 per cent of pharmacies in 
Nairobi had misoprostol available for sale, only 12 percent of pharmacists agreed to dispense 
misoprostol to mystery clients for abortion induction (Ong‟ech et al., 2008). 
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The public health discourse was also used by doctors at a personal level to justify 
their willingness to illegally provide abortions for women. When I asked one 
doctor why he performs abortions, he explained: 
When I completed medical school, I promised myself never to perform 
abortions. So, when a young woman came to me and requested the 
procedure, I turned her down. However, after about one week, as I looked 
through a newspaper, I saw her picture in the obituaries page. Although it 
wasn‟t stated, I knew what had happened and I have never been able to 
forgive myself. In a way, I have always blamed myself for her death. If I 
had performed the procedure, for which I am qualified, the girl may well 
be still alive. Since then, I promised to do it for any woman and although I 
have publicly declared my support for legalisation, I have not been 
arrested but have received death threats from anti-abortion crusaders. I 
have said should this happen, the writing on my grave should read, “Here 
lies a man who died of abortion.” (NSA13) 
Further, although doctors have often been accused by anti-abortion activists of 
pushing for abortion legalisation for economic gain, this is unlikely to be their 
primary motivation. As this doctor argues, if abortion were legalised, it would be 
free of charge in public hospitals. 
It is worth noting that the public health discourse has had the impact that even 
without an abortion liberalization law, the government has been able to provide 
post-abortion care, although at the risk of being accused of supporting abortion. I 
argue that this is a reflection of the fragmented and contradictory nature of the 
Kenyan government, reflected in the behaviour of political leaders, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. Because of the neo-patrimonial and winner-takes-all kind of politics in 
which being in or out of government determines one‟s access to economic wealth, 
leaders in Kenya avoid taking a position on abortion as this could lead to either 
gaining or losing votes from abortion proponents and opponents. Analysis of 
policy-making across different contexts has shown that individual politicians and 
bureaucrats often play central roles in championing issues as well as getting them 
onto the policy agenda (Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Shiffman, 2007). Consequently, 
if Kenya‟s bureaucracy perceives no political benefits in championing legalised 
abortion, the issue is not only unlikely to attract political entrepreneurs to 
champion it, but it is also likely to be deprioritized and only referred to in passing. 
For the State, however, I contend that the middle road position on abortion and 
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the provision of post-abortion care in public hospitals is an attempt to impress and 
build links with the international community, in the hope of accessing 
international funding. In Kenya, donors‟ contribution to the health sector is 
relatively large and has increased dramatically in the last decade (Chuma & 
Okungu, 2011). In 1994, for example, donor funds accounted for 8 per cent of the 
government‟s total health expenditure. This proportion increased to 16 per cent in 
2001/2002, 31 per cent in 2005/2006, and 40.6 per cent in 2008/09 (ibid.). 
Although the greater proportion is spent on HIV/AIDS and malaria, the significant 
amount spent on reproductive health provisioning can be considered an incentive 
for the Kenyan government to try to impress international donors (Crichton, 
2008). 
In sum, then, the pro-abortion public health discourse in Kenya posits that access 
to abortion is a crucial part of ensuring high quality healthcare for women. This is 
because criminalizing abortion not only exposes women to health complications 
and death as a result of the procedures being performed by unskilled individuals, 
but it also inevitably delays abortion, which therefore increases risks to women‟s 
health and raises the cost of procedures. As I have shown, the public health pro-
abortion discourse is the most favoured by pro-abortion actors because it is easy 
to sell to both political leaders and policy makers. In the next section, I 
demonstrate how the direct costs of treating abortion complications burden 
impoverished women, while indirect costs drain the national economy. 
7.3.2. The Economic Cost of Abortion  
Pro-abortion economic discourses in Kenya pay attention to the material cost of 
abortion related problems and to the advantages that would accrue, for both 
individual women and the national economy, if abortion were decriminalized. 
Unsafe-abortion related morbidity and mortality is presented as imposing a huge 
cost on the lives and health of Kenyan women, while at the same time burdening 
the country‟s public health system. The following excerpt from a publication 
provided by one of the organisations that I visited during fieldwork clearly 
captures the economic losses that may accrue to individual women as a result of 
an unsafe abortion: 
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In order to earn money to feed her family, Sarah was forced to leave 
school at age 13. When she couldn‟t find work washing clothes she would 
have sex with men for money. She would earn 100 shillings (less than 
$2.00 USD) from these encounters to buy food for the family. When Sarah 
became pregnant, a woman in Kibera
161
 advised her to get an abortion. 
Sarah procured an unsafe abortion from the woman‟s friend, and soon 
developed a dangerous, life-threatening infection which left her in great 
pain and bed-ridden for a month. The cost of emergency healthcare and the 
fear of arrest kept her from going to a hospital. Sarah and her mother were 
afraid to talk to anyone about how sick she was because of the risk of 
arrest and the fear of community condemnation. Sarah died at home on 
June 29, 2009. Her family now goes for days without food and survives on 
hand-outs from neighbours in Kibera (Center for Reproductive Rights, 
2010). 
As demonstrated by Sarah‟s case, in addition to the morbidity and mortality 
associated with unsafe abortion, women and their families also incur economic 
losses.  The economic costs are related to loss of productivity and increased health 
problems for those women who survive, as well as the impact on their extended 
family.  A research participant (NSA5) noted that in Kenya, a significant number 
of women who have abortions have other children, are in relationships, and are 
usually not procuring their first abortion. As such, the possible death of a woman 
or even a long incapacitating complication would exact a heavy economic toll on 
her family. This is more so in Kenya where women can be responsible for up to 
100 per cent of household income and for the welfare of their families. In fact, 
according to the World Health Organisation, an estimated quarter to half a million 
children around the world lose their mothers each year as a result of unsafe 
abortion (Grimes et al., 2006). These children are more likely than children with 
two parents to receive inadequate health care and social services such as 
education, and are more likely to die at an early age (World Health Organisation, 
2005). 
Moreover, as noted above, due to a variety of factors, unsafe abortion tends to 
affect poor women in Kenya. Consequently, it is likely that monetary costs for the 
procedure, as well as the cost of post-abortion care, can further increase women‟s 
poverty. The fact that abortion is criminalised means that the cost of abortion 
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services is unregulated and is therefore generally high. As such, poor Kenyan 
women, who normally have to wait longer to confirm their pregnancies due to 
lack of access to pregnancy tests (NSA4), usually defer abortion until their second 
trimester, by which time they will have saved enough money for the payment. 
Unfortunately, second trimester abortions are more often accompanied by greater 
complications, longer hospital stays, and, inevitably, greater expense. The 
observation that unsafe abortion affects poor women is important as it confirms 
Critical African Feminist Perspective, which recognises that the female subject is 
not a homogeneous category, and as such, depending on class, Kenyan women 
experience abortion differently. 
At the national level, the treatment of abortion-related complications in public 
hospitals was said to consume significant resources, including hospital beds, 
blood supplies, medications, and often operating theatres, anaesthesia and medical 
specialists (Kiberenge & Kiarie, 2010). NSA6, a pro-abortion health professional, 
noted that: 
The impact on the resources of Kenya‟s healthcare system is enormous. 
For example, as much as 60 per cent of the resources of Kenyatta National 
Hospital‟s maternity ward are being taken up by victims of unsafe 
abortions. If you walk into that ward, you will be surprised to discover that 
more than half of the women have not given birth. In fact, it would be 
better if they had because having a baby is almost 10 times cheaper than 
treating a victim of unsafe abortion. (NSA6) 
Another research participant, the head of a health institution in Nairobi, said that 
the approximate annual cost of the management of complications resulting from 
unsafe abortions to be about 300 million Kenya shillings (about USD $4 million). 
He explained that treating complications from unsafe abortion significantly strains 
the already limited funds, staff, and medical supplies available to Kenya‟s public 
health system by diverting scarce resources to an easily preventable public health 
problem.
162
 At the regional level, the annual cost of unsafe abortion in Latin 
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 The funding issue is exacerbated by the fact that the government of Kenya allocates little 
funding to health care services.  In 2001, African heads of states met in Abuja (Nigeria) and 
committed to allocating at least 15 per cent of annual budgets to the health sector. In Kenya 
however, government spending on health is not only less than half of the Abuja target and has 
been declining, but also Kenya has the lowest allocation in East and Southern Africa (Chuma & 
Okungu, 2011). 
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America and Africa is estimated to be between US$159 million and US$333 
million (Vlassoff et al., 2009). These figures seem to suggest that if legalised, 
funds spent on complications resulting from unsafe abortion could be put into 
better use such as providing contraceptives. 
Seemingly, the economic burden of unsafe abortion to households and on health 
systems is great, given both the scale of the problem and the high cost of treating 
complications. This pro-abortion economic discourse implicitly suggests that 
alternatives to unsafe abortion, such as contraception or safe abortion services, are 
more cost-effective. Although this argument strengthens the case for the 
elimination of unsafe abortion, it is evident that like the public health discourses, 
it fails to raise the issue of women‟s right to control their own reproductive 
capacities. Abortion as a women‟s right is discussed below.   
7.3.3. Human Rights Abortion Discourses in Kenya 
As has already been established, the most commonly used pro-abortion discourses 
in Kenya include public health, with explanations of the social, political and 
economic causes of unsafe abortion, and descriptions of consequent suffering and 
deaths. Pro-abortion discourses make note of the culpability of government 
policies and societal stigmatisation in causing unwanted pregnancies and unsafe 
abortions, and also the roles of poverty and gender discrimination. In this section, 
I focus on the pro-abortion rights discourse. It will become apparent that due to 
multiple factors, discourses framing abortion as a women‟s right are largely 
absent in Kenya. 
Around the world, feminist and women‟s movements have been at the forefront of 
campaigns for abortion liberalization. Most feminist movements define 
reproduction in terms of a woman‟s right to choose, and the liberalization of 
abortion is usually represented as an indispensable condition for achieving 
reproductive freedom and gender equality (Engeli, 2009; Fegan, 2002). However, 
as noted earlier in this chapter, an abortion rights discourse is generally absent in 
Kenya because pro-abortion actors, led by medical professionals, focus more on 
public health and economic discourses, which in turn have had the effect of 
silencing a rights discourse. Thus, although some women‟s and human rights 
organisations have actively participated in the abortion debate, they too make 
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reference to the health discourse in their public debates for abortion law 
liberalisation. In this context, I use the term public to refer to situations where a 
generalised audience may be the target, such as press addresses. Notably though, 
when the same actors participate in what I refer to as private contexts, such as 
organisational publications, conference presentations and even during interviews 
for this research, the majority of the actors make reference to women‟s right to 
control their reproductive capacities.  For example, when asked how FIDA-Kenya 
defines abortion, a lawyer within the organisation explained: 
In our Draft Reproductive Health and Rights Bill 2008, we are looking at 
abortion as a health issue because a lot of women are dying. Even for 
those women that do not die, many end up with lifelong disabilities so that 
they are unable to live normally afterwards. Again, women are affected 
economically because they spend their little money in paying for treatment 
after developing complications or in paying for the abortion itself.   
It might have been expected that FIDA-Kenya, being a lawyer‟s organisation, 
would articulate pro-abortion discourses in the language of democracy and human 
rights. However, this participant‟s observation of a Draft Bill that was to 
purportedly guide abortion law liberalization in Kenya makes no reference to 
women‟s rights to safe abortions. Surprisingly though, when the same participant 
talked about her own opinion on abortion, she was categorical that, “all women 
have a right to decide when to have children.” Contextually differentiated 
discourses are also identifiable in the case of women political leaders such as 
Martha Karua, a former Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. In 2004, 
while addressing a workshop on maternal deaths and unsafe abortion in Kenya,
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the minister observed that:  
[Various] factors will influence a woman‟s decision on whether to carry 
the pregnancy to full term or seek abortion. Given the complexity of this 
decision, the only person equipped to make this decision is the pregnant 
woman herself. Neither family, nor the clergy, her community or the 
government has the capacity to make the decision for the woman. History 
and statistics have shown that when women are determined to terminate an 
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unintended pregnancy, if necessary, they will risk their lives to do so 
irrespective of the law or religion. (Karua, 2004, p. 45) 
In this case, it appears the Member of Parliament fully recognizes a woman‟s right 
to an abortion when it is desired. However, when commenting on the issue of 
abortion during discussion of a draft Constitution in 2010, she said: 
The clause on abortion says that “abortion is not permitted” which clearly 
indicates that abortion is not legal. The misconception has been that the 
Draft Constitution legalizes abortion and this is simply not true. The only 
thing that is permitted is a medical procedure to save the life of a mother
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or in the event of an emergency as determined by a health professional.  
In the current Constitution abortion is not mentioned. It is however an 
offence under our Penal Code to procure an abortion and both woman and 
doctor are liable to prosecution. The Medical Practitioners Act ensures 
medical procedures that result in the loss of a pregnancy undertaken when 
the life or health of the mother are in danger are not liable for prosecution. 
Otherwise by law, doctors would even be unable to save women who by 
nature suffer miscarriage which medically is also known as an abortion. 
Overall, the law as it is today in our books has actually been elevated to 
the Constitution and given stronger provisions. It is important that we 
therefore understand in a comprehensive way what exactly is in the Draft 
Constitution and what it means before we outright reject a document that 
is actually good and paves the way for us as a country to move forward.
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It is clearly evident that in this case, the female parliamentarian does not articulate 
her earlier belief in a woman‟s right to an abortion. Rather, she dwells more on 
the health perspective and actually also makes reference to morality when 
responding to a question on whether she supported the Health Reproductive 
Rights Bill 2008
166
 which provided for abortion on specific circumstances. She 
explained: 
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 The former Cabinet Minister and presently Member of Parliament and Presidential candidate 
for 2013 general election posted these comments on her facebook page. Available at 
http://www.facebook.com/notes/martha-karua/more-thoughts-on-the-draft-
constitution/10150172848000364. 
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I can say with certainty that no Reproductive Health Bill has so far been 
tabled in Parliament and whether such a Bill if tabled would include 
legalizing abortion is speculative and should not be used to scare people 
away from the draft. We cannot legislate to stop people from making 
whatever proposals they wish in the future but society must remain 
vigilant to ensure that only those proposals that meet its moral standards 
are accepted.
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The MP‟s comment in this case exhibits two important factors. Firstly, she is 
incorrect in claiming that no bill had been tabled in Parliament because, although 
it was not discussed, a Bill was tabled in 2008. Secondly, the said draft Bill did 
actually provide for legal abortion in extended cases, including for economic 
factors. Seemingly, when she was addressing a workshop which was clearly pro-
abortion, this MP clearly indicated her support for abortion. However, when 
addressing the general public on the same issue, especially as a Presidential 
candidate, her stance focuses more on the more acceptable health discourse.  
In chapter 5, I noted another Kenyan female leader, Charity Ngilu, who has on 
various occasions expressed different opinions on abortion depending on occasion 
and audience. It is therefore plausible to argue that a pro-abortion rights discourse 
in Kenya exhibits two distinct characteristics. The rights discourse is prevalent 
when the target audience or readership is presumably pro-abortion, and absent in 
public debate. The need to front two distinct arguments targeting different 
audiences may be twofold. First, it may be donor driven, as most pro-abortion 
women‟s and human rights organisations, including FIDA Kenya, are funded by 
international foreign organisations. I contend that because international 
organisations working on abortion in Kenya (most of which happen to be 
American) tend to prioritize the rights discourse, the presence of this discourse in 
workshops, conference papers and other publications may be either because the 
organisations produce the documents themselves,
168
 or direct the content of the 
publications as funding agencies. Secondly, because the public debate on abortion 
takes place in a mainly patriarchal, neo-patrimonial environment (see Chapter 5) 
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in which women‟s rights are rarely recognised, pro-abortion actors are inclined to 
reframe their discourse in a way that recognises the prevailing socio-political 
constraints. In order to survive politically, the two women politicians referred to 
earlier must adopt positions that do not antagonise their constituents, most of 
whom are religious and publicly anti-abortion.  
It is important to note that male politicians in Kenya are also often faced with the 
need to articulate differentiated opinions. For example, during a mock tribunal 
organised by the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the 
Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance (RHRA) in 2007, Dr Enoch 
Kibunguchy, a Member of Parliament and Assistant Minister for Health, called 
for the legalisation of abortion, accusing religious leaders opposed to 
decriminalisation of dishonesty (Njeri, 2007; Onyango & Mugo, 2008). He is 
noted to have said, “It is true I have helped nuns and priests‟ mistresses procure 
abortions, and most of my fellow gynaecologists in town [Nairobi] would say the 
same if they were honest” (allAfrica.com, 2007). However, following a press 
conference in which the Executive Secretary of the Catholic Health Commission 
condemned the Member of Parliament‟s claims and dared him to “stand firm and 
repeat his statement to his constituents so that they may judge him and his actions 
at the next general elections”, the MP retracted his story, saying he had only 
helped one former nun to terminate an incomplete abortion while working in a 
government hospital (ibid.). It is obvious that for this Member of Parliament, as 
for the two female politicians referred to earlier, their personal principles are 
overruled by political realities. 
Although the need to win public support may help explain women‟s and human 
rights organisations‟ avoidance of expressing explicit pro-abortion rights 
discourse in public, the majority of pro-abortion research participants were 
themselves of the opinion that the organisations had actually not done much 
towards abortion law liberalization in general. The participants‟ claims were 
supported by my own observations that mainstream women‟s organisations avoid 
tackling the issue, choosing instead to focus on less controversial issues such as 
poverty, violence against women, female circumcision and HIV/AIDS.  For 
example, after making numerous attempts to have an interview with any senior 
official from the Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO), I was 
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eventually told none wished to be interviewed because they were uncomfortable 
with the area of my research.  Evidently, although unsafe abortion kills and 
maims thousands of women every year, the largest women‟s organisation in the 
country chooses to ignore it. Unsurprisingly, the organisation is not a member of 
the Reproductive Health and Rights Alliance, the central body working towards 
abortion law liberalization. I had a similar experience at another local and 
relatively large organisation, the National Council of Women of Kenya 
(NCWK),
169
 which is also not listed as a member of the Reproductive Health and 
Rights Alliance.
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The evident lack of commitment to the abortion issue by the larger women‟s 
organisations was blamed on their leaders‟ unwillingness, rather than their 
inability, to bring to the fore Kenyan women‟s reproductive rights. Instead, as 
shown in Chapter 5, the leaders were said to have been swayed by neo-
patrimonial and tribal politics, all of which have hindered the formation of a 
strong women‟s movement. Additionally, many leaders of women‟s organisations 
seem to have joined these organisations because of the publicity that the leaders 
may get, rather than because of their commitment to feminist ideals. This is 
evidenced by the fact that most female parliamentarians in Kenya, as well as those 
holding senior government positions, previously worked with non-governmental 
organisations, and particularly women-related ones, before joining politics 
(Mburia et al., 2011). It is possible that the leaders use the organisations as a 
means of testing their popularity as well as a good networking opportunity from 
where they are able to meet tribal leaders who hold sway in elections. Such 
leaders are therefore unlikely to pursue issues that could make them appear like 
radical feminists, which could jeopardise their being appointed to plum state jobs 
or election as Members of Parliament.  
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As the above discussion suggests, although a rights based discourse is explicit 
when the target audience and/or readership is presumed to be pro-abortion, it is 
largely absent when the audience is assumed to be anti-abortion or mixed. While 
this may be a reflection of donor preferences, it is also a result of the nature of 
politics in Kenya wherein political leaders avoid dealing with controversial issues 
for fear of losing potential votes. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 
government has in the past co-opted women‟s organisation which has had the 
effect of making them apolitical. Such organisations are unlikely to pursue 
women‟s abortion rights. Additionally, because most leaders of women‟s 
organisations often harbour political ambitions, they are often reluctant to pursue 
controversial issues that could make them less attractive to tribal and ethnic 
leaders who hold sway in political elections as well as to the general electorate. 
As such, the women leaders ignore the issue of unsafe abortion, while choosing to 
concentrate on the more acceptable health and economics discourse of abortion. 
However, as I will show in the next section, prioritising these discourses has 
implications that are not necessarily beneficial to women. 
7.4. Implications of Public Health and Economic Pro-abortion Discourses 
As noted above, the public health pro-abortion recommendation to legalize 
abortion is premised on the belief that all women should be able to obtain safe and 
affordable abortions if and when they desire them. To these actors, access to safe 
abortion services is a crucial part of ensuring high quality healthcare for women. 
They argue that despite its illegality, thousands of Kenyan women have abortions 
performed by unskilled persons in unsafe conditions, and many die or suffer 
health complications as a result. This not only negatively affects attempts to 
reduce maternal mortality and morbidity, but also results in funds being spent on a 
problem that could have been prevented. For the pro-abortion activists, making 
abortion legal is a prerequisite for making it safe. However, the privileging of 
public health discourse, which also places control abortion within the medical 
health fraternity, can be said to have had varied consequences, both positive and 
negative.  
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Identifying abortion as a public health issue allows for a transition away from the 
traditional focus on individual women‟s behaviour171 toward attention to the 
environments in which unwanted pregnancies happen. As such, in their support 
for policy changes towards abortion decriminalization, pro-abortion actors in 
Kenya point to the fact that it is not possible to understand abortion, or the factors 
that influence women‟s abortion decisions, without an awareness of the conditions 
of the women‟s lived realities. They thus acknowledge the need to address the 
material conditions, such as patriarchy, poverty, sexual abuse, and lack of sex 
education, that expose women to unwanted pregnancies. Arguing that poor and 
younger women are not only more likely to have unwanted pregnancies but also 
to turn to unsafe abortion providers, pro-abortion actors posit that dealing with 
unsafe abortion would, as recommended by radical and socialist feminists, need to 
go hand in hand with addressing the factors that lead to unwanted pregnancies. To 
this end, pro-abortion actors insist that women of all ages be granted more access 
to and knowledge about contraceptives and birth control.  
However, although framing abortion as a public health issue and the consequent 
resonance with mainstream ideals such as the attainment of Millennium 
Development Goals or Vision 2030 may have enabled pro-abortion actors to 
widen their support base by winning a significant proportion of popular support 
and elite allies, it also has the potential to deliver two contradictory consequences: 
depoliticization of the issue and the marginalization of the discourse of women‟s 
right to abortion. 
Depoliticization involves the suppression and replacement of the political element 
of social phenomena with a seemingly apolitical and technical perspective in 
policy and decision-making (Haines, 1979; Krippner, 2011; Lovenduski & 
Outshoorn, 1986). As a tactic, depoliticization works through the adoption of rule-
based systems that are theoretically insulated from political pressures or that 
significantly diminish the discretion of politicians (Buller & Flinders, 2005; 
Burnham, 2000; Flinders & Buller, 2006). In relation to abortion, depoliticization 
usually involves abortion being defined as a technical issue, for which medical 
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found in avoiding immoral sexual encounters. 
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experts ought to take responsibility (Lovenduski & Outshoorn, 1986). When 
abortion is seen in this way, to argue against abortion is to argue against a doctor‟s 
decision about what is best for a patient. In Kenya, the fact that mainstream pro-
abortion discourses mainly focus on the public health and to some extent the 
economic implications of unsafe abortion clearly points toward depoliticization. 
By concentrating on the tragic outcomes and costs of unsafe illegal abortions, 
these discourses explicitly suggest that the only way in which the social and 
economic consequences of unsafe abortion can be avoided is by allowing health 
professionals to provide safe abortions. Moreover, by emphasizing the benefits 
that would accrue if abortions were offered safely by skilled individuals, 
depoliticization provides pro-abortion actors with an opportunity to position 
themselves as life saving champions, while associating the efforts of anti-abortion 
groups with danger and death. By evoking images of butchered women left 
bleeding to death as a result of botched abortions, depoliticization not only 
discredits the anti-abortion construction of women seeking abortion as immoral, 
but also helps in concretising the medicalization of abortion.  
The influence of depoliticization is evident in Kenya‟s new 2010 Constitution, in 
which health professionals were accorded the right to determine the circumstances 
in which an abortion could be legally provided. When making submissions to the 
Committee of Experts which was writing the draft Constitution, medical health 
professionals argued that “the right to reproductive health should be entrenched in 
the Constitution. The only way we can reduce maternal fatalities in the country is 
by making abortion rare, safe and legal” (Mathenge, 2009b). Although this goes 
against feminist recommendations by giving doctors power over women‟s 
reproductive choices, presenting abortion as a medical condition helped galvanise 
support for the Constitution‟s adoption during the 2010 referendum. In fact, 
during debate on the draft Constitution in Parliament, members argued that 
backstreet abortions were costly to the nation and hence the proposal to give 
medical health professionals the right to decide on when to provide legal abortion 
was in order (Ndegwa, 2010). Consequently, it can be argued that medicalization 
of abortion may be a strategy borne of the realization that arguments grounded in 
the language of reproductive rights and privacy, which are common in the United 
States of America but absent from the Kenyan scene, could have generated 
negative feelings in the largely Christian and patriarchal community.  
245 
 
Furthermore, medicalization of abortion has an additional advantage. By 
presenting abortion as a public health issue, pro-abortion actors have been 
afforded an opportunity to characterise demands for safe abortion as demands for 
an essential health care service. This, coupled with the construction of victims of 
unsafe abortion as poor and generally marginalised women, also helps address the 
issue of access rather than just the legality of abortion. Silliman et al. (2004) 
explain how in the United States of America, failure to make abortion funding and 
access more prominent in the pro-choice campaign accentuated race and class 
divisions. Because the mainstream movement was primarily concerned with the 
legal right to abortion, abortion remains inaccessible for many women, but more 
so for poor and marginalised women in the USA. Furthermore, as shown by 
countries such as Zambia and Ghana, legalisation of abortion is a necessary but 
insufficient step toward improving women‟s reproductive health. In these 
countries, although abortion is legal, access to competent care remains restricted 
because of other barriers such as funding service provision and perceived poor 
quality of care (Castle et al., 1990). As such, the classification of abortion as a 
medical care service, alongside others, in Kenyan pro-abortion discourses, 
compels medical health providers, including those who might be anti-abortion, to 
provide the procedure for women in need.
172
 This is especially crucial because, as 
shown in Chapter 6, religious organisations not only provide almost a third of 
health care services in Kenya, but in some areas, they are the only providers. In 
such areas, religiously run health institutions‟ refusal to provide safe abortions 
would leave women susceptible to unsafe but legal abortions if they have to turn 
to unqualified providers. The realisation that law, while necessary, may not by 
itself guarantee access to safe abortion confirms a common criticism of liberal 
feminists who concentrate on laws but fail to problematise the overall structure of 
the society (see Chapter 2). 
At another level though, while depoliticization has allowed Kenyan pro-abortion 
activists to counter anti-abortion discourses that present foetuses as the only losers 
in abortion cases, the pro-abortion discourses nevertheless shift attention away 
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1998). Conscience clauses however normally do not apply in emergency situations, such as when 
the woman‟s life or permanent health is at risk.  
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from women with unwanted pregnancies to the consequences that their abortions 
could have on other sectors of society, rather than on themselves. By extolling the 
public health and economic costs of unsafe abortion, the discourses depoliticize 
the issue by obscuring political aspects of abortion such as patriarchy and power 
dynamics in a male-dominated society, and how these contribute to unwanted 
pregnancies. As already demonstrated in this chapter, economic forces and social 
structures, such as poverty, contraceptive unavailability and sexual violence, play 
an important role in influencing women‟s reproductive choices. Thus, while 
providing abortion for health reasons grants some women access to safe legal 
abortions, it does not extend the same to the majority of Kenyan women seeking 
abortion for economic and social reasons, to single mothers and young women in 
difficult circumstances, or to victims of contraceptive failure. These women are 
likely to continue seeking unsafe abortions from untrained individuals. Moreover, 
considering that many unsafe abortions in Kenya are procured by poor married 
women and younger women, depoliticizing abortion ignores political issues of 
spousal rape (which the Kenyan Parliament has failed to legislate against).  
Additionally, feminist researchers have contested the medicalization and the 
consequent depoliticization of abortion with arguments that women‟s struggle for 
better reproductive and sexual health is a political struggle for control over their 
bodies, and not merely a demand for the expansion of medical health services 
(Sheldon, 1997). These feminists have questioned the rationale behind placing 
control over termination within the medical domain by requiring the permission of 
a doctor and/or doctors. They have argued that this practice presents the doctor as 
best situated, based on medical expertise and presumably inherent wisdom, to 
assess women‟s needs and best interests (Sheldon, 1997). This in turn represents 
women as inadequate, unstable, or unwise decision-makers, as observed by a pro-
abortion research participant: 
The abortion law for example, is a barrier to women making their own 
decision on reproduction. Even if a woman is in danger of dying because 
of a pregnancy, it is the doctor to make the decision to terminate it.  That is 
what the law requires.  Even in a case where the woman makes the 
decision, the doctor can refuse. So the woman is totally out of the picture 
in the decision making process although she is the one carrying the 
pregnancy. Women are human beings. So why can‟t they be trusted to 
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make the right decision? That is an abnormality we have to correct. 
(NSA1) 
To feminist researchers as well as to this participant, the ascription of decision 
making authority to doctors not only reinforces stereotypes of women as people 
who lack reason, maturity, sanity, and the ability to assess their own interests, but 
also complicates and pathologizes a relatively simple procedure (Leslie, 2010).  
Moreover, placing abortion in the medical field fails to acknowledge the fact that 
most women, at least in Kenya, have abortions for socio-economic rather than 
medical reasons. As such, I argue that legalising abortion on health grounds, as 
the new Kenyan Constitution has done, leaves a majority of Kenyan women 
exposed to the dangers of illegal unsafe abortions.  
7.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed pro-abortion discourses in Kenya. I have shown 
that unlike women‟s movement-led abortion law reform campaigns in developed 
countries, the pro-abortion campaign in Kenya is spearheaded by medical health 
professionals and therefore tends to mainly concentrate on health complications 
resulting from unsafe abortion. To a lesser extent though, the pro-abortion actors 
also pay attention to the economic costs of unsafe abortion to the country as a 
whole as well as to individual women. I have shown that the institutionalization of 
anti-abortion discourses and the strategic ambivalence of Kenyan political leaders 
as a result of neo-patrimonial politics have influenced this framing of pro-abortion 
discourses. This framing has had the effect of sidelining a discourse asserting a 
woman‟s right to terminate a pregnancy. Although it is plausible to assume that 
the Kenyan pro-abortion actors could have considered public health arguments to 
be more forceful in a generally overtly religious and patriarchal society, other 
factors may also be at play. Firstly, a health and economic discourse resonates 
well with the political elite who tend to avoid controversial issues. Secondly, a 
health and economic discourse also resonates with the wider government 
developmental goals and more specifically the Millennium Development Goals 
and Kenya‟s Vision 2030. On the negative side, I have shown that the pro-
abortion actors‟ failure to construe abortion as choice, coupled with the fact that it 
is often left for doctors to determine when a woman can lawfully have an 
abortion, implicitly perpetuates the perception that abortion is an abnormal act for 
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which permission must be granted by a higher authority to those women who are 
unlucky or foolish enough to need it. But, research in Kenya has showed that 
Kenyan women do actually make conscious decisions to have abortions (Izugbara 
et al., 2009). 
It is also worth noting that in their attempt to challenge anti-abortion discourses 
that present abortion as harmful to women‟s health, pro-abortion actors have not 
utilised research already conducted in America and Europe that has proven the 
safety of abortion. In fact, the pro-abortion actors have not even dwelt on the fact 
that the abortion law is a colonial legacy and that prior to colonialism and the 
introduction of both Islam and Christianity into Kenya, abortion was an 
acceptable way of dealing with certain kinds of unwanted pregnancies. This, I 
suggest, would provide a powerful counter-claim to anti-abortion discourse that 
presents abortion as unAfrican. In fact, some African scholars have intimated that 
discourses that present abortion as dangerous for women are relatively new. Hunt 
(2007, p. 17), has, for example, noted that in Africa, abortion has always been “a 
banality in many African women‟s lives, easily obtained, often safely performed, 
and enabling them less to limit total numbers of births than to control their timing 
in relation to marriage, initiation, other births, schooling, vocational matters, and 
the opinions of others.” In her opinion, medicalization of abortion following 
European occupation is what exposes women and girls to greater risk from 
botched abortions. Researchers in Kenya (Lema & Njau, 1990) have shown that in 
traditional societies, there always were known providers of abortion services who 
relied on traditional methods such as herbs and massage.  
I have also shown that the absence of a women‟s rights approach to abortion is 
also related to the neo-patrimonial nature of Kenyan politics. In addition to 
politicians avoiding the issue because of the fallout that could result from either 
opposing or supporting abortion, neo-patrimonialism has weakened the women‟s 
movement and therefore the ability of women‟s organisations to comprehensively 
campaign for women‟s rights. Moreover, because leaders of women‟s 
organisations often have political aspirations, they also tend to avoid dealing with 
controversial issues. By demonstrating the significance of neo-patrimonial politics 
in the construction of pro-abortion discourses in Kenya, I have shown the 
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inadequacy of relying solely on Western-oriented feminist theories of the state, as 
shown by the Critical African Feminist Perspective (see figure 1).  
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Chapter Eight 
Concluding Remarks 
8.0. Introduction 
Kenya adopted a new Constitution in August 2010 that has made sweeping 
changes to the structure, institutions, and norms that frame the Kenyan state. 
Amongst the most significant constitutional changes of relevance to the sexual 
politics discussed in this study include reducing the power of the executive and 
strengthening the Parliamentary and judicial arms of government. As I have 
shown in this study, power concentration in the executive has been instrumental in 
enabling the ruling elite to influence public policy. The new Constitution also 
significantly expands the circumstances in which legal abortion can be offered 
and entrenches the principle of affirmative action. In sum, the new Constitution 
provides for equality of rights and freedoms, including equal political, economic, 
cultural and social opportunities, and outlaws discrimination on any grounds. 
At face value, it appears that a number of issues highlighted in this thesis are 
directly being addressed by the new Constitution. Are we, then, looking at the 
beginning of a new dawn in Kenya where women and medical practitioners will 
no longer criminalised for seeking or providing access to abortion? In this 
concluding chapter, I argue that although the new Constitution instils the principle 
of gender equality in governance structures in Kenya and allows for legal 
abortion, neo-patrimonialism remains deeply embedded in the fabric of Kenyan 
politics. 
I begin by reflecting on the major findings of the thesis and their significance, 
before turning to a discussion of the key relevant features of the new Constitution 
and their likelihood of transforming the regulation and discourses of sexual 
politics in Kenya. I end with some thoughts on future research directions. 
8.1. Major Findings of the Study 
The fundamental goal of this study was to undertake a feminist analysis of the 
Kenyan state to explore how the state, through its policy regime, shapes sexual 
252 
 
politics in general and the politics of abortion in particular. A review of existing 
mainstream western feminist theorisations of the state revealed that, although 
useful, they do not fully account for African states in general, and in particular, 
the Kenyan state‟s treatment of the issue of abortion. Specifically, these theories 
lack a gendered consciousness of African histories, and more so of the gendered 
effects of colonialism and the realities of the resultant neo-patrimonial nature of 
post-colonial states. Consequently, I developed the Critical African Feminist 
Perspective on the state, which draws on some relevant aspects of liberal, radical, 
socialist and post-structuralist feminist theorizations, but adds an analysis of the 
African state‟s neo-patrimonial structure. The perspective, which functioned as 
my analytical framework in this study, highlights the need to consider neo-
patrimonialism, coupled with related practices such as corruption, clientelism, the 
politics of exclusion and marginalization, and governmental manipulation, co-
optation and subversion, in the formulation of a theory that could be used in 
interpreting the Kenyan state‟s regulation of sexual politics. 
The Critical African Feminist Perspective, in addition to focusing on neo-
patrimonialism, also recognises the importance of legal reforms to ensure access 
to legal abortion as envisaged by liberal feminists. This study therefore supports 
legal reforms decriminalising abortion in Kenya, as well as mechanisms to 
increase women‟s capacity to engage effectively with the social, economic and 
political processes in the society. Additionally, the radical feminist concept of 
patriarchy as embodied in male domination of political leadership and all 
institutions, as well as the socialist feminist focus on capitalist patriarchy and on 
gender relations in both domestic and public life, informed the perspective. The 
role of discourse in shaping the public sphere of politics was highlighted through 
the use of post-structuralist feminist conceptualisations and how these discourses 
construct Kenyan women‟s bodies and abortion. Also from post-structuralism was 
drawn the idea of the non-unitary fragmented and the contradictory state as a 
means to explain the strategic ambivalence of the Kenyan state‟s response as well 
as the executive-judiciary dynamics in response to the influential public 
discourses.  
I contend that the Critical African Feminist Perspective has been useful in 
explaining why the issue of abortion remains largely unaddressed by the Kenyan 
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state. Using the perspective, I have been able to demonstrate that as a result of 
neo-patrimonial politics, the mainly male political elite have been unwilling to 
support legalization of abortion for fear of losing support from men in general and 
more specifically from traditional and religious groups. Neo-patrimonial politics, 
and its attendant norms such as patronage, clientelism and corruption, all of which 
continue to shape policies concerning women‟s sexuality and access to safe 
abortion, was introduced by the British in large part through a system of indirect 
rule (see Chapter 4). The transfer of authority to local male leaders, appointed by 
the colonial masters (Englebert, 1997; Njoku, 2005), had two major effects 
relevant to this study. Firstly, because these local leaders were foisted upon 
communities, the leaders felt no responsibility to the communities. This 
engendered a system in which access to government came to be seen as an 
opportunity for advancing self-interest rather than the interests of the community 
(see also Njoku, 2005). Secondly, indirect rule also facilitated colonization of the 
domestic realm, enabling local leaders to manipulate meaning and redefine 
relationships, particularly with regard to women‟s roles, women‟s sexuality, 
marriage, divorce, adultery, and childbirth (Amadiume, 1987; Geiger, 1996; Van 
Allen, 1976). Under the guidance of the colonial state, local leaders engineered 
the establishment and institutionalization of the gender discriminative customary 
laws, which legitimised not just the exclusion of African women from political 
life, but also their subordination in the private sphere. Thus began the process 
wherein gender reforms were (and continue to be) motivated by a desire to 
strengthen elite, patriarchal political power. In this thesis I looked at historical 
case of the female circumcision controversy as an exemplar of the manner in 
which these multiple, contradictory forces come to bear on sexual politics. This 
controversy demonstrated how women‟s and gender rights issues were used as 
bargaining chips in negotiations between contending male groups. It also 
illustrated how women‟s issues are often trumped by patriarchal, nationalist 
and/or capitalist concerns, which as claimed by liberal, radical, and socialist 
feminists, often leads to women‟s subordination in all spheres of life. 
Such systematic and institutional subordination of women continued even with the 
transition from a colonial state to a post-colonial one.  Inheriting a predatory 
bureaucratic authoritarian state from the British colonialists, post-colonial Kenyan 
leaders amended the Constitution of independent Kenya to install a dictatorial 
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order that centralised power in the executive, leading to the entrenchment of neo-
patrimonial politics (see Chapter 5). During this phase, the ruling elites used the 
state for personal enrichment and profit from a public administration that was 
patently unstable, inefficient, and distributed public resources through patron-
client relationships to important power bases that in turn provide political support 
and legitimacy (Crook, 2003; Dorman, 2006; Kebonang, 2005). The resultant 
systemic clientelism has had a profound effect on the design of public policy since 
policy reforms are conditioned by the need to acquire and/or appease clients, 
rather than serve the interests of the citizenry. Furthermore, the diversion of public 
resources to service particularistic patronage networks exacerbates corruption, 
leading to increased poverty for those outside of state patronage, particularly 
women. In such an environment, the Kenyan ruling elite have been unwilling to 
conclusively deal with the issue of unsafe abortion in order to forestall the 
political fallout that could result from either decriminalisation or enforcing the 
abortion law.  As such, although the political elite in Kenya may not necessarily 
be opposed to abortion legalization, the attempt to address the competing interests 
of different groups has made the Kenyan state adopt a tactic of strategic 
ambivalence on the issue, wherein the colonial law criminalising abortion has 
been sustained, but not enforced. 
Key among the politically influential anti-abortion actors are religious 
organisations, primarily mainstream Christian churches, whose moralised, foetal 
life-focused anti-abortion discourses have been successfully legitimised and 
institutionalised (see Chapter 6). As a result of historical processes such as 
colonialism, such religious groups have accumulated power, influence and social 
status that have increased their ability to significantly influence Kenyan politics. 
In the context of neo-patrimonial and clientelist politics, the ruling elite have 
taken into account the values and priorities of religious groups when formulating 
public policies, especially with regard to issues pertaining directly to women‟s 
status, including family values, abortion, and control of sexuality. The resultant 
mutual networks of reciprocity have hindered women‟s ability to access legal 
abortions, as the Kenyan state has consistently failed to decriminalise abortion for 
fear of sacrificing support from a large Christian constituency. 
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The influence of religious leaders, however, seems to have been shaken following 
the adoption of a new Constitution to which the clergy, and particularly Christian 
religious leaders, were opposed. Although it is possible to argue that the passing 
of the Constitution is reflective of the declining significance of religious leaders to 
politicians, I would argue instead that the political elite chose to temporarily 
ignore religious leaders‟ protests as they were under intense pressure to deliver a 
new Constitution following the 2008 post-election violence. Additionally, and 
more importantly, the mass violence and widespread destruction of property 
following the disputed elections presented a collective threat to both the political 
and economic interests of the elite, who understood that their political careers and 
wealth were better protected by constitutional reforms. My argument is 
strengthened by the fact that during campaigns in support of the draft 
Constitution, senior politicians publicly aired their opposition to abortion and 
promised religious leaders that they would amend the law later (Mutiga, 2010). 
Furthermore, as is presently evident, leaders campaigning for the March 2013 
general election constantly use church premises as political campaign platforms 
(Orengo & Kibet, 2012). Therefore, as is consistent with neo-patrimonial states 
where public policy reforms are guided by the needs of the ruling elite, Kenya‟s 
new Constitution can be seen as a form of political concession by the ruling elite 
in response to pressure from citizens and donors.
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Such concessions have been rare in Kenya, and pro-abortion actors have adopted a 
range of arguments, philosophical principles, narratives and other important 
rhetorical strategies to counter the institutionalised, foetal-focused and moralising 
anti-abortion discourses (see Chapter 7). In response to the strategic ambivalence 
espoused by Kenyan political leaders, Kenya‟s pro-abortion actors frame their 
messages in ways that appeal to the public at large. As such, rather than focusing 
on abortion as a woman‟s right, pro-abortion discourses in Kenya emphasize the 
health complications resulting from unsafe abortion, which resonates not just with 
the political elite who tend to avoid controversial issues, but also with the wider 
government‟s developmental goals.  
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 Although a majority of Kenyans are supportive of the Church and its moralistic position on 
abortion, they were disillusioned by the post-election violence and considered a new Constitution 
necessary for the future of the country. 
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In view of these findings, I examine the significance of this study in the following 
section. I focus on the contributions that this study makes both to feminist 
scholarship on the state in general, and to scholarship on the gender politics of the 
Kenyan state in particular. I also reflect on the Critical African Feminist 
Perspective, and specifically address the controversy surrounding the concept of 
neo-patrimonialism. 
8.2 Significance of the Research 
In Chapter 2, I argued that despite the contemporary dominance of Western 
feminist theorizations of the state, they fail to account for some of the complex 
realities of African states, and particularly the neo-patrimonial nature of post-
colonial states, and the effect this has on women. As such, a perspective that 
acknowledges the relevance of existing feminist theories but accommodates the 
specific ways in which the nature of post-colonial African states affect the lived 
realities of women in general, and their experiences of abortion in particular, 
largely enriches feminist understandings of the state. In other words, incorporating 
the concept of neo-patrimonialism into feminist analysis of the Third World 
African state greatly enhances the relevance and applicability of feminist theories 
by providing an added insight into how state power is exercised and experienced.  
At the regional level, this study tackles an issue of importance to African 
feminists‟ theorising on the state. It is notable that feminist studies on gender in 
Africa have tended to concentrate on how male domination and poverty cause the 
oppression and marginalization of women. However, these studies have given 
insufficient attention to how state ideologies, practices and structures contribute 
both to male dominance and women‟s marginalisation. Yet, as demonstrated in 
this research, understanding how neo-patrimonial governance works is central to 
understanding why states in Africa have consistently found it difficult to institute 
and enforce mechanisms for gender equality in both private and public spheres of 
life. For example, in the same way that the Kenyan state has failed to 
decriminalise abortion to appease contending interest groups, almost all states in 
Sub-Saharan Africa have consistently failed to legislate against marital rape, 
domestic violence, and female circumcision (Fallon, 2008; Kilonzo et al., 2009; 
Kimani, 2007).  Additionally, African states have also failed to pass laws ensuring 
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women‟s rights to inherit land, in order to appease men (Fallon, 2008; Harrington 
& Chopra, 2010). Although the patriarchal and masculinist structure of African 
states may be understood as being behind these states‟ actions, it should not be 
lost that the states, as noted by Connell (1994), do not do so just to discriminate 
against women. Rather, because patrons occupy bureaucratic positions in order to 
enhance their own personal wealth and to secure benefits for their clients, the 
interests of those outside of state patronage, particularly women, often get ignored 
(see Chapter 5). As such, the Critical African Feminist Perspective offers a new 
empirically grounded theoretical lens to understand contemporary African states 
and politics, as it explains why purely technical prescriptions for good governance 
and structural adjustment programmes, for example, have failed to address 
Africa‟s problems. 
The above discussion shows that the Critical African Feminist Perspective is a 
robust analytical tool that is useful in explaining not only why the issue of 
abortion remains largely unaddressed by the Kenyan state, but also has the 
potential to be applied to the analysis of other gender and policy issues. However, 
in making a case for the need to incorporate neo-patrimonialism into feminist 
analyses of the African state, I am aware of the controversy surrounding the use of 
the concept, as well as its limitations (deGrassi, 2008). Firstly, the analysis in this 
study presents neo-patrimonialism only in negative terms. However, some 
researchers have claimed that neo-patrimonialism is not always as damaging as 
has often been thought (Kelsall, 2011). Such researchers have argued that there is 
evidence of neo-patrimonial regimes presiding over rapid and poverty-reducing 
economic growth in countries such as Taiwan, China, Singapore, Korea, 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Amsden, 1989; Moore & Schmitz, 2008). However, as 
this study has shown, neo-patrimonial politics has clearly had a negative effect on 
Kenya‟s general population, and on women and issues concerning them, 
specifically. 
Secondly, scholars in developing countries have protested the wholesale 
pessimistic presentation of states in Africa as characterized by neo-
patrimonialism, wherein the state is seen merely as “an instrument for depraved 
elites” (Bauer & Taylor, 2005, p. 1). They argue that this view obscures important 
regional and sub-regional distinctions and confirms Western preconceptions and 
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misconceptions about the African continent (Mkandawire, 2001). Incidentally, 
many, though certainly not all, of the key proponents of the neo-patrimonial 
theory have been white men (deGrassi, 2008). Furthermore, the characterization 
of neo-patrimonialism as inherently African has been negated by scholars who 
have claimed that the personalized systems in Africa have been sustained by 
European and American donors, who have collaborated in enforcing policy 
conditionality, such as structural adjustment programmes, that have resulted in the 
concentration of decision-making power and financial control within the political 
elite (Berman, 1974; deGrassi, 2008; Hull, 1979; Sidaway, 2003; Szeftel, 2000). 
Although this discussion does not exhaustively deal with the controversy 
surrounding neo-patrimonialism as an analytical concept, I argue that it is 
important that the various ways in which neo-patrimonialism affects marginalised 
groups, such as women and youth be investigated.  As shown in this study, used 
alongside other feminist theories of the state, neo-patrimonialism helps explain 
why the Kenyan state has failed to conclusively address the issue of unsafe 
abortion.  
This study, ultimately, points out that the sexual politics of the contemporary 
Kenyan state is influenced by the following facets: 
 History: Colonialism has influenced sexual politics both directly through 
its Christian morality that is seen in contemporary anti-abortion 
discourses, and indirectly through the peculiar governance structures that 
emerged in the wake of indirect rule. 
 Institutionalised power relations: The state‟s sexual politics are skewed by 
other institutions, such as the church, that have sway over political 
decision-making and dominant social values. 
 Male-dominated state structures: Male domination refers not only to the 
predominantly male representation within the executive and the judiciary, 
but also to male ethos at all levels of the state‟s institutions. The 
masculinity of the state is also manifest in the persona of the head of the 
state that symbolises the interests of patriarchy. All of this has implications 
for sexual and gender politics. 
 Economic contexts: Finally, this research has shown that economic 
contexts also play a role in the sexual politics of the state. These include 
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colonial economic agendas, the economics of clientelism, as well as the 
wider development context which favours certain areas (eg, HIV/AIDS) as 
relevant to socio-economic wellbeing compared to others (such as unsafe 
abortion and its impact). 
Fundamentally, this thesis has shown the linkages between values (discourse) and 
structures. This is a dynamic link, not one based on a cause-effect relationship. 
While values and structures feed off each other, they are also independently 
influenced by a host of factors.  
Before proposing possible areas for future research, I wish to briefly discuss the 
significance of the new Constitution, which was adopted halfway through my 
research. This is mainly because the Constitution addresses some of the key issues 
identified in the findings of this study. I concentrate on how, and the extent to 
which, the issues of neo-patrimonialism, gender equality, and abortion have been 
addressed by the recent constitutional reforms. 
8.3. Key Features of the New Constitution 
8.3.1. Neo-patrimonial Politics and Kenya’s New Constitution 
Neo-patrimonialism, as shown in this study, relates to the centralization of power 
within the executive arm of government, and the resultant use of this power to 
acquire and reward supporters (Boas, 2001). As noted in Chapter 5, a series of 
Constitutional amendments to the 1963 Independence Constitution saw the 
Presidency ascend in power relative to Parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, the 
civil service, and the local government among others (Omollo, 2002).
174
 The fact 
that all senior civil servants served at the pleasure of the President meant that, to 
hold onto their jobs, government officials made decisions and/or policies that 
favoured their appointing authority. This obviously reduced Parliament, the 
judiciary and the civil service to near, if not complete, rubber stamps (Amutabi, 
                                                          
174 Some scholars have however argued that the concentration of power in the executive was 
predicated on the colonial legacy as it wholly inherited the laws, culture, and practices of the 
colonial state (Murunga & Nasong‟o, 2006; Mutua, 2001).  
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2010), thereby diminishing their desire and ability to act in the interest of the 
public good.  
It is therefore not surprising that a primary goal of the new Constitution was to 
drastically reduce the powers of the executive and to strengthen the Parliamentary 
and judicial arms of government. To this end, Articles 95, 152, 166, 228 and 229 
of the new Constitution require that all major Presidential appointments – 
including members of the Cabinet, the judiciary, senior bureaucrats, and 
ambassadors – are approved by Parliament or are subjected to recommendations 
from various independent commissions. Furthermore, in addition to abolishing the 
practice of appointing Cabinet ministers from among Members of Parliament,
175
 
the new Constitution limits the number of ministers, now renamed as Cabinet 
Secretaries, to between fourteen and twenty-two (Article 152(1) (d)).
176
 The 
abolition of the position of Assistant Ministers further diminishes executive 
control over the National Assembly by reducing the number of parliamentarians 
serving in government. Additionally, a Kenyan President is deprived of the power 
to decide when elections should be held, and/ or when to dissolve Parliament. A 
President can therefore neither threaten nor coerce Members of Parliament using 
this power. 
Assessing the above noted provisions in the new Constitution, it is plausible to 
conclude that the Kenyan legislature would henceforth function independently of 
the executive. In fact, in the period following the promulgation of the new 
Constitution in August 2010, the Kenyan Parliament has demonstrated a 
willingness and ability to put into practice its newly acquired independence to 
limit the excesses of the executive. For example, on 31 July 2012, Members of 
Parliament rejected President Mwai Kibaki‟s nominees to the National Police 
Service Commission (Shiundu, 2012). However, I contend that although a 
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 Section 152(3) of the new Constitution clearly states that a Cabinet Secretary shall not be a 
Member of Parliament. In case a Member of Parliament is appointed to the position of cabinet 
secretary, he/she is required to resign and a by-election be held at the individual‟s constituency.  
176
 Previously, the President has had the power to decide on whom, among elected or nominated 
Members of Parliament, to appoint to the Cabinet. In the current government, for example, almost 
half the Members of Parliament are part of the executive, either as ministers or assistant ministers. 
This obviously compromises Parliament‟s oversight role over the executive.  
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strengthened Parliament may in principle be effective at shaping legislation, 
representing citizens‟ views, and monitoring and challenging the executive, the 
Kenyan Parliament‟s ability to do so is constrained by two factors. First, Kenyan 
Parliamentarians have a history of being self-serving, and it is hard to see how 
changes to institutional rules alone can automatically instil in them a commitment 
to some higher notion of public good. Secondly, even if they appear to enjoy 
robust powers in the Constitution, the political realities of neo-patrimonialism are 
likely to continue to constrain their ability to exercise their duties.  
I would argue that although the new Constitution has addressed the issue of power 
concentration in the executive, it has not conclusively dealt with other aspects of 
neo-patrimonialism, such as the use of public resources for personal gain 
(corruption) and systematic clientelism. For example, in the post-new Constitution 
era, Members of Parliament and Parliamentary Committees have been accused of 
deal-cutting prior to questions, motions and committee investigations, as well as 
receiving bribes to absolve individuals involved in corruption (Gekara, 2012; 
Shiundu, 2012).
177
 For instance, the chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, 
whose report on a controversial money-printing contract was rejected by 
Parliament, accused Members of Parliament of having received bribes (Shiundu, 
2012).  It is notable that the report recommended the sacking of Cabinet Minister 
Amos Kimunya and Central Bank governor Njuguna Ndung‟u, both of whom are 
close allies of President Kibaki and the ruling elite. Thus, despite having caused 
the loss of US$21 million in public funds, the two senior government officers 
escaped censure (Shiundu, 2012).  
Furthermore, in the process of implementing the provisions of the new 
Constitution, Members of Parliament have passed laws aimed at serving their 
personal interests, some of which are in direct contravention of the new 
Constitution. For example, during the passing of the Leadership and Integrity Bill, 
MPs tore out sections intended to ensure those elected to public office are people 
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 In 2010, two groups of MPs were alleged to have forged a deal between them to support a 
Cabinet Minister accused of corruption during the purchase of the Kenyan Embassy building in 
Tokyo, in return of support for another minister involved in a controversial appointment of the 
Managing Director of a public organization (Mutai, 2010). Both Cabinet Ministers were 
subsequently found innocent by relevant Parliamentary Committees (Ndonga, 2011). 
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of high morals (Opiyo, 2012). They voted against requirements on wealth 
declaration, vetting by state agencies, and publication of their pending criminal 
court cases (ibid.). Not surprisingly, many MPs have been involved in 
controversies involving corruption or crimes against humanity (Leftie, 2012). 
Thus in passing a heavily edited Bill, the parliamentarians were engaging in a 
self-serving mission, whereby the adopted Bill totally undermined the provisions 
of Chapter 6 of the new Constitution. I would argue that in watering down the 
draft Bill presented by the Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution, Members of Parliament were intent on extricating prominent 
politicians Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto from being barred from contesting 
the Presidency in the March 2013 general election while facing charges for crimes 
against humanity at the International Criminal Court.
178
 These MPs may have 
been motivated by their need to receive patronage from the Presidential hopefuls, 
who not only control massive wealth, but are also their tribes‟ preferred 
candidates (Opiyo, 2012). As such, MPs intent on easily winning Parliamentary 
seats would prefer to receive the endorsement of the Presidential candidates, since 
this accords them the necessary political clout, while at the same time providing 
the money needed to mount campaigns (Arriola, 2009). It is likely that when, and 
if, such individuals become parliamentarians, they will serve the interests of the 
President who effectively engineered their election, rather than those of Kenyan 
society. 
Unlike Parliament, however, Kenya‟s revamped judiciary has exhibited the ability 
to act independently of the executive and to dispense justice as stipulated in the 
Constitution. As already noted, before the enactment of the new Constitution, the 
Kenyan judiciary lacked independence and was generally subservient to the 
executive. To correct this, the new Constitution accords the judiciary both 
financial (Article 160) and operational independence. Under articles 166-168, the 
Constitution significantly reduces the powers of the President over the judiciary 
by establishing an independent system for the appointment and dismissal of 
                                                          
178
 The two are among four suspects whose charges were confirmed in January 2012 by pre-trial 
Judges at the International Criminal Court over deadly violence following the disputed 2007-2008 
Presidential polls (Onyango, 2012).  
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judicial officers. Although the President retains the power to appoint the Chief 
Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and other judges, the appointments are required to 
be in accordance with the recommendations of the Judicial Service 
Commission.
179
 Additionally, the Chief Justice and her/his deputy are to be vetted 
by Parliament. It is noteworthy that some of these provisions have already been 
effected in the appointment of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, and 
judges of the Supreme Court and the judges of the Court of Appeal.   
I contend that in comparison to Parliament, an independent judiciary is likely to 
be of greater benefit to Kenyan women in general and the abortion debate in 
particular, as evidenced by recent judgements. For example, when President 
Kibaki on January 28, 2012 nominated four men into the positions of Chief 
Justice, Attorney General, Director of Public Prosecutions and Controller of 
Budget, the High Court ruled that the President had breached the Constitution by 
failing to appoint women (Kadida, 2012). While ruling on the case, filed by 
women‟s organisations, Justice Daniel Musinga said that “I am satisfied that the 
nominations were in breach of Article 27(3) of the Constitution that guarantees 
fundamental rights and freedom of women and men to equal treatment, including 
the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres” 
(Kadida, 2012, p. 1). Soon after the ruling, President Kibaki withdrew his 
controversial nominations to the four constitutional offices (Kariuki, 2011). Such 
positive implementation of Constitutional provisions holds the promise of a 
judiciary that will ensure the implementation of women-friendly laws.
180
 
It is therefore possible that the Kenyan judiciary, when called upon, will be 
instrumental in determining and providing guidelines on how the new abortion 
law, as stipulated in Article 26 (4), should be applied. For example, it will be 
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 An independent Judicial Commission has been created by removing the President‟s role in the 
selection of its members.  According to articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution, of the twelve or so 
members of the Judicial Service Commission, only two members representing the public will be 
appointed by the President. Even then, the two members require the approval of the National 
Assembly.  
180
 Civil society groups also successfully contested the President‟s appointment of 47 county 
commissioners, 10 females and 37 males. The organizations argued that the President‟s action was 
in violation of the Constitution since it did not meet the requirements of Article 27 which provides 
that no single gender should occupy more than two thirds of State appointments (Ogemba, 2012). 
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necessary to specify what is meant by abortion being allowed in emergency cases, 
who qualifies to be included in the identified category of “trained health 
professional,” and generally, to determine the circumstances in which, and 
conditions under which, the pregnancy of a woman may be terminated. 
Furthermore, because Article 2 (6) of the new Constitution also stipulates that any 
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law,
181
 Kenyan courts 
will be instrumental in the implementation of international law at the domestic 
level. The judiciary will be required to determine and interpret the provisions and 
implications of various international treaties and conventions, especially in 
instances where domestic provisions are pitted against international provisions. 
This is more so because the new Constitution, under Article 20 (3), compels 
courts to adopt an interpretation (of the law) that most favours the enforcement of 
a fundamental right or freedom. For example, although Kenya ratified the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the 
Maputo Protocol) on October 8, 2010, it entered a reservation on Article 14(2) (c), 
which obliges African states to take measures to ensure availability of abortion in 
situations of rape, incest and where the physical and mental health of the mother 
is at risk. Kenyan courts would thus be expected to adopt the provisions of the 
Maputo Protocol, since they most favour Kenyan women‟s right to legal and safe 
abortion. 
Additionally, the Bill of Rights in the new Constitution gives all persons the right 
to institute petitions in the High Court, and to have their rights recognized and 
enforced, either in their own individual capacity or on behalf of others. As such, 
any woman in Kenya is in a position to petition the High Court if she is denied 
legal abortion. This provision is enhanced by the fact that courts are mandated to 
listen to and to determine such petitions without due regard to technicalities of 
procedure and without any filing fees being charged.  At face value, it seems that 
the new Constitution has addressed the issue of illegal abortion in Kenya.  
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 As noted by pro-abortion actors who participated in this research, women‟s rights advocates 
have consistently struggled with domestication of progressive treaties or convention that the 
Kenya government has ratified. 
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8.3.2. Gender Equality in the New Constitution 
In the course of this thesis, I have noted that one of the most glaring ways in 
which patriarchy exhibits itself in Kenya is in women‟s marginalisation socially, 
politically, and economically. I have argued that this marginalisation is embodied 
in laws and policies that favour men at the expense of women. To ensure gender 
equality, the new Constitution fundamentally alters gender relations in all spheres 
of life. Of great importance to Kenyan women is Article 2(4), which stipulates 
that any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of the Constitution is 
invalid. Among the laws to be considered invalid if they contravene the 
Constitution are customary laws, which, as I have demonstrated, are responsible 
for gender discrimination in regard to matters such as marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and succession in Kenya.
182
The implementation of this provision would 
thereby eliminate the cultural and religious justifications for discrimination 
against women, including arguments such as “abortion is unAfrican”.183 
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for equality in land ownership (Article 60 
(1) (f)); marriage (Article 45 (3)); matrimonial property (Article 68 (c) (iii)); 
citizenship (Article 14 (1)); and employment (Article 232 (i)). 
Additionally, and most importantly in relation to the issue of abortion, Article 
53(1) (e) of the new Kenyan Constitution assures that parental responsibility shall 
be shared between parents regardless of marital status. As noted in this study, 
Kenyan women and girls have had to care for children born outside the institution 
of marriage without any support or contribution from the men involved. This has 
exposed women to unsafe abortions in cases where women feel economically 
incapable of caring for an unplanned child (see Chapter 7). The provisions of the 
new Constitution, when taken together, are likely to provide for equality of rights 
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 A well-documented case is that of a widow, Wambui Otieno, who lost the battle to bury her late 
husband to his clan (Stamp, 1991). 
183
 Chapter 2, Article 8 of the Constitution clearly states that there is no state religion and Article 
32(4) says that a person should not be compelled to act, or engage in any act, that is contrary to the 
person‟s belief or religion.  
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and freedoms including equal political, economic, cultural and social 
opportunities, as they outlaw discrimination on any grounds. 
At the political level, the new Constitution of Kenya makes major strides in 
institutionalising affirmative action by adopting gender quotas. To promote the 
involvement of women in national decision-making processes, Article 81(b) of the 
new Constitution provides that “the electoral system shall comply with the 
following principle: not more than two thirds of the members of elective public 
bodies shall be of the same gender.” To ensure compliance, Article 27(8) further 
demands that the state take legislative and other measures to implement the 
principle of Article 81(b). These provisions are particularly important because, as 
I have argued, women‟s exclusion from policy-making state institutions has led 
not just to the adoption of policies that favour men at the expense of women, but 
also to the marginalisation of issues affecting women, including abortion.  
The Constitution reserves 47 seats in the National Assembly for women, as 
Article 97(b) requires one woman to be elected from each county by the voters of 
the 47 counties. This is in addition to and does not bar women from vying for 
positions in the 290 constituencies and for the 12 political party nominations.  In 
the Senate, stipulated to have about 67 members, Article 98 provides that 16 
women members be nominated from political party lists. These members will be 
additional to any women elected directly from counties. Two more women will be 
nominated to represent youth and persons with disability. Obviously, the 
Constitution takes very clear measures to ensure women‟s inclusion in the area of 
leadership and decision making. In fact, the constitutional provisions for same 
gender representation are so clear that it is virtually impossible to miscomprehend 
them in any way. 
It is, however, important to note that as provided in the Constitution, the 47 seats 
out of a total of 349 reserved for women make up only 13.5 per cent of 
membership in the National Assembly, much less than the required 30 per cent. 
At the Senate, where women are guaranteed at least 18 seats out of a total of 67, 
their number translates to 26.8 per cent, again less than 30 per cent. That being the 
case, it would seem that to avoid a constitutional crisis if an election failed to 
deliver the required number of women, additional women representatives would 
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need to be nominated. Therefore, as required by Article 27(8), which demands 
that the state take legislative and other measures to implement the gender 
representation principle, the Kenyan state, and specifically Parliament, is 
obligated to develop a legislative formula for an electoral system that meets the 
representation criterion. The ongoing debate on how to effect the gender provision 
reveals the extent to which patriarchy is embedded in Kenya and also the threats 
to women‟s rights, even when they are legislated. 
The Kenyan cabinet in August 2011 decided that it was technically impossible to 
achieve one-third female representation in government, and therefore proposed a 
Constitutional amendment to remove the offending clause (Namunane, 2011; 
Sigei, 2011). However, following condemnation from the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution (CIC) and women‟s rights organizations, who 
threatened to seek court redress,
184
 the government published the Constitution of 
Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2011, which offered a formula to be adopted if 
elections fail to yield the requisite number of women (Ogoya, 2012; Sigei, 2011). 
The Bill proposed that if not enough women are elected and nominated, the 
number of legislators would be increased from 349 to 449 in the National 
Assembly, and from 67 to 90 in the Senate (Amdany, 2012).
185
 Unfortunately, the 
Bill has been pending in Parliament since November 2011, as members have 
failed to agree on appropriate mechanisms of implementation (Mutua et al., 2012; 
Rugene, 2012). In fact, some male Members of Parliament have been pushing for 
the removal of the two-thirds gender rule from the Constitution (ibid.). 
Although this study considers women‟s legislative representation crucial to 
addressing women‟s needs, the issue of gender quotas has received a mixed 
reception from feminist scholars. Those in support view gender quotas as an 
important policy measure for boosting women‟s access to decision-making bodies 
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 The results of an opinion poll pertaining to the two-thirds principle also showed that 78 per cent 
of the Kenyan population were aware of the Constitutional provision on the two-thirds principle 
and that 74 per cent were in favour of this provision (Leftie & Menya, 2011).  
185
 Political parties would be required to draw up standby lists of men and women which would be 
used to fill gender gaps if election results do not result in the right gender balance. The list would 
be deposited with the electoral commission before election day. 
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(Krook, 2009). They argue that quotas are not only likely to improve the level of 
female representation, but also lead to a more women-friendly agenda (Dahlerup, 
2006; Murray, 2010). To supporters, the appointment of women brings special 
and unique qualities to the political process, which benefits society by creating 
more balanced and integrated decision-making bodies. Supporters of quotas note 
that, although quotas may not eliminate the barriers that undermine women‟s 
participation in politics, they help women to overcome them and thus ensure fairer 
representation (Dahlerup, 2006; Lovenduski, 2005). 
Those opposed to quotas consider them a form of discrimination, and a violation 
of the principles of fairness, competence and equality of opportunities, while 
others believe that the practice leads to tokenism and can become yet another 
mechanism in the service of patronage politics (Tripp, 2006). They argue that 
quotas undermine the legitimacy of women politicians, and are thought to produce 
second-class politicians (Bacchi, 2006; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Kolinsky, 
1993; Krook, 2008; Zetterberg, 2008).
186
 Dahlerup (2006) adds that the focus on 
the descriptive representation of women fails to evaluate their impact on politics 
and political process: 
The use of electoral quotas challenges our ideas and theories about the 
relationship between women‟s political representation and their socio-
economic positions, since quotas may lead to unprecedented historical 
leaps in women‟s representation without simultaneous changes in 
women‟s socio-economic position. (Dahlerup, 2006, p. 4) 
Although I agree with some of the arguments against gender quotas, and 
specifically the observation that adding women to existing social and political 
structures may do little to eradicate the discrimination and inequities from which 
they perennially suffer, I support the affirmative action principle as stipulated in 
Kenya‟s Constitution. Such provisions mark the potential for institutional 
transformation, even if their realisation may require additional systemic and 
structural changes. 
                                                          
186 The arguments raised here certainly do not provide an exhaustive account of criticisms of 
quotas. 
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However, the fact that the nomination and/or appointment of women 
representatives will take place within the prevailing neo-patrimonial political 
culture is worrying. Studies in some African countries have shown that although 
the quota system in countries such as Rwanda and Uganda has significantly 
enhanced women‟s presence in representative politics, the ability of the 
nominated women to influence public policy has been curtailed by patronage 
(Goetz, 2003). Because women appointed through quotas tend to owe their 
allegiance to the party leaders who nominated them, they have been unable to 
champion women‟s interests, especially if the issues are not supported by the 
generally male party leadership (Hassim, 2009). In fact, in Uganda, women 
representatives have been forced by the ruling elite to support bills that are 
discriminatory towards women (Goetz, 2003). It is therefore possible that the 
performance of female representatives in the Kenyan legislature will be 
constrained by the same partisan loyalties as male MPs, as discussed earlier. 
Clearly, although the new Constitution has provided for women‟s representation, 
it has not, and perhaps cannot, provide mechanisms that ensure gender equity as a 
substantive outcome.  
8.3.3. The New Constitution and the Abortion Question 
Kenya‟s new Constitution, although recognising the right to life from conception, 
provides a stronger protection for the lives and health of women. Whereas the 
previous law only allowed legal abortion to protect a pregnant woman‟s life, 
Section 26 of the new Constitution explicitly permits abortion and clearly 
specifies the situations in which it is permitted. These include: (i) when there is 
need for emergency treatment, and (ii) where the life or health of the mother is in 
danger. Abortions can be offered following the advice of a trained health 
professional. Section 26 further provides a possibility of expanding the 
circumstances under which legal abortions can be offered by allowing the 
enactment of a law for that purpose.
187
 Access to legal abortion is further 
enhanced by Article 43(1) (a), which provides that every person has the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health care services, including reproductive 
                                                          
187
 The judiciary or Parliament could enact law expanding the conditions under which legal 
abortion could be offered.  
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health care. This provision becomes stronger when read within the context of 
Article 43(2), which prohibits denial of emergency medical treatment.  
As they stand, the above noted Constitutional provisions can secure women access 
to legal abortions in Kenya. If the meaning of “health” in the clause allowing 
abortion if a pregnancy threatens a woman‟s health is interpreted as widely as it is 
in America,
188
 Kenyan women are likely to access legal abortions for extended 
reasons. Additionally, if the “trained health professionals” mandated to perform 
abortions is interpreted as including doctors, clinical officers, nurses, and 
midwives, safe abortions will be available to women in rural areas where doctors 
might not be available. Moreover, the clause “or if permitted by any other written 
law” makes clear that the grounds listed in Section 26 of the Constitution are the 
minimum conditions under which abortion should be legal. In addition to leaving 
open the possibility for Parliament or the judiciary to pass law to create additional 
conditions for legal abortion,
189
 the clause does not allow for any written law 
which could limit access to abortion.  
It is important to consider that although the above provisions appear sufficient, 
actualising them will require the state to undertake significant measures to enable 
access to safe abortion. These, as noted in this study, include providing adequate 
human and financial resources to reproductive health services, evaluating and 
attending to the training needs of the different medical personnel, providing 
education on reproductive health, and facilitating access to contraceptives. 
Additionally, the state needs to revise the Kenyan Penal Code to reflect the 
language of the new abortion law, as the threat of legal consequences may make 
health professionals reluctant to perform abortions. 
There is also need for a complete overhaul of health provisioning in the country. 
For instance, as long as women are required to pay for abortion services, unsafe 
abortions will continue to be a major problem because unsafe abortion 
                                                          
188
  During the 1973 rulings in Doe v. Bolton, the Court defined health to include not just physical 
health, but also psychological, mental and emotional health. The Court cited age, familial 
circumstances and anything relevant to the woman‟s general feeling of well-being as reasons that 
would justify abortion. 
189
 For example if a pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, as it is in Ethiopia (Gebreselassie et 
al., 2010). 
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disproportionately affects poor women (see Chapter 7). This problem is evidenced 
by the fact that unsafe abortion remains a concern in countries such as Ghana and 
Zambia, where abortion law has been liberalised (Koster-Oyekan, 1998). In both 
countries, lack of adequate services and continued procedural barriers limit 
women‟s access to safe abortions (Lithur, 2004). This does not, however, 
downplay the importance of the translation of law to policy as a necessary step 
towards reducing the rate of unsafe abortions in a country. Rather, it points to the 
need for political will and commitment to ensuring the availability of services.  
A bigger problem regarding the availability of abortion services in Kenya is 
related to the fact that religious organisations control almost a third of health 
institutions in Kenya (see Chapter 6). During debate and campaigning for the 
adoption of the new Constitution, religious leaders in the country united in their 
bid to reject the new laws with claims that it allowed abortion on demand. To 
date, most church-controlled health centres do not provide contraceptives or 
abortion, even for needy cases. As such, it is unlikely that abortion services will 
be available to women in such hospitals. Considering that church-controlled 
hospitals are sometimes the only available healthcare providers in remote areas, 
women are likely to continue relying on unqualified people for abortion services – 
unless, of course, the Kenyan government provides these services.  
Thus far, the constitutional reforms in Kenya are clearly signalling the emergence 
of new structures and values. Whether the proposed radical changes with regard to 
women‟s equality before the law will influence the nature of discourses in the 
public space around women remains to be seen. Although there is room for 
optimism, the fact that neo-patrimonialism remains unchallenged makes the 
prospect for a feminist agenda for women‟s empowerment fragile. 
8.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
Kenya‟s new Constitution moderately eases abortion restrictions. An obvious area 
of future research would thus be an evaluation of the impact of the new abortion 
laws on the incidence of unsafe abortion. This is important because, as noted 
earlier, unsafe abortion remains a problem in some African countries, even where 
it has been legalised. Future research could therefore analyse the factors that have 
hindered availability of safe abortions in these countries, and perhaps provide a 
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comparative study with countries such as South Africa and Ethiopia, where 
legalised abortion has drastically reduced instances of unsafe abortion (Benson et 
al., 2011). 
Another possible area of future research would be to examine and evaluate the 
significance of increased gender representation in governance. Research might 
focus on whether increased women‟s representation has provided women across 
different social and economic strata with rights and resources that they could not 
access before, as well as on the impact of numerical increment on legislative 
priorities. Furthermore, future research can also examine the various ways in 
which women‟s presence in government affects, and is affected by, neo-
patrimonial politics. 
Lastly, researchers in the future can test the robustness and generalisability of the 
Critical African Feminist Perspective by applying it to an analysis of other issues 
such as HIV/AIDS, female circumcision and violence against women in Africa 
and elsewhere in the Third World. The perspective also has the potential to be 
applied to analysis of issues such as women‟s access to productive resources 
including land. Such studies would help consolidate feminist theorising on the 
post-colonial African state, as well as provide insights into the heuristic potential 
of this analytical framework.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix A: Interview Guidelines for the State Actors 
1. How would you describe women‟s position in this country, especially in 
relation to the state? 
2. Is the government a signatory to any international agreements on 
women‟s/human rights? If yes, which ones? 
3. What has the government done in order to comply with the international 
agreements‟ requirements? 
4. How is abortion defined by the government?  
a. Is it a moral issue? [Why or why not?] 
b. Is it a health issue? [Why or why not?] 
c. Is it a human rights issue? [Why or why not?] 
d. Is it an economic issue? [Why or why not?] 
5. In the past, civil servants, including a Vice-president and a cabinet 
minister have given contradictory statements regarding the government‟s 
position towards reforming abortion laws in the country. Why do you 
think this is the case? What is the government‟s official position and for 
what reasons? 
6. The latest government survey indicated that about 320,000 illegal 
abortions are performed annually in the country, leading to about 10,000 
deaths every year in addition to complication that contribute 60 percent of 
all gynaecological admission at public hospitals.  How does the government deal 
with this? What are the future plans? 
7. Does the government have information on the categories of women most 
affected by illegal abortions? What mechanisms have been put in place to 
cater for them? 
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Appendix B: Interview Guidelines for the non-State Actors (pro-law 
liberalisation) 
1. How would you describe women‟s position in this country? 
2. Is the government a signatory to any international agreements on 
women‟s/human rights? If yes, which ones? 
3. What has the government done in an order to comply with the 
international agreement‟s requirements? What more ought to be done? 
4. How is abortion defined by the government? As a moral issue, health 
issue, right issue or economic issue? 
5. How does your organisation define it? 
6. Why should abortion be legalised? 
7. What is your view of the state‟s position on abortion?  
8. What has your organisation done towards legalisation? 
9. How successful have those efforts been? If unsuccessful, why?   
10. How should an effective public policy deal with abortion? 
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Appendix C: Interview Guidelines for the non-State Actors (anti-law 
liberalisation) 
1. How would you describe women‟s position in this country? 
2. What in your opinion is the status of reproductive health in the country? 
3. The church maintains that abortion is immoral. What are your comments 
on the arguments that unsafe abortion 
a. Is a moral issue? [Why or why not?] 
b. Is a health issue? [Why or why not?] 
c. Is a human rights issue? [Why or why not?] 
d. Is an economic issue? [Why or why not?] 
e. Is a class issue affecting only poor women? [Why or why not?] 
4. What is your comment on the deaths and complications resulting from 
illegal abortions? 
5. Why shouldn‟t women have access to safe, legal abortion? 
6. What efforts does your organisation take to ensure abortion remains illegal 
in Kenya?  
7. How successful have you been so far?  
8. What is your message to those campaigning for law liberalisation to allow 
for abortion? 
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Appendix D: Information Sheet 
Name of Researcher: Jane Wambui Njagi 
 
The University of Waikato 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Political Science and Public Policy 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 
 New Zealand  
Phone: +64 7 8563385, +64 210 2919013, 0721530738 
Email: jwn5@waikato.ac.nz, njagij@yahoo.com 
Background:  
I am a PhD student in Political Science and Public Policy at the University of 
Waikato.  I am currently undertaking research to complete my doctoral thesis, 
which focuses on abortion in Kenya. Various groups and individuals have been 
involved in debates on how to deal with the abortion issue. This research seeks to 
examine how abortion is understood by the Kenyan state and non-state bodies 
including the church, medical professionals and women‟s organisations. It is 
hoped that this study will make a significant contribution towards understanding 
the ongoing debate. 
Interview Process: 
I would like to speak to you about abortion in the country. I am interested in 
hearing about your views on the issue, including about the Kenyan social, 
economic and political contexts that frame abortion. 
The interview will take about 60-90 minutes, depending on the time you have 
available.  I would like to tape-record the interview so that I can obtain an 
accurate record of your views.  
As a participant, you have the choice of being anonymous or not; this will be 
discussed at the start of the interview and again at the end of it. I will not use your 
name or identity in any form in the thesis, unless you give permission.  
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However, I wish to notify you that even when all these will have been done, 
confidentiality may be inadvertently breached with people who may be familiar 
with your opinions and arguments on the issue at hand. I will, on my part, do 
whatever is humanly possible to protect your identity. 
As a participant, the interview transcripts will be made available to you upon 
request. You have the right to clarify any aspect of the information or issue 
discussed in the interview within a period of two months after the interview. 
Any and all information derived from the interview (e.g. audio recordings, written 
transcripts) will be held securely in my university office.  No one except me or my 
supervisors will have access to them.  They will be stored there until the research 
is complete and the PhD thesis has been approved and accepted by the University 
of Waikato.  After this period, these research materials will be stored securely for 
an indefinite period.   
If you agree to take part in this interview, you have the following rights: 
a. to refuse to answer any particular question, or to withdraw from the 
interview at any time, 
b. to ask any further questions about the interview, how it will be 
used, or the research project at any time either during the interview 
or up to a period of 2 months after the interview, 
c. to examine any information you have provided and amend any part 
you wish, and/or request that certain information not be used, up to 
a period of 2 months after the interview, 
d. to withdraw your consent (written or verbal), up to a period of  2 
months, by contacting me at the address above, 
e. to take any complaints you may have about the interview or the 
research project to the University‟s Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences‟ Human Research Ethics Committee (University of 
Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, or you can email its 
secretary, at fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz . 
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f. You may also contact my thesis supervisor at the following address  
Dr. Priya Kurian 
Associate Professor 
Department of Political Science and Public Policy 
Contact phone number: +64 7 838 4466 ext 6109, 
Email: pkurian@waikato.ac.nz 
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Appendix E: Consent Form for In-depth Interviews 
University of Waikato 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Political Science and Public Policy 
 
Topic of Study: Abortion in Kenya 
 
Name of Researcher: Jane Wambui Njagi 
The University of Waikato 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Department of Political Science and Public Policy 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 
 New Zealand  
Phone: +64 7 8563385, +64 210 2919013, 0721530738 
Email: jwn5@waikato.ac.nz, njagij@yahoo.com 
Dear Participant, 
I would like to have an interview with you on abortion in Kenya. Questions will 
focus on the contemporary issues around abortion in Kenya. The interview will 
take approximately 60-90 minutes.  I would like to tape-record the in-depth 
interview so that I can obtain an accurate record of your views.  
The data (tapes and transcripts) obtained from this research will be used in my 
PhD thesis although there may be occasions where aspects of it will be used for 
publication in academic journals, books, media reports or at conferences.   
As a participant, you are given the choice of being anonymous or not. Your full 
name will only be required once, when you sign this consent form. You will have 
the right to refuse to answer any particular questions, withdraw participation at 
any time during the interview, and up to two months from the date of the 
interview. You will also be entitled to ask any questions either during the 
discussion or at any other time. Further, I will be willing to send to you the 
interview transcripts and/or a summary of the results of the study, if you wish 
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This research project has been given approval by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the University‟s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. You may 
contact the committee at the following email address: fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz. 
“I would like to be identified in the data collected for this doctoral research 
project” 
YES NO (Please circle one) 
I would like to have a pseudo-nym 
YES NO (Please circle one)  
If yes, please print your chosen name  
If would like to receive a copy of the transcript, 
 
please print your email address here:  
If you would like to receive a summary of the results of this study,  
 
please print your email address here: 
 
“I have read and understood this information and I consent to take part in the 
study”  
Name: Interviewee: ________________Signed: Interviewee: 
_____________Date: ______ 
“I agree to abide by the above conditions” 
Name: Interviewer: ________________Signed: Interviewer: 
_____________Date: ______ 
 
Thank you again.  Your time and input are appreciated very much.  
